Showing posts with label popular culture. Show all posts
Showing posts with label popular culture. Show all posts

05/07/2019

What Do Clothes Say?





Sometime in 1932, Salvador Dalí met with the psychoanalyst Jacques Lacan. A deliciously queer photograph records them loitering together in a Parisian street, swaddled in fur coats so sumptuous that Liberace would have died of envy. Dalí’s is draped insouciantly across his shoulders like a black cape, his straggly collar-length hair lending him a vampiric air. But Lacan, distracted, has his hands shoved in his pockets, and the coat, a plush and stripy affair, mink perhaps, is a kind of nonchalant afterthought.

That Lacan should be a dandy is predictable enough to those familiar with his writings on the ‘mirror stage’ of infant development. For Lacan, no account of the ego is complete without narcissism, the gaze and the ‘specular image’ – the idea that selfhood is profoundly bound up with the ways in which we are seen from the outside. Lecturing to a captivated audience at the University of Leuven in 1972, grainy film footage records him as imperious, idiosyncratic and, it turns out, fond of pussy-bowed paisley-print chemises. Puffing at a fat cigar, his hands strain and curl with the intensity of his efforts at articulation: ‘Language,’ he says, ‘never gives, never allows us to formulate…’

Where language falls short though, clothes might speak. Ideas, we languidly suppose, are to be found in books and poems, visualised in buildings and paintings, exposited in philosophical propositions and mathematical deductions. They are taught in classrooms; expressed in language, number and diagram. Much trickier to accept is that clothes might also be understood as forms of thought, reflections and meditations as articulate as any poem or equation. What if the world could open up to us with the tug of a thread, its mysteries disentangling like a frayed hemline? What if clothes were not simply reflective of personality, indicative of our banal preferences for grey over green, but more deeply imprinted with the ways that human beings have lived: a material record of our experiences and an expression of our ambition? What if we could understand the world in the perfect geometry of a notched lapel, the orderly measures of a pleated skirt, the stilled, skin-warmed perfection of a circlet of pearls?

Some people love clothes: they collect them, care for and clamour over them, taking pains to present themselves correctly and considering their purchases with great seriousness. For some, the making and wearing of clothes is an art form, indicative of their taste and discernment: clothes signal their distinction. For others, clothes fulfill a function, or provide a uniform, barely warranting a thought beyond the requisite specifications of decency, the regulation of temperature and the unremarkable meeting of social mores. But clothes are freighted with memory and meaning: the ties, if you like, that bind. In clothes, we are connected to other people and other places in complicated, powerful and unyielding ways, expressed in an idiom that is found everywhere, if only we care to read it.

If dress claims our attention as a mode of understanding, it’s because, for all the abstract and elevated formulations of selfhood and the soul, our interior life is so often clothed. How could we ever pretend that the ways we dress are not concerned with our impulses to desire and deny, the fever and fret with which we love and are loved? The garments we wear bear our secrets and betray us at every turn, revealing more than we can know or intend. If through them we seek to declare our place in the world, our confidence and belonging, we do so under a veil of deception.

Old, favoured clothes can be loyal as lovers, when newer ones dazzle then betray us, treacherous in our moments of greatest need. There is a naivety in the perilous ways we trust in clothes. Shakespeare knew this. King Lear grandly insists to ragged Poor Tom that: ‘Through tattered clothes great vices do appear;/ Robes and furred gowns hide all’ – even when his own opulence can no longer obscure his moral bankruptcy. Emerson too, mockingly corrects us when he writes: ‘There is one other reason for dressing well… namely that dogs respect it [and] will not attack you.’

Yet dress never promises to indemnify us from external assault or internal anguish. When the weaver invokes Khalil Gibran’s ‘Prophet’ to speak of clothes, the Prophet answers him dreamily:

          “Your clothes conceal much of your beauty, yet they hide not the unbeautiful. And though you seek in garments the freedom of privacy you may find in them a harness and a chain. Would that you could meet the sun and the wind with more of your skin and less of your raiment. For the breath of life is in the sunlight and the hand of life is in the wind.”

Skin turned to sunlight. Exultation in exposure. But there is also no burying our real-world unloveliness in clothes: the ugly truth bears no dressing up. As Gibran tells us, dress can bind and constrain us; its regulated repertoire is a bondage estranging us from truer, freer, more naked realities. E M Forster wryly cautions us to ‘Mistrust all enterprises that require new clothes,’ but his own prim English Edwardian elegance was the keeper of his undisclosed confidence, sexual and otherwise.

Yet clothes can provide refuge, offering a canopy under which we shelter those anxieties and agonies from whose force we might otherwise cower like a naked king on a stormy heath. If there is despair at the back of life, it might be that dress helps us pacify and mute it. And yet to entrust to clothes the keeping of our secrets is a seduction in itself.

For some people, clothes are a disguise in which we dissolve, a kind of camouflage that allows us to keep something of ourselves in reserve, as though all we are and own for ourselves refuses to be articulated and shared in outerwear. For others, clothes are an acknowledgment of our alertness to life; we signal it in the deft and quirky ways we fix a belt, hang a tie, pin our jewellery. The clothes we love are like friends, they bear the softness of wear, skimming the curves and planes of our bodies, recalling the measurements and ratios of proportions they seem almost to have learnt by heart.

There are certain clothes that we long for and into which our limbs pour as soon as we find a private moment: the jumper in which you, at last, exhale at the close of day, the slip that is the only thing pressed between you and your lover through the long hours of the night. We need not wear our hearts on our sleeves, since our clothes seem already to know everything we might say and many things for which we could never find words.

Surprisingly, the discipline of philosophy has rarely deigned to notice the knowledge to which dress makes claim, preferring instead to dwell on its associations with disguise and concealment. In part, this has something to do with philosophy’s ancestral debt to Plato. Haunted by Plato’s anxiety over how to distinguish truth from its ‘appearance’, and niggled by his injunction to see beyond an illusory ‘cave of shadows’ to a reality to which our back is turned, philosophy’s concept of truth is intractably aligned to ideas of light, revelation and disclosure. We’ve learnt to revere the nakedness of truth and to deplore the screens and masquerades that keep us from it. The very figure of truth, aletheia (ἀλήθεια), is undressed in the Greek tradition, figured as a nude.



When Martin Heidegger reprised the classical notion of aletheia, he imagined nothing as stark as naked truth, but figured something more like a slow dawning realisation of that which is already there: an evocative kind of disclosure of the world to the beings within it. But philosophy’s revelations remain nonetheless at odds with the idea of dressing up.

In a journal entry of 1854, Søren Kierkegaard notes that ‘in order to swim one takes off all one’s clothes – in order to aspire to the truth one must undress in a far more inward sense’. Even for modern philosophy, then, the truth of self-knowledge seems to require renunciation, the stripping of metaphorical clothes, but also all material preoccupations and vanities. And there is an implicit elision here too: material preoccupations are a vanity. Those garish outward garments keep us from our naked inward truth.




Before Kierkegaard, Immanuel Kant dispensed with fashion, declaring it ‘foolish’. And yet his notion of ‘appearance’ has provided one of philosophy’s longest-standing concerns. Kantian thought distinguishes between the reality of things in themselves (noumena) and how they appear to us (phenomena), and the business of philosophy is the handling of this irreconcilability – that of a world that might exist on its own terms, and our limited abilities to apprehend it. Whereas Kant agonised over this distinction, Friedrich Nietzsche’s radically iconoclastic philosophy prized appearance as the means by which we play and overturn received ideas. In the figure of Dionysus, Nietzsche recasts truth as only ever a series of performances, appearances and surfaces behind which there can be no single, unchanging or inherent morality. The world appears in ever changing disguises, to be experienced aesthetically.

Although ‘appearance’ remains a resolutely perceptual and epistemological issue in philosophy, this concern is entirely disconnected from questions of physical appearance or dress. And yet to ignore the material reality of the clothed body is to deny something crucial to the ways human beings see and are in the world.

The notable exception here is Karl Marx. For him, dress naturally figured as part of a fully materialist account of the world. Clothes, it seemed, could embody the mystification of objects that he detected in modern culture. In the opening chapter of Capital (1867), it is a coat that exemplifies the distorted nature of all commodities in a capitalist society. Marx understood this first-hand. In the summer of 1850, he deposited his gentleman’s overcoat with a local pawnbroker, hoping to generate funds during one of several periods of penury. To his puzzlement, though, without appropriate dress, he found himself debarred entry to the reading rooms of the British Library. What was it about objects such as coats that they could magically open doors and bestow permissions? Not even a coat belonging to Marx himself could evade the ineluctable mechanism of capitalist exchange and value.

All commodities, including coats, were, it seemed to Marx, mysterious things, loaded with strange significances, drawing their value not from the labour invested in their production but instead from the abstract, ugly and competitive social relations of capitalism. The mundane, repetitive making of such objects exhausted workers, draining them of their will and vivacity, but Marx also noted the perverse way a commodity could, in turn, appropriate and imitate the qualities of a human being, as though it possessed a diabolical life of its own. Clothes represent that awful mimicry with particular acuity: think of the swaggering braggadocio of the newest trainers with their swishing insignias, or the dress that seems to possess its own flirtatious personality in its swing; even vertiginous heels that speak of a languorous life without exertion, worlds away from that of the worker who made them. Such garments enter the market, virginal and untouched, wiped clean of the prints of the working hands through which they have passed.

When Marx condemns the all-consuming commodity ‘fetishism’ of modern culture, he derives the term from the Portuguese feitiço, meaning charm or sorcery, and referring specifically to the West African practice of object worship, as witnessed by 15th-century sailors. To the fetish, worshippers attributed all kinds of magical properties that such objects did not possess in reality. In the same way, modern capitalism, it seemed to Marx, traded on the supernatural life of objects. Clothes are not exempt from eliciting this false idolatry. We sing the praises of shoes, dresses, jackets and bags as though they possess an inherent power, a spirit or soul; we give them stories, lives, identities, and in so doing blot out their real origins.

For Sigmund Freud – himself a notable wearer of high-quality, decently made three-pieces – clothes were not an object of intellectual enquiry per se, yet the idea of dress figures the premise of psychoanalysis itself, insofar as it concerns the relationship between the hidden and revealed. When Freud contrasts the manifest or outward content of dreams with their latent or submerged significance, he notes how the work of dreams is the binding together of inside and out, surface and depth. We speak, sometimes, of weaving dreams, as though dreams are spun. More to the point, our unconscious is clothed in the stuff of our dreams.

In Freud’s account, memories are fabricated. By invoking the phenomenon of ‘screen memories’, Freud radically challenged the integrity of infant recollection. Seemingly derived from pleasing early experiences, the screen memory records a relatively insignificant story in order to shield or protect a more catastrophic, hidden, import. The screen memory is not a ‘real’ memory, but one whose façade conceals another. When Freud uses the term ‘screen’, it is commonly taken analogically, to suggest a movie screen, a visual plane upon which an image is imprinted or projected and which occludes another, truer memory; but the term ‘screen’ can also mean a guard, or shutter. The screen is a textile; and just as dreams are bound and memory fabricated, the psyche too, as Freud understands it, is shrouded and veiled, layer after layer. 




The word ‘fabric’ itself derives from the Latin fabrica meaning workshop or place of production, and faber – the artisan or maker who works with materials. It recalls the Indo-European dhab, appositely meaning ‘to fit together’. In the psychoanalytical scenario, analysand and analyst piece together the strands of the psyche, retracing forgotten pathways that lead from trauma to original experience, like Ariadne’s thread marking the route out of a maze. This piecing together, or fabrication of psychic life, entails a certain kind of creativity, even fictionality, albeit a fiction that is born of truth: the imaginative elaboration of dreams and writings revealed in talking cures and linguistic slips that lead us back to experiences we might be incapable of confronting.

We’re prone to disparage as crude the analogue of self with stuff, as though the substance of the soul might only be short-changed by the material things with which we seek to express it. And it is difficult not to read the diminution of dress in philosophy as part of a more general disdain for matters regarded as maternal, domestic or feminine. ‘Surface,’ wrote Nietzsche, is a ‘woman’s soul, a mobile, stormy film on shallow water.’ Relegating women to the shallows is, of course, to deny them depth, but the surface to which they are condemned is not without its own qualities: fluidity, responsiveness, sensitivity to a given moment or sensation. Female writers have always understood this. In Edith Wharton’s novel The House of Mirth (1905), Lily Bart concedes to herself the powerful truth of her passion for Lawrence Selden:

      “ She was very near hating him now; yet the sound of his voice, the way the light fell on his thin, dark hair, the way he sat and moved and wore his clothes – she was conscious that even these trivial things were inwoven with her deepest life.”

When we speak of things being ‘woven together’, we mean affinity, association, inseparability, but Wharton’s ‘inwoven’ intimates more: an intimacy so close that it is constitutive. Wharton’s contemporary Oscar Wilde quipped in The Picture of Dorian Grey (1890) that ‘it is only shallow people who do not judge by appearances. The true mystery of the world is the visible, not the invisible.’ With his dandyish green coats and carnations, Wilde teasingly nudges us towards the stark secularity of a new world in which divinity could be as readily located in dresses as in deities.

But Wharton’s insight goes beyond reference to a newly outward-facing modernity, and is more profound than the upturned paradox of a surface that could speak of the inner self. Lily is bound to Lawrence not simply by some romantic pledge of affection but in the particularities of his being, as though the tightest seam ran back and forth between her slow-gathered sense impressions (his voice, his hair, his clothes) and the interior life to which they seem to reach. As Lily is to Lawrence, we too are inwoven with the stuff of the world and the people to whom those things belong or refer.

Taking up this idea of a deeper, inwoven life, Anaïs Nin in Ladders to Fire (1946), writes of a woman in love:
    “weaving and sewing and mending because he carried in himself no thread of connection… of continuity or repair… She sewed… so that the warmth would not seep out of their days together, the soft inner skin of their relationship”.

 Here, sewing is both material activity and metaphorical expression somehow woven together, in a kind of rising to the surface of the soul. We speak readily of the ways in which clothes express personality, but dress, costume, textile and fabric – the ways we wear, make, live in and think through them – are inwoven with our deepest life. The proposition here is not simply the idea that clothes might reflect that life, but that life itself takes place in clothes, and that the making of, caring for, passing on and wearing of clothes is steeped in our sense of selfhood, and registered in exquisitely intimate ways, by us and those around us.

This is not to say that clothes are the self, but to suggest, exploratively, that our experiences of selfhood are contoured and adumbrated by many things, including clothes, and that the prejudices by which we disregard the concern for appearances or relegate dress to the domain of vanity, are an obstacle to a significant kind of understanding. As Susan Sontag says, contra Plato, perhaps there is ‘[no] opposition between a style one assumes and one’s “true” being… In almost every case, our manner of appearing is our manner of being.’

Perhaps we simply are in clothes. And in clothes, our various selves are subject to modification, alteration and wear. This happens in clumsy ways – the glasses you hope might lend you new seriousness, the reddened lips that mimic arousal – but also in innumerably subtle ways: the heel that cants the body, contracting your stride, the tie that stiffens your neck and straightens your spine. Some garments constrict and reshape us physically, but also, sometimes, emotionally. And there are garments we can feel, that itch and chafe, that make apparent the difference of their textures to that of the surface of our skin, as though we and they are not one. In these, we are alert to the experience of being in our bodies, in a way that seems at odds with the rest of the world gliding past, apparently immune to discomfort. In such garments, too, we are always alert to the ever-present physicality of our bodies. 

By contrast, there are clothes we wear almost imperceptibly, that are light or diaphanous to the point of being hardly seen or felt, as though we are sheathed in air. There are clothes that we are so accustomed to that we go about our business with barely a thought to the bodies they encase. If the self is somehow experienced, then perhaps there are moments when we strive to be seen and others when we seek a certain kind of invisibility. We wax and wane in the things that we wear. In clothes, there are always possibilities for difference and transformation.

Yet if those possibilities for transformation are exciting, they are also dangerous, dislodging the security of a self that could believe itself shored up, imperturbable and unchanging. How, for instance, could it be that we so easily emulate others in what we wear, as though our selves were interchangeable, indistinguishable, altogether indistinct? We make light of costumes and fancy dress, yet their very possibility contests the privileged exclusivity of personhood. In costume, after all, there is betrayal, the dispelling of an enchantment rather than the casting of a spell, an exposure of the pretence that is authenticity: if I can glibly dress like you, how then are any of us ourselves?

The anxiety of authenticity is never far away from dress. We seek clothes that ‘are us’, and there is an implicit insolence in the ready-to-wear, off-the-rail garments we rifle through, that unsettle us in suggesting that our precise measurements might be generic, predictable and average. Still, there can be immense tenderness in the ways our clothes tell the stories of a self subject to all kinds of alteration: the bitter-sweetness of ‘growing’ into a coat inherited from a long-gone parent; folding away the maternity dress you will never have cause to wear again. Sometimes, there is only anguish: the blood stain on a T-shirt from that most terrible of days. Clothes mark our mutability. They parallel the vicissitudes of our lives in their subtle shifts of colour and sheen, and they stretch over time.

But there is a promise in dress, too. The French philosopher, Hélène Cixous writes of designer Sonia Rykiel and the perfect dress – the dress in which one might, at last, be comfortable, almost natural (if not in your skin, then at least in your dress): ‘The dress that comes to me… agrees with me, and me with it, and we resemble one another… The dress dresses a woman I have never known and who is also me.’ This dress is a dream, or a dream dressed up as a dress, casting the wearer anew but also affirming an account of themselves that they gladly snatch up for display. In this dress, Cixous is unplagued by the anxieties of her body, her beauty, her age and her sex – the sense of perfection or completion it imparts, is almost divine:

     “   I enter the garment. It is as if I were going into the water. I enter the dress as I enter the water which envelops me and, without effacing me, hides me transparently… And here I am, dressed at the closest point to myself. Almost in myself. “




Here there is no rupture or discontinuity, only fabric that feels like the body itself, transmitting the truth of the self through it, without impediment. In an odd way, perhaps this dress of dresses aspires to a kind of transparency or an invisibility, whereby we might be seen as we really are, at our very best, in a light that is undiluted, perfectly truthful, and just.

Some of us might believe we possess such a dress, a rare thing lovingly preserved and only carefully exposed to the light of day; others reach for its possibility and find in every new purchase a pretender, sensing it forever slipping from our grasp or gaze, like the faces of the dead that come to us only in dreams. Perhaps the power of the right dress necessarily comes only rarely, like hard-won self-knowledge, the shining truth of which cannot stand too much scrutiny. Philosophy might have forgotten dress, but all that language cannot articulate – the life of the mind, the vagaries of the body – is there, ready to be read, waiting to be worn.

What do clothes say? By Shaidha Bari.  Aeon , May 19, 2016.






Whenever I catch a glimpse of my reflection during late-night lecture writing or midway through a mountain of marking, I recall, with dismay, a line from Jonathan Swift: "She wears her clothes as if they were thrown on her with a pitchfork." Academics can be a motley crew, coffee-stained and ink-blotted, so dedicated to ideas we can barely spare a thought for what we wear. But this dismissal of dress seems to me so often only an artful pose, implying that to care about clothes is to have fallen victim to vanity when you ought instead to have been immersed in abstract intellectual inquiry.

The way that we dress in the academy has changed because the academy has changed. Learned professors once inspired confidence with their tweed jackets and elbow-patched blazers, understandably unbothered by fleeting fashions when the longue durée of tenure stretched so happily ahead of them. A few hard-wearing separates, well-made and durable, in a muted palette, could make for a perfectly passable and desperately dull uniform, worn on rotation, week by week.

By contrast, the harried teaching assistants of today’s university, underpaid and overworked, have neither time nor income to spare on sartorial matters. Somehow they must seamlessly segue from graduate students slumming in sneakers to professorial formality. A blazer thrown over a Ramones T-shirt might do the trick, or you could try fishing out that pair of respectably stout court shoes you bought for the wedding you went to last summer.

And while those dusty dons sail in from time to time, the rest of us are asked to put our best (shoe polished) foot forward, smiling on campus-visit days for prospective students and for marketing brochures. Wandering around the administrative corridors, you can feel suddenly surrounded by a swarm of smartly pressed suits. Here you can see in clothes the professionalization and managerialism that increasingly circumscribe the modern university.
The glaring irony is that despite this gleaming vision of the university as a smoothly managed and efficiently administered organization, appearances are deceptive. Wander over to an actual department, and you’ll find a teaching assistant working late in a still-unwashed sweater, a lecturer slumped over a pile of essays, an errant pen mark on her brow. There is a gap between the way the professionalized university wants to present itself and the less glossy realities faced by the people who teach within it.
What we wear should not matter: Ideas, arguments, theories, and thought are the stuff in which academics trade. But our institutions are riven by power, and teaching and research are themselves underwritten by claims to authority and expertise. No matter how much we know, we still feel the need to show that we know it to solidify our status as bona fide intellectuals, deserving of deference and respect. One of the ways we demonstrate our possession of knowledge is in what we wear — an age-old tradition beginning with Plato in a himation, or cloak. Only now we stroke manicured beards in thought, carry bulging book bags to demonstrate commitment, and wield Moleskine notebooks when inspiration strikes.

But, sometimes, embarrassingly, the assurance and authority we possess on the inside is betrayed by the clothes we wear on the outside. My friend Anna, hurrying in from the rain to teach her sophomore-year poetry tutorial, once jammed the zipper on her fluorescent yellow puffer jacket in the rush to remove her coat and commence class. "I tried to shimmy out of the thing," she explained to me glumly afterward, "and then my head got stuck in the neck hole." Apparently the students sat and watched in silent horror for the 20 minutes it took for security to arrive with a pair of scissors. "Read stanzas 28-35," she instructed them, weakly, from the muffled interior of the coat. Nobody did.

And who hasn’t had the odd sartorial disaster? Who hasn’t casually brushed a sleeve across a flame while reaching over the Bunsen burner, or had to Sellotape her stockings to her legs when the adhesive wore off minutes before a lecture? If you’ve never tumbled down the stairs with a cup of coffee in hand and a crisp white shirt gleaming in its freshly washed glory, you’re more agile than I.

In such moments of sartorial crisis, the best strategy is to adopt a nonchalant attitude: Forget the wretched perfidy of outward appearance and immerse yourself instead in the holy life of the mind. When your zipper fails, teach Zola! But this decided indifference to matters of dress is itself an intellectual attitude, a pretense of haughty detachment, as though the indignity of material life and bodily form could never be of real concern to a real thinker.

In 1991, Valerie Steele, a fashion historian and now director of the museum at the Fashion Institute of Technology, made this same point in a nicely arch essay for Lingua Franca. She recounted how a Yale history professor, inquiring after the topic of her dissertation, responded enthusiastically, evidently mishearing her reply of "fashion" as "fascism." "Oh," he replied, once corrected, apparently aghast, "and then, without another word, he turned and walked away." In 2017 a dissertation on fashion is unlikely to send a Yale professor scuttling from a seminar. Indeed, histories of dress, costume, and textiles are topics deemed illuminating enough to warrant monographs, conferences, and research centers — the whole scholarly kit and caboodle.
It is a mark of our broadened academic horizons that the modern study of material culture thrives. This intellectual adventurousness is our profit on all the Barthesian hijinx of the early ’80s and ’90s — that melee of "signs" and "semes" once hurled so wildly that it seems astonishing that we should have escaped from it uninjured. Happily, there are now many ways in which scholars might valuably investigate fashion, variously finding in textiles a pathway into the history of race and empire, reading dressed bodies through the lens of feminism, assessing costume and performance as the site of complex sexualities. And if you’re looking to try dress studies on for size, you might rifle though Alison Matthews David’s excellent Fashion Victims (Bloomsbury Visual Arts, 2015) for the history of 19th-century industrialism, Peter Stallybrass’s 1998 essay "Marx’s Coat" for commodity fetishism, or Mark M. Anderson’s Kafka’s Clothes (Clarendon Press, 1992) for modernist aesthetics.

Yet, while fashion can be a deep and enlightening subject of study, there remains within the profession a niggling suspicion about scholars who spare a thought for matters of their own dress. To show that you care about your clothes can be taken as a token of intellectual inferiority. That we might be faintly interested in what we and others wear is too mortifying a folly to reveal, so instead we exchange earnest opinions over the coffee machine, only espying by side-eye the patch on the jacket, the brooch on the collar, the neat Cuban heels. If we do deign to remark on a new scarf or admire a jaunty tie, we do so hurriedly, exchanging pleasantries in passing, en route to the abstractions and arguments that are, apparently, the real business of our lives. This seems an especially absurd position at which to have arrived since, at times, ours can be such a dandified profession. We are plumed peacocks at the lectern. We are poseurs with PowerPoint.

In retrospect, my own undergraduate days seemed unusually peppered with marvelous old dons and brilliant young brains, all dressed with the most astonishing nonchalance and an artfully careless savoir-faire. I recall, for instance, the venerably three-piece-suited emeritus who would stride into the lecture hall with black homburg firmly planted on head and attaché case swinging in hand, as stiff-lipped as though food rationing had ended just yesterday; the radical Renaissance feminist scholar and yoga aficionado, nose studded and blonde cropped, whose lilac leather jacket would fly (like her thrown caution) in the wind as she roared off on a motorcycle at the end of a supervision; the serious-minded and untenured tutor who would arrive to teach Hamlet, inadvertently dressed as, well, Hamlet, in full sables and weeds, complete with mournful expression.
In fiction and film, where clothes serve as a kind of shorthand for character, academics rarely escape unscathed. When Kristen Wiig’s timid physics professor abandons academic ambitions to become a "Ghostbuster" in the recent reboot, she casts aside her habitually frumpy plaid skirts and pussy-bowed shirts for overalls and "proton laser" backpack. But even an ectoplasm-splattered suit won’t get you tenure at Columbia, the film reveals.

In Philip Roth’s The Human Stain, Delphine Roux, Coleman Silk’s French feminist nemesis, is mocked by cruel colleagues and derided as "so passé, such a parody of Simone de Beauvoir" in her "vintage Chanel jacket with tight jeans." But Roux’s expensive wardrobe is only a costume. She is a bundle of carefully concealed status anxiety, cultural mistranslation and academic isolation, all of which is expressed in her clothes. Roux favors cashmere and leather, Roth informs us, as though it were code for her particular continental brand of vanity and pretension.

Roth’s novel is a rare exception with its imaginary academics whose surface appearance conceals deeper waters. Michael Douglas’s ponderous professor of creative writing in Wonder Boys (2000), is a model of academic despair, disguised in a black turtleneck. A jaunty maroon scarf casually slung around the shoulders just so gives him a dash of verve and flair, the horn-rimmed glasses sitting low on his nose remind us he is an intellectual. Even the covertly rolled joints and Katie Holmes’s demure-lipped, overfamiliar grad student seem part of the act. It feels hokey as hell.

And yet there is something familiar in the film’s depiction of academic languor and stalled intellectual ambition, particularly in the scenes in which Douglas takes to staring blankly at his cranky typewriter, lolling in his ex-wife’s dusty-pink bathrobe. Haven’t we all been there? Maybe some of us are there, right now, whiling away an unproductive midafternoon in crumpled nightwear, cowering behind a squalid tower of coffee cups and a glaringly blank Microsoft Word document.

Wearing a black turtleneck, of course, condemns you to existential crisis, being, as it is, so beloved of pained writers and French philosophers. Part of its allure is pragmatic insofar as it circumnavigates the stuffiness of a shirt and tie, whilst not quite degrading the wearer to the slovenly blasphemy of a T-shirt. What we wear can signal our intellectual identifications, nodding to the schools of thought to which we subscribe.

Think of Foucault in a leather jacket and bottle-top glasses, Beauvoir with an elegant chignon and silk scarf, Butler in loose-fitted pants and deep pockets for a casually plunged hand, Cixous insouciant in an artfully draped Sonia Rykiel and a turban for added panache. Derrida dressed, as someone once put it to me, with the look of a "rakish ski instructor."



Even the ubiquitous tweed jacket has its place. It is not always redolent of the humorless humanities, of stuffy and stagnated spheres of scholarship. The great irony of the tweed jacket is that it should have fallen, quite by accident, back into fashion as part of the reclamation of heritage style in recent years. These days, department-store blazers come with elbow patches attached — a worn sleeve no longer the proud war wound of long stretches at library desks.

Even my very own array of academic cardigans, uniformly perforated at the elbow, and shirts, ink-stained at the breast pocket, are made (God forfend!) fashionable in the ironic light of "normcore" — the modern hipster aesthetic which so placidly appropriates the sensible and staid as the height of style. "Where did you get them?" a student keenly inquired of my owlishly oversized plastic glasses the other day. "1986," I replied.

Yet not all of us can wear what we like. Behind our workplace wardrobes lies the nexus of inequalities that structure the university. Dress bears upon our relationships with students and staff. The female professor who looks younger than her years knows this; she thinks hard about how to connote her age and command the respect her learning deserves. So too does the recently graduated teaching assistant who wants not to be mistaken for a student any longer, but to be seen by colleagues as an equal in the competitive job market. "Dress for the job you want," goes the mystifying mantra. The irony is that this should mean so little in an industry marked by a paucity of any jobs at all.



What We Wear in the Underfunded University. By Shahidha Bari. The Chronicle of Higher Education ,  August  27, 2017





Dressed : The Secret Life of Clothes. By Shahidha  Bari. Penguin, 2019.



Clothes are so ubiquitous as to be almost invisible, in many instances by their wearer’s design. Yet few material objects so necessary to human existence are as flippantly treated: consider the gravitas and column inches often given over to food and shelter (i.e. "property"), which Abraham Maslow posits are equally essential as clothing to humans in his heirarchy of needs. Perhaps our concept of clothing has become too easily conflated with fashion, by its very nature fleeting and impermanent.

Shahidha Bari’s Dressed: The Secret Life of Clothes seeks to redress that. "Lots of people think that clothes are superficial or functional or not worthy of intellectual inquiry," she says. "If that is the case, why is it that they are everywhere, in literature, in film, in art, in music?"

It’s not so much that the subjects of those artforms are wearing them, but rather the attention that is given to such garments by artists: see the labourer’s battered leathers in van Gogh’s "Shoes", or Zinedine Zidane’s balletic footwear in "Zidane: A 21st Century Portrait", or the mismatched shoes Robinson Crusoe happens upon. All three are analysed in Bari’s book, which uncovers and knits together such allusions, with chapters split into Dresses; Suits, Coats and Jackets; Shoes; Furs, Feathers and Skins; and Pockets, Purses and Suitcases.

The breadth of references is remarkable, and Bari says it owes much to her work as an academic, cultural reviewer and BBC radio presenter, specialising in literature, philosophy and visual culture. "I spend my life watching films, visiting galleries and reading literature," she says, adding that she "already had a backlog" of interesting references to clothing in artforms before deciding to write the book some five or six years ago. "My weird brain was attracted and distracted by those things," she laughs.

Dressed is a meandering, enriching and sprawling read. Of its style, the author says that "you have to get really good at code-switching when you are an academic who works in culture", arguing that "philosophy in particular is a really arid, ugly discipline in terms of its language". Dressed is a far cry from that. "I worked really hard to make prose poetic: often it rhymes or there’s a rhythm... I wanted it to feel sort of, almost incantatory." Each chapter opens with a lucid, novelistic first-person soliloquy introducing the type of clothing under scrutiny, then delves into its genealogy and portrayal in popular (and less popular) culture, with a fair dose of philosophy, too.

When conducting research, Bari "couldn’t find the book that I wanted—that philosophical-cultural account of clothes, the experience of wearing clothes... clothes aren’t flippant, they are profound artefacts of our human experience. So I wanted it to have serious philosophy; I didn’t want to compromise on the ideas. But I wanted the experience to be beautiful—if you want someone to understand a lived experience, you have to make them live it."

Bari wanted the prose to be "evocative", and her literary influences are fittingly broad. She names Elena Ferrante (Dressed muses on the significance of Neapolitan quartet protagonist Lila’s shoemaking lineage); Roland Barthes ("he says really curious things; that the things that are part of our everyday life can be really profound"); art critic T J Clark and novelist Rachel Cusk ("I wanted their precision and sensitivity"); and James Baldwin ("there’s warmth to his intelligence—you never doubt how clever he is, and how kind"). She also notes that both writing and dressing have an element of "exactitude", arguing: "When you write, however you write, you are looking to capture that exact thing you are trying to describe. Clothes are like that, sometimes. You are looking to articulate that exact thing that you are, or the occasion you are going to. And you can hide in language, and clothes are about hiding, too."

In the book she writes that she is "haunted by clothes", which is not to say she has a bulging wardrobe or a devout love of fashion ("fashion studies was new to me," she claims), but rather, it speaks of her method of apprehending the world. "Some of us have particular kinds of memory: some people are musical and attach songs to things; my brother is a mathematical genius, and sees the world as numbers... my memory is very visual. I often attach colour and texture to people. I am slightly synaesthesic." Bari says she would remember my (wholly unremarkable) get-up were we to meet again, "because that is how my memory is organised—I’ll remember the things a person wears, the colour and the feel of those things, the sound of a zip or a button. Those are the things that my memory retains, weirdly."

That is not to say that she is uninterested in clothing from an aesthetic or artistic point of view. Designers Yohji Yamamoto, Alexander McQueen and Walter van Beirendonck of the Antwerp Six are referenced, and Bari’s own experience of fashioning clothes was drawn upon, too. She learned to sew from her Bangladeshi mother—introduced in the author’s BBC Radio 4 documentary "My Mother’s Sari" in 2016—who "always sewed when I was growing up. If you are a first-generation immigrant, you aren’t going to find the clothes that you wore at home. She would buy yards of fabric, and sew. If you move between cultures, as someone like me, who is British Asian does, you have different registers of clothes. I was always conscious of different dress codes, cultural dress codes," she says, joking that her needlework skills were also developed out of necessity because "I’m small—I’m really tiny. So nothing ever fits."




The book chronicles thousands of years of clothed humans, yet Bari was a little reluctant to forecast their future. Ecological and welfare concerns are apparent throughout the book, notably in an analysis of an illustration of Cinderella by John Tenniel. His drawing muses on the plight of Mary Ann Walkley, a young seamstress worked to death after a near 27-hour shift; her case was also cited by Marx in Capital. Bari writes: The ballgown that brings life to Cinderella is the dress that brings death to Walkley... They are the two inseparable strands of one thread. Little has changed: in 2013 an eight-storey garment factory in Dhaka collapsed, killing 1,134 workers.

Yet Bari believes it is not straightforwardly a consequence of Western greed, narcissism or consumption. "The problem isn’t us buying—it’s overproduction as much as overconsumption. We have to stop blaming ourselves, and we have to challenge industry. I think that young women do buy a lot of clothes, that’s true, but they do it because there is a hole or an emptiness in life that they are trying to fill. I don’t blame them for that. I don’t blame them at all. I want to try and work out what that emptiness is. I don’t blame them for our environmental crisis—and we are totally in an environmental crisis. Fashion is one of the most polluting industries in the world.

"In a way, the whole project is driven by that. I didn’t want to write a polemical book, but I want you to think—when you put on your coat, or button your shirt—about what your clothes mean, who has made them." Bari says that to affect change, "we have to change our relationship with clothes, to take them seriously", because "if we care about our clothes, we might care about the people who make them. That’s the spine of the book, in a way. That is the secret life of clothes."

She has a more optimistic take on the aesthetic side, though. One could think mass production, low prices and ready availability of clothes, in addition to the increasing reach of media espousing a certain appearance, fashion or body type, may lead to a homogeneity of dress. Bari disagrees. "We complain about hipsters looking the same, or fast fashion, but human beings have never looked more different, precisely because they have so many different fabrics, colours, styles and shapes available to them," she says.

"We have this cross-cultural influence... it is miraculous and amazing to me, it’s endlessly exciting and interesting, that we have never looked more different. We’re lucky."


Shahidha Bari | 'Fashion is one of the most polluting industries in the world'.  By Danny Arter . The Bookseller , May 30, 2019. 






Writer, academic and broadcaster Shahidha Bari discusses her book about clothing, ‘Dressed’.

Monocle, June 23, 2019.




Mistrust all enterprises that require new clothes,” says EM Forster in A Room With a View, adapting a quote from Henry David Thoreau. What a spoilsport. Because surely one of the best bits about starting a new job, getting a dog or even taking up sky-diving is that it gives you permission to fashion yourself in a slightly different way. With the acquisition of new and unusual kit comes the chance to become someone fresher, sexier or, at the very least, someone who is prepared to give yellow a go.

The reason we are so desperate to buy or borrow new clothes, says the academic and broadcaster Shahidha Bari in her clever, subtle book, is because they appear to bestow on us a charm and intellect that we can’t quite muster for ourselves. Yet the moment we acquire that new coat or those new trousers, we realise that nothing much has changed at all. For no matter how fancy we look on the surface, underneath we still come with metaphorical trailing threads and odd socks. “Dressing is so hard,” Bari writes. “It is astonishing that we ever find the courage to keep trying as we do every day.”

Although her writing is critically informed – Foucault, Deleuze, Cixous and Irigaray all rock up here to chat about schmutter – her tone is insistently personal, intimate even. Between her main chapters she drops in lyrical accounts of her own encounters with specific items of clothing. She tells us about mending a dress for a college friend who has since died, or the first time she wore spiked shoes as a schoolgirl and found herself running like the wind. Other passages are determinedly oblique, as when she buys little girls’ dresses the colour of buttercream yet makes no mention of who they are for. Her future children, her past self? The withholding is deliberate since Bari wants us to think not so much about what clothes say as how they make us feel. Take the suit. The one that she has in mind is worn by Cary Grant in North by Northwest (1959). According to a panel of fashion journalists and stylists convened by GQ in 2006, this suit is “the best in film history and the most influential on men’s style”. Designed by Grant’s Savile Row tailor, Kilgour, French and Stanley, it is neither exactly blue nor grey, and combines a ventless jacket with high-waisted, forward pleated trousers. It is a suit (or suits – during the five month shoot Grant got through eight replicas, since hanging from Mount Rushmore by your fingertips involves a certain wear and tear) that is simultaneously authoritative and insouciant.
Although the appeal of the suit is that it doesn’t look as if it’s trying too hard, Bari is convinced that beneath that sheeny worsted surface it is doing important work. She discusses Grant’s early years in Bristol at the beginning of the 20th century where, as Archibald Leach, he was abandoned by his father who turns out to have been a tailor’s cutter. Could the suit, a form of clothing with which Grant is permanently associated, be both a defence against and a triumphant reworking of early childhood trauma? “A suit rises to the occasion in these circumstances,” Bari explains. “It is capable of dignified deception, precisely because it seems, on the surface … [to keep] unruly feelings at bay.”

She is good on dresses too. By rights, of course, they have no business being in any modern woman’s wardrobe. Nearly a hundred years after it became acceptable for “advanced” females to wear “divided skirts” on the tennis court, why would anyone voluntarily shimmy themselves into a garment designed to cling to one’s body while simultaneously restricting its movement (cycling in a dress today still feels like a risky business)? Bari is particularly good on how a dress looks while on a hanger – like a second skin waiting for flesh and blood to make it live. It is this sense of the dress as an alternative self that makes it so potent, far more charged, say, than a well-cut pair of trousers or a merino jumper: “This dress – not a poem, not a painting but a dress – is something, maybe even all things, that we are not.” Which is why it is the item most likely to be languishing, unworn, at the back of the wardrobe, waiting for the moment when we feel good enough – thin enough, feminine enough, just enough enough – to put it on and step out as someone improved and approved.

Dresses aren’t always about lack or reproach. In a particularly luscious section, Bari shows us women having fun with frocks. In a 16th-century Dutch tapestry, now in the V&A, the figures of the three female Fates are stitched in the most gorgeous red, blue and gold thread. Each fold of their plush skirts seems to promise extra supplies of dense and complex satisfaction. Nothing odd about this you might think – global art is flush with gorgeously dressed girls flaunting their access to fabric. But the point here is that Clotho, Lachesis and Atropos are usually rendered as badly dressed old crones, responsible for producing the threads that other, luckier, people wear. They are the original “spinsters”, a jibe that has historically disclosed anxiety around unmarried women and their economic and sexual self-sufficiency. Here, though, the three Fates are in their best dresses and seem to be enjoying every moment of it. It takes a while to notice that at their feet, quite unregarded, lies another woman. Bari tells us that this drably clothed figure is Chastity, and that the three gorgeously attired Fates appear to have trampled her into the ground.

In her final chapter Bari includes a short section of the role of the pocket in the psychology of getting dressed. Barbara Burman and Ariane Fennetaux have written a whole book on the subject. Their pockets, though, are not the modern kind, sewn into the seams of ready-made clothes. Rather, they are the soft, detachable pouches that women used to tie around their waists and hide under their skirts, reaching for them through discreet openings in their petticoats and dresses as required. What particularly interests Burman and Fennetaux is the way in which women of all classes have historically used these tie-on pockets as a supplementary body part to help them negotiate their way through a world that was not built to suit them.

Crammed into a woman’s pocket was everything she might need to keep her going for the day, from a snack to a tract from the New Testament. It was also a way of carrying precious cargo safely. Some of the strangest things the authors came across that were stowed away in pockets include two live ducks, the afterbirth of an illegitimate baby and a pocket microscope. Tradeswomen of all sorts, from pedlars to prostitutes, were most likely to stuff theirs with bank notes, which is why when Lucy Locket lost her pocket it was worth a surprised posterity noting that “there was not a penny in it”.

Pockets were precious. Georgiana, Duchess of Devonshire, ordered hers to be made of finest silk. Middle-class girls effortfully cross-stitched theirs, turning the whole experience into a lesson in precision and patience. Working-class women, meanwhile, patched and darned their pockets relentlessly with sturdy fabric saved from somewhere else in the household’s material economy.

The proximity of pockets to the pelvic area inevitably gave them a seamy side – hence the extra layer of salacious meaning in the Lucy Locket nursery rhyme. However, there were some pitiable consequences too. Burman and Fennetaux tell the story of Annie Chapman, one of the women killed by Jack the Ripper in the autumn of 1888. As a semi-itinerant worker, scrabbling a difficult living, Chapman’s pocket was her most valuable possession. The fact that she was still using a tie-on pocket, rather than a new fangled handbag, is testimony to the fact that for vulnerable women living in precarious circumstances, this was still the best way of holding on to your worldly goods.

In the early hours of 8 September, Chapman’s mutilated body was found slumped in a yard. Particularly chilling was the fact that her pocket had also been “torn down the front and also at the side” by the murderer, who clearly saw it as a proxy for the woman’s sexual parts. Out of this ritually disembowelled pocket spilled Chapman’s best treasures: an envelope, pills, a small comb and a piece of coarse muslin that she had been hoping to pawn or sell.


Dressed by Shahidha Bari and The Pocket review – two books on the secret life of clothes. By Kathryn Hughes. The Guardian , June 6, 2019. 





You Are What You Wear. Review by Lucy Moore. Literary Review, June 2019. 


















13/02/2019

Apparently Serial Killers are Having a Moment






A few months ago, Facebook started serving me ads for a subscription box called “Hunt a Killer.” There was a photo of a bunch of a papers and an old-timey pocket watch and a cackling line of copy: “Do you have what it takes to catch a killer?”

On the site I learned that “if I qualified,” I could see what it would be like to “have a serial killer deliver a package to [my] doorstep each month” for the low, low price of $30, or I could upgrade and get wine included and make it a #datenight or a party where we all worked together to decipher letters and “creepy” clues. “A fun and unique game for my husband and I!” said one user review.
Last weekend, I turned on Netflix to watch Unbreakable Kimmy Schmidt and was confronted with a massive homepage ad for The Ted Bundy Tapes. A few days later, while flipping channels, I caught ABC News’ teaser for its interview with the daughter of the “BTK” killer.
Apparently serial killers are having a moment. Or maybe the moment they were having last year just never ended. Maybe the moment has been on a slow simmer since 1977. Or 1888.

But despite all the hype, I’ve never been less interested. Which might seem strange considering I’ve been following a serial killer of my own for the past decade.

I’ve been to his home. I’ve written him letters. I’ve chatted with his high school friends and surveyed hundreds of pages of data about his psychological makeup and the pattern of violence he’s inflicted upon women. I’ve watched him from across a courtroom too many times to count, and at the end of it all, I’ve come away with only one clear conclusion: he’s a waste of my time.

When my childhood best friend was found murdered in her home in 2001, I had no idea that seven years later, an alleged serial killer would be the one to be charged with it. I have to say “alleged” because he still hasn’t been convicted, although he’s been in jail awaiting trial since 2008. DNA evidence connects him to three of his four victims, however, and if he goes to trial next month as he’s currently scheduled to, chances are, by the end of year we should be able to drop the “alleged.”
I’ve watched this man get thinner and more angular over the past ten years. More fidgety and more cocky. I’ve seen him dismiss attorney after attorney, and stare stone-faced at the wall while the mother of one of his victims tearfully read her statement to the judge. I’ve seen person after person — reporters, prosecutors, obsessives — regard him with fascination, vitriol, and a compulsion to get closer to him, as if he somehow held all the answers. And I understand the compulsion, because I once shared it.

But after ten years of researching my friend’s murder, and almost 20 since her death, I can definitively say that her killer is the least compelling thing about her story. Her killer is simply a man. A boring, attention-hungry, deeply misogynistic cipher.

When we talk about serial killers, as we have been so frequently lately, we’re really talking about power and gender and fear. We’re talking about revolting, inhuman, outrageous, thunderous violence. We’re talking about the things men can do to women and the way they do them. (Obviously, serial killers also target men, but it seems most of the media attention goes to the ones who kill white women.) We’re talking about that sinking feeling that we can never truly know another person, and that tragedy can strike anyone at any time. We’re talking about loss, and the ripple effects it can create throughout life.

The problem is, most crime storytelling and media is formulaic and male-driven and gets at none of these ideas. When crime shows aren’t eclipsing the stories of female victims, they’re objectifying them. When they’re not staging corny reenactments, they’re dishing out graphic visuals and calling it entertainment. The male killer and his complicated, devious brain is always the focus, at the expense of everyone else. Inside the Mind of a Whatever, To Catch a Blah, Blah — it’s all the same. And we, the viewers, seem to fall for it every time. We’re titillated by gore and extreme violence. We’re blushing over our attraction to a criminal. We’re elevating the monster.

There’s an opportunity cost to this. When we exalt the killer, we’re diverting our focus from people and ideas more worthy of our attention. We could be considering the victims and the people they left behind. Or examining how it is that women’s bodies are selected as an outlet for violence, both extreme and quotidian, again and again.

But something does feel a little different about this particular serial killer moment. Maybe it’s because we’re different now. Maybe it’s because some of what’s going on in the world — school shootings, hate crimes, climate apocalypse — feels scarier and more urgent than the ravenous murderer next door whom the media is trying to gin up our fear of.
Just last week, Netflix issued a much-pilloried tweet cheekily chastising viewers for crushing on Bundy.

I've seen a lot of talk about Ted Bundy’s alleged hotness and would like to gently remind everyone that there are literally THOUSANDS of hot men on the service — almost all of whom are not convicted serial murderers

— Netflix US (@netflix) January 28, 2019


Then the platform turned around and purchased another Bundy film, this one starring Zac Efron, which feels a bit like they baked the cake, served it to you, shamed you for eating it, and then put another one right in front of you. And so the cycle continues: the cooks know we aren’t ready to make better food choices, even when they — and we — can see they’re making us sick.


What We Don’t Talk About When We Talk About Serial Killers. By   Carolyn Murnick. The Cut , February  5, 2019.







On 12 December 2017, Lauren Berlant posted an article on her blog, Supervalent Thought, titled ‘The Predator and the Jokester’. In the opening paragraph, she wrote:

                          Al Franken has said he’ll resign. If so, he will be gone from the Senate not because he was a vicious    predator but because there was a bad chemical reaction between his sexual immaturity, his just ‘having fun’ with women’s bodies, and this moment of improvisatory boundary-drawing that likens the jokester to the predator. What’s going on?

Berlant argues that US Senator Franken thought his ‘good guy credentials separated him from the predators’. The delineation between good guy and predator is also the focus of David Fincher’s Netflix series Mindhunter (2017) and Netflix’s Conversations with a Killer: The Ted Bundy Tapes (2019). Both shows explore the phenomenon of the 1970s serial killer. What the decade birthed, however, was not simply a new criminal taxonomy, but a new kind of masculinity that had to engineer a new mode of catharsis for itself in order to respond to the increasing socio-economic liberation of women. Bundy’s earliest documented homicides were committed in 1974 and targeted sorority girls on college campuses around Washington State. During the first half of 1974, female college students disappeared at the rate of about one per month.

The Ted Bundy Tapes – along with the almost-nostalgic, Extremely Wicked, Shockingly Evil and Vile (2019) and Lars Von Trier’s serial-killer feature, The House That Jack Built (2018) – is illuminating not because it uncovers the reason Bundy murdered women, but because it reveals that Bundy could only perform male normality if he was killing women. Just as acting normal is what it took to get away with murder, normality, a restorative valve, becomes the affective mode that deploys male transgression. Much to the frustration of Stephen Michaud, the journalist who recorded roughly 100 hours of interviews with Bundy in 1980 at the Florida State Prison, where he awaited execution, Bundy refused to blow his cover. (He finally confessed in 1989, only a few days before his electrocution.) It is the ‘good guy credentials’, as Berlant puts it, that enabled the transgression. Male violence, therefore, is not an aberration or a surplus; normalcy is. ‘I don’t feel guilty for any of it,’ Bundy said about his crimes. ‘I feel less guilty now than I’ve felt at any time in my whole life. About anything. I mean really. I am in the enviable position of not having to feel any guilt. Guilt is this mechanism we use to control people. It’s an illusion. It’s this kind of social-control mechanism and it’s very unhealthy.’ Bundy regrets not the murders, but the years he wasted trying to suppress and manage the urge to commit them. He views it as lost time; wasted potential. Self-control becomes synonymous with blockage and emasculation.

Bundy’s two prison escapes (the first lasted six days; the second 46) marked a turning point in both his killing and his thinking. Once Bundy was apprehended and convicted, he was freed from upholding the good-guy act that interfered with unencumbered violence: it was getting caught that provoked him to go on increasingly reckless killing sprees as a fugitive. Judging from the bootleg audio of disgraced comedian Louis C.K.’s set in December 2018 – performed at the Governor’s Comedy Club in Long Island, less than a year after he was accused of sexual harassment by numerous women – C.K. forgoes the ‘self-awareness’ of his late comedy in order to go on irrepressible rants about women, the survivors of the Parkland high school shooting and transgender teens. ‘I’m committing career suicide here,’ C.K. tells the crowd. ‘Let’s just go all the way […] My life is over. I don’t give a shit.’ For C.K., who, like Franken, is both predator and jokester, the idea of ‘going all the way’, in spite of getting caught, is, in a sense, a verbal equivalent of the murders Bundy committed during his two escapes from prison.

When Michaud questioned Bundy about his dating history, Bundy told him: ‘It wasn’t that I disliked women or was afraid of them. It was just that I didn’t seem to have an inkling as to what to do about them.’ The preposition ‘about’ is all-revealing here. It reduces one’s relation to women to just two options: extermination or acceptance. The construction of straight, white, post-war masculinity, Bundy tells us inadvertently, literally becomes: what do men do about women? Something had to be done about the newly liberated, feminist women of the 1970s, the question was: what? The decision Bundy made is the real story of The Ted Bundy Tapes. What the #MeToo and Time’s Up movements have brought into sharp focus is the extent to which men have succeeded in seamlessly interchanging compliance and abuse, normality and abnormality, good guy and predator, in various ways – not, as we previously told ourselves, being either one or the other. Bundy, despite his famously brutal and numerous crimes, managed to get married and father a child while on death row.

On 20 July 1979, Ted Bundy spoke in court against his own counsel: ‘Maybe we’re dealing with the problem of professional psychology,’ he told the judge during his trial for the murders of Margaret Bowman and Lisa Levy at Florida State University’s Chi Omega sorority house. When found guilty of both convictions, Bundy told Michaud: ‘They [the jury] refuse to perceive me as being anything that approaches being normal […] I’m just a normal individual.’ This logic is echoed in the Lifetime series You (2018), another serial-killer drama recently picked up by Netflix. You repurposes the romantic comedy genre as a tool for examining male seduction and manipulation, exploring the way social media amplifies the male gaze and is inherently a system of stalking and control. Joe, the show’s psychotic Romeo, refers to Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein (1818) to ‘justify’ his actions. The monster, he says – alluding to himself – is not really a monster; an old argument.





The Ted Bundy Tapes ends where Mindhunter begins: with the FBI’s methods of criminal profiling and pattern study in the late 1970s. By having serial killers supply the raw data of their murders, the FBI ‘built a composite of the mass killer and his victims’, as newscaster Tom Brokaw reported on the evening news in 1984. The establishment of a national centre of analysis of violent crime – which Mindhunter creator, Joe Penhall, refers to as a ‘death museum’ – allowed male FBI agents to figure out ‘who kills and why’ and, in Brokaw’s words, to ‘look for patterns in the methods of murders’ using interviews with notorious serial killers, including Charles Manson. (While the FBI employed female agents, the majority were overwhelmingly male.) Mindhunter is also built around the testimonies of real life-serial killers. In season one, Ed Kemper and Jerry Brudos recall the various humiliations they suffered at the hands of their so-called overbearing mothers (fathers are not mentioned). It would seem that women, along with feminism, drive men to kill women. The increase in the number of serial killers during the 1960s and ’70s, therefore, can be attributed – at least in part – to a feminist backlash enacted by men who felt emasculated by post-war America. In her book, Defending the Devil: My Story as Ted Bundy’s Last Lawyer (1994), attorney Polly Nelson writes: ‘It was the absolute misogyny of his crimes that stunned me,’ she wrote. ‘His manifest rage against women. He had no compassion at all [...] he was totally engrossed in the details. His murders were his life’s accomplishments.’

Mindhunter looks for reasons to corroborate motive while retroactively questioning that reasoning. It builds an epistemology around the psychology of serial murder in order to avoid addressing the lethal system of misogyny that produces it. The duality and duplicity that creates sociopathic masculinity puts it on the spectrum of artifice and psychosis, as Mindhunter illustrates through its young and increasingly morally culpable FBI profiler, Holden Ford. To its credit, the series does not separate normal masculinity from abnormal masculinity, federal agent from serial killer, the profile of the behaviour from the behaviour itself. Rather, it bonds and conflates them through a shared performance of masculinity. Both the profiler and the killer engage in the act of normality, or what David Sims – in a 13 November 2017 article about C.K. in The Atlantic – describes as ‘performing self-awareness’. In the case of sociopathic masculinity, normality is often the public act of self-awareness that subsidizes the private psychosis of misogyny.

Where male-centred dramas like Mindhunter and The Ted Bundy Tapes fail, and a feminist series like BBC’s crime series Happy Valley succeeds, is in the antiquated pursuit of motive and the study of ‘abnormal’ masculinity using psychological profiles designed by men. Happy Valley, which stars a female lead, and is written and produced by women, understands that patriarchy is a total system which houses all masculinity, and that misogyny itself is a principal psychology which is both aberrant and prescriptive. The forensics of motive, therefore, become redundant. Even Bundy himself dismissed it – claiming it didn’t ultimately matter. Men don’t need a reason to kill women, Happy Valley tells us: they need a reason not to. Moreover, men can kill women off – both literally and symbolically – in lieu of what actually restricts and displaces their authority. In Bundy’s case, the executioner was reportedly a woman.

In David Fincher’s Gen X Fight Club (1999), the narrator’s emboldened alter ego, Tyler Durden (also murderous), bitterly seethes about post-war feminization: ‘We’re a generation of men raised by women. I’m wondering if another woman is really the answer we need.’ In the age of Me Too and Time’s Up, the serial killer revival, in movies and on TV, hints at a troubling resurgence of the psychosexual male panic that led to the rise of the serial killer in the 1960s and ’70s. Perhaps, as with any distress, especially the kind sutured into our everyday lives, we need to keep replaying the banal horrors of masculinity in order to figure out how to finally wake up from its nightmare.

Return of the Serial Killer: How Psychosexual Male Panic is Infecting Pop Culture. By  Masha Tupitsyn. Frieze , February 11, 2019.






In the wildly popular Netflix show “You,” former “Gossip Girl” star Penn Badgley plays Joe, a handsome-yet-unassuming bookstore clerk who, when he’s not caring for the ancient novels in his shop’s basement, is obsessively stalking his girlfriend. Her name is Beck, and in an effort to secure her affections, he resorts to manipulating and eventually murdering several people she knows and loves.
Earlier this month, Badgley ― aka everyone’s TV crush circa 2007-2012 ― responded to the hordes of online fans who admitted to finding his “You” character attractive, to actively rooting for Joe in spite of his blatantly violent and controlling tendencies.
“Penn Badgley is breaking my heart once again as Joe,” one Twitter user wrote. “What is it about him?”

“A: He is a murderer,” Badgley matter-of-factly replied.

In the yet-to-be-released movie “Extremely Wicked, Shockingly Evil, and Vile,” another former all-American heartthrob ― Zac Efron ― plays another murderer with a complicated female following: Ted Bundy. In the film’s trailer, Efron-as-serial-killer grins, winks and charms to the tempo of a catchy rock tune. If you didn’t know better, you’d think you were watching a preview for a fun and fast caper about a relatively harmless criminal in the style of “Catch Me If You Can,” rather than a biopic about a monster.

The teaser, which dropped in late January, left a bad taste in the mouths of some people online, who blasted it for romanticizing a misogynistic rapist and necrophile who confessed to killing about 30 people in the 1970s ― and yes, was also attractive. The trailer plays up this quality ― perhaps, as others have pointed out, to make a point: The common narrative around Bundy is that he was able to get away with his unimaginably cruel acts for so long because he was exceedingly charming, clever and disarmingly handsome.

The common narrative, however, is wrong.

In many ways, true crime culture’s ongoing fascination with evil men like Bundy and the problematic reception of Joe on “You” seem to go hand in hand. We’ve been fed a line that serial killers are fascinating, evil geniuses whose misdeeds warrant a near-obsessive degree of analysis. And so documentarians and filmmakers and showrunners eagerly dive into the minds of these predators ― most of whom are white ― hoping to shed light on the inner demons that make our sociopaths tick.
But often, the mystery is less deep. Onscreen and off, whiteness is a shield that protects typical, everyday men from scrutiny. Being white is often associated with attractiveness, and attractiveness is often associated with decency, and together these associations help to provide cover. Neither Ted Bundy nor Joe needed to be exceptional criminals or atypically conniving people ― or even inordinately attractive men ― to get away with the horrors they enacted.

As Badgley, whose character on “Gossip Girl” turned out to be yet another man prone to stalking the people he hoped to control, put it: “Would anyone else be considered unassuming on the side of the street standing there too long? It’s pretty evident that no one but a young, handsome white man could do that.”
Refinery29 writer Ashley Alese Edwards recently declared as much. “The Ted Bundy of America’s consciousness is a myth,” she wrote. “Bundy was not special, he was not smarter than the average person; he did not have a personality so alluring that his female victims could not help but simply go off with him. ... What Bundy did have was the power of being a white man in a society that reveres them.”

Contemporary shows like “You,” movies like “Extremely Wicked” and docuseries like Netflix’s “Conversations With a Killer: The Ted Bundy Tapes” are intended to illuminate the truths so many true-crime and serial killer-centric programs before them failed to do. They are ostensibly about broken systems that privilege some over others ― the intangible things that help murderers to get away with what they get away with. But no matter how hard they try, these projects inevitably fall into the precarious trap of perpetuating narratives about “fascinating” serial killers even as they attempt to dismantle them. 

Instead, they rehash a story that’s been told several times before, they flatten some narratives and inflate others, and most importantly, they leave the viewer more preoccupied with the murderous men than the victims. Even on “You,” the audience gets so wrapped up in Joe’s journey to “win” Beck at all costs, that we forget that Beck is, in fact, a victim. In the case of Bundy, it’s easy to forget that his victims had stories of their own, too, when each woman’s body is primarily used to reveal another facet of her killer’s biography.

The question really boils down to: What is the value in rehashing these stories if they’re going to be packaged in the same way?

Early reviews of “Extremely Wicked” suggest that, unlike its trailer, the film takes a more nuanced approach to Bundy and his murders; it’s told from the perspective of Bundy’s longtime girlfriend, Elizabeth Kloepfer. But even if the movie resists romanticizing Bundy’s deeds in favor of condemning them (according to my colleague Matthew Jacobs, who saw the film at Sundance, there are two shots of Efron’s sculpted butt that, among other things, complicate the film’s intentions), the very existence of yet another Ted Bundy movie is a kind of romanticization, one with unwieldy results.

The “Conversations With a Killer” docuseries, for example, has garnered far worse critiques: The show was described as “cruel” and boring” in a review on Jezebel by Stassa Edwards, who also argued that it preserved “the tired narrative of the smart, good-looking serial killer.” On Vulture, Matt Zoller Seitz criticizes the four-part docuseries for focusing on Bundy rather than exploring the lives of his victims. Somehow the point continues to evade storytellers: Beyond the killings, beyond the killers’ minds, are actual human beings.

It seems that for stories like these to truly elevate the discourse around serial killers, there must be some value beyond simply getting into the mind of the man who kills. “You,” for instance, has sparked vital discussions about internalized misogyny that amounts to distrust of victims and the kind of toxic masculinity that masquerades as the opposite, by placing us in the killer’s mind and revealing that it isn’t all that interesting ― just delusional. Joe’s inner monologue isn’t a register of brilliant criminal strategizing; rather, it’s an average man’s earnest stream of consciousness that’s littered with entitlement and dispensation at every turn.

“You” has its flaws, but it seems far more self-aware of its place in the conversation than past serial-killer lore and “Conversations With a Killer.” Rather than just lead us blindly down the killer’s path of destruction, it challenges us to interrogate why we’re following at all.

  
Sexualizing Serial Killers Like Ted Bundy Has Its Consequences. By  Zeba Blay. The Huffington Post,  February 4, 2019.