It is
just such a task that Mark Taylor, professor of religion at Columbia University
and author of some two dozen scholarly and not-so-scholarly books, sets himself
in Seeing Silence, a glowing melange of philosophy, theology, and art
criticism. Taylor, however, poses the question differently. He does not so much
throw suspicion on the realist motive as he pulls the rug of the Real from
under realism, thus forcing us to ask: “How does one see what cannot be seen,
speak what cannot be said, hear what remains silent? How is it possible to
figure the void?” For Taylor then, the reality of the realist is secondary to
the unconceptualizable, unrepresentable void that underlies and makes it
possible: “Far from a mere lack, this void, like the silence between words, is
what makes the articulation of all forms and appearances possible.”
Seeing
Silence is ostensibly a lively meditation on silence — our vexed relation to it
and our vexed attempts to figure, master, and humble ourselves before it. Yet,
as one reads on, faced with the soft torrent of materials and Taylor’s
mantra-like interjections — “Does black consume red, or does red overcome
black?”, “How do you listen to light listening?”, “Pause. Pause once again to
ponder. Ponder a lingering question: What color is silence? Perhaps white?
Perhaps black?” — one finds oneself somewhat vertiginously at sea. Taylor’s
koanlike “silence” is not merely the familiar quiet, the quiet of negation,
when no one is speaking and nothing is making a sound, and so it is not clear
how or to what purpose we are to ponder it.
Our
minds are rigorously engaged, yet despite Taylor’s imposing (never forbidding)
learnedness, we are obviously not being asked merely to learn or think.
Intellection is persistently qualified and set against a more primitive or
primal contact with the world: “Education does not begin and end with ideas,
but requires something deeper, something more profound that can be taught only
through physical labor and bodily discipline.” As though introducing us to a
friend about whom we have heard many charming things, Taylor plays the role of
spiritual-aesthetic matchmaker, saying just enough to kindle the relation — yet
the lover we are provided is, as Taylor quotes from the doomed knight in
Bergman’s The Seventh Seal, like “someone who is out there in the darkness but
never appears, no matter how loudly you call.”
Of
course, the works — the beads of fascination strung together on the
incandescent thread of the author’s own life and peregrinating passion — do
appear one after another, conjuring a kind of postmodern performance piece in
our minds: John Cage on a stage playing nothing, while a retro slide projector
flings before us black-and-white images of abstract expressionist and
minimalist masterpieces and a man dressed as Heidegger intones, “If the holding
is done by the jug’s void, then the potter who forms the sides and bottom on
his wheel does not, strictly speaking, make the jug. He only shapes the clay.
No — he shapes the void.” I do not tease lightheartedly, for Taylor’s book is a
trenchant and perspicuous effort to probe what matters in unabashedly
indeterminate terms, refusing to reduce the aesthetic and spiritual dimensions
of human experience to politics, history, morality, or unequivocally statable
truths. In this, Taylor rises fully to the occasion of the negative half of the
Nietzschean ultimatum he sets himself: to engage with life not as one seeking
to correct or render it transparently knowable.
The
positive, however, is more elusive — both for Nietzsche himself and Taylor —
and it is here that we run up against the temptation to satirize, for the
pursuit to lay bare life’s imperiled seriousness necessarily risks a kind of
comic self-seriousness or mawkish affectation. Taylor concludes his
introductory Chapter Zero with a question that recurs throughout, providing a
single flame to entrance, to meditatively congeal, the otherwise amorphous
array of artists and thinkers: “The question that lingers after (the) all has
been said is: can the Via Dolorosa also be a Via Jubilosa?” In plain terms, we
might put it thus: how to be properly serious — to hold oneself existentially
accountable — without becoming pathologically glum? Can one engage in rigorous
self-scrutiny without lapsing into self-laceration, viewing oneself always with
a certain levity and creative freedom? In religious terms, the question is: how
to believe in God, to protect what is sacred, after the death of God and Truth
and just about every norm-governed institution of meaning? How then to believe
in God without, as it were, believing in God? — what to do when unbelief is as
unattainable as belief? Taylor’s response is to turn to the cryptic origin of
the work of art, cryptic in the sense also of “crypt,” a concept-image that
Taylor borrows from Derrida to conjure that which surpasses the logic of both
either/or and neither/nor: “The crypt within the self is the silence tolling in
every word and the fertile matrix of the most profound works of art.”
Taylor’s
philosophical venture begins among the ruins of Hegel’s dream of absolute
knowledge, a perfectly rational synthesis (overcoming) of subject and object.
The Hegelian system signaled the zenith of Western thought’s suppression of
silence. For Kant, the refractory “thing-in-itself” forced reason to redound
critically upon itself, curtailing its metaphysical presumptions and
appreciating the limits not merely of the knowable but of what knowledge is and
the satisfaction it can ultimately afford us. Hegel, by contrast, made it his
“philosophical mission … to break this silence by allowing the world to speak.
Toward this end, he translates Kant’s subjective idealism into absolute
idealism in which mind and world are isomorphic … in which everything and
everyone become completely comprehensible.”
Though
Taylor fundamentally objects to Hegel’s totalizing rationalism, it nevertheless
plays a rather crucial negativerole in his account. For when Taylor asserts
that “there is always an overlooked, exceeded, repressed remainder that cannot
be articulated and, thus, forever remains silent,” he reinforces the Hegelian
picture of the known world even as he qualifies it. Thus, “the unsayable,
unnameable, unfigurable” which Taylor treasures is in fact dependent on the
articulable rationality it spurns. In other words, what is namable — the world
continuously present to our senses — is largely ceded to reason, while the
devout artist sets up camp elsewhere, where “the Real [is] a distant Beyond
that can be approached, if at all, only negatively.” Taylor sums it up thus:
“Phenomenology is the study of the appearance of phenomena, but how does one
study, ponder, reflect on what does not appear?” My complaint is that Taylor is
a bit hasty in presuming to draw the line between what does and does not
appear. Phenomenology, after all, is not the study of appearance in the sense
of appearance as opposed to hidden reality; it pursues a level of experience
that is deeper than (and prior to) the rational recasting of the experiential
relation in terms of, on the one hand, a perceptual mechanism and, on the
other, the data with which the objective world furnishes it.
Let us
return now to the realist predicament with which we began. Although Taylor does
not grapple directly with questions of genre, his fascination with (the
impossibility of) figuring silence persistently nips at the heels of the
age-old problematic of representation and its discontents (Taylor confines
himself to just the discontents). The artists with which Taylor concerns
himself, in a sense, are realists of the direst mold; they chase a pure
realism, one that punctures and ultimately wishes to bypass aesthetic artifice
in the hope of turning perception back on itself. As the book traces its
“infinite conversation” from John Cage’s provocative 4’33”, a work that forces
one to attend to the “ambient noise that usually is repressed,” through James
Turrell’s sensory deprivation installations in which we discover “how the
absenceof sound and light make hearing and seeing possible,” to Michael
Heizer’s Double Negative, a 240,000-ton incision made on Mormon Mesa that
suggests “a haunting anonymity, a terrifying impersonality, an inhuman intelligence,”
one arrives at a somewhat inverted sense of creation. The task of the artist is
not so much to add as to strip away, revealing a world that is already a work
of art — shattering the petrified opulence that hijacks perception and drives
subject and object irreparably apart. Such, I take it, is the danger Taylor
sees in the contemporary world’s feverish need for ever more noise, speed, and
virtuality.
Thus,
the abandonment of representation, the splintering of literal realism into a
shepherdless flock of avant-garde black sheep, need not signify mere fatigue, a
generation of Solomonic disciples for whom there is nothing new under the sun
to do or see and thus nothing worth representing. Rather, “the Real” has
revealed itself as interstitial, just beyond the pale of visible forms and
hearable words, predicated on a lacuna. Of Barnett Newman’s Vir Heroicus
Sublimis, Taylor writes:
“When viewed at close range, the
painting engulfs you in a red glow where all distinctions and differences dissolve
… Subject and object disappear to create a sense of at-onement. In this way,
Vir Heroicus Sublimis becomes, impossibly, the experience of what I, or more
precisely the I, cannot experience. Rather than the attempted representation of
the sublime as in a Turner seascape, for Newman, the ‘experience’ of the
sublime occurs in the painting itself. The painting, in other words, is an
event, a happening.”
Although
such descriptions give the reader a pleasantly impressionistic sense of the
majesty of such works, one begins to wonder how Taylor conceives of the
relation between his words and what he describes. If, as he says, “the pure
black or white surface cannot be translated without leaving an inexpressible
remainder,” then the philosopher or critic is somewhat distastefully positioned
against what is meaningful, bringing to light the sacred remainder only by
partaking verbally in the limited whole from which it is excluded. And so, it
is not quite clear just what Taylor’s many suggestive aporias — absence that is
presence, withdrawal that is approach, silence that is seeable, silence deeper
than silence, voids that make plenitude possible — ultimately are meant to
mean, what role they are to play in our lives, intellectual or otherwise.
Of
Ellsworth Kelly’s chapel “Austin,” Taylor dramatically concludes: “In this
space, the Via Dolorosa becomes the Via Jubilosa. Neither beyond nor within,
neither above nor below, neither circumscribed nor limited to a place set
apart, the sacred is all around us. To follow the stages on life’s way Kelly
charts is to come through the dark night of the soul and to discover gaiety,
gladness, joy — perhaps even hope.”
This may
be true of the world suspended within Kelly’s chapel of light, but in what
manner does this omnipresent sacredness persist elsewhere and otherwise?
Taylor’s insistence on the experiential, his vehement sense of art’s capacity
not merely to shed light greedily on itself but to generously purify
“experience itself,” risks the sacrifice of specific experience — the
unassimilable particularity of the work of art — to a disappointingly generic
mystical whole. That is to say, there is a danger of absolutizing the work of
the artist, until little remains to distinguish art from any other human activity,
and so the figure of the supremely meaningful, the sacred, becomes diffuse,
lacking the necessary contrast with ordinary, profane life.
Or
perhaps I am the fly who simply will not leave the bottle, one of the
disparagers of contentment to whom Taylor puts his question: “Why is despair
profound but joy superficial?”
On Seeing Silence by Mark C. Taylor. By Daniel
Schwartz. On the Seawall, January 5,
2021.
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