Showing posts with label film theory. Show all posts
Showing posts with label film theory. Show all posts

03/07/2020

State of Cinema 2020 : Cinema in the Present Tense. By Olivier Assayas.






I have some good news, for everyone: cinema is in crisis. Which is hardly news, in a way, for it has continuously been in crisis throughout its existence. It is not a sign of future danger either – the future is an enigma, and it takes a lot of irresponsibility to speculate about it, to pretend to decipher its mysteries – but rather that of a seismographic sensibility to the stakes of the present. I think there is no other symptom more relevant to an art’s vitality than its constant reappraisal, in accordance with the constant reformulation of our world. The real issue would be to know whether the forces that transform the world are the same forces that transform the arts, how both feed on one another, unless they are contradictory.

It seems to me that another question arises today as well, which, in its own way, parasitises the other two, muddies the waters, and obscures our reading of cinema and its place in its own history: the nature of the reflection determining our gaze and the way in which this reflection is structured. Historically, that is to say, since the middle of the history of cinema, its modern age, the tools of cinephilia have defined this framework, which was conceived by André Bazin, himself a product of Jacques Maritain’s Social Christianity. Its success and relevance are due to the fact that it was adopted by a generation of young filmmakers, those of the Nouvelle Vague, for whom theoretical writing was the foundation of their practice. Reflection and action were two poles of a dialectic that would become the key to our understanding of cinema, its singularities as well as its paradoxes.

Forgive me for going back so far in time, more than half a century, in order to deal with the current state of cinema, but the problem of time seems vital to me when trying to understand where we are exactly. This is why we should begin by asking ourselves both the question of what this original cinephilia is exactly and what its alternative might have been.

I postulate, rightly or wrongly, that any reflection on cinema is consciously or unconsciously based on the ambiguous nature of cinema’s relationship with the other arts. And, consequently, with their theory. From the earliest days of cinema, a contrast existed between the proponents of a cinema in line with the synchronous history of the avant-garde on the one hand and the proponents of its intrinsic bastardism on the other – torn between popular literature and symbolist imagery. André Bazin and Cahiers du cinéma, for their part, chose to examine praxis and to build an essentialist bubble out of it. Cinema was, as it were, elsewhere, unrelated to the old issues.

The various Nouvelles Vagues that spread through the world federated around this approach.

At the centre of it all was the question of filming and the ethics of filming, and the freedom of the auteur, which allowed all idiosyncrasies. But from the beginning of the 1960s, and more extremely afterwards, this cinephilia was doubly cornered: by the repressed relationship with the visual arts – Jean-Luc Godard made this the centre of his work – and the socio-political evolution of the world, which was shaken up by the youth movement that materialised in France in May 68 and in the United States in the Summer of Love of 1967.

Put simply, the relationship with the visual arts questioned the form of modern cinema, its relationship with figuration and narration, while the upheaval that swept across contemporary societies questioned the place or even the legitimacy of the auteur.

Everything that seemed clear became blurred; everything the new cinema had been built on was consequently called into question, even by its main artisans.

This profound and insoluble question of whether or not cinema is part of the visual arts left its mark on me personally. Is cinema the “seventh art”, a term that is often used without really understanding it, or is it something other than an art, perhaps even the philosopher’s stone that the 20th-century avant-gardes were searching for, the sublation of the arts, in the Hegelian sense of the term. Cinema as an art, indeed, but one that would possess the power to look at the other arts, to solve the mysteries of the representation of the world, in short, to perform the miracle of the reproduction of perception as a whole, the access to which haunts the history of painting – Turner similarly solved the search for movement by way of abstraction.

I often think of what Ingmar Bergman said about Tarkovsky moving freely through spaces whose doors he himself had knocked on his entire life.





In this sense I have always been confused by the misunderstandings sparked off by the distinction between experimental cinema, heir to the early-20th-century Dadaist (Hans Richter) and Surrealist (Man Ray, Buñuel) endeavours, and the narrative cinema that established itself very early on as popular entertainment, gradually winning its spurs. Venom and Eternity (1951) by the founder of Lettrism, Isidore Isou, should in my opinion be regarded as the harbinger of the Nouvelle Vague. And, on the other side of the Atlantic, a similar break brought about by a generation of experimental filmmakers who challenged everything that came before them, Kenneth Anger, Andy Warhol, Jonas Mekas, Stan Brakhage or John Cassavetes, was the basis of the free cinema to come, of New Hollywood, if you like. Especially in terms of the formal reformulation of cinema’s aesthetics, which far less affected the Nouvelle Vague. Through superimposition and black magic (Anger), abstraction (Brakhage), a diaristic style (Mekas), dramaturgy and the status of the actor (Cassavetes), or the use of the zoom as a reinvention of the fixed shot, liberated from the static camera obscura (Warhol), it is not the syntax but the very texture of cinema that is at stake.

I, for my part, regard cinema as a whole: narrative cinema has always fed on experimental works just as the latter have always been inspired by the limits or deadlocks of figuration. What I mean is that there is some Brakhage in Michael Bay and some Warhol in Fassbinder or Almodóvar.

At the heart of these matters, as is often the case when it comes to questioning the contemporary, is the work of Jean-Luc Godard, initially a product of classical cinephilia and haunted until sundown by his questioning of and by the doubt eating away at this same cinephilia, the knot of suffering that has defined his art for a long time now.

Theory is thought in motion, thought in its capacity to take hold – including in strategic terms – of the issues of a present that is constantly redefined. At what point, when exactly, did cinema cease to be thought? When did it lose the vital, essential link between the practice of an art and its reflection? I fear that many irresistible forces have contributed to what I continue to perceive as the failure of a generation.

First of all, I would say that cinema has been the victim of its own prestige, and (auteur) theory of its international success, which has opened wide the doors of the academy. As soon as film thought became an academic discipline, it became fixed; it ceased to be the continuation of filmmakers’ material and practical concerns. Who, today, is seriously interested in how lenses transform space, particularly by the long focal lengths specific to modern cinema? Who wonders about the monocular perspective as a limit to cinema’s reproduction of the real? Or, again, who explores the disparity between the open, free field of novel or modern-theatre writing and the narrow limits of the conventions governing the work of committees and commissions holding the power of life and death over cinematographic works? Not to mention series, whose standard-bearers seem all too happy to have a go at applying the tissue of conventions and platitudes from American screenwriting textbooks.

What I am getting at is the point when living theory becomes dead ideology. In the hands of university professors, who see it as a chance to add a touch of modernity to their teaching, thought in motion becomes a doxa, an assemblage of rules, of automatisms, no longer based on anything since we have forgotten their very source, the source of youth, of the most spontaneous poetry.

If I wanted to take my reflection another step further and be more provocative than I wish to be in this context, I would say that it is time, today, to seriously, and responsibly, confront the failure of cinephilia. I do not mean to cast doubt on its achievements, nor on its critical importance within 20th-century thinking about the image: it is of paramount importance. But the very success of this treasure of film history should open our eyes and force us to admit that it is a moment of cinema, that this moment is long past because it no longer produces anything new, if not a form of tetany resulting in the idea that the totality of cinema would have been thought in the era of 1960s modernity and of classical cinema before that, and that the only thing left for us today is to be satisfied with the values and tools of an ironic, or rather non-duped postmodernity, if not lapsing into baroque grotesques.

What I mean is that in a world of proliferating images, of all kinds, we cannot but notice the fragility of the place of cinephile thought, which has become a fall-back position, whereas, until recently, it was still at the centre of the debate.

Once its great principles had been acquired, once film had been recognized as a legitimate object of study, once its auteur had gained the prestige that was formerly reserved for those practising older and more serious disciplines, once its legitimacy had been recognized to be halfway between high and low culture, we did not move an inch, it seems. I have witnessed the walls of a – university – stronghold being constructed so as to protect, around the guardians of this temple, values that have not produced anything useful or relevant for a very long time.

I say this all the more uneasily as I put myself not only in the position of essayist here but also in that of a filmmaker examining theory, asking the question of knowing, of understanding, in what way it would have been useful or stimulating to me beyond what I learned by contributing to Cahiers du cinéma for five years, between 1980 and 1985. The answer, as far as I am concerned, and it could – perhaps – be different for others, is brutal: nothing. And, as nature has gifted me with a rather contrary spirit, I am left with the feeling that I had to swim against the tide of ephemeral conceptions, of lucky charms, of instantly forgotten fashions of a drifting cinephile thought, determined by a late connection with Bourdieusian sociology, dabbling in the mirror games of postmodernity and naively running after the prestige of the visual arts, ever since the latter have invaded the field of the moving image via the practice of installation art, however fragile and questionable.

Please allow me to look to the past one last time before coming to less negative considerations, although I am in many ways a supporter of the powers of the negative, which were a great inspiration to me.

When historical cinephilia was formed in the late 1950s and early 1960s, did the theory of the visual arts have anything at all to say about cinema, about its history and the powerful forces that determined its transformation? Not much, in my opinion, and you do not have to be, as I was, a reader of Guy Debord and the Situationists to observe that during those years, faced with the advent of the New York School (Pollock, de Kooning, Rothko...), the main question troubling the European avant-gardes was their own political failure and the rehashing of the deadlocks of abstraction, the repetition of transgressions that weren’t even shocking anymore in 1930. Cinema was so far removed from the concerns of the theory of the visual arts that it referred, even in its most contemporary variations, such as Italian neorealism, to the the most basic monocular reproduction of the world. Cinema’s question of figuration seemed insignificant compared with the exploration of the obscurities or the dazzlement of the unconscious through the means of abstraction and, even more so, compared with the movement of art’s negation through happenings in their most radical and extreme variations, such as Viennese Actionism. Or, again, the Hamburg Theses of Debord, Vaneigem and Kotanyi which signalled the Situationist renunciation of art in favour of the “realization of philosophy”.




I am writing this to recall how cinephile thought was also a powerful antidote to the destructive forces at work within the avant-gardes and how it enabled the budding filmmakers of the time, undoubtedly the richest and most prolific generation in the history of film, to find a basis for a practice of representing the world, which the visual arts were denying them.

We will have to come to the present. I am going to try and do that. I would like to begin with the issue of theory, given that I reject cinephilia for its ossification into ideology and dogma.

In his recent book A History of Pictures, David Hockney, whom I consider to be the main contemporary thinker of the image, apart from being the greatest living painter, pursues a fascinating reflection on the origins of representation: how it was long built around a relationship with the monocular perspective, with the technical evolution of lenses and their usage, and the technique of the camera obscura. As much as these tools allow him an infinitely stimulating rereading of the classical era of painting, he also deals with their modern reappraisal. The Cubist moment was a pivotal event in this regard, breaking with the traditional reference points of perspective through a multiplication of angles for one and the same image.

In my view, Hockney does not go far enough, in the sense that his view is not supported by the theory of cinema, which has over time forgotten being a theory of perception – except with Gilles Deleuze who, primarily in The Movement Image, has been one of the very last great thinkers of cinema. It is indeed from the point of view of movement – and of the multiplication of perspectives and axes within a sequence, not within a shot, which is not the true syntagm of cinema – that the question of cinema as an answer to Hockney’s concerns plays out, as a way of questioning the limits of the original camera obscura. The movement of the camera, ever since it can be carried, and the use of long lenses, including indoors, ever since we have sensitive enough opticals at our disposal, indeed brings us several steps closer, I think, to the reproduction of perception, which is finally within reach.

Hockney refuses to take stock of these questions at work in cinema, which is the limit of his reflection, but it seems to me that the last breakthrough in his most recent work is essential, in the sense that it suggests placing painting back at the heart of the history of images. To summarize it schematically, he does not consider the shift from painting to photography as a break but a continuity in which the decisive invention is not so much the rival reproduction of the real as it is the ability to fix – on photographic paper – an image that painters had already known for a long time through their use of perspective and which was at the source of its techniques and their evolution.




The importance of this idea lies in its relegitimization of the age-old artistic theory developed around painting at the heart of cinema, which could quite reasonably be considered the continuation of the invention of photography. Fundamentally, the question I am trying to ask would be to know if it would not be in the interest of cinema today to confront the wealth of reflections that have, since the Renaissance, been concerned with considering both the question of the reproduction of the world and the even more essential question of the exploration of perception. If I were asked what I think is most useful to teach in today’s film schools, I would recommend these two tracks.

Besides, in order to support these intuitions, it would suffice to observe how the thinkers of the image that Jean-Luc Godard – the most authentically plastic of all the great modern filmmakers – most often refers to are Elie Faure and, above all, André Malraux, whose brilliance and staggering juxtapositions – theoretical short circuits – most certainly continue to haunt us.

What I am trying to say here is how poorly equipped cinephilia is to face these questions, which are at the heart of the understanding of cinema’s mysterious contemporary nature, whose very elements still seem to escape us. Whereas the history of the arts offers us a wealth of stimulating opportunities to reinvent our relationship with the moving image and, perhaps, to set it back in the long history that ended up being obscured by the opposition between classical cinema and modernity, a productive time.

Who is thinking cinema today, from which point of view and based on which values? And what does cinema think of itself, according to which ethics and principles? Two questions of a very different nature, whose answers seem to have crumbled – especially on the internet – and whose coherence has become infinitely difficult to imagine.

Seen from a limited angle, that of French cinema, it seemed to me that, although I was not part of it myself, the strong personalities of Serge Daney and Claude Lanzmann served as reference points for a while by founding a sort of funeral postscript to cinephilia, which was post-leftist rather than post-modern and defined by the question of the taboo: on the one hand, the “tracking shot in Kapò” which was criticized by Jacques Rivette in an essay about Gillo Pontecorvo’s film of the same name (Pontecorvo made The Battle of Algiers and had previously been an indestructible idol of anti-colonialist cinema) and which, for Daney, becomes obscenity itself, the aestheticisation of deportation, at a time when he is giving a deeply moving literary form to his own hitherto repressed personal history of a father he never knew, a Polish Jew and victim of the camps.

Claude Lanzmann, on the other hand, the auteur of the astonishing masterpiece Shoah, by grasping deportation in a transcendental way and refraining from using archival images, built a film ethics around this question that made a lasting impression.




The combination of these two issues served as theory for a generation of filmmakers who were themselves rarely directly affected by these historical questions but who were looking for a moral code which the ruins of classical cinephilia, already critically wounded by leftism, were unable to provide.

The paradox of this moment in cinema theory is that it had nothing constructive to propose other than the establishing of some code of restriction. Complete with the obligingly raised spectre of the death of cinema. I wouldn’t have liked to start making films in those dire circumstances, and it was Arnaud Desplechin who, in La Sentinelle – a film I always thought Serge Daney would have loved – managed to untie this knot and rescue cinema from this curse. But wasn’t there a fundamental truth to all this and wasn’t Serge Daney, who climbed aboard the post-Bazinian train during the 1970s, nearly clairvoyant with regard to the deadlocks of cinephilia around which he had established himself and whose unravelling, decomposing and self-denial he witnessed while he was himself dying?

What is left of these questions? Do they remain, did they get past the borders of France? Not really. Do they appeal to young filmmakers? Do they have a posterity, or are they only relevant within the context of this reflection on the present state of cinema? Hardly.

When trying to identify the place of a reformulation of cinephilia today, it is impossible not to situate it on the internet and in the latter’s redefinition of both the viewing modes of cinema and the way in which we move through its history. It is an irrelevant commonplace and yet a truth worth mentioning that today’s generations have an infinitely wider access to history – to the entire history of cinema as well as to its present – unimaginable for pre-digital humanity, who only had access through the Cinematheque to a fraction of the masterpieces of cinema, some of them remaining perfectly unattainable.

We don’t see everything, but we have access to almost everything, free of charge even; cinephilia has dissolved into a multitude of conflicting cliques, each organized around one fragment of one glorious past, to the extent that even its symbolic value continues to diminish. There are still films, often very good ones too – more good films are made today than at any other time - whose stakes play out on an ad hoc basis: will it win the Oscar, the Palm, the Lion, the Bear, will it be nominated? While filmmakers as auteurs are fading. Who today knows how to follow the thread of an oeuvre, to understand what is at work in an artist’s search, however senseless and futile? It’s all about this film right here, and after that everything starts all over again. In the digital fragmentation and its dilution of theoretical pertinence today, the entire legacy of auteur cinephilia is pretty much called into question.

Which theory is entering into dialogue with cinema in the present, which theory is accepted, has the right to help shape the inspiration of filmmakers? To whom is one accountable? I am a little afraid of the answer, to be honest.

It seems to me that it is sociology – it is easier to say the political – and communitarianism. But is this a good or a bad thing? And am I not venturing onto fragile, shifting sands? I believe there is an injunction to address these questions, even if I doubt that I will be able to formulate a satisfactory, let alone consensual, answer.

We know the evils of our time. Global warming, ecological disaster, an insane increase in social inequalities, the impossibility of managing migratory flows and, above all, the inability of those who govern, of states, to give a satisfactory or even vaguely reassuring response to these anxiety-inducing subjects, not to mention wars, epidemics or unemployment. Conversely, it seems as if the self-destructive opposition to the apprehension of these evils has in our democracies become an electoral asset.

It is only natural that filmmakers are citizens too and thus legitimately involved in the issues society is facing. But the political is the domain of the complex, and it does not necessarily produce good cinema. What’s more, fictional cinema struggles – which is normal – to grasp social issues that are analyzed or represented much more adequately by publishing, the press or even documentaries, longer and therefore more legitimate forms that possess the ability to treat fragile or sensitive subjects with the necessary rigour, precision and exactingness that cinema can only very exceptionally offer.

From my point of view, the sociological is a bad branch to catch hold of, not least because simplifications, amalgamations, and dramatization risk cutting out the facts, reducing them to comfortable generalities and resulting in an interpretation that is both erroneous and harmful.

I do not wish to criticize or delegitimize a cinema that aims to be accountable to the state and its citizens; on the contrary, it is perfectly commendable. I just want to say that I find it very difficult, and sometimes even dangerous, and that I do not at any rate discern a key there that would allow us to think contemporary, let alone future, cinema in a satisfactory or stimulating way.

What to think of communitarianism, which has become a factor influencing our societies and which in turn examines cinema for lack of being examined by it, which would seem more fundamental, riskier and more satisfying anyway to our minds; I have always been convinced that it is the role of cinema and art to examine society and certainly not to be examined by it, especially not in terms of censorship, the eternal hallmark of totalitarian regimes.




I was an adolescent in the 1970s. I have often repeated this and will continue to do so because this period, and its questioning of all society’s values, left an indelible mark on my life. I lived and was actively involved in a counterculture that advocated the liberation of everyday life, and I was engaged in forms of leftism that promoted individual liberation rather than collectivist utopias and support for authoritarian or even genocidal regimes. I have seen the liberation of homosexuality in words and deeds, I have seen the revival of feminism and its decisive victories. I have seen the invention of a Franco-Maghrebi identity, of a culture originating in the districts the African immigrants were relegated to, encouraged to settle in France in order to serve as labour for Gaullist France’s great infrastructure works.

I was less interested, afterwards, in the identitarian drift that followed from these steps forward, nor in their political or ideological instrumentalization. Perhaps they were fatal; perhaps they were necessary, I don’t know. I have personally never thought of my relationship with others in terms of the colour of their skin or their sexual preferences. As for my relationship with women and feminism – which would be my lifelong favourite political party because I am utterly convinced that toxic masculinity has become the source of all evil in our world – it was Groucho Marx who gave the best definition when he said that man is a woman like any other. I couldn’t have said it better myself.

I add these more personal comments not just to define who I am but, in this instance, “where I’m speaking from”, to use the jargon of the political years. I personally think that cinema can be communitarian – I do not think it is intended that way, but why not – but this communitarianism is nevertheless entirely unsuited to taking the place of the absence of theoretical thinking on cinema, which we have to take stock of today.

I will have to address Hollywood. I have practically nothing positive to say about it except that this industry’s prosperity and new modalities do not delight me, they frighten or even repulse me, because what they have recently produced is diametrically opposed to what I loved or admired about the American cinema that, throughout film history, provided this art with several of its greatest masters.

We are witnessing the triumph of series, the distribution of films through digital platforms and the confiscation of screens in the service of (mostly Disney-studio) franchises, whose hegemony now seems absolute.

Why take the trouble to finance a film that is not meant to provoke a sequel, a spin-off, or another film “in the universe of” and whose unsure relationship with the public is unpredictable? For a long time now, in Hollywood, the territory of film has been shrinking. To the benefit of an independent cinema forced to make do with ridiculous budgets – and thus limited in its practicing of the contemporary syntax of cinema, which is reserved for major productions.

And Netflix, and Disney Plus, and Apple, etc.: hasn’t cinema taken refuge there? Haven’t Alfonso Cuarón, Martin Scorsese, the Safdie brothers, and Noah Baumbach found political asylum there? I have even been there myself, since my film Wasp Network is distributed by Netflix in most places, except where it had been bought in advance — first of all in France, where it was an honest public success on the big screen. No other distributor offered the producers of the film a viable alternative.

If there is one issue cinema-thinking – which could use some sorely missing theoretical tools – comes up against, it is the confusion generated by the profound transformation of film distribution and financing. First of all, do the platforms intend to finance ambitious contemporary auteur cinema, beyond the incidental effect of fame that comes with the rivalry in this field of newcomers determined to take over a large share of the market? In other words, will Netflix, in need of prestige and symbolic value today, still need it next year or the year after? Not really, I guess. As for the studios, will they return to film as a business model or is the deviation towards franchises on the one hand and series on the other definitive?




In short, is there still room for a free cinema on the big screen? I believe that if this window is not closing, it is at least shrinking before our eyes. The only real model left is an independent, radical, daring cinema, alas with limited distribution.

Am I comfortable with that? Not really. I come from the visual arts originally; I was influenced by contemporary poetry, and my musical tastes have most often led me to artists on the margins’ margins, not to mention my aesthetic, philosophical, and political convictions, which are of a terribly minority nature within my generation. But if I chose to devote myself to cinema, it was because of its majority status, because it was the last art form that profoundly resonated with society, that wasn’t trapped in its stronghold, that hadn’t suffered the overwhelming deviation of the visual arts, which opted for an alliance with triumphant financial capitalism, choosing a false cynical radicalism, which Guy Debord called “state Dadaism”, meant to promote it to stratospheric heights.

The cinema that inspired me, that I loved, that I have tried to practise myself is an impure and open cinema, particularly accessible to those for whom cinema is often the only opportunity to encounter art as vital, beneficial and, why not, salutary.

Do I think, in this regard, that Alfonso Cuarón, Martin Scorsese, the Coen brothers, and so many others have been right in choosing a form of security and entrusting their films to Netflix? I don’t. I think that their films demonstrate that the cinema I believe in is alive and feasible – most of these films could have easily been financed without the help of Netflix or other platforms – and that it is the extension, the continuation of an art that is truly of our time, of our generation, that gives the most susceptible, sensitive account of the transformation of the world, of beings, of time, so many things that belong to cinema and which are in danger of getting lost or forgotten in the flow of images; and, even if I have few certainties, I am certain that this danger is very real, that facing it and persevering will unite us, however powerful the forces we have to face.



At this point, my reader has every right to ask me what this absent theory is, exactly, that cinema in the present time would need. It seems I have already evoked the indispensable back and forth between intuitive, spontaneous, uncontrolled practice, often determined by the use of new tools or new mediums, and its thought. I don’t mean to say that the development of the arts is the word of the Pythia and that it is up to critics, essayists, and certain filmmakers too, as I am doing at this very moment, to try to decipher its enigmas. But I do think it might be important, perhaps even essential, that works generate what Roberto Longhi called ekphrasis, that is to say the discourse made possible and provoked by the questions, enigmas and breakthroughs that art in its quest for life and its contradictions leaves unsolved. A writing that would be in dialogue with the artists, a revelation of the work and by this very fact an intercessor for the spectator.

I understand this in the most literal sense, that of knowing how to read and answer the questions raised day by day by the practice of film, but I would also like to push this issue a little further and open it up to two fields which seem to offer great potential within the present context. The first is the unconscious, and the second is ethics.

Here, more than elsewhere, I must speak in the first person and share concerns that have always haunted me, even when they were losing ground in film reflection and in the inspiration of filmmakers.

Applied to cinema, and please forgive me the inevitable simplifications and shortcuts when approaching that vast a subject, psychoanalysis enlightens us in two different forms. The first, broadly Freudian, form reminds us that auteurs are never entirely aware of what they are doing in their apprehension of characters and their acts, in the same manner that writers, taking up their pen, do not always write what they had planned to, as writing reveals thought rather than thought freezing writing: in short, I mean that both filmmakers and writers, however lucid they may be, do not always know what they are saying or doing because their unconscious is at work.

In another time, not long ago, this went without saying, and one went looking for what motivated or determined the modern individual, for better or for worse, in reflections on Ingmar Bergman’s, Michelangelo Antonioni’s or Jacques Tati’s characters. I believe the same could be the case today, at a time when the meaning of films, in its multiple forms, has more than ever become a subject of debate and polemics. In films, as in any work of the mind, it is the unconscious that acts. We open our doors to it and there is nothing more precious than what it expresses through us once we refrain from commonplaces, convenience, conventions and all the false dramatic rules determining committees and commissions on which the present and future of cinema sadly all too often depends, limiting and distorting the authentic inspiration and desires of young filmmakers who are taught how not to be themselves by the dominant rules of the film industry.




The other dimension according to which psychoanalysis defines cinema I would like to call broadly Jungian, in the sense that cinema in its entirety, even in its most conventional and simplistic form, can – and, in my opinion, should – be regarded as a collective unconscious. The world of images, the fantastic, the imaginary, wherever it may lead us, often in the most disappointing or banal ways, is the dream of our society, and it informs us, often without knowing, about the state of the world better than any other art, with the exception maybe of songs, of popular entertainment and music in all its forms, providing a real-time account of what is flowing through our present time.

For example, I have always considered Star Trek a quasi-documentary look at office life and the interactions between employees, torn between their daily routine and the dangers of the outside world; I only later realized what was literally staring me in the face, that their spaceship is called “Enterprise”...

On a darker note, it is difficult not to consider the proliferation of films that are in some way haunted by destruction and the end of the world, and built around Marvel superheroes, a sort of revenge of masculinity, which is threatened by the redefinition of the place of women in modern societies.

And I deliberately choose two rather simple tendencies with the sole intention of showing that unravelling these threads could contribute to thinking the truths, including the unpleasant ones, that animate our time.

Which brings me to ethics.

It deserves to be examined, even if the present state of cinema might provide us with few easy or satisfactory answers.

It is not a question of morality for me, given that most of the works of Eisenstein or Vertov could be defined as propaganda, that Rossellini himself made films approved by the fascist state, that it can be painful to watch The Birth of a Nation, one of film history’s masterpieces, that Bergman, Hitchcock and many of the most eminent artists in the history of cinema have made Cold War films. This does not detract from their genius. Not to mention Leni Riefenstahl, who is denied her – important – place only because of her Nazism and the benefits she derived from it. A great filmmaker like Xie Jin, the inspired auteur of Two Stage Sisters and Woman Basketball Player No. 5, had no scruples about pursuing his career during the Cultural Revolution’s darkest hours.

I rather consider it a question of practice, like when André Bazin spoke of a “forbidden montage” when two antinomic shots are put together, a wild beast on the one hand and an actor disguised as an explorer on the other. Or when Claude Lanzmann, who I quoted earlier, examines the legitimacy of representing, of fictionalizing the concentration camps and the gas chambers. Everyone has the right to argue and to defend his or her point of view on this issue. It is no less relevant and it has, above all, the merit of going to the utmost limit of a question that arises on a smaller scale in every single gesture of the practice of cinema.

Who finances films, where does the money come from, whose accomplices do we become when spending that money, when practising our art? What did we give up, what did we have to compromise with when we needed to meet the demands of the market and the industry dictating their rules? The practices of which television channel, basing its audience on which demagogy, do we approve of? To which fantasized demand, to which “general public”, despised by those who claim to speak in their name, have we given in?




For example, fifteen years after the fact, I discovered that my film Sentimental Destinies had been distributed in the United States by a company, and a very sympathetic one at that, whose main shareholder happened to be the extreme-right agitator Steve Bannon. Am I comfortable with that? No, I’m not. Do I have a choice? I don’t know, perhaps, but things would be much clearer if these issues were discussed and laid out in black and white. The same goes for American megaproductions adapting their scenarios to the demands of the Chinese government’s politico-confucian censorship in order to reach the planet’s largest audience.


I am often reminded of the title of an article by François Truffaut, ironically called ‘Clouzot at Work, or the Reign of Terror’. We have to acknowledge, as Truffaut did, the image, widespread at the time and more diffuse today, of the demiurge-filmmaker who abused his authority and power to the benefit of an unspeakable quest, an absolute as vague as it is hard to formulate, and whose whims, anger and impertinence are as many tangible expressions of it, remaining, however, inaccessible to ordinary mortals. I consider the opposite important, that filmmakers are accountable to their crew and that the quality of concentration, the richness of sharing, the clarity of intentions all form a decisive part of the collective adventure of a film shoot. I have often, whenever I had the opportunity, thanked the crew of my films and reminded them how much cinema is the sum of energies relayed by a director, whose art often depends on his ability to listen, to pay attention to ideas, to the flow of things that arises on set day after day. His talent also depends on knowing how to give rise to that. For me, it is an old and deep conviction that the best of cinema depends on the quality of everyone’s commitment to a strange undertaking which has to do with the reinvention and re-enchantment of the real, but which is also a parallel world, a parallel life in which everyone must be able to surpass themselves, to find fulfilment and, in a way, to give meaning to what is a little more than a job, the commitment of a life, an intimate quest.

This in no way means that I would renounce what I have often declared, namely that directing is first and foremost a force of disruption in the automatisms that structure the functioning of a set. It is indeed up to the mise en scène to constantly unsettle conventions and conveniences, forms that are only alive if they are constantly shaken up and questioned: and the more we shake them up, the more we refuse to content ourselves with ready-made answers, the more we put into practice the conviction that cinema can and should be a thousand things – what it was in the past or what remains to be explored, that this territory is infinite and the only one that really deserves exploring – the more chances we get to reveal the very meaning of our art and its place in the world. But none of that can be achieved alone. It needs to be extended, deepened, applied by everyone, with all attendant risks and with the exactingness necessary to realize this ambition.

This applies to all filming and to all filmmakers who have chosen to practise their art outside the laws and rules of the streaming industry and who have been able to preserve their often hard-won freedom – cinema’s supreme value – to their own benefit, of course, but also, and just as much, to the benefit of their collaborators. A film is a microcosm, all of society, every stratum is represented in it, and the same waves, the same tensions run through it, except that these values are put to the test more immediately, more urgently, on a daily basis and with immediately observable consequences. This is why I attach inestimable value to an ethical practice of cinema whose beneficial effects, pleasures as well as dangers, would be shared by all, amounting to a disalienated work at the heart of the very territory of alienation. I talked about accountability, and I believe one must first of all submit one’s work to the respect of these values.

As you can guess, I do not really like what has become of the current film industry in the hands of executives who look more like business managers produced by business schools, or of senior civil servants, who are often people of great quality but whose instincts, ambitions and imagination are a million miles away from those of the adventurers, the players and visionaries who built this cathedral we all share, the cathedral of the first century of cinema.

In this regard, I have always put my Faith in what is called independent cinema – structures whose historical models would be François Truffaut’s Les Films du Carrosse or Barbet Schroeder’s and Eric Rohmer’s Les Films du Losange. But this would disregard the work of producers who have, in the often hostile undergrowth of various film-funding bodies and in the maze of the banking system, managed to support – beyond any profit logic, happy not to be out of pocket themselves – singular, atypical works against the values of their time. Works by authentic authors who are themselves carried by nothing but their convictions, their obsessions but also their limits and their fragilities, the raw material of their work.



It is this ecosystem, rephrased time and again in different cultures and countries, more or less dependent on cinema-favourable legislation or patronage, or on nothing at all, that has kept alive reflection, research, daring and, first of all, a form of integrity that is indispensable to the best practice of cinema.


We have seen the wave of streaming cinema grow, we have seen cinema become an industry, and this industry become dominant – and I am hesitant to use the words “mind-numbing” or “alienating ”, which would have, until recently, flown quite naturally out of my pen without even feeling the need to justify it. Yet whereas, in another time, one could dream of cinema as a utopia, it seems to me that it has become perfectly dystopian and that, in the name of entertainment or whitewashed in conformism and bland good intentions, it is essentially devoted to the perpetuation and flattery of the most conventional emotions and of the lowest, if not inane, desires. In this respect, I am happy enough when a film, for lack of a concern with nature, light and the human, at least refrains from being harmful.

This is why, deep down, today, cinema must be made against cinema. Especially if it wishes to embody, within the new world of images, that which is most precious and most vital: the freedom to think, to invent, to search, to wander and to err, in short to be the antidote we need so as to preserve our faith and keep the flame alive, which it is our duty to know how to protect and transmit, generation after generation, in a battle that is never won.

March – April 2020






In 2018, by analogy with similar initiatives in other art forms, Sabzian created a new yearly tradition: Sabzian invites a guest to write a State of Cinema and to choose an accompanying film. Once a year, the art of film is held against the light: a speech that challenges cinema, calls it to account, points the way or refuses to define it, puts it to the test and on the line, summons or embraces it, praises or curses it. A plea, a declaration, a manifest, a programme, a testimony, a letter, an apologia or maybe even an indictment. In any case, a call to think about what cinema means, could mean or should mean today.

 For the third edition on 26 June 2020, Sabzian was honoured to welcome the French filmmaker and author Olivier Assayas. He had chosen Tarkovsky’s The Mirror to accompany his lecture. Sadly, due to the corona crisis, the screening could not take place. Olivier Assayas’ State of Cinema was streamed online.

State of Cinema 2020 :  Cinema in the Present Tense. By  Olivier Assayas. Sabzian , June 26 , 2020


Sabzian. Video
























19/11/2018

The legacy of André Bazin





André  Bazin died November 11, 1958. In honour of Bazin’s centenary, a look at his ideas. 



 “A modest fellow, sickly, slowly and prematurely dying, he it was who gave the patent of royalty to the cinema just as the poets of the past had crowned their kings.” So wrote Jean Renoir of the great French critic and theorist André Bazin, nine years after he succumbed to leukaemia a few months past his fortieth birthday. The occasion was the 1967 publication of What Is Cinema?, the first selection of his articles and reviews to be translated into English, and Renoir added in his preface: “There is no doubt about the influence that Bazin will have in the years to come.”


The prophecy was amply fulfilled, though (as is often the case with prophecies) not quite in the way Renoir had imagined. It’s no exaggeration to say that Bazin is the single thinker most responsible for bestowing on cinema the prestige both of an artform and of an object of knowledge. While scattered attempts had been made before to define the ‘essence’ of cinema (most notably in the works of Rudolf Arnheim and Siegfried Kracauer), Bazin’s ideas were to prove the decisive ones in establishing its credentials as a separate and legitimate field of intellectual enquiry. In one of his essays from the 40s Bazin projected that distant day when film studies would enter the university curriculum – and it was Bazin more than anyone else who played the role of midwife.

He was born on 18 April 1918 in Angers in north-west France. Having desired from an early age to be a teacher, he entered training college, finishing his studies in 1941 at the école normale supérieure at Saint-Cloud. Ultimately denied a teaching post because of his stammer, Bazin had the consolation of participating in the Maison des Lettres, an organisation founded to look after students whose schooling had been interrupted by the war. It was here, during the German occupation of Paris, that Bazin set up a ciné-club, regularly screening banned films in defiance of the Nazi authorities.

Shortly after the liberation Bazin was appointed director of cultural services at the Institut des Hautes études Cinématographiques, where he first began to crystallise his ideas in oral presentations and debates. He was also employed as film reviewer for the daily newspaper Le Parisien libéré, where his official career as a critic began. Yet Bazin never entirely lost sight of his educational ambitions, evidenced in a heuristic style of argument that implies more than it states and forces readers to think for themselves.

Bazin’s blend of the logical and the poetical drew the attention of Jean-Paul Sartre, who commissioned him to write essays for the distinguished philosophical journal Les Temps modernes. Thereafter his name became associated with a staggering array of popular and specialist magazines, the most notable being L’écran français, France-Observateur, Radio-Cinéma-Télévision, La Revue du cinéma, Critique and Esprit – and finally the historically momentous Cahiers du cinéma, which he founded with Jacques Doniol-Valcroze in 1951. In all Bazin is said to have penned some 2,000 pieces (he needed to be prolific since by this time he had a family to support – his wife Janine and a small son Florent).

The remainder of his life was an uneventful round of festivals, conferences and editorial meetings, progressively overshadowed by the illness with which he was diagnosed in 1954. He died at Nogent-sur-Marne on 11 November 1958. At the time he was completing a book-length study of Jean Renoir (later edited and arranged by his loyal disciple François Truffaut) and working on the script for Les églises romanes de Saintonge, a short documentary about Romanesque churches which he planned to direct himself.

There was always something a little medieval and monkish about Bazin. Renoir compared him to one of the saints pictured in the stained-glass windows at Chartres; Truffaut went so far as to call him a creature from the time before original sin. Nearly everyone acquainted with him eulogised his wisdom alongside his personal goodness – and couched both in terms drawn from religious asceticism. While the merest rumour of the transcendental is enough to scandalise most film theorists, it helps to explain Bazin’s enduring appeal among those at least open to the possibility.

Reading Bazin, you never have the sense of a professional flogging his specialism in return for institutional preferment. Instead, you come into contact with a person – or more correctly, a soul – bound by a sacred charge to enquire after truth. The luminous quality of Bazin’s writing can no doubt be attributed in part to his chronic frail health – reality stands out in colours all the more radiant for being contemplated under the shadow of death. But though it comprises the biggest stumbling block even for critics congenial to Bazin, there’s no denying the primary source of his inspiration: faith.

At the heart of Bazin’s strictures on cinematic realism lies the conviction that the movie camera, by the simple act of photographing the world, testifies to the miracle of God’s creation. It is sanctioned to do so precisely because it is an invention of science. Throughout the ages, Bazin argues, mankind has dreamed of being able to see the surface of the world faithfully copied in art (The Ontology of the Photographic Image, 1945). Bazin ascribes this wish to what he calls the “mummy complex” – an innate human need to halt the ceaseless flow of time by embalming it in an image. But it wasn’t until the development of photography in the nineteenth century that this appetite for the real could be fully satisfied.

For Bazin, a photograph holds an irrational power to persuade us of its truth because it results from a process of mechanical reproduction in which human agency plays no part. A painting, however lifelike, is still the obvious product of human craft and intention, whereas the photographic image is just what happens automatically when the light reflected from objects strikes a layer of sensitive chemical emulsion. “Photography affects like a phenomenon in nature, like a flower or a snowflake whose vegetable or earthly origins are an inseparable part of their beauty.”

In Bazin’s view, it’s this objective quality of the photograph – the fact that it is first of all a sensory datum and only later perhaps a work of art – which gives the medium its privileged relationship with the real. It follows that both photography and its spawn, the motion picture, have a special obligation towards reality. Their principal responsibility is to document the world before attempting to interpret or criticise it. For Bazin, this moral duty is ultimately a sacred one – the photographic media are, in effect, preordained to bear endless witness to the beauty of the cosmos.

Predictably, Bazin’s thesis has been assailed for placing the metaphysical cart before the materialist horse. And as if resolved to tweak the noses of his Marxist opponents, Bazin propounds the fanciful notion that technical change arises less as the outcome of economic and historical forces than from an ineffable something one can only call spiritual will (see The Myth of Total Cinema, 1946).

Photography and cinema, together with such innovations as colour stock, sound recording, anamorphic lenses and 3D, are successive responses to an obscurely planted desire for an ever more perfect approximation of the real. Although Bazin is generally too discreet a writer to let his theological slip show, it’s clear that he conceives of such artistic and industrial gains as prompted by an esoteric design. Here his thought betrays its sizeable debt to the science-cum-mysticism of radical Catholic visionary Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, who projected an evolutionary spiralling of human consciousness until it fuses with divine revelation. In more secular terms, there’s also a tinge of Sartrean existentialism in Bazin’s emphasis on a cinema of “becoming”.

Still, Bazin sets a hypothetical limit to his “myth of total cinema”. If cinema ever could succeed in becoming the exact double of reality, it would also fail – since it would cease to exist as cinema. Like a mathematical asymptote, filmic representation is always doomed to fall a little short of its goal. But if cinema never quite merges with life, that’s what allows it to be an artform whose mission is to reveal life. Bazin concedes that there is no art without artifice and that one must surrender a measure of reality in the process of translating it on to celluloid. The cinematic staging of the real can be carried out in untold ways, so it would be more suitable to speak of ‘realisms’ than of a single definitive realist mode. In this respect Bazin comes closer to endorsing the postmodern shibboleth of pluralism than his adversaries tend to realise – though he happily forgoes its nihilism. “Only the impassive lens,” he writes in The Ontology of the Photographic Image, “stripping its object of all those ways of seeing it, those piled-up preconceptions, that spiritual dust and grime with which my eyes have covered it, is able to present it in all its virginal purity to my attention and consequently to my love.”

Yet this pristine vision remains, strictly speaking, the inaccessible alpha and omega of the movie medium, since it is inevitably contaminated by human subjectivity. Individual films and filmmakers carve up the unbroken plenitude of the real, imposing on it style and meaning.

The crucial distinction for Bazin is (in an oft-quoted phrase from The Evolution of the Language of Cinema, 1950-55) between, “Those directors who put their faith in the image and those who put their faith in reality.” He took a notoriously dim view of Robert Wiene’s The Cabinet of Dr. Caligari (1919) and other films made in the German expressionist style because he judged their elaborate manipulations of lighting and decor a wilful attempt to bend reality out of shape and force it to reflect perverse states of mind. What Bazin objected to in the work of Sergei Eisenstein was how the Soviet director splintered reality into a series of isolated shots, which he then reassembled through the art of montage.

Bazin distrusted montage on the grounds that its dynamic juxtaposition of images hurtles the viewer along a predetermined path of attention, the aim being to construct a synthetic reality in support of a propagandist message. To Bazin this was a minor heresy – since it arrogated the power of God, who alone is entitled to confer meaning on the universe. But in as much as God absents himself from the world and leaves it up to us to detect the signs of his grace, Bazin valued those film artists who respected the mystery imbedded in creation.

One such director was the Italian neorealist Vittorio De Sica, who in films such as Bicycle Thieves (1948) and Umberto D (1951) humbly renounced the hubristic display of authorial personality and thus enabled the audience to intuit the numinous significance of people and things. “The mise en scène seems to take shape after the fashion of a natural form in living matter,” Bazin wrote in 1951 in De Sica: Metteur en scène. Bazin recognised that film art always condenses, shapes and orders the reality it records, but what he looked for in filmmakers was a kind of spiritual disposition towards reality – an intention to serve it by a scrupulous effacement of means and a corresponding unwillingness to do violence to it through ideological abstraction or self-aggrandising technique.




Given Bazin’s passionate advocacy of this cinema of ‘transparency’, it may seem puzzling that he is likewise remembered in film history as an architect of the celebrated politique des auteurs. Under his tutelage the younger journalists at Cahiers championed such previously patronised talents as Alfred Hitchcock, Howard Hawks and Douglas Sirk, thereby shifting the critical goalposts forever. (Since many of Bazin’s reviewing colleagues – Truffaut, Jean-Luc Godard, Eric Rohmer, Claude Chabrol and Jacques Rivette among them – went on to direct their own films, he is also often regarded as the father of the nouvelle vague.)

If Bazin’s criticism constitutes a cine-theology, it might almost be said that the auteur fulfils the role of saint – an inspired intercessor with reality. Bazin’s stake in the politique can probably be traced back to his involvement in the 1930s Christian existential movement known as personalism, which posited the creative individual who takes risks, makes choices and exercises his or her God-given faculty of free will.

However, it should be added that Bazin eventually distanced himself from the priestly cult of the director-author because he felt it ignored the commercial context in which most films were produced. A keen observer of Hollywood cinema (whose ‘classical’ adaptability he was among the first to appreciate), he nonetheless set its geniuses on a lower rung than those masters who answered to his chaste and simple ideals: Renoir, Chaplin, De Sica, Roberto Rossellini, Carl Dreyer and Robert Bresson.

Despite differences in stylistic approach, these film artists converge on the same enigmatic reality like the radii of a mandala. If anything joins them more specifically, it’s a concern to find the technical means for a concrete rendering of space and time. Another charge Bazin brought against montage was its sacrifice of the dimensional integrity of the photographed event. Though we live in duration and extension, montage can only cheat on our experience since it is an art of ellipsis. In the name of a higher realism, then, Bazin celebrated the long, uninterrupted take for its capacity to simulate the most elemental aspect of nature – its continuousness. Though Bazin knew, of course, that the camera must restrict itself to slicing out a tiny portion of space, he thought a tactful deployment of the mise en scène could sustain the illusion of life spilling over the borders of the frame.

His great hero in this regard was Renoir, who, significantly for Bazin, combined long takes with the technique of deep-focus cinematography. Bazin considered this not just one aesthetic option among others but perhaps the very essence of modern cinematic realism. For him, the incalculable virtue of deep focus is its ambiguity. Since everything in the film frame can be seen with equal clarity, the audience has to decide for itself what is meaningful or interesting. While a director such as Orson Welles or William Wyler (to whose 1941 The Little Foxes Bazin would return again and again) may provide accents in the composition of the image, a possibility is nonetheless opened up that the viewer can, so to speak, do the editing in his or her own head. In short, deep-focus cinematography invites an awareness of both personal freedom and ethical responsibility. In cinema as in life, we must be free to choose our own salvation.

On his death an obituary notice in Esprit cited Bazin as predicting that: “The year 2000 will salute the advent of a cinema free of the artificialities of montage, renouncing the role of an ‘art of reality’ so that it may climb to its final level on which it will become once and for all ‘reality made art’.” In this as in so much else, Bazin the jubilant millenarian has been proved exactly wrong. At no other period in its history has cinema been so enslaved by escapist fantasy – and never have we been less certain of the status of the real. Now the digitisation of the image threatens to cut the umbilical cord between photograph and referent on which Bazin founded his entire theory.

Moreover, the particular forms of transparency that he admired have grown opaque in just a few decades. Italian neorealism increasingly yields up its melodrama and fakery while the mannered and rigid mise en scène of deep focus betrays its theatricality. In the end, every living realism petrifies – becomes a relic in the museum of obsolete artistic styles. But as Bazin might have said (of himself above all), the certainty of failure doesn’t rule out the necessity for each artist to strive to honour reality according to his or her own lights and to those of the time. All it requires is a leap of faith.

Though he didn’t live to see the first flowering of academic film theory in the late 60s, the pedagogic side of Bazin would doubtless have been gratified that cinema was no longer a trivial pursuit but henceforth a serious discipline calling for the most concentrated attention and rigour. Yet the poet in him – the fecund wielder of figure and metaphor, who drew on the fathomless well of his own intuitions – would just as surely have experienced a sense of loss. For the scholarly discourse of cinema soon developed a pomp and rigidity that increasingly excluded those dazzling imaginative leaps at the heart of Bazin’s style.

It was his good fortune to write in the period just before film studies congealed into an institution. As a working critic, contributing irregularly and – so he thought – ephemerally to the pages of Cahiers du cinéma, Bazin could allow his mind free play in an atmosphere as yet unhampered by Jesuitical nit-picking. He enjoyed the privilege of a critic in being able to cut to the quick of an argument with no other justification than his own unerring instinct. In consequence, Bazin’s thought is infinitely more concrete, nimble and flexible than the lucubrations of those obliged to flag each theoretical move with a sheaf of footnotes.

Yet it was for these very virtues that Bazin came under attack by the budding generation of film pedants – and almost at the same moment as he was canonised as a classic. Bazin, it was claimed, refused to follow due process. His vaunted theory of realism amounted to little more than a loose patchwork of ideas that never coalesced into a stringent system but remained dangerously impressionistic and often flatly contradictory. But professional intellectuals who jumped on Bazin’s alleged incoherence also underrated the profoundly dialectical nature of his thinking. To put it another way, they were stone-blind to Bazin’s poetic genius – his ability to hold contrary terms in a state of paradoxical suspension that transcends mere theory and approaches mystical understanding.




But there was worse to come. For Bazin, a rhapsodist of cinema and a true believer in its perfectibility, had replied to his own sweeping question ‘what is cinema?’ with a resounding affirmation – whereas the new breed of theorists answered it increasingly in the negative. In the wake of the 60s counterculture film-studies departments across Europe were transformed into hubs of self-styled revolutionary activity. Fuelled by the absolutist views of French structuralist Marxist Louis Althusser (who proclaimed the function of the mass media to be an endless replication of ruling-class values), radical academics came not to praise cinema but to bury it.

It was perhaps impossible to avoid a head-on collision between Bazin’s meditative humanism and a dogmatism that saw popular cinema as an ideological apparatus – an efficient machine for turning out docile citizens. As the most eminent critic of the preceding decade Bazin became a figurehead for the establishment and the militant new regime at Cahiers hammered him for his political complicity (an Oedipal rebellion if ever there was one). Crossing over to Britain by way of the influential theoretical journal Screen, the sport of Bazin-bashing proliferated throughout the 70s and 80s. How could anyone be fool enough to suppose that cinema was capable of recording reality directly when the reciprocal insights of semiotics and Lacanian psychoanalysis had demonstrated that human perception is always mediated by language? It might almost be said that the whole Byzantine edifice of contemporary film theory sprang out of an irresistible itch to prove Bazin wrong.

Nowadays, of course, it is a truth universally acknowledged that reality is a construction, and Bazin’s reputed innocence on this score no longer raises sectarian hackles – more like a condescending smile. It must be admitted that his earnest belief in the intrinsically realist vocation of film puts him on the far side of postmodern relativism and doubt. Yet in so far as a compulsive scepticism and a jaded cynicism have become the orthodoxies of our age, this may be the moment to start rehabilitating reality – and André Bazin.


Divining the real: the leaps of faith in André Bazin’s film criticism. By Peter Matthews. Sight and Sound , April 18,  2018


From the 1910s into the 1960s, filmmakers, critics, and intellectuals created a distinctive tradition of writing about cinema. These writers were seeking to understand the nature, functions, and resources of film as an art form. Georg Lukács, Riccioto Canudo, Louis Delluc, Leon Moussinac, Rudolf Arnheim, and other writers contributed to this tradition, as did filmmakers like Eisenstein, Kuleshov, Pudovkin, and Dziga Vertov. These theorists advanced widely different positions, but they held some ideas in common. For instance, they tended to assume that the medium had an expressive essence that set it apart from other art forms. For Delluc and his followers, that essence lay in the mysterious quality of photogénie. For the Russians and many of their admirers, cinema’s expressive core was to be found in the technique of editing. For Arnheim, the essence of film was its abstraction from perceptual reality.

Another feature of this trend was a prescriptive bent. Both filmmakers and film theorists tended to judge some techniques superior to others, usually because those techniques were in harmony with the purported essence of cinema. For example, many thinkers held that a lengthy, static shot constituted merely passive recording. The result was “theatrical” and hence “unfilmic.” By contrast, editing was ipso facto a good thing because it manifested what cinema was uniquely equipped to do—juxtapose moving images in time and space, with a freedom unavailable to the drama. Essentialism and evaluation meshed: The best films tended to be the most “cinematic” ones.

André Bazin’s theorizing fits snugly into this tradition. His writings reflect on the fundamental nature of film, its artistic resources, and its social and political effects. His original contribution to the tradition lay in his arguments for mechanical recording as a virtue, not a deficit to be overcome. Contrary to the dominant strain of the 1920s and 1930s, Bazin believed cinema’s essence to lie in its photographic capacity, its power to lay bare the phenomenal reality of the world. As a result, he argued that the “unfilmic” technique of the long take, conjoined to camera movement and depth of field photography, respected that reality. It was editing, the technique once held to be the supremely filmic technique, that introduced a level of artifice with which directors would have to contend.

The originality of Bazin’s thought challenged other traditional beliefs as well, perhaps most radically the notion that a theory of cinema ought to be wholly occupied with the question of film as an art. Still, he did not reject certain assumptions of the standard position. Like his forebears, Bazin posited an ontology of cinema that defines its intrinsic nature: in his view, its recording capacity. Like his forebears, he based value judgments about films and filmmakers on the extent to which they respected that nature. In these respects he remained a classical film theorist.

Suppose, however, we imagined another strain in film theorizing. Imagine reflection and research that do not take Cinema as a whole as its object. This project would concentrate instead upon certain periods, genres, styles, trends, or other delimited phenomena. Imagine as well that this investigation holds in suspension the idea of a cinematic essence, recognizing film’s distinct (if not unique) resources while also exploring cinema’s many affinities with other media. Imagine as well that this inductive inquiry seeks out regularities of cinematic subjects, forms, and styles of a certain places or periods. Imagine that the researcher also tries to discover how certain effects are reliably produced by those regularities. And imagine that this enterprise is descriptive, analytical, and explanatory, not (at least primarily) evaluative.

What would differentiate this from the study of trends in style and form undertaken by art historians or musicologists? The search for broader principles—be they explicitly canonized rules or items of expertise that filmmakers know tacitly. I take it that this search can be labeled a poetics: a systematic inquiry into the materials, forms, and constructive principles of filmmaking within various traditions.

The most salient instance of this enterprise in the classical era of film theorizing is the anthology Poetika Kino (1927). Here prominent literary critics affiliated with the Russian Formalist school joined filmmakers to propose some general principles governing film structure and style. Granted, the essays don’t wholly avoid evaluation, and some make passing declarations about what the essential conditions of cinema might be. Yet to a surprising extent for their period, the writers try to elucidate principles of plot construction, stylistic texture, and spectatorial uptake.

Given this perspective, we can read other classical theorists as offering as a sort of poétique malgré lui. For example, Arnheim valorizes significant form as a basis for cinematic art. We do not have to accept his theory of value, or his ontology of film art, to recognize that he discovered broad principles of expressive form, such as the geometricization of shot composition and the importance of changing image gestalts in the course of a shot or sequence. These principles can help us pick out important pictorial trends, from silent cinema (Keaton, Sternberg) through to modern times (Tarkovsky, Sokurov). Likewise, Eisenstein’s taxonomies of types of montage (metric, rhythmic, tonal, etc.) may apply well to his own practice, but the principles he enunciates can be found in several filmmakers, even Ozu. Eisenstein’s pedagogical exercises offer an even more explicit conception of poiesis, or active making, than his better-known “official” theorizing. Vladimir Nizhny’s collection of classroom sessions, Lessons with Eisenstein, is a rich source of “practical theory,” the sort of fine-grained attention to creative choices that feeds directly into a film poetics.  In sum, when theorists base their claims on inductive inferences and empirical claims, a poetician can take those as prods, hypotheses, or bodies of evidence warranting further inquiry.

Bazin, of course, is traditionally thought of as a realist. Yet much in his work points toward a film poetics. Reading him from this angle forces us to bracket off some of his most original assumptions about photographic realism and the strongly evaluative conclusions he arrives at. For many readers, this is too much to surrender. But I think that the effort is worth making. My own research is deeply indebted to his work, so in a sense this essay is a tribute. He might not agree with how I’ve treated his ideas; I wish he were still living to criticize me. In any event, here are what I take to be some major lessons that Bazin’s work offers to someone pursuing an empirical and historical poetics of cinema.

Bazin taught us several methodological lessons. Perhaps the most striking is his propensity for analyzing shots and scenes in exquisite detail. In his journalistic reviews, of course, such description would have been out of place, but in his longer essays, such as his classic study of William Wyler, and in his book on Orson Welles, he plunged into fine-grained analysis of a sort that was almost unprecedented in film writing. Most such passages are too long to quote here, but I can’t refrain from a sample, from Bazin’s account of The Best Years of Our Lives.






      This scene is set in a bar. Fredric March has just convinced [Dana] Andrews to break off with his daughter and urges him to call her immediately. Andrews gets up and goes toward the telephone booth located near the door, at the back of the room. March leans on a piano in the foreground and pretends to get interested in the musical exercise that the crippled sailor (Harold Russell) is learning to play with his hooks. The camera’s field of view shows the keyboard of the piano dominating the foreground, March and Russell in the middle distance, the whole barroom around them, and, quite distinctly, Andrews in the far distance, tiny in a telephone booth. This shot is clearly built upon two dramatic poles and three characters. The action in the foreground is secondary, although interesting and unusual enough to demand our keen attention, since it occupies a privileged place in the composition. Yet the true action, the one that constitutes at this exact moment a turning point in the story, develops almost secretly in a tiny rectangle at the back of the room—in the left corner of the screen.

And so on for six more paragraphs of nuanced description!

This level of detail remains extraordinary. Most discussions of film today, in both the popular press and academic work, don’t try for it. (Perhaps that’s partly because after all these years both critics and researchers remain largely uninterested in visual style.) Bazin had a sharp eye. He counted shots across entire films and used a stopwatch to time scenes.  As a result, he was the only critic I know to realize that Hollywood films typically had an average shot length between nine and twelve seconds. Bazin’s precision is all the more remarkable in that he was largely working from memory and notes. He did not have our access to archives and editing tables, let alone video copies. He wrote his final essay, a penetrating analysis of the courtyard murder in Le Crime de M. Lange, after watching the film in a television broadcast.  If he had done nothing else, Bazin would be remembered today for his pioneering efforts in close visual analysis.

Analysis can degenerate into shapeless description if there are no concepts to mold it. Bazin’s explications gain solidity because firm ideas organize the details. The broadest of those concepts—profondeur de champ, the long take, cinematic narration, and the like—are commonplaces today, but it’s worth remembering that he made them important tools for every critic and theorist. In most cases, however, he didn’t originate them. Where did they come from? From other writers, but also from film artisans. Hence a second methodological lesson for poetics: Listen to the filmmakers.

In early 1941, Gregg Toland wrote an article called “Realism for ‘Citizen Kane.’” He claimed that he and Welles had agreed on a visual approach that obliged them to shoot in what we would now call long takes. Apart from chiming with Welles’ theatrical experience, the sustained shot would avoid cuts.

      We tried to plan action so that the camera could pan or dolly from one angle to another whenever this type of treatment was desirable. In other scenes, we pre-planned our angles and compositions so that action which ordinarily would be shown in direct cuts would be shown in a single, longer scene—often one in which important action might take place simultaneously in widely-separated points in extreme foreground and background…. Welles’ technique of visual simplification might combine what would conventionally be made as two separate shots—a close-up and an insert—in a single, non-dollying shot.

What permitted this, Toland explained was his technique of “pan focus,” the tactic of keeping all planes of action in sharp relief. Later in 1941, he published a more general piece on the creative work of the cinematographer, and he restated this theme.


       Hitherto the camera had to be focused either for a close or a distant shot, all efforts to encompass both at the same time resulting in one or the other being out of focus. This handicap necessitated the breaking up of a scene into long and short angles, with much consequent loss of realism. With pan-focus, the camera, like the human eye, sees an entire panorama at once, with everything clear and lifelike.

The idea of optical realism, the emphasis upon sustained shots (called “scenes,” as they often were called at the time), the possibility that a single depth shot could contain the equivalent of two or more closer shots, and of course the technique of “deep-focus” cinematography—all these tenets of Bazin’s aesthetic are here in rudimentary form.

Citizen Kane opened in Paris on 3 July 1946. Its technical innovations had already been discussed in the French cinephile press of the time, and Toland’s second 1941 essay was translated in 1947. All critics were primed to notice the film’s technique, and Toland’s rationale, which was part of the film’s publicity campaign, gave critics several important concepts with which to work.

Similarly, in early 1947 William Wyler published an article about the making of The Best Years of Our Lives, and this teases out another implication of Toland’s signature style.


        Gregg Toland’s remarkable facility for handling background and foreground action has enabled me over a period of six pictures he has photographed to develop a better technique of staging my scenes. For example, I can have action and reaction in the same shot, without having to cut back and forth from individual cuts [shots] of the characters. This makes for smooth continuity, an almost effortless flow of the scene, for much more interesting composition in each shot, and lets the spectator look from one to the other character at his own will, do his own cutting.

French critics knew Wyler’s essay, and they picked up his idea that a densely composed shot in depth gave the spectator a certain amount of freedom. In February of 1948, Alexandre Astruc declared that profondeur de champ “obliges the spectator's eye to make its own technical découpage, that is to find for itself within the scene those lines of action usually delineated by camera movements.”  In the same month, Bazin’s appreciative essay, “William Wyler ou le janseniste de mise-en-scène,” quoted the passage above as evidence that Wyler allows the spectator “to perform the final cutting [l’opération finale du découpage] himself.”

It takes nothing from Bazin’s originality to acknowledge that these concepts were circulating in his community. For he grasped their implications more deeply and developed them more imaginatively than anyone else. He quickly extended the idea of depth staging to Renoir’s 1930s work, again following up comments from the director.  He distinguished Welles’ baroque use of depth from the more neutral and uninflected setups of Wyler. And as I’ll show shortly, he developed the concept of “the viewer’s découpage” of the action in highly original ways. In all, Bazin’s work offers an exemplary instance of how a poetics of cinema can pick up hints from filmmakers’ explanations of their creative choices, test those statements against the films, and elaborate the ideas in ways that point out broader principles of construction.

This brings me to my third methodological lesson, one we might call constrained generalization. Film theorists, as I’ve suggested, tended to think globally, seeking out laws that characterize cinema as a whole. Film historians tended to think more locally—sometimes too locally. The historiography of Bazin’s day treated film’s development as owing everything to national cinemas. Maurice Bardèche and Robert Brasillac’s Histoire du cinema (published in 1935), the standard book on the subject for Bazin’s generation, treated history as largely a matter of national cinemas, each with an indigenous movement or trend at a given period. The same plan was expanded to epic dimensions in Georges Sadoul’s Histoire générale du cinéma, volumes of which were being published as Bazin was starting his career.

Bazin saw continuity where these senior historians saw change, and he posited common tendencies across different cultures. Some of these tendencies were frankly speculative, as when he posited that a universal yearning for a simulacrum of reality led cinema to be invented in different countries at about the same time. More concretely, he showed that a many postwar directors in Europe, England, and the U.S. faced a common problem: How to adapt plays and novels in ways that respected, indeed acknowledged, their specific identity as dramatic or literary texts? This led him to study how modern cinematic technique could highlight conventions characteristic of other media: the theatricality of theatre in Olivier’s Henry V and Melville’s Enfants terribles, the use of ellipsis and tense structures in Diary of a Country Priest.




Senior historians had claimed that “film language” developed along a straight line, with each artist contributing to a growing fund of expressive resources. But Bazin saw a clash of norms. He identified an international film style, derived from American continuity editing, that was slightly modified with the coming of sound. Against this he located a more distinctive trend, one that was coming to fruition in his own day. Current filmmakers seemed to be rejecting the American découpage-based style in favor of something more faithful to the continuity of time and space. This trend he saw in Renoir, Wyler, Welles, and the Neorealists—linked not by country or culture, but by a shared urge to render the phenomenal world. Bazin’s account is thus neither universal nor narrowly local. It is fixed firmly in history but acknowledges that disparate artists can arrive at similar solutions to shared problems. By pointing out how filmmakers in different countries could converge on similar norms, he managed to create middle-level generalizations that avoided vacuity and invited refinement.


To these three methodological lessons—scrutinize the film; listen to the filmmaker; and build constrained generalizations—I’ll add three substantive ones. The first is directly related to the search for middle-range trends.

Elsewhere I’ve argued that Bazin engineered a counter-history of film style suitable for the mature sound cinema. Through close analysis and an ingenious deepening of arguments sketched by his contemporaries, he revised the standard account in subtle and far-reaching ways.  The product of this effort is best seen in his essay “L’Évolution du langage cinématographique,” assembled at the end of his life from three earlier essays. Other essays, along with his books on Welles and Renoir, supplement and clarify these.

The “Évolution” essay is usually seen as offering historical support for Bazin’s larger theory of cinema. If cinema’s ontology is based in photographic recording, the history of cinema enacts a Hegelian unfolding: the medium’s development gradually reveals its true essence. It goes this way: Two tendencies of the silent cinema, sheer recording (e.g., Lumière actualites) and artifice (abstract montage), vied with one another for supremacy until an unstable equilibrium was reached in the early sound cinema. That international sound style banished the extremes of montage seen in Griffith, Gance, and Eisenstein. In the “classical découpage” of the 1930s the phenomenal reality of space and time was respected to a considerable degree. But then Renoir, Welles, and Wyler lifted the dialectic to a new level. They fulfilled the promise of cinema’s ontology through techniques like camera movement and profondeur de champ, which record phenomenal reality. These creators “surpassed the surpassing” by building into the densely composed shot all the details that would have been assembled through classical découpage. Editing now took its rightful place, used when it is necessary for more abstract storytelling (e.g., montage sequences summarizing a passage of time). The new style of the period after 1939 was the fulfillment of cinema’s essence.

Here Bazin’s evaluative preferences come to the fore. The best films are those early films that respected reality (works of Murnau, Flaherty, von Stroheim, Dreyer) and those contemporary films that delivered cinema from decades of flirtation with stylized artifice (works of Renoir, Wyler, Welles, the Neorealists).

The difficulties with Bazin’s conception of film’s essence are well-known, and the dialectical trajectory he traces can be faulted on historical grounds. For example, classical découpage is not a creation of the sound era. It was forged in the 1910s (only partly thanks to Griffith), and it was stabilized before the “heresies” of German Expressionism and Soviet Montage emerged. Nevertheless, if we decouple Bazin’s grander theoretical commitments from his investigation into the evolution of film style, we find that he has sketched a rich research program in film poetics.

His claims can be tested, corrected, expanded, or rejected in the light of further information. Has he accurately characterized the tendencies at work in the periods he sets out? What motivates the choice of his exemplary filmmakers? If we sample a wider range of films than he could, do his claims stand up?

To summarize drastically, I think that contemporary research would revise Bazin’s schema along the following lines. There was much more variety in the first dozen years of filmmaking than he could have known. Editing, close-ups, camera movement, and other “advanced” techniques were developed and, rather surprisingly, sometimes abandoned. By the 1910s, two broad stylistic norms emerged in the fiction film. European filmmakers and some in other countries, including America, refined a tableau style based in lateral and depth staging. Meanwhile, in the course of the 1910s most U.S. filmmakers abandoned the tableau and embraced continuity editing as the controlling technique. The years afterward saw the triumph of the American editing style in most film industries, although that style was subject to some local variation.

To continue my revision: The coming of sound ratified continuity norms, and camera movement was integrated into them in ways that fulfilled and expanded traditional functions. Longer takes and depth staging, to be found in every decade and many countries during the silent era, were also assimilated into the continuity style, not only by Renoir, Welles, and Wyler but also by Ophuls, Mizoguchi, Hawks, and many other filmmakers. Deep-space arrays and deep-focus filming became international trends in the 1940s and in the 1950s, at least in black-and-white work, but such imagery remained embedded in a framework of classical continuity editing. In sum, Bazin’s claims about dialectical breaks and freedom of visual exploration depend on a selective use of evidence. From the early 1910s on, international film style in mass-market cinema shows a pattern of development in which new technical devices are harnessed to powerful norms of cinematic construction.
My account of this newer story is itself schematic, and it isn’t invulnerable to criticism. It will doubtless be revised in future research. My point is simply that Bazin offered us a new framework based on acute observation and bold conjectures. We need not accept his ontological premises or his prescriptive conclusions to find his empirical claims informative and his inductive inferences plausible. By testing and recasting this framework, the study of the history of film style has made progress.

So let’s take Bazin’s transnational story about the evolution of style as a first substantive lesson in poetics. A second lesson bears more on causes and functions. How do we explain the process of continuity and change we observe in Bazin’s scheme, or the recasting of it that I sketched? What conditions created the “evolution of film language,” and what resulted from it?


The influential historians of Bazin’s day offered two principal explanatory strategies. Bardèche and Brasillach, as befitted their right-wing alliances, saw national schools as informed by a sort of volksgeist or national character. Sjöström, they tell us, “flooded his sober plots with a sort of radiance, with a sort of nostalgia and all that atmosphere for which the Scandinavians have created an untranslatable word—Stemming.” Sadoul, man of the left, tended more towards a broadly economic mode of explanation, particularly when discussing the class appeals of early cinema and the cartelizing conduct of Hollywood.

Bazin admired Sadoul, and he took much from Bardèche and Brasillach (without acknowledging them). Yet he often preferred more transcendent explanations. The most famous instance is his claim, in “Le Mythe du cinéma total,” that the earliest inventors were fulfilling a universal dream of capturing reality. This tendency to posit a spirit or will to form, whereby individual historical actors fulfill a mission inherent in the medium, can be seen in the “Évolution” essay as well. The stylistic tendencies—“faith in the image” versus “faith in reality”—become historical forces in themselves rather than convenient labels we apply to a welter of individual decisions and institutional pressures.

Granted, Bazin was sensitive to certain technological constraints, especially of lens design and lighting. (Are these also the inheritance of Toland’s remarks on Kane?) But his comments treat these as chiefly encouraging or inhibiting the flowering of cinema’s true essence. For example, Bazin claims that the lenses of early filmmaking were designed to take in a wide view of the set, as filmmakers covered scenes in a single distant shot. Lenses of longer focal length, he implies, were developed in tandem with cutting patterns that isolated figures and threw backgrounds out of focus. “Progress in optics is closely linked with progress in editing.” Again, however, Bazin was subject to limitations of his period and limited knowledge of silent film history, so his remarks, however pregnant with implications, tend to treat “technical progress” as another reified force.



Abandoning Bazin’s Hegelian evolutionary scheme, later researchers have been able to disclose more concrete causal forces. In The Classical Hollywood Cinema (1985), two collaborators and I sought to show that the development of classical découpage sprang from a mix of institutional and individual action. The American cinema developed a mode of production that, in order to be routinized, based its work processes on the continuity scenario. That document served as a blueprint for other phases of what Marx called “serial manufacture.” The script broke scenes into shots for maximum control during shooting and editing; it had the equally important effect of creating a cinema of dynamic storytelling. At the same time, the discourses of the industry—chiefly the trade and professional press—converged on conceptions of quality, continuity, and other features that provided fairly clear-cut goals for filmmakers. Adjacent Hollywood institutions, like service firms and professional associations, affirmed these goals as well, even as they steered them to their own aims.

In sum, the system of aesthetic norms we call “classical film style” was created by a convergence of particular institutional forces offering historical agents a restricted set of choices, a weighted set of solutions to recurrent problems. Once the system was stabilized, new technologies, new stylistic devices, and new modes of organization could be adapted to fit the traditional structures of production and stylistic expression.

Whatever the virtues and faults of these arguments, The Classical Hollywood Cinema attempted to provide specific accounts of how institution-driven norms and craft practices shaped stylistic choices in a particular era. It is to these factors that a poetician can look for proximate causes of artistic continuity or change. Once more, Bazin has bequeathed us a set of questions rather than answers. By looking beyond national character and class-based interests, Bazin reminded us that other causes might have played a role.


Bazin floated not only causal but functional explanations for the stylistic changes he observed. This tendency accords well with a poetics of film, which seeks to explain how constructive principles are designed to elicit particular effects from spectators. He assumed that we are tacitly sensitive to style, and that even subtle stylistic choices are registered, perhaps subliminally, by spectators. He argued that showing a child in the same frame as an approaching lion was more arousing than creating the impression of that action by intercutting shots of a child and shots of a prowling lion. Filming an action in a full shot will serve to create a greater sense of concrete spatial and temporal realism.

Most theorists in the classical tradition assumed that pictorial devices functioned to guide the spectator’s attention. Writers who saw editing as the central film technique insisted that it worked to draw the viewer’s eye to what was most important in the scene at any moment. Bazin did not question this assumption, but he refined it in two ways. First, he suggested that classical découpage was in this respect basically an extension of theatre, enlarging this or that aspect of a homogeneous scene, much as if the viewer were scanning the stage and using opera glasses to study a part of the action. More importantly, the density of the deep-focus image, according to Bazin, worked against the linear, univocal effects of editing. Cutting forced us to look here, then there; but Wyler and Welles designed their shots so that spectators had more “freedom” to discover levels of significance, to “make their own découpage,” as we’ve seen.

Further, this activity offers a new kind of experience. Citizen Kane and The Magnificent Ambersons use deep focus to increase the viewer’s psychological investment in the action.

                     Obliged to exercise his liberty and his intelligence, the spectator perceives the ontological ambivalence of reality directly, in the very structure of its appearances…. [Deep-focus filming yields] a realism that is in a certain sense ontological, restoring to the object and the décor their density of being, the weight of their presence; a dramatic realism which refuses to separate the actor from the décor, the foreground from the background; a psychological realism which brings the spectator back to the real conditions of perception, a perception which is never completely determined a priori.

Once established, this perceptual realism can yield a daring game of vision. What is in the foreground should be more important than action in the distant background, but in The Best Years of Our Lives, Wyler makes the foreground action at the piano distract us from what is taking place in the telephone booth. In The Little Foxes, the key action of Herbert Marshall collapsing on the staircase takes place in the background, but Wyler throws it out of focus. Bazin remarks that this makes us strain to see it: “This artificial blurriness augments our feeling of anxiety: as if over the shoulder of Bette Davis, who faces us and has her back to her husband, we have to discern in the distance the result of a drama whose protagonist nearly eludes us.”

Bazin has selected some striking, probably atypical examples, but he shows that the hypothesis of guiding the spectator’s attention around the frame can yield great insights. We can go on to study how staging such scenes calls on more basic principles of steering the viewer’s visual exploration (frontality, position in the picture format, and so on). We can also study something that Bazin neglected: the ways in which dialogue can highlight figures in a densely composed shot. Moving beyond the individual scenes, we can analyze how in earlier scenes in Little Foxes and Best Years Wyler prepares us to notice these climactic compositions.Nonetheless, it was Bazin who made them prototypical cases—tough, if extreme, examples that demand explanation.

My account of Bazin’s contributions to poetics might seem to have favored only one dimension of inquiry, stylistics. The emphasis reflects both my own interests and one of Bazin’s abiding concerns. But poetics has many other dimensions: the study of genre, of thematics, and of overall form, or “composition” in its broadest sense. Bazin made contributions to all of these areas of inquiry, but I want to conclude my survey of his curriculum by examining yet another dimension of poetics. Besides his effort to analyze and explain film style, Bazin proved truly pioneering in examining new strategies of narrative construction that arose in the postwar period.

Bazin was captivated by the Neorealist films that were pouring into Paris at about the same time as American imports were. “It could well be that, today, Italy is the country where the understanding of film is at its highest,” he wrote in 1948. Most critics celebrated the fact that Neorealist films turned a new light on the nation’s social problems and did so by using nonactors and shooting on location. Bazin went further. He greeted these technical innovations part of that evolution toward realism that he saw as the most progressive trend in contemporary cinema. And another hallmark of the movement was its attitude toward cinematic narrative, an attitude that was in harmony with the contemporary American and European novel.

Bazin finds, for instance, that the new Italian films display remarkably fragmented plots. Paisá is a film of episodes, treating its stories as more or less incomplete; even within each episode, the action is presented obliquely, and many dramatic issues remain unresolved. “The technique of Rossellini undoubtedly maintains an intelligible succession of events, but these do not mesh like a chain with the sprockets of a wheel. The mind has to leap from one event to the other as one leaps from stone to stone in crossing a river.” Hollywood’s dramatic arcs and tight linkage of cause and effect yield to a sheer succession of events, with scenes dwelling on conventionally undramatic moments. “The story unfolds without regard for the rules of suspense, its only resource being a concern with things themselves, as in life.” De Sica’s Ladri di bicyclette “unfolds on the level of pure accident: the rain, the seminarians, the Catholic Quakers, the restaurant—all these are seemingly interchangeable, no one seems to have arranged them in order on a dramatic spectrum.” In such formulations, Bazin showed himself as sensitive to narrative constuction as he was to visual style.



Bazin’s discussions of Neorealism laid bare several principles that would shape the narratives of postwar cinematic modernism. The temps morts of so many 1950s and 1960s dramas were anticipated in La Terra trema, in which Visconti builds his scenes out of “blocks of reality.” “A fisherman rolls a cigarette? No ellipsis compresses the operation; we see the whole thing. It will not be reduced to its dramatic or symbolic meaning.”       The meandering, unpredictable string of encounters in Rossellini’s Voyage to Italy is a logical step in the Neorealist approach to plotting. Bazin did not live to see Hiroshima mon amour, with a second half centering on a couple drifting through the city in a nocturnal pas de deux, or L’Avventura and La Notte, with their languid, apparently aimless strolls. But he would surely have recognized these wayward excursions as a logical extension of what he found in Ladri di bicyclette: “It would be no exaggeration to say that Ladri di bicyclette is the story of a walk through the streets of Rome by a father and his son.”Dwight Macdonald sloganized the insight: “The Talkies have become the Walkies.”

Bazin invested the narrative experiments of Neorealism with an ontological and moral weight stemming from his commitments to phenomenological realism. Once again, those of us who don’t share those commitments can nevertheless weigh the justice of his observations about large-scale form. Bazin’s observations have proven very helpful in characterizing what we call in English “art cinema.” Bazin’s analyses of Neorealism point up principles of construction basic to an entire narrative tradition that was forming under his eyes.

Beyond matters of methodology, beyond the empirical discoveries he bequeathed us, Bazin shows us that any theory which takes into account the craft practices of filmmaking, the formal and stylistic patterning that films display, and the implications of filmmakers’ creative choices can help answer the questions posed by a poetics. All this isn’t to say that we should strip off the “poetics” from Bazin’s theory and toss away the rest. His theoretical arguments are fascinating and remain relevant to the digital age. His criticism is lyrical and eloquent. As a researcher, however, I want to explore some paths he did not follow to the end. Barred from university posts by a chronic stammer, he became an inspiring teacher, and we are still his students.

Lessons with Bazin: Six Paths to a Poetics. By David Bordwell.  David Bordwell , October 2018. 





André Bazin plays a central role in the history of film and media studies. Initially praised by modernist filmmakers and proponents of French film criticism of the 1950s, Bazin shortly after became one of the most denounced thinkers in an academic film studies informed by Althusserian Marxism, Lacanian psychoanalysis, structuralism and, later, post-structuralism. Yet only a handful of canonical essays from a much wider corpus of Bazin’s work were referenced by many of his critics, which meant that there was a limited understanding of Bazin’s ideas in the field of film studies for more than thirty years. Therefore, one should not be overly surprised that in the 21st century, a time of archival excavation and unexpected theoretical encounters, the Bazinian line of thought has reappeared in a new light. A tide of academic essays and collections of articles on Bazin’s legacy in combination with ongoing translations of his dispersed texts have given rise to what Richard Allen recently described as the “moment of Bazin Studies.”

André Bazin’s New Media is an original and solid contribution to this “moment.” The book features fifty-seven of Bazin’s essays that were selected and translated by Dudley Andrew. In the introduction, Andrew reveals Bazin’s concern with a broad “family of images,” including films, photos, television and moving image technologies. By expressing his primary interest in the unexplored archive of Bazin’s writings, Andrew sets forth the main intention of the book: “to look beyond André Bazin’s film theory to see what kind of media critic he might have been.” Therefore, it contains essays that either focus on television (204 pages of the 319-page book are devoted to television criticism), or addresses technological innovations of cinema of the 1950s. The collection is structured into six primary parts and a ‘Finale.’ Each part consists of Bazin’s essays written between 1952 and 1958 that were published in various French periodicals.

The first part of the book, ‘The Ontology and Language of Television,’ demonstrates Bazin’s captivating insights into the question of the nature of television. In these essays Bazin admits that TV is more a technology of reproduction and transmission than an artistic medium. Thereafter, Bazin identifies a psychological feeling of the intimacy of television image that, from his point of view, has the strongest effect on the viewer. For him, intimacy is generated by “live transmission,” one of the most important ontological qualities of the new medium. Believing that TV should not prefer the recorded image, Bazin writes that “the aesthetic morality of the television … is one of frankness and risk” . Subsequently, in some other essays the concept of ‘Telegénie’ is repeatedly pinpointed by stressing that an appearance on the small screen is no longer a question of beauty (as it is in case of ‘Photogénie’, a term coined by French impressionists in the 1920s), but of “human authenticity” . Bazin’s fascination with TV’s ability to present ordinary people in real time and space – for instance, in social dramas that were shot in a single non-studio location during a short period of time – is comparable to his admiration of neorealist aesthetics in cinema.

In the second part, ‘Television among the Arts,’ positing television in connection to different arts of the time allows Bazin to delineate an exceptionality of the conditions of television production and its spectatorship. Yet, while acknowledging the technological innovativeness of television, Bazin advocates a respect for “the fundamental laws” of older arts, arguing that these laws can be modified but should be not destroyed. In fact Bazin described television as “the presence of the theater with the ubiquity of cinema” .

In the third part, ‘Television and Society,’ Bazin’s fervent thoughts about the ubiquity of the emerging small screen media evoke the once lively but unfulfilled promise of TV as a social medium able to spread culture and create a wide community of responsible viewers. However, Bazin’s generally positive attitude towards the expansion of television does not stop him from a critical evaluation of the content of TV programs and their impact on the viewer. Essay titles such as ‘Do We really Need Those Serials?’ or ‘TV Can Popularize Without Boredom and Betrayal,’ signal his irritation with some television programs of his time. Accordingly, the French critic rhetorically asks about the possibility of the new medium to entice the viewers not by automatising their daily habits (“intoxicating the imagination of the mass viewer” and functioning as “narcotics of the mind,” as Bazin puts it , but by liberating them from their mundane fixations and turning them into attentive spectators. Bazin’s discontent with the stupefying nature of television serials and other solely entertaining shows points to his concern with the broader issue of the social mission of television.

Despite his disappointment with some of the content of French television, Bazin remains, as the fourth part of the book titled ‘Television and Cinema’ demonstrates, quite positive about the future of television and especially about its significance for cinema. “With TV cinema can be rejuvenated”  Bazin believes, encouraged by seeing American auteur directors (e.g., Alfred Hitchcock) producing exceptional work for television. Feeling a regret that none of the well-known European film directors had yet substantially contributed to the new medium of the small screen, Bazin held high hopes for the projects Jean Renoir and Roberto Rossellini were starting to produce specifically for TV. In the interview with Renoir and Rossellini, Bazin again expresses his hopes for the future of television as an impetus for cinema.

As the fifth (‘Cinemarama and 3D’) and sixth (‘CinemaScope’) parts of the book demonstrate, despite his hopes for television’s future, Bazin does not see any other medium capable of reaching cinema’s artistic status at the time. Therefore, the evolution of the technology of the seventh art influenced by the emergence of television and the crisis in Hollywood remains of great interest to him. By taking into account the broad context of the media environment, Bazin foregrounds the interdependence between technological progress, market demands and the aesthetics of visual media. Besides his circumspect insight into the influence of the media industry on the progress of cinematic technology, the French critic also shows an immense interest in the potential implications of screen and projection innovations for the evolution of film aesthetics. In one of his essays on 3D technology, Bazin points out that “The distant future of 3D cinema will see a leap as great as the one from L’Arrivée d’un train en gare de La Ciotat to the train engine sequence in La Bête humaine. . . Let us nimbly take this new and decisive step toward total cinema”. However, the more positive and enthusiastic he is about 3D innovations, the more Bazin is disappointed by a majority of 3D screenings he had the opportunity to attend in Paris. Pointing to a series of obstacles – some industrial (frequent choices by managers of Paris theaters to screen 3D films in 2D), perceptual (migraines suffered by the viewers), and aesthetic (the visual impression that “3D characters have shrunk”  and, more importantly, the feeling of the contradictory “impression of unreality” produced by a stereoscopic cinema) – Bazin diagnoses that the “3D revolution did not take place”. Similarly, he expresses disenchantment with the experience of Cinerama screenings.

The only technological advance in cinema that Bazin reveres, both in theory and in practice, is CinemaScope, which substantially widened the surface of cinema’s screen. He sees CinemaScope as a significant move towards what he calls “a cinema of space” , which is intended to show rather than signify the real. The enlarged and elongated screen, whose angle in relation to the viewer’s eye gets closer to the angle of normal vision, motivates Bazin to extend his theory of the evolution of the language of cinema – familiar to many from a well-known essay published in What is Cinema? – by adding a technological component of the widened screen to it.

An outstanding ‘Finale,’ the last essay of the book, ‘Is Cinema Mortal?’, shows that Bazin is fully conscious of the aporia intrinsic to his film criticism. Taking into account the evolutionary nature of film technology, he modestly recognises that “perhaps in twenty years the ‘young critics’ of some new form of spectacle that we cannot even imagine, and which can’t be guaranteed to be ‘an art’, will be reading our film criticism from 1953 with a condescending smirk.”


Despite Bazin’s reservations about the relevance of his criticism for future generations, the book proves the opposite. In André Bazin’s New Media, the reader encounters Bazin as a critic who writes about audiovisual technology ranging from radio and television to cinema, and whose interests oscillate between the archaeology and sociology of the different technological incarnations of sound and image as much as their ontologies, aesthetics, and ethics. Yet, the diversity of Bazin’s writing on the media of his time does not lead the reader away from the central concerns of his film theory – namely, a strong belief in the modernist character of industrial arts, an ethical stance for the film viewer’s freedom of choice, an advocacy of cinematic realism beyond representation, an evolutionary approach to the history of art and technology, and a critical analysis of the filmic portrayal of animals – but brings them into renewed focus. This prompts the reader of the book to understand Bazin not as an apologetic believer in cinema par excellence, but as an open-minded media theorist of his time. Thus, André Bazin’s New Media pulls the French critic’s work far beyond the limited interpretations that had criticised him as naïve and illuminates the importance of the wider corpus of Bazin’s texts to the history of film and media studies.


A Broad Family of Images: André Bazin on the New Media of His Time. Review by  Lukas Brasiskis
Screening the past ,  July 2015. 


Also of interest : 


Introduction to André Bazin, Part 1: Theory of Film Style in its Historical Context. By  Donato Totaro. Off Screen ,  July 2003. 

Introduction to André Bazin, Part 2: Style as a Philosophical Idea. By Donato Totaro. Off Screen , July 2003.