Showing posts with label symbolism. Show all posts
Showing posts with label symbolism. Show all posts

29/03/2020

Joris-Karl Huysmans, Art Critic




Nineteenth-century​ French art, and French artists, were fortunate to have the backing of some of the best writers of the day. Stendhal, Baudelaire, Gautier, Goncourt, Zola, Maupassant, Huysmans and Mallarmé all doubled up as art critics. (The bullish Courbet took on both tasks: doing the work and the self-promotion.) It helped that there were extraordinary new artists to support, as well as a hulking and immobile target to attack: the annual Salon. The Académie des Beaux-Arts organised it, controlled who and what was shown, awarded prizes and public commissions. The thousands of artworks were all for sale: this was, as Huysmans put it, an ‘official bazaar of art’, the ‘Stock Exchange for oils on the Champs-Elysées’, the ‘temple of Offcuts’ from ‘the state-run farms of the Academy’. It also controlled, both implicitly and explicitly, what and how a painter was expected to paint. There was an established hierarchy of subject matter: high solemnity and low sentimentality were applauded; imagination should be orderly; finish was preferred to vivacity. You could say that all Salon pictures were still lifes, even a picture of a heroic battle or a portrait of Victor Hugo – perhaps especially a portrait of Victor Hugo, whose marmoreal fame had turned him into a still life already.

This is not, of course, as simple or monumental a story as the professional insiders v. the excluded rebels. Artists, even the most rule-breaking, often enjoy acclaim just as much as diligent hacks: they want to offend but they also want to be accepted. Delacroix kept trying to get elected to the Institut de France (to Baudelaire’s bafflement), succeeding at the seventh attempt, while a number of the Impressionists showed – or tried to show – at the Salon. The second half of the 19th century saw active and well-publicised breakaways: the famous Salon des Refusés, established in 1863; and, from 1874 onwards, the Independent exhibitions, of which there were eight. But even so, there was a surprising amount of overlap. Renoir and Monet turned up on the Salon’s walls; and Manet, despite being one of the Refused in 1863, played a double game, continuing to submit and show pictures long after the new painters had their own outlet. That Manet’s Bar at the Folies-Bergère, which nowadays seems one of the quintessential Impressionist paintings, was first shown (along with a Manet portrait) at the Salon of 1882 comes as a genuine shock. But then Olympia had enraged the Salon-goers back in 1865.

Nor did the modernist writers who supported the modernist painters prove unfailing, either in support or in judgment. Baudelaire believed that the painter of modern life was Constantin Guys; Zola seemed to regard painters as the provisional wing of prose naturalism, preferring them not to stray into trivial or unhelpful subject matter: he dismissed Degas as ‘nothing more than a constipated artist with a talent for the pretty’. The wildest, funniest and most violent of the writer-critics was Joris-Karl Huysmans (1848-1907), who began his moral career as a degenerate and Satanist and ended up a pious Catholic. He had a day job for thirty years with the Paris Sûreté, while also holding down night jobs as an art critic and as a novelist of Zola’s naturalist school. French journalism at the time was a largely unpoliced zone, with libel laws very weak, which allowed Huysmans to express the full scale of his rage and contempt. As Anita Brookner put it, ‘his judgments on his contemporaries were not unlike the humours of an invalid, his view of the world as subjective as that of a patient in a hospital bed.’ His misanthropy gave him much less pleasure then than it does us now.




Huysmans reviewed the Salons of 1879-82 and the Independent Exhibitions of 1880-82 at considerable length. His articles, collected as L’Art moderne (1883), have never before been translated into English, probably because he is the least known of the writer-critics, and his French is often not straightforward. Robert Baldick, biographer of Huysmans (1955) and translator of his most famous novel, À Rebours, described his style as ‘one of the strangest literary idioms in existence’. Léon Bloy, a fellow writer and fellow Catholic, described it as ‘continually dragging Mother Image by the hair or the feet down the wormeaten staircase of terrified Syntax’. Brendan King, who has already translated most of Huysmans’s fiction, has produced an excellent version. Rarely can it have been such fun to read translated denunciations of so many forgotten French pictures. The edition also includes scores of small black and white illustrations, which can easily be Googled into colour. Try, for example, Peder Kroyer’s Female Sardine Worker of Concarneau, from the 1880 Salon. A young woman sits in profile: sabots on her feet, muslin cap on her head, red scarf over her shoulders, yellowing apron. She is in a large shed, surrounded by other women, and working her way through an endless pile of sardines. Her resigned expression suggests that she already sees her life stretching ahead of her in terms of gutted fish. It is a truthful and tender picture, and as a rare image of a female industrial production line it would undoubtedly have had Zola’s approval. Huysmans gives it half a line and the adjective ‘pleasing’.


In old age, Huysmans largely turned his back on what he called ‘all that literary jiggery-pokery’. He became the first president of the Académie Goncourt in 1900, but was simultaneously an oblate at the Benedictine abbey of Ligugé near Poitiers. This spiritual seclusion fulfilled half of a famous prophecy made by the (Catholic) novelist Barbey d’Aurevilly after Huysmans published À Rebours in 1884. Barbey said that the future for Huysmans lay in a choice between ‘the muzzle of a revolver’ and ‘the foot of the Cross’. Now, as an oblate, he had to have the prior’s permission to come up to Paris on literary business. One of his fellow academicians, the novelist Joseph Rosny, remembered that ‘Huysmans behaved towards the members of the Academy like an old gentleman brimming over with consideration and respect. He seemed to have grown more compassionate, and he took a brotherly interest in our work.’

Such mellowness and charity – perhaps attributable to the Church – would have come as a surprise to those who had known him in earlier times. Léon Daudet, also one of the first ten academicians, left a rather different description of Huysmans in his memoir Fantômes et Vivantes:

      “ He was as silent and grave as a bird of the night. Slender and slightly stooped, he had a beaky nose, deep-set eyes, sparse hair, a long and sinuous mouth hidden beneath a floppy moustache; his skin was grey and he had the delicate hands of a jewellery engraver. His conversation, normally of a crepuscular nature, consisted entirely of outbursts of disgust, sickened as he was by the things and people of his time, which he cursed and execrated: everything from the decline of cooking and the rise of readymade sauces to the shape of hats. On cue he would vomit out his century, through which he ran shivering: skinless, squirming at every contact and every atmosphere he encountered, at the stupidity he was surrounded by, at both banality and feigned originality, at anticlericalism and bigotry, at architecture put up by engineers and at bien-pensant sculpture, at the Eiffel Tower and the religious imagery of the Saint-Sulpice quarter ... Most critics writing about him have based their approach on his Flemish origins, and treated him as a painter of interiors, in the style of the greater and lesser painters of the North; but within him there was also a ferociously cocky Parisian, quick and colourful in his judgments, and first-rate in irritability.”

Huysmans was a great hater of falsity: of models clothed from the costumier’s dressing-up box and pretending to be Joan of Arc while looking entirely contemporary; of nudes (such as those by Bouguereau) which didn’t look at all like naked women – ‘a kind of gaseous painting ... not even porcelain ... soft octopus flesh ... like a badly inflated balloon’. (For Huysmans, only Rembrandt had ever painted truthful nudes.) He hated landscape artists ‘whose brushes move of their own accord’ and vast military pictures offering up ‘a frozen purée of combatants’. For one so sensitive and so irritable, reviewing the Salon must have been a secular martyrdom. The 1879 Salon was ‘a heap of crackbrained nonsense’: of its 3040 pictures ‘not a hundred are worth looking at’ and the other 2940 were ‘certainly inferior to the advertising posters on the walls of our streets and on the pissoirs of our boulevards’. His account of the 1882 Salon begins: ‘Once you’ve seen one Salon, you’ve seen them all.’ If the Impressionists, in their shifting composition and nomenclature, were also known as the Independents and the Intransigents, Huysmans is the most intransigeant critic of the age. At times it almost makes you feel sorry for that modestly talented, modestly ambitious young or middle-aged painter hoping that their picture wouldn’t be hung too high, that their version of landscape or history will catch the acquisitive eye of a passing visitor, that they themselves may find favour with the high chiefs of official art and – one day – win a medal and thus be exempt from the selection process for the rest of their painting life. Almost.

Huysmans loathes Salon stalwarts like Léon Bonnat (‘never has a more belaboured, more pitiful painting come off the dull trowel of that mixer of mortar who goes by the name of Bonnat’), whose influence as juror at the Salon and teacher at the Académie had deformed generations of young painters; or Gérôme, with his glossy, influential, ‘oft-repeated nonsense’; or Henri Gervex, who started promisingly but flopped back into conventionality. As Daudet pointed out, he was enraged by ‘feigned originality’ such as the ‘fake modernity’ of Jules Bastien-Lepage, a ‘prudent rebel’ who was no more than ‘a sly fellow-traveller of modernism’. Huysmans salutes a heroic military picture – a sapper pointing heaven out to a dying rifleman – as ‘the most powerful disinfectant I know for spleen, and I recommend it to anyone who has difficulty laughing’. He invents categories of badness for painters: there are the ‘couturiers’, who paint clothes rather than character, the ‘vaudevillistes’ with pretensions to wit, and the self-explanatory ‘weepies’. The fundamental failure of Salon painters was their refusal to paint what was in front of them, their sheer inability to see, for instance, that ‘the trees growing in Paris are not the same as those growing in the countryside.’ In 1879, Bastien-Lepage exhibited October: Gathering Potatoes, which features a female potato-picker, pretty, genteel and ‘lethargic’, straight out of the studio models’ listings, a suspicion of make-up on her cheeks. With grouchy pedantry, Huysmans points out that ‘the hands of his peasant aren’t the hands of a woman who delves in mud, they’re the hands of my maid, who dusts as little as possible and who barely even does the washing up.’ Contrast this with the way Degas portrays his ballet dancers. ‘Here,’ Huysmans writes, ‘there’s no smooth creamy flesh, no silky gossamer skin, but real powdered flesh, the painted flesh of the theatre and the bedchamber, just as it is, like flannelette, with its veiny granularity when seen up close, and its unhealthy sheen when seen from a distance.’

At root, truth to life in painting is truth to light. Huysmans – of Dutch origin – is extremely sensitive to its representation, and misrepresentation. And in his view French painters had long stopped looking at light as it is. Instead, they automatically imported the illumination of the old masters, with Dutch, Italian or Spanish light unthinkingly transplanted into Parisian scenes. But Dutch light, governed as it is by the proximity of the sea, of canals and rising mists, then filtered through narrow sash windows with small square panes, was ‘absolutely ridiculous in Paris, in the year of grace 1880’, where the only canals are street gutters, and the drawing rooms have ‘large casement windows and clean panes with neither bubbles nor imperfections’. In another lying stratagem, painters applied ‘standard’ daylight as taught by the Académie: manoeuvring curtains on poles until you get the same bland effect ‘whether it’s supposed to be on the ground floor, in a courtyard, or on the fifth floor of a boulevard, whether in rooms that are bare or upholstered in fabrics, lit by a candle or by stained glass’. Similarly, landscapists may go out into the countryside and sketch accurately, but then return to the studio and give their pictures the same light ‘regardless of season, whether it’s midday or five o’clock in the evening, whether the sky is clear or overcast’. Jean Béraud paints a night-time scene of an open-air ball lit by circular gaslight bowls: the problem is that ‘Béraud has never, and I mean never, even noticed the pale green of leaves when lit from below, or the harsh brilliance of skies above the fierce gleam of gaslight.’ As for Bonnat’s portrait of Victor Hugo, ‘the lighting is, as usual, mad.’




Highly entertaining though all this is, we don’t read Modern Art for its caustic denunciations – especially as few of those taunted by Huysmans have ever made much of a comeback. We read it for the speed and accuracy with which he identified and championed the new painters who in his view – and posterity’s – would supplant them. Given his central concern with light, it’s clear that Huysmans was the ideal critic to welcome the Impressionists. ‘The new school proclaimed this scientific truth: that broad daylight fades colours, that shadows and colours, of a house or a tree, for example, painted in an enclosed room, differ absolutely from the shadows and colours of a house or a tree painted under the selfsame sky in the open air.’ Of Caillebotte’s Interior, Woman at the Window he writes: ‘That supreme quality of art, life, exudes from this canvas with an intensity that is really incredible; added to which ... it’s here that one should see it, the light of Paris, in an apartment located on a street, the light deadened by window hangings, filtered by thin muslin curtains.’ Of the still-lifers, Huysmans asks: ‘Where is the artist who, instead of making his objects or his flowers stand out as bright spots against a sombre background, has painted them simply, in the open air and in full daylight? ... The only previous attempts to have been dared were those of M. Manet, who pulled off some paintings of flowers in real daylight.’

And as they took back control of their native French light, the new painters also took back control of subject matter. The longstanding hierarchy laid down by the Académie was now completely discarded. None of those old gods and nymphs, those ancient and Christian myths, those ‘noble’ history paintings, and so on. Flaubert had written that ‘everything in art depends on the execution: the story of a louse can be as fine as the history of Alexander the Great.’ Now, in 1880, the year of Flaubert’s death, as if in homage, Huysmans writes: ‘It’s ... quite useless to choose subjects that are said to be more “elevated” than others, because subjects are nothing in themselves. Everything depends on the way they are treated.’ Even so, theory and practice don’t always accord. A couple of pages later, Huysmans is denouncing a ‘democratic and liberal still life’ of a politician’s desk as unacceptable subject matter, as a ‘monstrosity’: ‘When will we see Robespierre’s chamber pot or Marat’s bidet in the Salon? When, supposing a change of government comes about, will we see Louis-Philippe’s umbrella, Napoleon’s catheter, or Chambord’s hernia pads?’ As for Flaubert: in 1877, writing to Turgenev, he dismissed the Impressionists as ‘a bunch of jokesters, trying to delude themselves and us into believing that they have discovered the Mediterranean’.

And yet – and happily – the story is more complicated than we might have expected. It isn’t the case that everything suddenly changed for Huysmans and the avant-garde trainspotters the day Monet painted Impression, Sunrise. He didn’t write about the first four Independent shows, but it’s clear that at first the Impressionists didn’t make much of an impression on him. He saw their opening group show at Nadar’s photography studio in 1874 and then their second one at Durand-Ruel’s gallery in 1875. And what he found on display were ‘touching follies’ that should be examined not aesthetically but as ‘a matter of physiology and medicine’. The painters were suffering from ‘monomania’: one would see intense blue in everything, another purple, tingeing everything with lilac and aubergine. Green disappeared from their palettes, as it did for patients suffering from atrophy of the nerve fibres in the eye. ‘Ultimately, most of them would have confirmed Dr Charcot’s experiments on the deterioration of colour perception, which he’d observed in many hysterics in the Salpêtrière hospital.’ Colour theory (or at least colour thought) is reduced to a retinal disorder – as it would be by others who attacked the Impressionists in subsequent decades. Le Figaro agreed with the diagnosis of monomania. Of the 1874 show, it wrote that the new painters merely flung a few colours together and imagined the result a masterpiece ‘in the same way that lost souls in the Ville-Évrard insane asylum pick up a pebble in the road and imagine that it’s a diamond. A frightful spectacle of human vanity straying into dementia.’

What happened over the next few years, in Huysmans’s analysis, was that painters like Monet and Pissarro jumped ‘from bad to good’. Pissarro started off painting ‘vague motley-coloured canvases’, then developed into ‘a landscape artist of talent at times, but often unhinged, a man who either gets it completely wrong or else calmly paints a very beautiful work’. Monet seemed at first to be a ‘stammering’, ‘unmethodical’ and ‘hasty’ painter, his Impressionism ‘the poorly hatched egg of realism’, ‘painting left in a rudimentary and confused state’, and Huysmans lost interest in him. But then Monet’s eye was ‘cured’, whereupon he grasped ‘all the phenomena of light’, emerging, in the critic’s final judgment, as ‘a seascape artist par excellence’. Even Caillebotte, whom Huysmans came to rate straightforwardly as ‘a great painter’, started off suffering from ‘indigomania’. But ‘after being cruelly afflicted, this artist has cured himself and, apart from one or two relapses, he seems to have finally managed to clarify his eye.’ However, it’s not at all apparent how such ‘clarification’ took place: was it the result of hard work, or of a knock on the head? Which leaves us with an alternative explanation: that after several years of looking at Impressionist pictures, Huysmans managed to clarify his eye, and came to understand the revolution that had been taking place. There is also the overlapping matter of personal taste: Huysmans never came round to the fluffier, white-dabbing aspect of Impressionism.

This is clear from his attitude to the movement’s two women painters, Berthe Morisot and Mary Cassatt. Malely, he describes the first as Manet’s pupil and the second as Degas’s – true in neither case. Morisot was one of the founder Impressionists of 1874 and Huysmans barely has an unpatronising word to say about her. The ‘unfinished’ sketches she shows at the 1880 Independent show are ‘a chic jumble of white and pink’; the following year she ‘limits herself to improvisations too summary and too constantly repeated without the slightest variation’, while being ‘one of the few painters who understand the adorable delights of the fashionable woman’s toilette’. In 1882: ‘If it were a dinner, her painting would always be the same insubstantial vanilla meringue dessert!’ Whereas Cassatt – whom he sees, oddly, as ‘a student of the English painters’ – has emerged as ‘an artist ... who owes nothing to anyone, a wholly spontaneous, wholly original artist’. She paints babies – which normally give Huysmans ‘the shivers’ – with a ‘delicious tenderness’ and ‘manages to extract from Paris what none of our painters know how to express: the joyous quietude, the calm good-naturedness of an interior’.

In sum, he finds Cassatt ‘more balanced, more tranquil, more intelligent’ than Morisot, and this explains some of the basis of his taste. He is interested in light and a democracy of subject matter and a truthful eye. He is less interested in the ‘irrational’ fragmentation of colour and the fleeting impression. It’s also the case that he applauded many non-Impressionists just as loudly. He greatly admired Moreau and Redon (not only in these essays – he devoted half a chapter to them in À Rebours), as well as Fantin-Latour and Raffaëlli. Writing of Christoffel Bisschop’s The Eternal Giveth, the Eternal Taketh Away, a Dutch picture in the 1880 Salon of a grieving mother, an empty cradle and a sympathetic onlooker, he praises its un-Frenchness, its sobriety, its refusal to direct our emotions. ‘By force of good faith M. Bisschop isn’t ridiculous for a second.’ To my eye it looks pious and mock-medieval. Huysmans compares it to a Vermeer: ‘It’s a luminous painting ... highly finished and very spacious.’ That ‘highly finished’ is significant. The average Salon picture was, of course, also highly finished, but highly wrongly finished.

Félix​ Fénéon described Huysmans as ‘the inventor of Impressionism’. ‘Endorser’ might be better (we shouldn’t allow critics too much power). But his one enduring claim to fame is that he was the first person to see Degas as the greatest painter of the age, ‘the one who has remained the boldest and the most original’. Huysmans first came across him in 1876, when he’d shown two pictures of ballet dancers:

        “”The joy I experienced then, wholly boyish, has since increased with each exhibition in which Degas has featured ... A painter of modern life has been born, and a painter who doesn’t derive from anyone, who doesn’t resemble anyone, who brings a whole new flavour to art, wholly new techniques of execution. Washerwomen in their shops, dancers at their rehearsals, café-concert singers, theatre scenes, racehorses, portraits, American cotton merchants, the paraphernalia of bedrooms and theatre boxes, all these divers subjects have been treated by this artist, who nevertheless has acquired a reputation for only painting dancers! “

‘What truth! What life!’ Huysmans exclaims. This is not – or not only – the response of a sophisticated connoisseur: it is simple, ‘boyish’ awe. ‘What a study of the effect of light!’ What an ability to ‘forge neologisms of colour ... and what a definitive abandonment of all the techniques of light and shade, of all the old impostures of tones’. Look at the artist’s portrait of Edmond Duranty: ‘Up close, it’s a slashing crosshatch of colours that clash against each other, that seem to overlap each other; at the distance of a few steps, all this harmonises itself and melts into the precise tone of flesh, of flesh that breathes, that lives, and that nobody in France has known how to do until now.’ Again: ‘No painter since Delacroix – whom he’s studied for a long time and who is his true master – has understood the marriage and the adultery of colours like M. Degas; no one today has a drawing style so precise and so broad, a touch for colouring so delicate ... When will it be understood that this artist is the greatest we have today in France?’ ‘The marriage and the adultery of colours’ – this wonderful phrase takes us back to a scene in Maxime Du Camp’s memoirs, of Delacroix spending an evening bent over a basket filled with skeins of wool, picking them up, grouping them, placing them against one another, separating them shade by shade, and ‘producing extraordinary effects of colour’.





And then, only a year later, Degas strikes again. Huysmans had long been of the opinion that French sculpture was even more moribund than French painting, locked into old forms, old techniques and old materials. A tradition which Degas demolished with a single work in the 1881 Independent show, The Little 14-Year-Old Dancer, before which ‘a confused public has fled, as if in embarrassment’. Huysmans declared that Degas had ‘immediately made sculpture completely individual, completely modern’. A painted head, a corsage of kneaded wax, skirts of muslin, a leek-green ribbon at the neck and real hair: ‘At once refined and barbarous in her machine-made costume and her coloured flesh which palpitates, furrowed by the working of the muscles, this statuette is the only real attempt at sculpture I know of.’ And because of such profound originality, he concludes, ‘I have strong doubts that it will obtain even the slightest success.’

Huysmans isn’t the sort of critic who latches onto a new movement and applauds slavishly as a way of applauding himself. His doubts and vacillations make him the more interesting, and he is inclined to be schoolmasterly. At the Seventh Independent exhibition, Gauguin, whom he had been the first to notice favourably, is ticked off (‘No progress, alas’); Morisot likewise (‘Always the same’). He can misread paintings. At the same show, Renoir – ‘a gallant and adventurous charmer’ – offers the public the still charming and ever popular Lunch in Bougival. ‘A few of his boatmen are good, some, among his women, are charming, but the painting doesn’t smell strong enough,’ Huysmans decides. ‘His whores are chic and merry, but they don’t give off the odour of a Parisian whore; these are springtime whores freshly disembarked from London.’

Throughout Modern Art, Huysmans is unwavering in his insistence that women should look like women – that’s to say, the women they are meant to represent. Don’t just dress up a model; don’t show potato-pickers with the unblemished hands of a lazy housemaid; and above all – Huysmans is rather obsessed with this subject – show whores as they are. This is an echo of Huysmans the prose naturalist, and the unforgiving view at least displays commitment. The only problem with his disparagement of Lunch in Bougival is that the participants aren’t in fact boatmen with native – or even imported – whores: they are a group of Renoir’s friends, including Caillebotte and the poet Laforgue, entertaining some well-known actresses, including Renoir’s future wife.

By the time Huysmans saw the Salon and Independent shows of 1882 he had become bomb-happy and trench-weary. Gervex received his annual instruction to put on the dunce’s cap for painting ‘tall coalmen scrubbed clean with herbal soap’. But Huysmans was also getting grumpy with those he had previously praised. Despite having admired Sargent’s ‘soft and dreamy’ portrait of Carolus-Duran, he loathed the crowd-pleasing swagger and ‘turbulent pastiche’ of his El Jaleo, which still pleases crowds at the Frick. His staunch admiration for Fantin-Latour is now tempered: the ‘portraits are superb but will never change’. But his most surprising response is to Manet’s masterpiece Bar at the Folies-Bergère. Huysmans had already expressed the view that Manet ‘remains incomplete’ as a painter and that some of his work is ‘going downhill’; here he praises the modernity of the subject, the ‘ingenious’ placing of the bar-girl and the liveliness of the crowd. The problem is that old and essential one, the quality of the light:

   “ What’s the meaning of that lighting? Is that supposed to be gaslight or electric light? Come off it! It’s as if it was set in the open air, it’s bathed in pale daylight! As a result, everything collapses – the Folies-Bergère only exists, and can only exist in the evening, so however knowing and sophisticated the painting is it’s absurd. It’s really deplorable to see a man of M. Manet’s quality sacrificing himself to such subterfuges and, to be blunt, making a painting as conventional as those of everyone else.”

Time to retire? Time to admit, at least, that the implacable aesthetic which impelled the critic to such cheering rage against the Salon needs to be adjusted to take in all the stretchings and loosenings and formal developments of the new art. (So he doesn’t confront Manet’s unrealism in all the ‘impossible’ mirrorings behind the bar girl.) Art moves on; portrayal of light moves on; ‘finish’ moves on. But the irony here is that within two years Huysmans would himself be publishing his own great act of disobedience to Zola’s school of realism: his unruly masterpiece, his ‘wild and gloomy fantasy’, as he called it, À Rebours.

Robespierre’s Chamber Pot. By Julian Barnes. London Review of Books , March 22,  2020





Few late nineteenth-century art critics were more clearly on the right side of history than the early J.-K. Huysmans. For to read his essay on the “Exhibition of the Independents in 1880” is to discover in retrospect an anticipation of the twentieth century’s aesthetic preferences:

When will the high place that [Degas] should occupy in contemporary art be recognised? I am not a prophet, but if I judge by the ineptitude of the enlightened classes – who after having reviled Delacroix for so long still don’t even suspect that Baudelaire is the poet of genius of the 19th century, that he is head and shoulders above everyone else, including Hugo, and that the masterpiece of the modern novel is Gustave Flaubert’s Sentimental Education, even though literature is supposedly the art most accessible to the masses – I can well believe that this truth about M. Degas, which I am the only person to write today, will probably not be recognised as such for many, many years.

In privileging Degas over Manet, Huysmans was already distancing himself from his Naturalist maître, Zola. That journey was to be completed the following year with the publication of his most famous work, the novel À rebours (Against Nature), which also marks an art-historical shift in the Symbolist direction of Gustave Moreau and Odilon Redon, and away from the quest for modern life embodied in his accounts of exhibitions of Impressionist refusés in 1880, 1881 and 1882. These essays stand in contradistinction to the vitriol he pours on the official Salons of 1879, 1880, 1881 and 1882. Huysmans cites Baudelaire’s “righteous anger” in order to describe his own taste for iconoclastic polemic which embarrassed his publisher so much that when L’Art moderne finally appeared in May 1873 with Zola’s publisher, Charpentier (also the friend of some of Huysmans’s targets such as Gervex and Bastien-Lepage), the publisher “deliberately dragg[ed] his heels as regards marketing and distributing,” as noted by the able editor, translator and Huysmansophile, Brendan King.

King displays both considerable knowledge and easy humour in the tone of his introduction (“To many critics”, we learn, Impressionist paintings were “the products of artists who were untalented, if not even a bit sick in the head”.) His detailed notes (not without errors in the French) and glossary of artists (which also serves as an index) are useful, but particularly appealing to the reader will be the inclusion, in the main body of the text, of small black-and-white illustrations for a number of the paintings referred to, some taken from the original Salon catalogues.


    Sick in the head. By Nicholas White. Times Literary Supplement , September 6, 2019. 










About Modern Art /  by J.K. Huysmans, translated by Brendan King. Dedalus, 313 pp. February 2019, 978 1 910213 99 5











Flowing through three contiguous galleries along the right-hand mezzanine of the Musée d’Orsay is the stream of consciousness of the novelist and art critic Joris-Karl Huysmans, in the form of the exhibition and installation Joris-Karl Huysmans Art Critic. Acting as a valve on this torrent of images and ideas is another enigmatic aesthetic impresario, the artist Francesco Vezzoli. This is an academic exhibition curated by André Guyaux and Stéphane Guégan, contained within an artwork by Vezzoli. Complicating things further, Vezzoli’s artwork folds in on itself and is based on the writings of Huysmans, primarily his masterpiece À Rebours (Against Nature, 1884). The coordination between artistic fantasy and historical reality, i.e. between Vezzoli and the curatorial team, was deftly juggled by Donatien Grau (who has edited for and contributed to the Brooklyn Rail in the past). Luckily the transition from history to fiction begins with a traditional white box gallery space, so we can get our bearings, and migrates into a final total conceptual piece, via a spell in a sumptuous scarlet house of pleasure designed by Futurist poet Gabriele D’Annunzio (an acolyte of Huysmans). In the final conceptual gesture, Vezzoli fills a single room with multiple paintings based on Matthias Grünewald’s Isenheim altarpiece (1512–16), indicating on the one hand Huysmans’s seemingly inescapable destiny in the arms of some form of spirituality, and on the other the uncomfortably close relationship between dandyish decadence and intense Catholic religious fervor. Like Vezzoli, Huysmans had no problem mixing fact with fiction and peppered his novels with references to real-world writers and artists. The color-coded white, red, and black galleries are filled with the artists Huysmans championed as well as the art works which inspired his fictional character in Against Nature, the Baron des Esseintes. In this, there is a wonderful ambiguity in what the exhibition is attempting to accomplish: illustrate the life of the critic or bring his novel to life? If the viewer understandably balks at this mille-feuille of subtexts and metaphors, the range of works exhibited is truly extraordinary, featuring seminal pieces by Edgar Degas, Eva Gonzalès, Gustave Caillebotte, James Abbott McNeill Whistler, Gustave Moreau, and Odilon Redon, as well as historical documentation, photographs and a jewel-encrusted turtle fabricated by Bulgari.

The tale begins in a series of white galleries introducing the viewer to Huysmans’s initial fascination with naturalism and his overall likes and dislikes. William-Adolphe Bouguereau’s Naissance de Venus (Birth of Venus, 1879) and Fernand Pelez’s La Mort de l’Empereur Commode (The Death of Emperor Commodus, 1879) are presented as examples of the insipid sentimentality that the critic regularly dismissed, while he was lukewarm on Pierre Puvis de Chavannes’s pallid Jeune Filles au bord de la Mer (Girls at the Seaside, 1879) and its ilk. It is hard to discern why the illustrative Jean-François Raffaëlli’s Chiffonnier Allumant sa Pipe (Ragpicker Lights His Pipe, 1884) or Henri Gervex’s soft-core erotic Rolla (1878) was more appealing to the critic, but Huysmans was very nuanced in his definition of naturalism in terms of what he deemed authentic. The Second Impressionist Exhibition of 1876 introduced Huysmans to Degas, and the last two-thirds of the white galleries are devoted primarily to examples of Impressionism, including Degas’s L’Absinthe (1875-76) and Édouard Manet’s Portrait of Irma Brunner (1880). The piercing and dramatic canvas Une Loge au Théâtre des Italiens (A Box at the Italian Theatre, 1874) by Eva Gonzalès, Caillebotte’s Au Café (In a Café, 1880), and several works on paper by Jean-Louis Forain exemplify the critic’s fascination with direct contact between the figures in the image and the viewer, a commingling of the illusory volume of the picture plane and the personal space of the viewer that would emerge in his intensely descriptive novels. Vezzoli’s gentle contribution to the white zone is a modest, embroidered Self-portrait (2019), but it acknowledges the themes of fictional autobiography and role reversal between critic and artist with which Huysmans would engage: Vezzoli’s Self-portrait is a portrait of the artist as a young girl, and while the allure of the piece is one of Vezzoli’s trademark tears in sparkling sequins, the pun lies in an embroidery of an embroiderer (embroidering).

The second, red, gallery joyously begins the process of purposefully confusing the writer with his characters, and the viewer is transported to Huysmans’s alter ego des Esseintes’s obsessively crafted home in the novel Against Nature. D’Annunzio modeled his own home after Huysmans’s detailed description of the protagonist’s house, and Vezzoli has laminated the walls of the gallery in floor-to-ceiling photographs of the decadent paneling and interior decoration of D’Annunzio’s recreation of the fictional domicile. At the entrance to the red gallery are a selection of portraits of poets and dandies (sometimes both simultaneously) who inspired or are referenced in Against Nature: Félix Nadar’s photographic portrait of a pensive Baudelaire (1855), Émile Lévy’s painting of a haughty Jules Barbey D’Aurevilly (1881) and a Giovanni Boldini portrait of a rakish Count Robert de Montesquiou (1897). The Baron des Esseintes spends almost an entire chapter agonizing over two of Moreau’s Salome paintings in Huysmans’s novel, but in this exhibition, we are treated to the painter’s Galatea (c. 1880), its subtext of thwarted love just as applicable. This second phase of the exhibition charts Huysmans’s trajectory from a critic espousing Naturalism to a proponent of Symbolism, while simultaneously following a personal path from agnosticism towards devoted and monastic Catholicism. That personal transformation is mirrored in the selection of works by Redon, which features a dozen of the artist’s surreal black and white lithographs but concludes the red passage of the exhibition with his color pastels Christ au Sacre Coeur (Christ of the Sacred Heart, 1895) and Parsifal (1912). Images not only steeped in Christian mysticism, but iconography as well, objects that, like des Esseintes’s endless catalog of luxurious objects, can be radiant forms, almost as decadent in their depiction as the life-sized, gilt and jewel-encrusted turtle, created by Vezzoli with the jewelers at Bulgari, that sits at the center of the room.




In Against Nature, the protagonist purchases a turtle to pair with the Persian carpet in his study. Not satisfied with the natural appearance of the reptile, he hires a lapidary to encrust his pet with gold and jewels, decoration which in the end crushes the poor creature to death. The figure of Vezzoli’s golden turtle placed center-stage in the red gallery transitions to the gaudy and morbid intensity of the putrid, decomposing, and lacerated flesh of Christ in the three full-sized painted reproductions of Grünewald’s Isenheim altarpiece placed in the exhibition’s final pitch-black chamber. Huysmans called Grünewald “the boldest painter who has ever lived.” In his two pieces about the German master—the first chapter of his novel, Là-Bas (The Damned, 1891), and his description of the painter’s works in Colmar, France from Trois Églises et Trois Primitifs (Three Churches and Three Primitives, 1908)—the author revels, possibly to the point of arousal, in descriptions of blistering tortured skin and the ravages enacted on the Savior. This parallels his earlier obsessions with sensory exactitude in discussions of color, smell, and taste in Against Nature. Vezzoli, who in the red gallery had presented us with a stately pleasure palace of shimmering gold and gemstones, as well as the hallucinatory Moreaus and Redons, has let this voluptuous atmosphere sour into a murky zone of sadomasochistic Catholic pain fetish. It is a rich and satisfying verdict on Huysmans’s life. The writer was able to retire from the French civil service by 1898, at the age of 50, based on the sales of his writings. He had envisioned creating a cloistered monastic community of Catholic artists, which on the surface seems a life of humility and introspection. Vezzoli digs deeper, instead unearthing an erotic trend in the arc of the critic’s life. Huysmans’s early championing of naturalism, seemingly innocent enough, transmogrified into his affair with sensuality, dandyism, and symbolism, and finally ascended to what might be considered a plane of clarity and revelation. In Vezzoli’s eyes, though, Huysmans’s aesthetic biography is a lateral move into a zone of darker, and perhaps more delicious, perversion.

Joris-Karl Huysmans Art Critic. By William Corwin. The Brooklyn Rail,  February 2020.







À Rebours (Against Nature) (1884), by the French novelist Joris-Karl Huysmans (1848-1907), is the quintessential statement of literary decadence. It depicts the hyper-aesthete Jean des Esseintes’ attempts to reject society and nature in favour of pure aesthetic indulgence. With little in the way of continuous narrative, the novel follows Huysmans’ protagonist as he decorates his house and arranges his library. In one vignette, he creates a garden from poisonous tropical flowers, chosen because they appear more artificial than natural. In another scene, probably the novel’s most famous, he embeds gemstones in the shell of a tortoise, which is crushed by the increased weight.


A simulacrum of this unfortunate creature has been contrived as the centrepiece of Huysmans, Art Critic: From Degas to Grünewald, in the Eye of Francesco Vezzoli, an exhibition at the Musée d’Orsay, Paris, that will travel this spring to the Museum of Modern and Contemporary Art in Strasbourg. It was created by Vezzoli, an Italian contemporary artist best known for his open-armed embrace of fashion and celebrity. Vezzoli has directed Gore Vidal and Helen Mirren in a fake trailer for a remake of Vidal’s infamous 1979 erotic epic Caligula and choreographed a performance by Lady Gaga. Away from these circuses, his work often involves translating past masters from one medium to another, or melding them with images from popular culture.

There is a whiff in this of “art for art’s sake”, the mantra of the decadent movement, where the Ruskinian notion that art has a moral value is cast aside. It might be a stretch, though, to compare Vezzoli to Huysmans’ more intellectually fixated protagonist; in 2011, the New York magazine critic Jerry Saltz aptly described a solo show of Vezzoli’s work as “empty-headedly decadent”. Here, Vezzoli has turned decorator, furnishing three of the Musée d’Orsay’s galleries to represent different stages in Huysmans’ thought. Each intersperses a smattering of Vezzoli’s own works with that of Huysmans’ contemporaries, many from the museum’s own collection. It also contains texts, largely letters, from the writer’s archive, the most exciting of which is the draft manuscript of À Rebours itself.




The presence of this novel threatens here, as it so often has, to overshadow the rest of Huysmans’ satisfying, many-sided career, which encompasses both sober, Émile Zola-indebted naturalism and extravagant emphasis on gothic architecture. In a time of raging debates between advocates of different artistic approaches, Huysmans’ art criticism for weekly periodicals was non-prescriptive, embracing naturalism and symbolism. An early advocate for the Dutch Golden Age, his tastes have shaped what is now regarded as the canon of the old masters. His views on his own generation were also prescient: while Zola dismissed Edgar Degas as a “minor artist” and the Goncourt brothers smeared him as a “constipated artist”, Huysmans identified his genius for depicting modern life.

A full-time civil servant for the majority of his adult life, Huysmans was slightly removed from the grandest artistic circles of Paris. While Zola was immortalised by Édouard Manet, Huysmans had to settle with the era’s B-list. An 1878 painting by Jean-Louis Forain shows the young Huysmans as a figure of keen, intelligent eyes and sober manner; the printmaker Eugène Delâtre’s sketch-like depiction of 1894 has the now infamous writer as a debonair gentleman, with a hint of mischievousness.

Both feature in the exhibition’s first section, left white by Vezzoli to evoke a present-day gallery space. It provides a capsule tour of the tendencies at play during the 1870s and 80s. Major and minor impressionist works share space with the final gaps of academicism. Huysmans was often scathing about the latter. William-Adolphe Bouguereau, represented here by the meringue-accented Birth of Venus (1879), was singled out for a devastating dressing-down. The then-celebrated painter, wrote Huysmans, “has invented a gaseous style of painting, an inflated art. It is not even porcelain any more, it is flabby and overworked; I can’t even describe it, it is a bit like soft octopus flesh.” The Spanish-descended artist Fernand Pelez, meanwhile, was shamelessly mocked for his 1879 attempt to depict the assassination of the emperor Commodus. “At first,” said Huysmans, “I thought the man in the green bathing trunks leaning over the other man in the white bathing trunks was a masseur, and that the woman raising the curtain was simply saying: “The bath is ready.’”

When it came to the art Huysmans enjoyed, he could be rhapsodic in his praise. He admired the perpetual impressionist also-ran Gustave Caillebotte, represented here by his masterpieces The Floor Scrapers (1875) and In a Cafe (1880). Huysmans chose the latter for inclusion in his ideal museum, along with several works by James Abbott McNeill Whistler. The American émigré’s wispy, ukiyo-e-indebted Variations in Violet and Green (1871) provides one of the exhibition’s finest pairings of work and text, as Huysmans singles out the American’s landscapes as “whisper-soft and tender, like a confession, like a caress”. In comparing Whistler’s work with the visionary reveries of Thomas de Quincey, the influential author of Confessions of an English Opium Eater, Huysmans positions him as a bridge to the dreamlike works of symbolist artists such as Gustave Moreau and Odilon Redon.




These two have a starring role in the exhibition’s second section, which Vezzoli has coloured red. The walls are adorned with photographic wallpaper evoking the house of the Italian poet Gabriele D’Annunzio, who designed his own home after that described in À Rebours. This room contains superb examples of Moreau and Redon, including the former’s unspeakably sumptuous Galatea (1880) and a broad selection of the latter’s phantasmagorical illustrations. It is also here that the exhibition’s previously tight focus around Huysmans’ writings begins to dissolve into something looser. There are fewer texts, so that pieces such as Jean Auguste Dominique Ingres’ Virgin Adoring the Host hang without explanation. Four works by Vezzoli that see photographs of famous dancers, including Ida Rubinstein and Isadora Duncan, adorned with embroidered tears allude to something of the fin de siècle’s commingling of pleasure and tragedy, but feel misplaced next to that era’s actual expressions.

In his final decade and a half, Huysmans rediscovered Catholicism. A sequence of four novels fictionalised Huysmans’ own conversion, along the way interpreting rapturous passages on gothic and northern Renaissance art. The late essay Trois Primitifs (1905) describes his reaction to Matthias Grünewald’s Isenheim Altarpiece (1512-16), one of the very greatest works of the Renaissance. “It is as if a typhoon of art had been let loose and was sweeping you away, and you need a few minutes to recover from the impact, to surmount the impression of awful horror made by the huge crucified Christ.”

It would be a nigh-impossible task to recreate the conditions of Huysmans’ experience, or even those which greet present-day visitors to the altarpiece’s current home in the Musée Unterlinden in Colmar. But Vezzoli tries in the exhibition’s final chamber, devoted entirely to the glibly titled Jesus Christ Superstar (2019). Painted pitch-black and lit with theatrical flair, it displays three reproductions of the altarpiece’s central crucifixion scene. It manages to retain a glimmer of the original’s splendour while undercutting the cult of authenticity, tying together Huysmans’ faith with Des Esseintes’ preference for the replica over the real. But you may wish that the writer’s ardent belief in the unmediated power of art had been left alone.

Huysmans, Art Critic: From Degas to Grünewald, in the Eye of Francesco Vezzoli. By Joe Lloyd. Studio International , January 2, 2020. 






Joris-Karl Huysmans Art Critic. From Degas to Grünewald, in the Eye of Francesco Vezzoli.

Musée d'Orsay. November 26 ,  2019 -  March 1, 2020. 



























20/12/2019

A Forest of Symbols : Symbolism and Philosophy




“I always had a soft spot for artists and writers labeled symbolists,” Andrei Pop tells us, “if only because they were often picked on.” Indeed, he explains, they were unjustly labeled incomprehensible neurotics or egoists, anarchists or decadents — the latter even becoming a popular name for the movement. For Pop, an associate professor of art history at the University of Chicago and a member of its Committee on Social Thought, symbolist practices are crucial to understanding the genesis of modern art. Now an intellectual assumption across many disciplines, symbolism, Pop affirms in his new book “A Forest of Symbols,” was a consequence of the radical rethinking of the nature of the symbol in the late 19th century. His book provides a rich and unprecedented examination of this historical period, and a unique framework for rethinking the emergence of non-referential models of perception and for understanding the modernization of how various forms of knowledge can be represented.

Like many of the titles we at Zone Books are proud to have published in recent years — Christopher Heuer’s “Into the White,” Mitchell Merback’s “Perfection’s Therapy,” and Amy Powell’s “Depositions,” among them — Pop’s vibrant book is driven by crucial questions internal to art history but which, in their realization, are fundamentally transdisciplinary in extraordinarily creative ways. This creativity is well-reflected in the far-reaching interview featured below, in which Pop discusses, among other topics, what drew him to symbolism, the potential symbols have to communicate a common visual language, and the outsized influence of Edgar Allan Poe.

Zone Books: “A forest” seems a fittingly symbolic choice for the title. How did you decide upon it?

Andrei Pop: Credit goes to the great French poet Baudelaire, who wrote that “Man passes through forests of symbols which watch him with familiar gazes.” This reminds me of a jungle with stone idols glaring through the foliage, mysterious but also a bit silly — like a Tintin comic. But a forest is so much more: not just a thing or place but a world for plants and animals and people, who use it for food, shelter, resources — in other words, they coexist uneasily within it. And everything the humans do, practical or theoretical, they represent in pictures or words or other symbols: so symbols are our forest, and we even overlay nonhuman nature, whether forest or outer space, with symbols to bring it closer to us (the Moon, the Sun, the Milky Way). A Forest of Symbols then is a symbol full of symbols: the very theme of the book. But the title didn’t come easy! I only picked it after being struck by all the forest symbolism I used in the book, like the common phrase of ‘not seeing the forest for the trees’. Finally, there is a small but significant difference between Baudelaire’s phrase and mine: his forests are many, mine just one, “a forest” linking art and science as symbol-making activities.




ZB: What drew you to questions of symbolism?

AP: I always had a soft spot for artists and writers labeled symbolists, if only because they were often picked on. They were supposedly overblown or overwrought or incomprehensible, they ignored nature, dabbled in the dark arts or art for art’s sake, were neurotics or egoists or anarchists or decadents — the last was even a popular name for the whole movement. Yet what these criticisms missed is the humor and the intelligence of this art, which often turned its razor wit against itself and its makers: the artist’s futile attempts to represent the world for other human beings. Then I was struck by what seemed a pure linguistic coincidence: the fact that mathematicians of the era spoke of “symbolism” too, e.g., the mathematician-philosopher Whitehead even wrote a book with this title. They did not mean art, but just the technical notations they used to express logical proofs. It turned out, on closer investigations, that these two apparently opposite practices both involved getting unreliable, subjective, self-centered human minds to pay attention to subtle nuances of drawn or printed or otherwise inscribed figures, for the purposes of coming to understand each other and recognize objective truths they could share. I was hooked.


ZB: Several artists, writers, philosophers, and mathematicians appear throughout your discussion: including Edgar Allan Poe, Stéphane Mallarmé, and Ludwig Wittgenstein. How did you choose which figures to discuss?

AP: I wish I could say it took great originality to collect these people, but the artists, whether poets or painters, just couldn’t shut up about Poe. And they were right! Just like Bart Simpson and a lot of general readers, I’ve always loved Poe, but did not realize what a systematic thinker he is. He explained with great philosophical clarity just how he intended to get the personal, incalculable effects his stories and poems like “The Raven” have on us. This theoretical bottom to Poe, but also to his translator Mallarmé and his friend the painter Manet, made them akin to my mind to the great turn-of-the-century philosophers Frege and Wittgenstein, who wrestled with how limited animal minds with a rough and ready language can know eternal truths of logic and mathematics. These thinkers in turn were friends in real life and connected in the history of philosophy. My one originality, which I think justified, has been to bring them together: Poe and Frege, Wittgenstein and Mallarmé. It is their shared ideas and the common difficulties they wrestled with, such as the possibility (or impossibility) of a private language, that to my mind justifies the combination. It might also allow us, having the benefit of their insights, to see farther than these geniuses.

ZB: How did you find and curate the illustrations for the book?

AP: Some of them have been with me since student days — especially the Manet lithographs of Poe’s Raven, which I stumbled across in the Fogg Museum print study room while studying for grad exams at Harvard: a scary rite of passage where you could be shown any object in the enormous collection without being told what it is. The Manets didn’t come up, but a seed of curiosity was planted. Another work, Van Gogh’s otherworldly green portrait of his mother, painted from a black and white photograph by the homesick son, is one of the first artworks I discovered on starting high school in Southern California in the 1990s. Others, like Seurat’s Grande Jatte and the chest, painted and carved by Gauguin, I’ve seen repeatedly over the last few years at the Art Institute of Chicago. Many I found in books, and are only to be found there, being book illustrations. One particular drawing was known to scholars over the last quarter-century only in reproduction. I finally tracked down the original just as the book was being printed this summer 2019. So it is quite a cast of characters, from familiar friends to chance acquaintances. They belonged in the book if I could explain what drew me to them, and what made them speak to each other. I have also given each a little commentary on the page where they are reproduced, in addition to the main text. They deserve the second look!




ZB: At one point, you outline that there are aesthetic, scientific, political, and other signs. What are the other kinds of signs might one encounter?

AP: There may not be “countless uses of language” as Wittgenstein thought, but indefinitely many sign systems: as many as activities requiring coordination. Every sport has its gestures and slogans, there are lovers’ hearts carved into trees, rituals and regalia for every priesthood and profession. A whaler and a thief have their own patois, and possibly worldview: modern stories like Moby Dick show us that. Music is fascinating because its signs are often implicit. Key signatures can convey mood, like the bleak D minor heralding Mozart’s stone guest, who drags Don Giovanni to hell. I have always wondered: are keys really signs to “be read” correctly, or just sound patterns to which people respond freely? One may ask the same about animal calls: stomping tails to indicate danger may be a sign, but what about pheromones that animals and even plants release unwittingly? The American logician Peirce, who makes a cameo in my book, was fascinated by natural signs, like smoke for fire. (He was doubtless acquainted with Native American communication systems). In the book I focus on symbols, which are signs intended to be recognized as intentionally made to be such. I’ll end with an odd one: martial arts. I practiced judo a lifetime ago, and knew the names for the grabbing at each other’s kimonos and trying to trip each other up that we did. These were ordinary Japanese words, but our fumbling moves were themselves signs of the elegant modes of flooring the opponent to whose ideal beauty we aspired in vain.


ZB: It seems that symbols have the potential to communicate a common visual language, but also to be overlooked, or misunderstood. How do you see the artists of the 19th century grappling with that issue?

AP: Enlightenment thinkers, confronted with classical Chinese and ancient Egyptian writing, thought pictures could be a new universal language, imparting wisdom impossible to misinterpret. Alas, two centuries of false starts with hieroglyphs taught them, by the end of the 19th century, that pictorial language, being immediate and intuitive, can give rise to the wildest misunderstanding. That has its bright side too: one doesn’t misunderstand prosaic interactions like paying for groceries. It is with singular, puzzling, dark or dazzling things or happenings that we have a hard time saying what they are. In my book I quote some classic vitriol, such as the painter-poet Dante Gabriel Rossetti, a visionary artist in his own right, exclaiming that Manet’s Raven illustrations are only fit for insane asylums. The old art critics were interested in such outbursts because they showed what prejudices modern innovators had to overcome. The Marxist critics on the other hand think they stem from class tensions. Both might be right: but there are more immediate causes of misunderstanding, from the state of one’s own body to the education one brings to the artwork. The artists in my book were used to being called incomprehensible: they did not despair, but patiently asked that viewers look closer, and think longer. It’s good advice for us too, as distractions and the demands on our time have multiplied.


ZB: Going further, you discuss the slippage between private and public meaning. Is there something that viewers of art can do to recognize public meaning more often?

AP: The 20th century, from Wittgenstein to various technocratic states, was haunted by the idea that all meaning is public and so all our thinking ought to be as well. In art, this amounts to going into the gallery and doing long division out loud: the only reason we’d speak is to show off our facility doing something trivial. This has been the ideal of some old academic art institutions, but fortunately art is too unpredictable to achieve it. The opposite extreme, a purely interior world of unutterable feelings, is unfortunately closer to the cliché of museum as temple: silent people looking pained, furrowing their brow at artworks, grunting now and then. Much better, both for personal enjoyment and for any kind of political, moral, or scientific insight, is a balance between the experiences we have as individuals and shared content — the plot of a story, the sitter of a portrait, the mode of representation or the use of material, which points to historical context. The private too can be given its due, without being remorselessly made public: a parent’s pain for a deceased child, or the artist’s commitment to a cause, which thankfully we need not share to appreciate. One might say with Freud that “I (the ego) will be where It (the unconscious) was”, that is, become self-aware. But I prefer to think we can make articulate in dialogue what we both see as well as the marvelous fact that we do not both see everything one of us sees.

There may not be “countless uses of language” as Ludwig Wittgenstein thought, but indefinitely many sign systems: as many as activities requiring coordination. Image: Wikimedia Commons
ZB: You write that “the logical content of pictures is richer than generally supposed.” How can one learn to identify the logical content?

AP: “Logical” here doesn’t mean syllogisms or standard notation out of a first-year college course. By those standards, pictures are judged logically boneless, flabby, formless; but so is much language. Take the simple utterance “See Spot run”. Nothing follows from it syllogistically. Yet there is logical content: the scaffolding on which its meaning is built. The request or command to the hearer to perceive something, the claim that what will be seen is an action of the subject Spot, perhaps even the suggestion, built on Anglophone traditions, that Spot is a dog. Here we see how the logical blends into the factual, but there are facts about the world that are not logical: whether there is a Spot, who or what that is, and so on. Likewise, in pictures, such matters as the causal means of their making (mechanical, optical, by hand?), whether they belong to the past or to timeless imagination, whether they represent sentient beings, and those beings are meant to be doing or thinking something, or showing awareness of the presence of spectators: all this belongs to the scaffolding of meaning, which historical detail fills out. There is no algorithm for figuring out what is logically implied in an image and what we need to know about the world to grasp it; it is a mutually informing process. The payoff to perceiving what is there logically is that we are more likely to look in the right place for the facts that bring the picture to momentary life.



ZB: Do symbols help people to see an artwork in the way that the artist intended it?

AP: Writing this book, I grew fascinated and finally impatient with all the catchy terms for what is really the same thing: sign, emblem, allegory, Leitmotiv, Ur-form, Gestalt, schema, and of course symbol and all its variations. What is important about symbolist art — and science, which is not usually called symbolist, but should be — is that it regards symbols as purposely devised to function as such. An artificial, that is a human-made object, be it paint or sound or ink on paper, stands for some reality, abstract and conceptual like Number or Truth or concrete and dusty like a bone or a tree. The point of the symbol is to not confuse it with the thing symbolized. Even if you take a tree to symbolize another, say a bonsai for a mighty oak, you do not conflate the two. The artwork describes reality at a distance, and it is good to know the distance. This is already a step along the road to understanding art rightly, that is self-reflectively and intelligently. Whether it is also what the artist intended depends on the artist — was the artist careful and reflective? It is possible to notice something in an artwork that the artist totally missed. But the greatest artists invest their work richly with meaning, whether they are aware of it or not. So knowing the art helps up enormously to know the people. It is the closest we will ever get to reading the minds of those long gone.

ZB: You write that “Color is, as much as pain, a paradigm case of the private.” Yet, today, marketing and psychological studies try to find common, if not objective, effects of color. Is color still private? Would one’s experience of color and its symbolism have been more private in the 19th century?

AP: Advertising wouldn’t earn its keep if it didn’t explore our hopes and fears — as do doctors for nobler purposes. I would say pain is analogous: it is colonized today by states seeking ways to torture without hurting the body (waterboarding?) and pharmaceutical companies peddling opiates, but also to cure, and if not, to understand the experience of those living in pain. These developments start in the symbolist 19th century, prior to which little was known about how the eye processes light, not to mention the liquor-and-a-board-to-bite-on approach to anesthesia. So it certainly seems as if the lonely part of our minds is shrinking. But: to this we must always add, “approximately.” An adman or dietician might know that this or that hue will make you hungry or kill your appetite: they still don’t see what you see when you have that measurable public reaction. In science fiction, authors imagine telepathy or ‘feely’-machines. The hero of William Gibson’s Neuromancer feels the excruciating pain of the heroine when she breaks her leg. Frege foresaw this scenario a century ago and replied: is it the same pain, or a different one beamed now into a second person? He thought there could be no right answer, unless we were both people at once. So there will always be metaphysically private experiences, no matter how intrusive Big Brother becomes. The challenge is how to make them count: like aesthetes circa 1900, many of us want transformative experiences that also matter to the world we inhabit.

ZB: Can you say what you’re working on next?

AP: I think it might already be obvious from the last answer: science fiction! Like symbolism, it explores the farthest imaginable reaches of human — and not just human — experience, but it does so often in a naïve, breakneck fashion that is a lot of fun after the subtleties of Manet or Frege. And if symbolism is inseparable from my experience of growing up intellectually, science fiction has been with me even longer: as long as I could read or write, and certainly before I spoke the American English that even the most exotic Hollywood aliens favor. It stayed with me too. Today literary scholars look to this genre for answers, or at least questions about our uncertain future: climate change, human migration to the stars, a world of radical genetic and computer science. That is important, but for me it is also exciting to attend to earthy and disposable materials like pulp paperbacks and magazines, lurid space films from the dawn of cinema and today’s slick video games, so different from the fastidious elegance of symbolism. Although there is symbolist science fiction too: not for nothing was Poe a pioneer of the genre. His revived Mummy observes that they had Progress in its time too, but it never progressed. I find what is absurd and funny as important as what is sad and portentous, and only together do they capture our experience of that part of reality that does not yet exist — the Future.

Zone Books is an independent nonprofit publishing house founded in 1985. Zone Books are edited by Jonathan Crary, Michel Feher, Hal Foster, and Ramona Naddaff, and designed by Bruce Mau and Julie Fry. They are distributed by the MIT Press.

A Forest of Symbols: In Conversation With Andrei Pop.  By: Zone Books/The Editors.  The MIT Press Reader , December 9, 2019.








On the face of it, art historian Andrei Pop, in his latest book, A Forest of Symbols: Art, Science and Truth in the Long Nineteenth Century (Zone Books, 2019), sets out to achieve something rather concrete—a reevaluation of the French symbolist movement in art—and yet the reader soon becomes aware that much more is at stake, as Pop weaves together art history with an account of early analytic philosophy to raise questions about the very nature of truth and human ways of meaning-making in artistic and scientific practice, which are further explored in this interview with David Kretz.

DK : A Forest of Symbols: Art, Science, and Truth in the Long Nineteenth Century begins by characterizing a type of mid-19th-century reductionism about the self and the mental that finds expression, for example, in Ernst Mach’s psychologistic philosophy and impressionist painting, which, roughly speaking, presents the viewer with sensations of color pigments rather than with objects. You then establish a surprising parallel between two counter-reactions to this Zeitgeist: symbolist art and early analytic philosophy, especially Frege and the Wittgenstein of the Tractatus. Can you sketch the parallel in their responses for us?

AP : The predominance of positivism and various forms of mechanistic philosophy and science, including physiological psychology, was no ideological conspiracy but a result of real progress: the invention of analytic chemistry, the refinement of celestial mechanics, and the rapid strides in comparative anatomy, microbiology, and the rest, crowned as we still think by Darwinian evolutionary theory. To say nothing of practical gains from pasteurization to electricity. This materialist front faltered a little when confronting the mind and subjectivity, but here too advances were legion: from the study of the eye and physiologic color to the psychology of counting and their manifold applications, from calculators to color printing, early motion pictures, and, yes, realist and impressionist painting. These art practices, of course, were not always understood as reductive, but insofar as they were—as they answered to the decree of “paint only what you see”—they fit the positivist lockstep.

Only they also produced weirdness: what an impressionist ‘saw’, made up as it was of blocky saturated brushstrokes, differed markedly from what anyone else saw, live or through a camera. So the act of translating vision to canvas produced an effect different in kind. At the same time, positivism was of little help in the foundations of arithmetic, or physics, where explaining natural law mechanistically and psychologically (a tendency called “psychologism” on the model of scientism—taking psychology beyond its field of application) led to theories of numbers as consensual hallucinations, or meaningless counters in a game. This self-undermining nature of positivism—its search for verification leading always to unstable mental states that could deceive the verifier—naturally led to revolt among ambitious scientists from Boltzmann to Cantor. The revolts tended to assert the reality of things unseen and strictly unseeable: whether infinite sets (Bolzano) or irrational numbers (Weierstrass) or both of these (Dedekind, Cantor, Frege). This is a reformed Platonism, because it doesn’t point us to the perfect Bed in the sky, but to what is necessary for there to be anything at all—the laws of arithmetic describe any possible universe. They certainly underlie the mathematical natural science on which positivism relied while undermining it.

It is perhaps surprising then that the scientific revolt against equating truth with the perceptible or verifiable, which issued in mathematical logic and philosophy of language that you call “early analytic philosophy”, also made room for domains inaccessible to it, what it called the subjective realm, which stretched from color perception and proprioception to poetic nuance to aesthetic judgment. If we identify the later tradition with the elimination of subjectivity and a nearly algorithmic commitment to the application of logic to philosophical problems, we may, ironically, regard Frege and the young Russell and Wittgenstein as backward Romantics, because they sought to delimit objective sense and laws from realms of radical subjectivity that separate each mind from each other: the very notion of private language, which the older Wittgenstein violently rejected. The philosophical point of this book is to show that the objective requires the subjective as a foil if it is to play the scientific role late nineteenth-century philosophers assigned to it, not to mention to become accessible through our perceptual apparatus in new kinds of mathematical and logical symbolism. As for the symbolist artists, they frankly acknowledged that the mind contributes as much as the hand in reproducing reality, so that continuous color and contour, which impressionism and the opticians had rejected as found nowhere in nature, reappear as signs of our subjective activity as perceivers as much as our logical activity organizing percepts into objects. The category of the image serves as a useful beacon, joining theoretical speculation to plastic art: it is structured sense itself, distinct from and mediating between the concrete things embodying it and whatever else, concrete or abstract, they stand for or refer to. But once one has noticed the affinity between the artistic and philosophical project, there is no reason to leave out photographers, realist painters, or romantic poets like Poe, when one finds them engaged in a project of exploring the interface between the logically objective, or public world, and the private, subjective worlds which Heraclitus already said we each possess.


DK : You agree with historians of science like Lorraine Daston and Peter Galison that there is an artistic aspect to scientific practices of observation and documentation, for example, but want to also claim the inverse: that artworks are, in a sense, truth-apt and logical. Truth in art, moreover, on your view lies not so much in its power to disclose a world (Heidegger, Gadamer). Rather your concept of truth in art seems to follow along representationalist lines: Frege and the early Wittgenstein. Could you tell us more about your understanding of truth—in art, in science? Are they the same? Is truth in art the same as meaningfulness?

AP : The opposition between disclosive and representationalist accounts of truth requires some scrutiny. I take it by the latter you have in mind the view that sentences or images build up models of reality, which we compare with their referent and judge to be true in case the representation corresponds to reality. Frege in fact denied that such a view is generally applicable to pictures—as he pointed out, we would only call a picture of Cologne Cathedral “true” in this sense if we appended the sentence “the cathedral looks like this”, so that what we are really judging true is the sentence. But then he went further and pointed out that the correspondence theory doesn’t explain truth in language either! For if you ask just what makes this sentence correspond to reality, and I provide an answer, you can still ask whether the answer is true, which on the correspondence theory would lead to asking for another object of correspondence (not of the sentence, but of the sentence asserting the truth of the sentence), and thus a vicious regress. So correspondence will not explain truth in general: but it certainly plays a role in much everyday language and imagery, from ID cards to IOUs.

So it won’t do to dismiss representation altogether and insist on elevated uses of “world-disclosing” language and images: it matters whether I owe you or you owe me a sum of money, just as it should matter to the disclosing of a peasant world whether, say, a pair of boots painted by Van Gogh belonged (are painted as belonging) to a peasant woman or not. What matters still has to do with the language or the image: these are logically articulated, which needn’t mean reducible to language. What it does mean is: properly interpreted, it is responsive to true or false propositions about it. This is how a picture differs from the object which is its bearer, as it differs from a stone or a leaf, which are neither meaningful nor potentially true or false, though we can say meaningful, true or false things about them. As for the worry that pictures allow for multiple plausible interpretations, that doesn’t differentiate them from language qualitatively, only quantitatively. A picture might seem awfully ambiguous about, say, the intentions of the person it portrays, but it is merely compatible with several different ones. In turn, a sentence describing a face, as Lessing noticed, is endlessly more ambiguous than even a crude visual image of that face. Logically articulated, then, in every domain, means something like this: the object would mean different things if it were structured otherwise.

Likewise, context matters: language abounds in indexical expressions whose full significance (as opposed to linguistic meaning) depends on who is speaking and listening, and the sense of images may depend on assumptions about who is looking, what goes on beyond the frame of the picture, and so on. This is why I like to say that a historian may not be a Platonist, but a Platonist must be a historian: you never reach mind-independent meaning from a historical artifact unless you account for specific human conventions and acts. As for truth, that is once again a further step: it is not objects as such, but the thoughts they provoke, which are true or false. The only guaranteed truths are the tautologies held in such suspicion by Wittgenstein—which are perfectly respectable logical truths, true solely due to their structure (the same goes for contradictions, which are necessarily false). As for other thoughts, their truth and falsity depends not so much on correspondence to fact (which, inconveniently, tends to ape the representational content of the thought), but on what they really mean. Again artifact and world, structure and context interlock, while remaining very much distinct.




And that is why images, and not just texts or scientific sentences, may be logically articulate: it’s because they are interesting, eventful. The Nelson Goodman line, according to which pictures are just analog color gradients with no structure, is as implausible as Heidegger’s speculations on peasant shoes, which he claims are accessible only in looking at a Van Gogh painting, but which in fact can only be had by reading Heidegger. In order for this kind of art theory to reestablish contact with ordinary acts of looking, and with communication between lookers, and their other intellectual activities (including science), logical structure has to be recognized wherever it is found. It is naturally rather unevenly distributed among meaningful artifacts (perspectival pictures may be dreadful at tense, but they are far better than sentences at describing spaces, and both are terrible at clarifying inferences). We also have to recognize and respect the incommunicable aspect of each subject’s experience, which we can sense rather than verify and which I suspect is what drives the world-disclosing philosophers to their premature attempts at disclosure.

DK : Is there anything that would make an artwork logically inarticulate? Would you rule out the possibility of interesting, eventful nonsense?

AP : I rule out “nonsense” understood as “no sense”, a degree zero of sense: the nonsense poems of Lear, Carroll, dada, medieval monks, etc. are in fact full of tidbits of sense, arranged less than sentence-wise (or even word-wise at times). So the “may be” above applies to the degree of coherence a particular artwork aspires to. A monochrome may well occupy a monistic logical space akin to David Chalmers’ fantastic “consciousness of a thermostat”. If so it is quite dull, perhaps inarticulate by our usual standards, but never unintelligible or senseless in a pure way. Poésie concrète, doodles, automatic writing are telic activities too, with a minimal sense that is requisite to being an interesting representation. Of course, a fossil or a blank wall may be interesting, but not as representation: only as a natural object about which questions may be asked.

DK : How does your understanding of these larger metaphysical and epistemological issues inflect your own methodology as a historian? What do you think art historians should learn from philosophy—and philosophers from (art) historians?

AP : I more than once heard a celebrated philosopher say that his only method is to never say anything that is obviously false. One could do worse! The use of external “theory” in art history once had a dogmatic cast—the writer “knows” that Marxism or Lacanian psychoanalysis or structural linguistics is right, and rearranges art, or rather the extant writings on it, in accordance with this certainty. The old (“classical”) Germanophone art historians by contrast had some philosophical training (generally neo-Kantian), which they did not flaunt, instead inventing terms like Kunstwollen (‘art-willing’), Pathosformel (‘pathos formula’) or symbolische Form (this one due to a philosopher, Ernst Cassirer) to do their philosophizing, still in a broad generalizing vein, but generally asserting a continuity or change over time in how concrete objects embodied these more abstract patterns or schemata. I hope I have learned some lessons from both traditions: to think on our feet when the form of artifacts is meaningful and to look outside them when artifacts reach into the world. Still, art historians must learn not just philosophical theories, but some habits of mind philosophers take for granted (notably analytic philosophers, whom too few of us read, but above all the great philosophical minds, wherever those occur): not to adopt any position because they think it’s right or will elicit admiration without understanding it, but to think for themselves, accepting only what on their best efforts they regard as the truth. This, of course, need not involve certainty, but includes possibilities and hypotheses and the most plausible conclusions.

Can philosophers in turn learn anything from art historians? Well, besides learning what not to do (in the bad case), most art history, and certainly art history at its best, abounds in careful and explicit observation of meaningful artifacts, from all known human cultures and epochs: I think it does so in a way that if properly taken up could challenge the philosophy of mind, of language (which really should be a branch of a larger philosophy of meaning), and of logic and science. Art history isn’t just interesting to aestheticians. Questions ranging from the compositionality of semantics to the nature of things can be elucidated, if not definitively answered, by closer attention to art and artifacts. Not that this will involve taking anything art historians say at face value, but most of what philosophers think about the limits of thought, discursive language and the expressible, would benefit from an acquaintance with a wider range of meaning-making tools. Knowing symbolic logic helps, but so do comics or sculpture or opera! I am just as bad, I have no clue what to make of key signatures and chord changes in music, which can be instruments of thought, as much as any syllogism or perspectival projection. The key to wisdom, I’d agree with Socrates, is knowing that we don’t know. That is something art historians and philosophers have in common with each other—and with everyone else.

Andrei Pop is a professor in the Committee on Social Thought and the Department of Art History at the University of Chicago. Previously, he has taught eighteenth- and nineteenth-century art history and aesthetics at the Universities of Basel and Vienna

David Kretz is a Ph.D. student in the Department of Germanic Studies and the Committee on Social Thought at the University of Chicago. His current project contrasts poets and translators as complementary paradigms of historical agency in times of crisis


French Symbolism and the Origins of Analytic Philosophy. By David Kretz.  Journal of the History of Ideas Blog, December 16, 2019.