Showing posts with label Enlightenment. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Enlightenment. Show all posts

26/11/2023

Georg Matthias Bose's Electric Venus And Other Attractions of Electricity in the Eighteenth Century

 




Electricity was one of the emblems of enlightened modernity. The “youngest daughter of the sciences,” as the philosopher and theologian Joseph Priestley defined it, offered a vocabulary and a repertoire of embodied sensations with which to articulate visions of human progress. Enlightened moderns turned the page on the nostalgic look to the past that characterized the previous centuries. Electricity was one of the tools they brandished to articulate a historical narrative that positioned them at the beginning of a new age of cumulative knowledge, material progress, and racial superiority. They conceded that the attractive properties that amber—“elektron” in Greek—acquired when rubbed had been known since antiquity but noted that only in the present had experimenters demonstrated that electricity was a universal power of nature.
 
One of the earliest British writers on the medical applications of electricity, Richard Lovett, regarded the phenomena of the Leyden jar, discovered in 1746, as nothing less than an act of divine revelation. The Italian scholar Ludovico Muratori similarly declared that God “reserved for our times the discovery of a most wonderful phenomenon. I mean electricity.” Jean-Jacques Rousseau believed that if “a person had started up, in the last century, armed with all those miracles of electricity which are now common to the meanest of our experimentalists, it is certain he would have been burnt for a sorcerer, or followed as a prophet.”
 
The widespread success of the new science was facilitated by a preexisting experimental culture that crossed boundaries between academic and the social realms. Academic journals and popular magazines, along with a vast variety of other texts, popularized the surprising results of a heterogeneous group of self-styled “electricians” or “medical electricians,” many of whom had just a smattering of natural philosophy and often no medical training at all. The Swiss physiologist Albert von Haller remarked in a long article on electricity that was published in the Gentleman’s Magazine in 1747 that electrical demonstrations had awakened the curiosity of those who would not normally pay attention to experimental philosophy. Not only the literate but even the “ladies and people of quality, who never regard natural philosophy but when it works miracles,” became interested in electricity: Everyone wanted to see a “lady’s finger darting flashes of lightning, or her charming lips setting houses on fire.”
 
All over Europe and its colonies, electrical performances shocked and instructed. They offered sensorial evidence for the existence of an all-permeating natural substance that did not reveal itself unless properly prodded. The spectacle of electricity relied on “electrical machines” that made the newly discovered power of nature tangible. Participants in electrical demonstrations experienced with their own senses the effects of the invisible power that performers initially called “electric fire.” When connected to the electrical machine, audience members’ bodies responded uncontrollably to the passage of electricity: their hands attracted small feathers or pieces of papers without their touching them, their hair stood straight up, and their entire bodies jolted when they underwent the “electric commotion.” Only following Benjamin Franklin’s 1752 kite experiment did the association between lightning and electricity become widely accepted. Before then, there was no clear understanding of the nature of the electric matter. The popular experiments seemed to demonstrate that electricity was an ever-present natural substance, even when invisible.
 
Electrical demonstrators were eager for their audiences to understand that the electrical machine did not create any effect, since it only revealed the electric matter that existed in nature. However spectacular, their performances were by no means to be confused with magic tricks. In The History and Present State of Electricity (1767), Priestley admitted that the phenomena of electrical attractions and repulsions “looked like the power of magic” and so, without explanation, “and with a little art,” they could very well be used for “a deception of this kind.” However, he underscored, the electrical machine was a “philosophical instrument,” not a magician’s tool, because it exhibited “the operations of nature, that is of the God of nature himself.” Just as the air pump—another philosophical instrument according to Priestley—demonstrated that the vacuum was a natural phenomenon, the electric machine manifested the electric fire, it did not create it.
 
While experts debated the nature and properties of electricity without reaching consensus, electrified bodies seemed to provide evidence that electricity was an all-permeating, if still largely poorly understood, natural power. In his Essai sur l’électricité des corps (Essay on the electricity of bodies), published in 1746, French physicist Jean-Antoine Nollet offered the first comprehensive theoretical account of all known electrical phenomena, supporting his theory with a description of the physiological responses that any electrified audience member could feel. He believed that streams of electric matter—which shared some features with the substance of fire—issued in and out of electrified bodies. Participants in his lectures could use their own bodies to understand this theory: when they brought their cheeks close to an electrified object, they could feel the stream of electric fire causing a delicate tingling in their faces, and they could also see sparks issue from their fingers, hear cracking noises, and smell sulfuric odors.
 
Electrified bodies jolted, whooped, and gasped, potentially disrupting the codes of civility and politesse of eighteenth-century sociability. Natural philosophers whose lectures attracted aristocrats, like Nollet in Paris and Georg Matthias Bose in Leipzig, devised strategies to make the uncontrollable electrified body socially acceptable. They turned electrical demonstrations into a new kind of group dance. Lecturers led participants in explosive choreographies that showed that the loss of control caused by electrification was only temporary. Just as men and women in the group dances performed during the social gatherings of elites were assigned different steps, so the most popular electrical demonstrations enacted well-established gender roles, which played with the elite culture of courtship and seduction, along with the sexual allusions connected to the vocabulary and gestures of electrical experiments.
 
Bose, who performed for the duchess of Gotha, designed an experiment that turned ladies into electric Venuses. For this demonstration, which he called “Venus electrificata” and which Franklin later renamed the “electric kiss,” a lady stood on an insulated stool while a gentleman tried to kiss her, only to receive painful sparks from her lips. Gentlemen, in their turn, could perform their virility by “inflaming spirits,” that is, setting fire to alcohol with electrified swords. For those who preferred a less aggressive model of masculinity, Bose designed an electric “beatification,” which made a luminous halo appear above a person’s head. Nollet’s celebrated “electric commotion,” an experiment where people holding hands experienced an instantaneous electric shock at the same time, borrowed bodily gestures from the cotillion, a dance popular at court and among the aristocracy. The first and most spectacular iteration of such demonstration took place in the Hall of Mirrors at Versailles, the place for special balls, where Nollet invited one hundred eighty people to form a human chain. Not surprisingly, Haller commented in his article that electricity had “replaced the quadrille” in the social gatherings of the time.
 
Bose also introduced a gendered terminology into his theory of electric attractions and repulsions, which presented an innovative explanation of electrical phenomena based on the distinction between “male” and “female” electric fire. According to this theory, the male fire, emitted by metals and animal bodies, was strong and powerful, and sparks, with their crackling sound, were its visible manifestations. The female fire, on the other hand, was a weak luminous emanation, the kind of light that characterized the aurora borealis. The gendered roles participants were assigned at electrical soirées in which entire families took part turned the potentially indecorous effects of electrification into socially acceptable choreographies.
 
Electrical demonstrations took place for the most part in the dark and capitalized on the gallantry and innuendo that characterized eighteenth-century sociability. The gestures associated with electrical experiments—the rubbing of a long glass rod that emitted a stream of sparks or the gentle caressing of a globe—elicited the salacious curiosity of the salon goers and captivated the imagination of pornographers and satirists. Theories that connected the electric matter to the principle of life, together with the discovery of animal electricity later in the century, further excited the popular imagination. The Marquis de Sade was profoundly inspired by the violent bodily convulsions caused by the discharge of the Leyden jar and liberally employed electrical vocabulary in his works. The idea that electricity could be used to promote fertility was at the core of the Temple of Health and Hymen, the London extravaganza of the medico-electrical quack George Graham. Among its many prodigious treatments, the temple featured a “celestial bed” surrounded by electrical effluvia, where couples allegedly could successfully conceive. Authors who believed that the electric fire was connected to virility found short-lived confirmation in the rumor that the Leyden experiment did not work on the castrati. Although the rumor was unfounded, the very fact that it spread reveals the pervasiveness of the sexualized interpretations of electricity.




 
 
Adapted from In the Land of Marvels: Science, Fabricated Realities, and Industrial Espionage in the Age of the Grand Tour by Paola Bertucci.. Published by  Johns Hopkins University Press. 2023. .

 

The Youngest Daughter of the Sciences :  Electrical performances shocked upper-class eighteenth-century audiences. By Paola Bertucci. Lapham’s Quarterly, November 1, 2023. 






Where did this excitement come from?
 
Francis Hawksbee the Elder built his influence machine and people experimented with rubbing glass balls and rods of resin. And then, during the 1740s, the phenomenon of electricity became a subject of popular wonder in the salons of Europe, especially in Germany. Fascinated by Hawksbee’s experiments and Dufay’s writings, Georg Mathias Bose, a young poet and physicist from Leipzig, devised a series of technical feats intended to impress a public of respectable ladies and gentlemen who hurried to admire the spectacle of this new fire, ‘electric fluid’, surging spontaneously from matter.
 
‘Sanctified by science and frozen with surprise’
 
What did Bose’s device consist of? He would invite guests to break bread with him. Beforehand, he would insulate all the furniture and his own chair. The apprentice wizard would then discreetly touch a thin copper wire placed under a tray and connected to a hidden generator activated by an accomplice; then, with gravitas, Bose would put his hand flat on the table. The current passed along the guests’ arms, which they would politely rest on this same table, and the crowd, sharing a look of panic, would become overjoyed, surprised, and dishevelled, their hair standing on end as it teemed with thousands of crackling sparks. ‘It’s marvellous!’ one exclaimed. A few months later, Bose invented a machine for mechanical beatification, with the ‘saint’ seated on an insulated chair, the top of his head covered by a little pointy metal hat, under a sort of crown of bits of cardboard and junk. The current was diffused by a long wire that hung just above a metal plate. Situated barely a centimetre higher than the crown, it set off a crackling of sparks that outlined a halo above the head of the person now sanctified by science and frozen with surprise.
 
‘My mouth twisted, and my teeth almost broke!’
 
Bose’s imagination was particularly drawn to an attraction called ‘the electric kiss of Leipzig’, which he lyrically describes in his poem ‘Venus electrificata’. Having been insulated from the current beforehand, a beautiful young woman would be connected to Bose’s primary generator, her lips coated with a conductive substance. An honourable audience member was then invited to come up and kiss the girl. The twenty-something-year-old man would bring his quivering lips close to those of the Venus and suffer a violent discharge. The astonished public would then see a surging flash between the mouths of the two young people. The man, having literally received the shock of his life, would be momentarily dazed, the power of the electricity, the fire emanating from the woman, leaving him breathless. ‘The pain came from up close, and my lips were quaking. My mouth twisted, and my teeth almost broke!’
 
‘A fire of the purest kind’
 
Bose, the maths professor Hausen, and Winkler, their young colleague in Eastern languages, all set Leipzig ablaze with audacious experiments straddling the line between physics and quackery; in this period, the ‘electric fairy’ (la fée électricité) was still a magical form of scientific entertainment, an irrational promise of reason. Soon enough, the games would be replaced by theories. But, for the time being, the fumes of this subtle fluid sparking a fire in the ether stoked the spirits of Europe and sketched the outline of a new image of human desire. ‘Madame, you are now filled with fire, a fire of the purest kind, one that will cause you no pain as long as you keep it in your heart, but one which will also make you suffer as soon as you communicate it to others.’ Lying latent, perhaps this internal fire is to blame for only revealing itself through contact with her suitor, the man who tries to kiss her. This fire represents the desirability of the young woman; sensual desire is like an electric force and, conversely, electricity is like the natural libido of all matter, just waiting for its suitor, humanity, to reveal itself.
 
‘The shiver of a new intensity’
 
In the guise of desire, electricity is not without danger, but it triggers the shiver of a new intensity, that of an ‘unthinkable fluid’. We still did not know the nature of this fluid or its possible uses. The human body served as the principal conductor for these first demonstrations of electrostatic power. Like an electric shiver through the body, something happens that makes manifest the occult power of certain objects to repel or attract others, to heat up, to set off sparks, and to produce a combined discharge of energy and light. But soon the human body was replaced by metal. Flesh, muscles, and nerves were separated from this mysterious impulse. It returned to its place within things, as the first electrostatic generators, Leyden jars, batteries in cylinders, and trays of thousands of jars were constructed.
 
‘An intoxication cultivated by the modern mind’
 
But then electricity entered into humanity, where it would always remain as a sort of intoxication cultivated by the modern mind. Like blood coursing through the veins of society, electric light spread through optical science and transported fabulous cinematographic images to the screen. It broke the image into a thousand bits of light, decomposed and encoded it into short pulses capable of being transmitted over distances, and made way for the diffusion of television. It invaded all data, images, texts, and sounds and then placed itself in the service of electronics. It illuminated the street lights of the great capitals as well as the lamps above the beds of children reading late into the night. It fed the indefatigable motor of growth and progress. It demanded that dams, generators, power plants, and windmills be constructed. It set in motion all things or nearly all things to the extent that humanity, without even knowing it, became the living medium between entities (cables, telephones, radios, pacemakers…). Little by little, humanity forgot the electric nature of those entities, but the idea remained in the bloodstream. It was as if Leipzig’s kiss, which sealed the modern alliance of desire and electricity, had never ended.
 
Extracted from The Life Intense: A Modern Obsession by Tristan Garcia.  Edinburgh University press, 2018.
 
 
What Electricity Has Done to Thought: an excerpt from The Life Intense by Tristan Garcia. By Naomi Farmer. Edinburgh University Press, October 2018.





The Nature is generous. By endowing sulfur and glass with the property of attraction, it has allowed everyone to seize the electrical phenomenon. The simplest stick of sulfur or the most banal glass tubes already give beautiful effects. But these materials lend themselves especially to the manufacture of "machines" which will complete the "cabinets of curiosities", obligatory attraction of any noble or bourgeois home that respects itself, from the second half of the 17th century.

Otto de Guericke (1602-1686)

Among the builders, a name emerges, that of Otto de Guericke. He is the descendant of a family of notables from the free city of Magdeburg. His father and grandfather served as mayor, helping to make it a prosperous and populous city. He studied first at the University of Leipzig and then joined Leiden to complete his studies in languages as well as in the art of fortifications and war machines.

In 1626, he returned to Magdeburg where his knowledge quickly became useful because, in 1631, the Protestant city was besieged by the armies of the German Emperor in conflict with Sweden whose city is allied.

On May 20, at dawn, the troops of Catholic mercenaries of warlord Tilly, composed of Spaniards, Italians, French, Poles and Germans enter the city. The population resists heroically but fails to repel the attackers. Then begins what has been remembered as the "massacre of Magdeburg": in four days, twenty thousand civilians have been killed by the sword or burned alive in the fire of their house.

Once peace is restored, Otto de Guericke helps raise the city from its ruins and becomes mayor. In this position, he represented Magdeburg at the peace congress which, in 1648, ended this "thirty-year war". Good negotiator, he gets for his city, the recognition of his old privileges. This mission leads him to sit on the Imperial Diet. It was at one of these meetings, in Regensburg, in 1654, that he chose to reveal the capabilities of the vacuum pump he had recently developed.

The so-called "Magdeburg hemispheres" experiment is well known. It follows Torricelli's experiments (1608-1647) on atmospheric pressure.

In 1643, to respond to the problem posed by the Florence fountain-makers who had difficulty pumping water into their wells beyond 32 feet (about 10 meters), Toricelli had spilled a tube full of mercury on a tank containing the same liquid. He could see that the mercury was falling down the tube to stabilize at a height of 28 inches (76cm) above the free surface. He thus demonstrated the existence of the atmospheric pressure but also that of the emptiness which, according to his adversaries, Nature had "horror".

The subject fascinates Otto Guericke who undertakes successfully, the development of a pump capable of evacuating  air from a container full of it. After trying to empty a barrel that did not resist the experiment, Guericke had a copper sphere made up of two contiguous hemispheres and equipped with a tap. In front of a large audience, he is emptying into this imposing sphere of a diameter of 1.19 meters. Twenty-four horses hitched to the hemispheres are unable to break the adhesion between the two parts.

 This experience radically inaugurates the practice of "science show" whose popularity will also be decisive in the advancement of electrical science.

The experience of the "Hemispheres of Magdeburg" is a landmark in the history of mechanics. Guericke's place in that of electricity is more modest. His contribution in this area was, moreover, ignored by most of his contemporaries. Yet, nearly a century later, several physicists, and in particular the Frenchman Dufay, note that one would have gained to consider his experiments with more attention.

Guericke, in fact, is not realy interested in electricity. He meets it only through the questions he asks himself about the functioning of the Universe and first of all about that of the earth. Among the "virtues" he attributes to our globe, two seem to him fundamental. First a "conservative" virtue: the earth attracts all the materials that are necessary for its formation, water, rocks ... Then an "expulsive" virtue: it repels everything that can destroy it. Fire, for example, whose flame rises to the sky.

Guericke offers of it a spectacular demonstration. Take, he says, a glass balloon the size of a "child's head", fill it with finely ground sulfur, heat up to the fusion of the sulfur, let cool, break the glass and collect the sulfur globe . Equip the globe with a handle and place it on a wooden support. Rub this ball vigorously with a very dry hand.

The ball will then manifest many of the earthly virtues. "Conservative" virtue first, attracting light objects to her.

More amazing is the observation of the "expulsive" virtue ! The globe sometimes repels what it first attracted. A feather, for example, after touching the globe is repulsed. So suspended in the air, it can be walked around the room. Better: whatever the movement of the globe it seems to always present the same face. Exactly like the moon opposite the earth.

Guericke, who has read Gilbert, can not doubt for a moment that the attraction virtue of the earth is simply electrical in nature. As for repulsive virtue, no one before him seems to have noticed it. He attributes to it a different cause and imagines it only proper to the constituent elements of the earth and among these to sulfur. It passes, thus, beside a truth which will remain long obscure until the French Dufay shows that the electricity also has a "repulsive virtue"!

Guericke's experiments contain other rich intuitions. To prove that the air is not the vehicle of the attraction, it shows that this virtue can be transmitted by means of a linen thread, more than a meter long, stretched from the surface of the globe. This first observation of the electrical "conduction" will also remain without a future. It will be up to the Englishman Gray to rediscover it almost a century later.

Even if its title of glory remains the famous experiment of the hemispheres and if its theoretical contribution in the field of electricity remained limited, the talent of observer and experimenter of Guericke, recognized by his successors, deserves the place which him is reserved in the Pantheon of electricians.

Hauksbee ( ?- 1713)

Electricity and vacuum works together in the machines devised by Francis Hauksbee.

 The first years of his life are not well known. Self-taught, he is noticed by Newton. In December 1703, the famous physicist, author of the law of universal gravitation, became president of the Royal Society of London, the largest English Scientific Academy. He hires Hauksbee as his lead experimenter. Until 1705, it animates the sessions of the Academy. In particular by classic vacuum experiments inspired by Guericke.

From this date he moves towards the study of "mercurial" or "barometric" phosphorescence. Since 1675, a fortuitous observation intrigues physicists. When a barometric tube arranged in the conditions of the Toricelli experiment is jostled in the darkness, a phosphorescent glow appears in the emptiness released at the upper part of the tube. When Hauksbee tackles the problem, it is generally accepted that this glow comes from an emanation of mercury. For his part he chooses to use method and study the respective roles of emptiness, glass and mercury.

The vacuum ? Hauksbee partially fills a balloon with mercury in which he creates vacuum. The whole remains dark as long as the liquid remains motionless. It is therefore clear that the vacuum is not sufficient but that, on the other hand, the friction caused by the movement is essential.

 Friction on mercury or on glass? From November 1705 Hauksbee uses, to answer this question, a montage which ignores mercury. It is a sphere of glass provided with two diametrically opposed copper pieces serving as its axis. This sphere can be put in rapid motion by placing it on a machine inspired by a carpenter's wheel. But its essential property is to have been conceived so that one can realize the emptiness. Hauksbee took the precaution of keeping a valve in one of the parts of the shaft that can be connected to a vacuum pump.




The sphere, emptied of its air, is set in motion and rubbed by the hand of the experimenter. Suddenly, in the darkness, the sphere fills with a strong diffuse glow. A wall ten feet away is illuminated. A book held near the globe can be read. When a finger approaches the sphere, the light is concentrated in filaments that seem attracted by this finger. The light gradually decreases when, little by little, the air is allowed to enter the tube.

 Even when the atmospheric pressure is reached, we can still catch some light from the globe. It is external this time, and present themselves in the new form of sparks. Hauksbee still hesitates but for Newton opinion, the light does not come from emptiness, nor from mercury but from glass!

We now know that if it is the glass that is electrified, the light comes from the air. In the "empty" globe, there is still residual gas and it is "ionized" under the effect of the electric field created by the friction of the glass. It becomes, by this fact, bright, like neon in a tube of lighting. Naturally this interpretation was impossible to those who had neither the knowledge of the nature of the air, nor, still less, of the existence and constitution of the atoms.

 This "electrical phosphorescence" will continue to obsess generations of physicists. His study will lead to cathode-ray tubes, which for some time still equip our televisions and computers screens. The discovery of X-rays, that of electrons, that of radioactivity, will also be at the end of this adventure that we will discuss later.

For the moment, Hauksbee's spectacular and frightening demonstrations in the darkness of a cabinet are becoming the star experiences of physics shows.

Tube or globe?

One thing is certain: for those who saw glass as a secondary material and with few electrical effects, and who continued to prefer amber, sulfur or wax, Hauksbee opposed them a convincing denial.

Glass is essential, but in what form? Hauksbee himself for his classical demonstrations renounces his spheres and uses only a tube of flint-glass, the flint-glass used for optics and of which the English are the specialists. With a tube one meter long and three centimeters in diameter, it attracts thin sheets of copper several tens of centimeters apart. These sheets of copper, or better of gold, more sensitive than pieces of string or paper, will become the classic material of electrical laboratories. To put them in motion, a glass tube is more than enough.

 The globe, mounted on a tower, will be forgotten for thirty years until, around 1733, a German physicist, Bose, takes up the idea.

Bose (1710-1761)

Georg Matthias Bose, born in Leipzig, is interested in new physics and mathematics while pursuing his medical studies. In 1738 he was appointed to a chair of "natural philosophy" at the University of Wittenberg. From this position, he establishes a close relationship with all that Europe counts as well-known people, both scientists and men of letters, religion and politics. The magic aspect of electricity seduces him. When his readings lead him to meet the electrical experiments of Gray and Dufay (two persons of prime importance that we will talk about again), and in particular those on conductors and insulators; when, moreover, he finds the description of Hauksbee's globe, he knows that he has found both his vocation and his public.

It first completes the Hauksbee device with an assembly that will become the standard for all European laboratories. An iron tube, sometimes in the form of a rifle barrel, hangs horizontally from two cords of silk. He grazes, without touching it, the rubbed glass globe. This "first conductor" will then be used to distribute the "electrical fluid" through various chains or conductors to the surrounding experimental devices.

Bose then organizes "electric parties" that are not limited to its student audience. Imagine a meal where you have invited all the prominent notables in your city. The legs of the table have been isolated by wax patties as well as the chair that you have reserved for yourself. From the electric machine you have operated and concealed, a connecting wire is brought near your hand. At the moment your guests want to grab their fork, you just have to do the contact with the table so that an electric shock comes to make them jump on their chair. At dessert you will set a liquor cup on fire simply by the approach of one of your fingers from where only the closest spectators will have seen a spark escape. Your guests will then be ready to follow you in the cabinet of curiosities where you will transport them in a universe at once wonderful and terrifying.

Wonderful! Wafers of thick wax are placed on the floor. Each participant climbs on one of them and reaches out to his neighbors, forming a chain whose first link firmly holds the rifle barrel suspended above the globe of the machine. When the globe is set in motion, the person at the other end of the chain reaches out over gold leaves placed on a plate. Each one then sees the leaves rise from a light flight, as attracted by a magic will, towards the open hand of the experimenter. Let's put out the candles that light up this closed-shuttered salon and reach for the driver of the machine, we will see sparkling sparks. In the form of apotheosis we can propose the demonstration of the "electric beatification". The loveliest person in the assembly is invited to climb on a cake of wax and to seize the driver. When the machine is vigorously activated, its hair unfolds in a halo which illuminates, in the darkness, a thousand gleams of holiness.

Terrifying ! The man who has the courage to run a few drops of his blood sees them glitter like fire beads in the dark as he grabs the electric conductor. Tense fingers of a person connected to the machine can kill the poor flies to which the spark will be directed. Could we not make more serious victims tomorrow? Such manipulations would certainly have condamned their authors to be burned in the times, still close, of the Inquisition!

 Terrifying and traitor! As beautiful as the young person haloed by the contact of the machine be, it will not be prudent to approach his lips for a kiss. The "Electrified Venus" will defend its virtue by a vigorous electric shock.





 L’abbé Nollet (1700-1770)

The news of these wonders reaches France and in particular to the Abbé Nollet who is then one of the most prominent European electricians. He said he could not sleep until he himself had built and perfected a machine.

The globe, one foot in diameter, used by Nollet, is thick glass. The wheel which drives it by means of a belt passing by a pulley fixed on its axis, must be at least four feet in diameter and be provided with a crank which allows two men to activate it. Nollet prefers to rub the globe by hand but many European physicists have chosen to add a leather cushion.



 The plate machines.

 This voluminous machine will fit most physics cabinets until the Englishman Ramsden (1735-1800) builds the first plate machine in 1768. The plate machine is perfected quickly and will become really effective when the first machines appear. " with electrical influence ", ie requiring no friction. The famous machine invented by the English Wimshurst in 1883, still equips the laboratories of our high schools.

History of electricity. The first electric machines.  Le blog d'histoire des sciences, June 3, 2018.





 





 

In March 2017, Elon Musk, chairman of Tesla, flamboyantly proposed a solution to South Australia’s chronic power shortages in the ever-worsening summer heat. He would meet peak electricity demand by building a wall of batteries capable of storing up to 100 MWh of electricity; and it would be operational in 100 days or he would give it away for free. The news was just the latest indication of how spectacularly the economics of electricity storage have shifted in recent years. Yet the problem of storage takes us right back to the earliest days of electrical discovery, when a semi-accidental discovery by a gentleman scientist set the world on the road toward an electrical future.
 
Ewald von Kleist was born with a silver spoon in his mouth. The von Kleists were one of the more prominent noble families in the Prussian aristocracy, which for generations would supply high ranking administrators and military officers for the state – almost all of them called Ewald. Little is known of his childhood, but he went to university in Leiden, Netherlands in the 1720s where he studied law and theology. But while he would later become dean of the cathedral chapter in Kamień Pomorski, Poland, he also seems to have fallen under the spell of Willem ’s Gravesande, who introduced Isaac Newton’s work to the Netherlands and quantified the idea of kinetic energy, and Jean-Nicolas-Sebastien Allamand, his Swiss–Dutch pupil. When von Kleist returned home to Pomerania he took up science as a hobby, a common pastime for educated gentlemen of the day.
 
The 18th century was the age of weird electrical phenomena. Building on the century-old observation that objects could be charged simply rubbing one against another, all kinds of electrical ‘machines’ had been built. Wonderful demonstrations were devised. Among the most famous was Stephen Gray’s ‘The Flying Boy’, in which a small child was suspended by silk threads and then charged up, giving off spectacularly amusing sparks to anyone who approached. Among the masters of the public demonstration was Georg Matthias Bose (no connexion with Satyendra Nath Bose who developed the quantum mechanics of even spin particles in the 20th century), whose demonstrations were particularly flamboyant and piquant – in the ‘Electric Venus’ an attractive young woman was made to stand on a disc of insulating resin and charged up. Men in the audience were then invited to come up and kiss her, only to receive a nasty shock on the lips. Then, with the lights in the room extinguished, Bose would charge up a volunteer or assistant dressed in a suit of medieval armour equipped with sharp spikes. As the voltage rose, a blue-violet corona discharge could be seen in the darkness, a ghostly effect effect that Bose called ‘beatification’.
 
But among the japes there was real science. Bose showed that electrical conductors could become charged provided they were insulated from the ground using suitable material. He ‘electrified’ water in a drinking glass, and drew sparks from it using a finger or, more theatrically, with a sword. It presented a contradiction: fire could somehow pass through water. In public, Bose heightened the drama by setting fire to alcohol using a spark.
 
His demonstration experiments caused a sensation. Von Kleist, who had an electrical machine of his own, probably wondered whether the electricity could not be stored in the liquid itself. On 15 October 1745 he filled a small medicine bottle with alcohol or water and stoppered it, having hammered a nail through the cork to allow the electricity to reach the liquid. He then touched the nail to his machine. In the dim evening light he noticed a ‘pencil of fire’ around the nail, which lasted while he walked 60 paces around the room holding the bottle. When he touched it with his finger he received a massive electrical shock that stunned his arm and shoulder – enough to make von Kleist extremely wary of his bottle.
 
Astonished by his discovery, he wrote to several academics in Berlin, Hallé, Leipzig and Gdánsk, all of whom failed to reproduce the effect. He may also have written to university friends in Leiden, because four months later the university’s professor of physics Pieter van Musschenbroek reported an almost identical experiment in letters to the French scientist René de Réaumur. Arguments have swirled among historians about how the Leiden experiment came about. It is known that a lawyer Andreas Cunaeus, who spent his spare time with van Musschenbroek and Allamand, was involved and he is generally agreed to have received the first major jolt in Leiden.
 
Were the three aware of von Kleist’s work? Van Musschenbroek has been dismissed by historians as an indifferent electrical experimenter, tending to spend more time repeating others’ work carefully than on embarking on anything new. We may never know the precise sequence, but the uncertainty over priority has led to the gradual disappearance of the term Kleistian, to be replaced by the more generic Leyden (Leiden) jar – a term coined by French scientist Jean-Antoine Nollet, who translated van Musschenbroek’s work.



 
Von Kleist died less than three years after his discovery, probably oblivious to its significance. The ability to store charge opened up new possibilities in the study of electrical phenomena. Metallic coatings on the inside and outside of the jar improved its performance, but American scientist Benjamin Franklin in particular showed that the charge was stored on the glass rather than the metal. He also began to link them in series (‘in cascade’) to make a battery of Leyden jars. In Bologna, Luigi Galvani used the jars to make dead frogs twitch and likened electric eels to biological Leyden jars; Alessandro Volta (Chemistry World, June 2011, p58) used them to demolish Galvani’s speculations. Kleist has also been referred to, rather improbably, as ‘the father of the telegraph’ due to the role Leyden jars played in its development.
 
Perhaps there is some irony that, while today there has never been a greater need to store electricity, the first scientific studies of electricity were made possible by a reliable storage device. There really is nothing new under the sun.
 
Von Kleist's jar. By Andrea Sella. Chemistry World, March 28, 2017. 











In 1737, a poet/physicist at the University of Leipzig, Georg Matthias Bose, became enthalled with the electrical experiments of Hauksbee, Shilling and Dufay. After constucting a static electric generator (little more than a rotating glass sphere with a friction rubber of fur and a brass conductor), he proceded to conduct demonstrations such as the electrical kiss (Venus electrificata, the attempted osculation of an electrified young lady) and his pièce de résistance, Beatification.
 
His poetic nature enabled him to describe the process of Beatification in such woolly terms, that he had the monopoly on the demo. No-one could replicate his production of a halo hovering above the cranium. It was trickery, in so much as it required an evacuated crown to be worn, with a highly electrified conductor above that. Rackstrow managed to replicate the process in 1748, as shown in the engraving above. However, the controversy raged for many years....
 










The High Voltage Beatification of Professor Bose at Wittenburg.  Lateral Science Blog, November 23, 2015. 




Electricity was the craze of the eighteenth century. Thrilling experiments became forms of polite entertainment for ladies and gentlemen who enjoyed feeling sparks, shocks and attractions on their bodies. Popular lecturers designed demonstrations that were performed in darkened salons to increase the spectacle of the so-called electric fire. Not only did the action, the machinery and
the ambience of such displays match the culture of the libertine century, it also provided new material for erotic literature.
 
Electric party
 
‘A turkey is to be killed for dinner by the electric shock, and roasted by the electric jack, before a fire
kindled by the electrified bottle; when the healths of all the famous electricians of England, France, Holland, and Germany, are to be drunk in electrified bumpers, under the discharge of guns from the electrical battery .’
 
This description of an electrical party, penned by Benjamin Franklin in 1749, humorously captures the eighteenth-century craze for everything electric. In the age of Enlightenment, electricity was one of the most promising branches of experimental philosophy as well as one of the most requested forms of polite entertainment. Aristocratic ladies and gentlemen delighted in experimenting with the
newly discovered powers of the ‘electric fire’. In darkened salons demonstrators choreographed simple electrical phenomena – such as attractions, sparks and shocks – so as to turn them into interactive performances that involved the audience and that appealed to the culture of the libertine century.
 
The new science of the Enlightenment
 
Although the etymology of the word electricity testifies to the fact that the attractive properties of rubbed amber (elektron in Greek) had been known since antiquity, at the time Franklin wrote, electricity was still regarded as a young science. In 1767, almost two decades later, his friend
and chemist Joseph Priestley termed it the ‘youngest daughter of the sciences’ . Indeed, it was in the age of  Enlightenment that electricity gained prominence both in the academic world and in the public sphere. Starting from the 1740s, learned audiences in Europe and North America became familiar with a natural power as disruptive as lightning and as enchanting as the aurora borealis, a
phenomenon that also promised sensational new therapies.
Itinerant lecturers toured capitals and provinces with their portable electrical apparatus, offering dramatic demonstrations of the laws effects of the ‘electric fire’ in public squares and aristocratic salons. Their activity made electricity one of the most discussed topics of polite conversations, with the media of the time extolling instruments and inventors. As early as 1745 readers of the
Gentleman’s Magazine would learn of the ‘wonderful discoveries’ recently made in the field, ‘so surprising as to awaken the indolent curiosity of the public’. Not only the literate, but even ‘ladies and people of quality, who never regard natural philosophy but when it works miracles’,
became interested in electrical effects: ‘princes were willing to see this new fire which a man produced from himself, and which did not descend from heaven’ .
 
 
Electrical phenomena as simple as attractions and repulsions between charged bodies were choreographed to keep audiences from boredom. Spectators could feel on their own bodies the effects of electricity: if properly connected to the electrical machine they could see their
hair raise or their hands attract small pieces of paper. Several instruments especially designed for scientific soirees contributed to make a spectacle of electricity (Figure 1). Instrument-makers exploited what we now know as electrostatic induction to make paper puppets dance or metallic bells ring, whereas the livid light of electrical sparks was displayed in the dark in order to increase theatricality. Spectators could so admire spirals of sparks appearing inside glass tubes, luminescent images flashing onto wooden boards, suggestive bluish or greenish glows filling
exhausted glass vessels.
 
 In 1746 the introduction of the Leyden jar (what is now called a cylindrical condenser) enhanced the dramatic character of electric demonstrations by allowing storage of the electric fire and its sudden release as shocks or sparks. The instrument contributed to the design of new fashionable, though somewhat shocking, experiments. By touching the jar’s inside and outside coating with both
hands, it was possible to provoke an instantaneous electric discharge through one’s body. The ‘Leyden experiment’, as this phenomenon was known from the name of the town where it was first discovered, aroused great curiosity. As Franklin declared, for a number of ingenious lecturers who
showed it for money, it meant ‘meat, drink and clothing’. The French instrument-maker and public demonstrator Jean Antoine Nollet made the Leyden experiment collective by forming chains of people holding hands: they would be shocked simultaneously as the first and the last person
in the circle touched the inside and the outside coating of the jar (Figure 2).
 
Useful electricity
 
Along with the Leyden jar, another innovation brought electricity to the fore of learned discussions and public interest: medical electricity. The therapeutic virtues of electricity remained a debated issue throughout the century, nonetheless patients were receptive towards the possibility
that the newly discovered electric fire might also be a healing agent. Equipped with the most up-to-date electrical instruments, performers readily included ‘medical’ electricity in their repertoire of theatrical demonstrations, offering to administer shocks and sparks for therapeutic purposes in
the course of their performances.
 
If utility was a keyword of the Enlightenment, electricity was definitely an enlightened science. Its useful applications were not limited to innovative therapy. As it is well-known, Benjamin Franklin was a fervent advocate of lightning rods, grounded metallic conductors that were employed for preventing buildings and people from the dire effects of lightning. Franklin based his promotion of lightning rods on his own theory of electricity, according to which the movement of the electric fire was responsible for several disruptive phenomena, both in the atmosphere and in the
bowels of the earth. As Priestley made clear in his History and Present State of Electricity, by the second half of the eighteenth century electricity was regarded as a natural agent that could account for several disruptive ‘unusual appearances’. Not only lightning, but also earthquakes, whirlpools and whirlwinds were explained in terms of the motion of the electric fire. Several instruments helped
demonstrators illustrate the implications of Franklin’s theory to the public. Thunder houses dramatically demonstrated the difference metallic conductors would make in case lightning struck a building, whereas the ‘aurora flask’ reproduced the aurora borealis which was regarded as an
electrical phenomenon on a small scale (Figure 3). Such demonstrations contributed to the construction of an electrical cosmos: health, sickness, thunderstorm, earthquakes
and aurora borealis, all resulted from the motions of the electric fire.
 
Science in the salon
 
The quick reception of electrical science in the public sphere was strictly tied to the ongoing success of experimental philosophy. Public lectures on natural philosophy, based on experimental demonstrations, were well-established forms of education and recreation in the mid-eighteenth century . Newtonian natural philosophy spread widely thanks to the courses that itinerant lecturers
offered to paying audiences. Educated ladies and gentlemen delighted in experimenting on the natural world and the conversations they hosted in their salons – which can be regarded as one of the cultural spaces of the Enlightenment – often focused on scientific subjects. Instruments
such as the orrery (or planetarium), the air pump, microscopes and telescopes, were familiar items not only for the learned but also for the polite. As icons of natural knowledge, they were included in gentlemanly collections of curiosities and rarities, or exhibited in especially dedicated physics cabinets. As electrical experiments gained the attention of the public, lecturers readily included the
new science in their repertoire of demonstrations while instrument makers promptly added electrical instruments in their sales catalogues.
 
Electrical phenomena, on their part, lent themselves particularly well to the culture of public performances, which blended spectacle and education. In darkened salons electrical performers staged a repertoire of sparks and attractions that exhilarated their audiences. The electric
fire revealed itself to the eyes, the ears and even the nose: its livid light was accompanied by a crackling noise and left a distinctive sulphurous smell. Audiences in search of entertainment and education were particularly impressed by the sensuous experience of the electric fire. Electrical
soirees never failed to satisfy such expectation.
 
In 1730 Stephen Gray, a Fellow of the Royal Society of London, conceived an experiment that demonstrated the ability of the human body to conduct electricity. The socalled ‘flying-boy experiment’ became one of the most popular demonstrations that made the fortune of itinerant
performers throughout Europe. Suspended by silk cords, a young boy was connected to a friction generator by his feet: by this means his hands could attract small pieces of papers.
In the course of the century several variations were proposed: the boy’s electrified hands turned the pages of a book, or transmitted the electric fire to a young girl who would attract light objects herself. Nollet involved the ladies in the audience: as they approached their fingers to the boy’s nose a big spark could be seen and heard (Figure 4).
 
The inclusion of the human body in electrical demonstrations increased their spectacularity and the curiosity they aroused among polite society. With the armoury of attractions, repulsions, sparks and shocks, itinerant demonstrators could be certain of success.




 
 Bodily attractions
 
Women became essential protagonists of electrical soirees. Electrical performances staged in courts and salons counted on their active participation and played with sexual difference. Although both men and women could experience the electric fire with their bodies, they would tackle it in different ways. The most common electrical experiments provide a glimpse into the different roles salon culture codified for ladies and gentlemen. One of the most popular demonstrations of the time was the electrifying Venus, or electric kiss. Invented by the German professor Georg Matthias Bose, it was soon replicated throughout Europe. The experiment was simple to organize. The selected lady would stand on an insulated stool while an operator charged her body with an electrical machine.  gentlemen in the audience would then be invited to kiss her, but alas, as they tried to approach her lips a strong spark would discourage any attempt, while exhilarating the lady and the rest of the audience. The Gentleman’s Magazine celebrated Bose’s invention:
   ‘Could one believe that a lady’s finger, that her whalebone petticoat, should send forth flashes of true lightening, and that such charming lips could set on fire a house? The ladies were sensible of this new privilege of kindling fires without any poetical figure, or hyperbole, and resorted from all parts to the public lectures of natural philosophy, which by that means became brilliant assemblies.’
 
Bose, by contrast, deliberately used ‘poetical figures’ as a way of ingratiating members of the opposite sex, especially if there was a chance aristocratic ladies might offer him patronage. One of the most active electricians of the mid-eighteenth century, he wrote a poem on electricity
that he dedicated to the princess of Gotha and to the duchess of Brühl-Collowrath, who enjoyed attending his electric demonstrations. In his verses there was of course a reference to his attempt to kiss an electrifying Venus:
 
     ‘Once only, what temerity!
I kissed Venus standing on pitch.
It pained me to the quick. My lips trembled
My mouth quivered, my teeth almost broke.’
 
 
Bose contributed substantially to making the repertoire of electric demonstrations spicier. If his electrifying Venus gratified ladies, the defeated men could exhibit their virility by ‘inflaming spirits’ with electrified swords (Figure 5). Bose also allowed gentlemen to show more spiritual tendencies by undergoing ‘beatification’: the volunteer sat on an armchair and, thanks to a device that resulted
invisible in the dark, after a few minutes a luminous halo would appear above his head (Figure 6).
 
Bose did not limit his creativity to experiment. Convinced as he was that academic prose would never capture the imagination of the public he wished to attract, he worked at changing the vocabulary of electricity so as to adapt it to the libertine century. In his poem on electricity he presented an
innovative explanation of electrical phenomena based, not by chance, on the distinction between ‘male’ and ‘female’ electric fire. The male fire, emitted by metals and animal bodies, was unsurprisingly strong and powerful: sparks, with their crackling sound, were visible manifestations of
this kind of fire. The female fire, instead, was a weak luminous emanation, the kind of light that characterized the aurora borealis.
 
Although Bose’s theory was short-lived, his vision of electricity as a bridge between experimental and erotic culture continued throughout the century. In fact, both the machinery and the gesture of electrical experiment inspired pornographic satirists. The vocabulary of friction, attraction, sparks and flames lent itself particularly well to verses that defeated prudery:
 
‘What makes our first felicity,
But this pure electricity,
Divested of all fiction:
Motion makes heat, and heat makes love,
Creatures below, and things above,
Are all produc’d by friction’
Such satirical poems drew freely from the allusions so obviously offered by electrical instrumentation. The globes of the electrical machines, caressed by the operators’ hands
in order to produce electric fire, became the subject of another poem:
 
‘Each charm, by turns, reveal’d, must fuel prove,
To feed the gentle, lambent flame of love,
But most the beauties of the Bosom please,
Nor any female charm can vie with these!
The tempting seat of all that’s sweet and fair,
For Nature’s Electricity is there! ‘
 
At the end of the century the discovery of animal electricity provided new sources of inspiration for such kind of  literature. If the marquis De Sade suggested that the electric eel (or gymnotus electricus) could be employed as an instrument for sexual torture, other authors believed
that the power of conducting the electric fire was strictly related to virility. Their opinion was supported by the contemporary rumour that the Leyden experiment did not work on the castrati. The connection between electricity and virility/fertility stood at the core of the Temple of
Health and Hymen, the London extravaganza of a medicoelectrical quack, George Graham. Among the many prodigious cures electricity afforded in the Temple, the most requested was the Celestial Bed, a gigantic bed surrounded by electric vapours that – he claimed – helped couples fight
against barrenness.
 
When Franklin described his electric lunch, experimental apparatus was common enough for learned readers to  get the hilarity of his statement. Electrification of everyday life was still to come, yet excitement about the new science  of the Enlightenment was widespread, in academies and
salons. Electricity became the craze of the eighteenth century thanks to the thrilling demonstrations choreographed by lecturers and demonstrators that explained the role of the electric fire in the natural world with an eye to the tastes of their audiences. The instrument trade, the marketing of cultural products, the sociability of electrical experiments, all played a crucial role in spreading interest in the ‘youngest daughter of the sciences’.
References
 
 
Sparks in the dark: the attraction of electricity in the eighteenth century / By  Paola Bertucci. Endeavour , nr. 1,  September 2007


















29/04/2022

Look on the Dark Side, Mara van der Lugt on Pessimism

 




In the 17th and 18th centuries, a group of Western philosophers came to clashes, on the page at least, over the age-old problem of evil: the question of how a good God could allow the existence of evil and suffering in the world. Philosophers such as Pierre Bayle, Nicolas Malebranche and G W Leibniz, later followed by such pillars of the canon as Voltaire, David Hume and Immanuel Kant, vehemently disagreed not only on how the problem could be solved – if it could be solved at all – but also on how to speak of such dark matters.
 
Some of these arguments of ‘theodicy’ (the attempt to justify creation) may seem antiquarian to modern eyes – but in an age where young people question the morality of bringing new children into the world, they are surprisingly relevant. After all, the issue is not just about God: it is about creation and, more specifically, the extent to which creation can be justified, given the ills or ‘evils’ that are in the world.
 
The question of creation is urgent for us today. Considering the great uncertainties of the climate crisis, is it justified to create new people, not knowing what kind of future lies ahead of them? And if it is justified, is there any point at which it ceases to be? Most people would probably agree that some worlds are imaginable in which creation would be immoral. At what precise point is life too bad, or too uncertain, to pass on?
 
In the early Enlightenment, of course, there were no such concerns for the future of the planet. But there were evils in existence – plenty of them. Crimes, misfortunes, death, disease, earthquakes and the sheer vicissitudes of life. Considering such evils, these philosophers asked, can existence still be justified?
 
This longstanding philosophical debate is where we get the terms ‘optimism’ and ‘pessimism’, which are so much used, and perhaps overused, in our modern culture. ‘Optimism’ was the phrase coined by the Jesuits for philosophers such as Leibniz, with his notion that we live in ‘the best of all possible worlds’ (for surely, if God could have created a better one, he would have done so). ‘Pessimism’ followed not long afterwards to denote philosophers such as Voltaire, whose novel Candide (1759) ridiculed Leibnizian optimism by contrasting it with the many evils in the world. ‘If this is the best of all possible worlds,’ Voltaire’s hero asks, ‘what on earth are the others like?’
 
But really, Voltaire wasn’t much of a pessimist: other philosophers such as Bayle and Hume went much further in their demonstrations of the badness of existence. For Bayle, and for Hume after him, the point is not just that the evils of life outnumber the goods (though they believe this is also the case), but that they outweigh them. A life might consist of an equal number of good moments and bad moments: the problem is that the bad moments tend to have an intensity that upsets the scales. A small period of badness, says Bayle, has the power to ruin a large amount of good, just like a small portion of seawater can salt a barrel of fresh water. Similarly, one hour of deep sorrow contains more evil than there is good in six or seven pleasant days.



 
Against that bleak vision, thinkers such as Leibniz and Jean-Jacques Rousseau emphasised the goods of life, and the power we have to seek out the good in all things, for if we learned to adjust our vision we would see that life is in fact very good: that ‘there is incomparably more good than evil in the life of men, as there are incomparably more houses than prisons,’ Leibniz writes, and that the world ‘will serve us if we use it for our service; we shall be happy in it if we wish to be.’ Just as the pessimists believed the optimists were deceived in their insistence on the goods of life, so too the optimists thought the pessimists’ eyes were skewed towards the bad: each side accused the other of not having the right vision.
 
A large part of the question thus became: what is the right vision?
 
One thing that struck me as I dug deeper into these questions was how concerned both the optimists and the pessimists were with the ethical assumptions underlying the theoretical arguments. On the surface, the question was: can creation be justified? But beneath it, never far removed, lay a deeper question, a question just as ethically and emotionally imbued: how to speak of suffering in a way that offers hope and consolation?
 
There is not just a theoretical, but also a moral objection that each side makes against the other. The great objection that the pessimists lay at the feet of the optimists is that to insist that life is good even in the face of hard, unyielding suffering, or to stipulate that we are in control of our happiness, that we shall be happy ‘if we wish to be’ – that this is to make our suffering worse. It is to add to suffering the responsibility for that suffering; it is to burden the sufferer with a sense of their inadequacy. If life is so good, then the sufferer’s trials must be a case of wrong vision – and indeed the optimists tend to say things just like that. This is why optimism, so say the pessimists, is a cruel philosophy. If it gains us some hope, it fails in consolation.
 
But on their side, the optimists prove to be similarly concerned. Their objection to the pessimists is that, if we insist on the intensity and ubiquity and inescapability of suffering, if we describe it in all its depths and bleakness (as the pessimists indeed are wont to do), this heaps suffering on suffering – and it is this that makes suffering worse, as ‘evils are doubled by being given an attention that ought to be averted from them,’ as Leibniz says.
 
Pessimism, so say the optimists, is itself unconsoling – but more than that, it is unhopeful.
 
The question concerning these philosophers, then, is not just the theoretical one about whether life in general is good or bad, but also a more concrete one: face to face with one who suffers, what can philosophy bring to the table? What can philosophy offer in the way of hope and consolation?
 
Both strands of thought have the same aim, but they plot different routes to get there: the pessimists offer consolation by emphasising our fragility, by recognising that no matter how hard we try, we may fail to achieve happiness, for no fault of our own. Meanwhile, the optimists seek to unfold hope by emphasising our capacity, by insisting that no matter how dark, how bleak our circumstances, we can always change our vision and direction, we can always aim for better.
 
Of course, there is no reason in principle why both roads could not be combined, each to serve as the necessary counterpart for the other, an antidote for the poison each draught may become when served up undiluted. But the fact remains that these earliest optimists and pessimists saw them as opposed – and in fact we do too: we still have the tendency to think in binary terms, as if there is in life a stark choice to be made between optimism and pessimism, or, in Noam Chomsky’s words, for optimism or despair:
 
“We have two choices. We can be pessimistic, give up, and help ensure that the worst will happen. Or we can be optimistic, grasp the opportunities that surely exist, and maybe help make the world a better place. Not much of a choice.”
 
That last example itself makes manifest the coarseness and onesidedness of our use of these terms. Optimism tends to be positively charged, pessimism negatively charged. When we call someone an optimist, it’s usually praise. This is why politicians are particularly keen to insist that they are optimists, or even to speak of a ‘duty of optimism’. Conversely, to call someone a pessimist is usually to deride, denounce, deflate them. ‘Pessimism is for losers,’ as one recent book title has it.
 
But are our choices so dichotomous? If there are shadows on the road of pessimism, there are dangers on the opposite road also. And these are the very dangers that those older pessimists kept warning us against: that if we overemphasise the power we have over our minds, our lives, our destinies, it is all too easy to stumble into cruelty.
 
We need not look very far to see examples of what optimism, in its darkest forms, can become. When a 2008 London tower block named Heygate Estate was sold off to foreign investors, its inhabitants were first evicted then offered mindfulness courses by the local council to deal with their anxiety, so that they were themselves made responsible for their misfortunes. If we are each radically in control of our mental states, what reason is there to ask for social justice? This is the shadow-side that cleaves to the popular narrative that ‘you are responsible for your own happiness’, and is bolstered by the subtle terror of a social media regime that pushes us to broadcast our success and happiness to the world.
 
It is in such cases that the consoling force of pessimism reveals itself: it’s OK to not be OK. Sometimes we fail, sometimes we run up against the hard walls of our own capacities or the world’s boundaries – and it can be consoling to be reminded that our suffering, our fragility, is not our fault. That we suffer despite ourselves. That it can be right to grieve for what we are losing, or are yet to lose, or have already lost.
 
We are so quick to equate pessimism with passivity or fatalism or despair, and to reject it on that basis – for, of course, we do not want a philosophy that tells us to give up. But is that really what pessimism means? As Joshua Foa Dienstag argued in his book Pessimism: Philosophy, Ethic, Spirit (2006), far from leading to passivity, pessimism can be closely linked to a tradition of moral and political activism, as in the case of Albert Camus, whose courage and activism in the Second World War were infused by his pessimistic views.
 
Even the darkest pessimists never said that life would only get worse or can never be better: this is a caricature of pessimism, sketched quickly to dismiss it. Arthur Schopenhauer, the bleakest of them all, did not subscribe to it. On the contrary, he suggested that it is precisely because we cannot control the course of things that we can never know what the future holds: life may become worse or better. ‘The pessimist,’ in Dienstag’s words, ‘expects nothing.’ There is not much hope in this, perhaps, but it is a kind of hope nevertheless. And so too is the faint glimmering that can be found amid the darkest pages of these writers: the quick unquiet intuition that something can be gathered in the black vision; that our eyes may be opened in ways they were not before; that we may see in the darkness.
 
It is why hopeful pessimism may not be a contradiction, but a manifestation of the wild power that is harnessed only when life’s darkest forces are gathered into the strange alchemy of hope.
 
I think about these things in this age marked by ecological depletion and devastation, by floods and fires and heat ceilings that no one had thought possible, by the spectre of the climate crisis that takes shape all around us. This age is marked also by the quiet, or not so quiet, desperation of the young. The same criticisms once waged against the pessimists of yore are now laid at the feet of the despairing young by those techno-optimists and advocates of progress for whom any consideration of the mere possibility of decline is itself a sign of weakness, a lack of imagination, a moral flaw – a failure of vision, most of all. And so they denounce young people’s outcry as pessimism, as fatalism, as ‘mere’ despair. They criticise them for the bleakness of their vision, call their statements exaggerated and the speakers spoiled.
 
It is all too easy to miss the fact that this generation – the first to grow up in a world where a climate emergency is not just on the horizon, but a stark reality – is haunted by a real sense of losing the future, as all the things they have been told give life meaning are rendered either pointless or problematic. Things like: study, get a good job, settle down – but what jobs are still certain? Where will it be safe to settle down? As Greta Thunberg said in Parliament Square in London in 2018: ‘And why should I be studying for a future that soon will be no more, when no one is doing anything whatsoever to save that future?’ Things like: start a family – but if there is no future for one’s children, is it still OK to procreate? Even more trivial things, like developing oneself by travelling, are no longer straightforward: for how important is self-development when weighed against the carbon cost of modern travel?
 




This is a wholesale collapse of meaning that is only now becoming clear to us. There is a very real sense in which young people are experiencing not only the loss of concepts, but the loss of the future itself, as all the usual answers to the question of what makes life worthwhile become increasingly uncertain. They are in that darkness, searching for some kind of hope, some kind of consolation – and what can we offer them? Surely we can do better than give the manifestly inadequate answer (which may also be an outright lie) to assure them that all will be well – since we know there is every chance it won’t be.
 
Any crude statements of optimism would be more than misplaced: it would be the kind of lie that deceives no one, least of all the sharpened moral senses of the young, who see through the empty promises and reassurances of politicians with an anger we know is justified. If we told them that everything will be OK, these are less than empty words: they are a failure to take their experience seriously, and that, as the pessimists would tell us, is the one thing guaranteed to make their suffering worse.
 
But if brute optimism fails – could pessimism do better? I have suggested that pessimism can have value – but could we go further? Could it be, in fact, a virtue?
 
To some, the very notion of a virtue of pessimism may seem absurd. For instance, we may subscribe to Hume’s notion that the mark of any virtue is that it is useful and agreeable, either to the person who possesses it or to others. But surely pessimism is neither useful nor agreeable. It is not useful, the argument goes, because it renders us passive, depresses not only ourselves but ‘our sense of the possible’, as Marilynne Robinson has said of cultural pessimism in particular. And it is not agreeable, since it intensifies our suffering, making us focus on the bad side of life rather than the good (or so arch-optimists such as Leibniz and Rousseau would have it). It is not surprising, then, that certain studies of supposed ‘moral exemplars’ identified positivity, hopefulness and optimism among the characteristics that such exemplars had in common.
 
But then, think of Greta Thunberg. If there is such a thing as a ‘climate virtue’, she would seem to exemplify it – considering the hard personal choices that she has made, the steadfastness of her vision, and the courage with which she holds world leaders to account and takes them to task for their half-heartedness, their unwillingness to commit fully to the cause. If this is not an exercise of virtues, then I don’t know what is – and yet there is nothing positive or optimistic about Thunberg. If there is hope, it’s a dark, bleak hope, full of rage and grief and pain for what is being lost – but infused also with insistence, perdurance, determination. It is clear that this activist, at least, will continue to strive even if her efforts are doomed to fail. This is not optimism: if anything, it is a hopeful pessimism, and I believe it has every right to be called a virtue in our age.
 
Hopeful pessimism breaks through the rusted dichotomy of optimism vs pessimism. It is this attitude, this perspective that is exemplified in Thunberg and other figures who by their example give an affirmative answer to the question posed by Paul Kingsnorth: ‘Is it possible to see the future as dark and darkening further; to reject false hope and desperate pseudo-optimism without collapsing into despair?’
 
The thing to avoid is not so much pessimism, but hopelessness or fatalism or giving up. Even despair need not be completely avoided, since it too can energise and encourage us to strive for change, but we should avoid the kind of despair that causes us to collapse. These things are not the same as pessimism, which is simply the assumption of a dark view of the present as well as the future and does not imply the loss of courage or insistence to strive for better: on the contrary, often these are the very gifts that pessimism can bestow.
 
One can be deeply, darkly pessimistic, one can find oneself in the cold hard clutches of despair, and yet not be depleted of the possibility (and it could just be a possibility) that better may yet arrive. This is a kind of hope that is dearly bought, that does not come lightly but is carved out of a painful vision which may just be the acknowledgment of all the suffering that life can and does hold. If anything, the pessimists have taught me this: that with eyes full of that darkness there can still be this strange shattering openness, like a door cracked open, for the good to make its entry into life. Since all things are uncertain, so too is the future, and so there is always the possibility of change for better as there is for worse.
 
This can itself be a moral stance: one that welcomes the good when it is given and urges it onwards on its journey, but also acknowledges the bad without explaining it away or overburdening the will of those it crushes in its path. Sometimes we are not in power to change the world as we would like to, and acknowledging this can be the greatest effort as well as the greatest consolation, while not taking away the drive to give our best and hardest labours to the cause.
 
As Jonathan Lear has written in his book Radical Hope (2006), one common phenomenon at times of cultural devastation is that old values lose their meaning. If they are to survive the collapse of the moral horizon, they need new meanings, new concepts to breathe life into them. The most difficult thing of all is to negotiate this change, to start inhabiting new virtues while the old are still among us. And this, I believe, is one way in which pessimism might serve us – as a virtue in itself, but also as a way of giving new meaning to virtues that are changing as part of this changing world. To behold with open eyes the reality before us requires courage, and not to turn away from it, forbearance, and yet not to decide that it ends there: this is hope.
 
Hope – not that everything will be all right in the end, but that nothing has ever truly ended; that there is this ‘crack in everything’ of which Leonard Cohen once sang, in the good as well as the bad, so that neither is ever entirely shut away from us. This is not the steadfast conviction that things are bound to get better – not the crude optimism that can no longer be a virtue in a breaking world, and might prove to be our besetting vice. It may be easier to lend our efforts under such a banner of assured success, but this ease is a deceptive one, for while it is possible to be dispirited by passivity or fatalism, it is possible to be depleted by continued disappointment also. What hopeful pessimism asks instead is that we strive for change without certainties, without expecting anything from our efforts other than the knowledge that we have done what we are called upon to do as moral agents in a time of change. This may just be the thinnest hope, the bleakest consolation – but it may also be the very thing that will serve us best in times to come, as a value, and yes, an exercise of moral fervour: a fragile virtue for a fragile age.     
 
Look on the dark  side. By Mara van der Lugt. Aeon  , April 26, 2022.





“We have two choices. We can be pessimistic, give up, and help ensure that the worst

will happen. Or we can be optimistic, grasp the opportunities that surely exist, and maybe help make the world a better place. Not much of a choice.” Noam Chomsky

In an age marked by such overwhelming cause for concern for the state of the planet and the future of mankind as ours, the word pessimism has received a surprising amount of bad press.
 
Noam Chomsky, in the tellingly titled collection Optimism over Despair, puts the question of optimism and pessimism as something of a forking path: we can either be optimistic about the possibilities for the future, or we can be pessimistic, i.e. desperate, i.e. just “give up”. Similarly, and almost simultaneously, Steven Pinker in his book Enlightenment Now makes his plea for the belief in progress against what he sees as a widespread current of “pessimism”, or a belief in cultural decline. Musing from another angle, Marilynne Robinson strikes out against the “always fashionable” phenomenon of cultural pessimism, which has the “negative consequence of depressing the level of aspiration, the sense of the possible”, or even of “encouraging a kind of somber panic, a collective dream-state in which recourse to terrible remedies is inspired by delusions of mortal threat.” Even the unborn baby in Ian McEwan’s novel Nutshell sagely points out that pessimism is no less than an intellectual weakness, a refusal to see that things have never been better than in modern-day Western society: “Pessimism is too easy…”
 
It is generally a good idea to be at least mildly sceptical when encountering such sweeping statements, such denunciations of what is obviously or evidently a widespread fad­ – and we should be all the more suspicious when no convincing examples are given of a phenomenon of which we are all supposed to be so acutely aware. After all: who, these days, calls themselves a pessimist with any conviction? Where are these black-minded doomsaying pessimist throngs? When was pessimism ever a thing that was “in vogue”? And who says that pessimism is the same thing as believing in decline or resigning in despair?
 
It is in fact much more difficult to find a self-proclaimed pessimist than a self-proclaimed optimist, whether in politics, philosophy, science or everyday life, and the few examples we can find are hardly ever straightforward cases. Thus John Gray, perhaps the philosopher most notorious for his pessimism, will not take on the term without qualification: “I am hopefully pessimistic”, he says on the BBC-programme Desert Island Discs. This caution, this tentative nature of his self-description, and the very adjective he chooses to moderate it, are each telling: they reveal what pessimism is often accused of and has to defend against. But the things we most often associate with pessimism are far removed from what it really is; they are based on a mixture of misgivings, prejudices, and concerns that fail to do it justice. For the truth is that pessimism, or the philosophy properly known as pessimism, was never attractive, never popular, and never, ever easy. The truth is also that pessimism represents a much richer, deeper, and more interesting view on life than the dulled-down version lets us see. Furthermore, not only does this shallow glance on pessimism dull the truth of pessimism, but it does the same for the contrary doctrine known as optimism.
 
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So, what are optimism and pessimism? The standard view is that these terms simply refer to our chosen expectations about the future: an optimist believes things will get better; a pessimist believes things will get worse. Aside from the fact that this definition gets pessimism (as well as optimism) wrong in important ways, the main problem with this representation of both optimism and pessimism is that it sets the latter up for failure. If the two outlooks are supposed to tell us what we can expect, and therefore what we can hope for from the future, then optimism obviously wins, on moral grounds. The intuition is that pessimism leads to despair, which will in turn lead to resignation: to giving up. These, again, are Chomsky’s alternatives: we can choose either optimism or despair (that is: pessimism). If this is indeed the choice before us, then Chomsky is right, and ethics itself moves against pessimism. We ought not to be pessimists if to be a pessimist means giving up on our common future, and on our fellow man.
 
So much for the intuition; now for the facts. Do pessimists actually believe their outlook commits them to resignation? Far from it: in fact, in many cases, the opposite is true. Joshua Foa Dienstag has devoted an entire book to arguing that there is a pessimist tradition of political thought, and that pessimism can be a source of powerful political engagement. How else could we explain the fact that one of pessimism’s pivotal figures, Albert Camus, was also one of the most politically committed philosophers in Western thought?
 
The problem with the common-sense view of pessimism is that it relies on a mistaken conception of what pessimism, in its deepest and most significant manifestations, really is. Far from resting in a belief that things are going to get worse, pessimism in most cases doesn’t have to do with the future at all: rather, it is a philosophy that tries to give a place to the darker side of life, to the reality of evil and pain and suffering in human (as well as animal) existence. Furthermore, insofar as pessimism is oriented on a view towards the future, most philosophical pessimists will tell you that to be a pessimist is not to expect the worst, but rather to expect nothing at all. Pessimism has to do rather with a limitation of what we can possibly know about what life has in store for us. It is, therefore, not at all a positive belief in decline, but rather a negative belief, a refusal to believe that progress is a given. Thus, to those people who would cleverly say “I’m not a pessimist or an optimist: I am a realist”, the pessimists could answer that this is just another way of saying they are a pessimist, in that they suspend judgment on the question of what is or is not going to happen.
 
But this view cast upon the future is only a secondary and derivative part of what philosophical pessimism is at its most ardent and most interesting: an attempt to paint an alternative picture of the reality of human life. This, not the caricature we have become accustomed to, is the beating heart of pessimism. It is also its original conception.
 
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A quick turning back of history’s pages tells us that the terms optimism and pessimism first came into being in the early eighteenth century. This happened in the heat of the philosophical debate on the problem of evil: the question of how an all-good, all-knowing and all-powerful God could permit the many evils and sufferings of existence.
 
Interestingly, both terms were originally pejorative and oppositional in nature: they were coined as ways of putting down the opposing philosophy, and this derogatory nature still clings to them. (To this day, a person can still be discredited by being called a pessimist, or even, in some contexts, an optimist). Optimism was the first to be coined, by the Jesuits, to deride Leibniz’s famous system that we live in “the best of all possible worlds” – and it was the Jesuits too who coined pessimism as a name for the opposing view. But it was Voltaire’s famous Candide, or Optimism that ensured the worldwide success of this term, pessimism following only slowly in its footsteps.
 
Now if we look at what both terms meant philosophically, this was to do with a set of existential questions, such as: Do the goods of existence outweigh its evils? Is life worth living? Would it have been better for some people, or most people, or any people, never to have existed? Very roughly sketched, on the one hand, the “optimists” (such as Leibniz and, most fervently, Alexander Pope), argued that life is on the whole good, that God’s creation is therefore justified, and so the evils of existence don’t form an argument against the goodness, let alone the existence of God. On the other hand, the “pessimists” (such as Voltaire and David Hume) argued that the optimists failed to give sufficient weight to the depth of human misery: not only is it the case that the evils outnumber the goods of life, but the evils carry more weight – they matter more when we make up the balances. One hour of real suffering, said philosopher Pierre Bayle, is enough to tip the scales over five or six comfortable days. Therefore, considering the dreadful potential of human misery, the terrible extremes to which suffering may reach, existence is a wager that ought not to have been made. Better no existence, argued the most dark-minded of these philosophers, than an existence in which suffering could take such horrific forms. And we all know, they hinted, what the implications are for Whoever has created us this way.
 
This, in a nutshell, is the theoretical question of optimism versus pessimism. However, behind the theory there stands a profound ethical impulse, one that is equally active on both sides of the debate.
 
The reason the pessimists object so vehemently to the system of optimism (according to which the parts may suffer but the whole is good) is that it neglects the reality of suffering, or worse, explains it away. For instance, the optimists argue that we suffer because we have sinned, or we suffer because pain is useful to us, or we suffer by our own choice, since we have the power to rise beyond our suffering. The ethical drive of pessimism is that this is no way to speak of human experience: that this implies a failure in compassion for our fellow sufferers, or even that it can serve to make their suffering worse. No consolation could be less welcome than to be told, in your suffering, that you suffer pointlessly; that you suffer through your own doing. This, say the pessimists, is to double suffering with guilt.
 
On the other hand, the optimists too are driven by an ethical motivation, their argument being that pessimists exaggerate human suffering and so it is they who make suffering worse, by adding to the fact of suffering a reflection upon that suffering. The pessimists are now accused not only of ingratitude to their creator, but of moral weakness: here already is the view that there is something desperate and immoral about pessimism; that it is a failure of the will.
 
This moral concern on either side is, on my view, precisely what saves both philosophies: it gives them an integrity that they would lack as merely abstract considerations. It manifests a sense of engagement that takes several forms throughout the tradition, revealing itself fully in the question of how to speak sensitively and considerately of human suffering: how to find a language of compassion and consolation that nevertheless does justice to the breadth of our experiences. It is also what gives coherence to both traditions, which are defined precisely by their ethical opposition to each other. Thus what Voltaire and Rousseau, in their famous clash over the Lisbon earthquake, are really arguing about is not the abstract philosophical question of whether we live in the best of all possible worlds, but the proper grounding of consolation as well as hope. The last word of Voltaire’s Poem on the Lisbon Disaster is, famously, espérance.
 
It is, then, tragic, that throughout the history of philosophy, and up to the current day, both traditions have failed to recognize this ethical drive in the opponent, and to take the opposing philosophy truly seriously. Hence the division that continues today in even the most commonsensical uses of the terms optimism and pessimism; hence also the caricatures that have resulted on both sides, and especially those associated with pessimism.
 
And yet the person most responsible for pessimism’s bad name is also the philosopher whose name is most closely associated with pessimism: that arch-pessimist, Arthur Schopenhauer.
 
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The reason for this is that Schopenhauer, in his argument that life is marked deeply and principally by suffering, to the extent that suffering is the very end of life, leads us to the exact conclusion that latter-day pessimists are most eager to avoid: that we should cease to affirm life, and turn instead to resignation. In order to achieve “salvation”, on Schopenhauer’s view, we must radically turn away from this existence, which means turning from our pleasures as well our pains. We must give up happiness as our ideal, and go beyond ourselves, our desires, and especially our will, in order to go beyond the world.
 
 This kind of resignation, haunted as it is by dark ascetic musings, seems to confirm precisely that intuitive conception of pessimism as a kind of hopelessness, a philosophy of giving up. It also raises two questions that strike at the heart of pessimism’s bad reputation. First, doesn’t this kind of philosophical gloom make for a very potent argument for suicide? Second, doesn’t it mean we should just stop caring about anything, including our fellow man? These are the kinds of questions that have resulted in a bad name for not only Schopenhauer’s particular brand of pessimism, but for pessimism more generally. And yet Schopenhauer was the first to answer these questions in ways that should be enough to change our minds.
 
First of all: his is not an argument for suicide. Suicide, says Schopenhauer, is not an answer to the problem posed by existence. An awareness of the reality of pessimism should place us on a path of philosophical and spiritual enlightenment, in which we learn to understand the illusory nature of most of our knowledge and even of our own identities: of that which distinguishes us from other people. Pessimism is meant to help us find some kind of consolation in the fact that our suffering is not accidental and is not exceptional, but is an intrinsic part of our existence in this world. True resignation, for Schopenhauer, is an attempt to achieve salvation by conquering ourselves, which can only be done by living in acknowledgment of our human condition, not by choosing death instead (though what precisely is meant here by “salvation” remains somewhat mysterious).

It is yet another misconception clinging to pessimism that its proponents must be pro-suicide. This is not the case even in that philosopher who famously argued that suicide is the most important philosophical question, Albert Camus. On the contrary, the canonical philosophers of pessimism give argument upon argument against suicide – but unlike most arguments against suicide, which make this case in moralistic or legalistic or theological terms, the pessimists’ arguments are deeply sensitive to the experience that informs the act, in all its tragic complexity and profundity. Their arguments distinguish themselves in that, more often than not, they are formulated from the inside of this experience, rather than from the outside, looking in. Theirs is an awareness that suicide tells us something about the darkest corners of existence and about the depths of human suffering. It is, in their eyes, not at all an action to be recommended, but an experience to be taken seriously.
 
As for the second question, far from making ethics impossible, Schopenhauer wants his argument to be a foundation for ethics: there is perhaps no philosopher who has given as much weight to the ethical mechanism of sympathy or compassion as Arthur Schopenhauer. His central idea is that, by going beyond our individual wills and pursuing an ethic of personal resignation, we will recognize that deep down we are all connected by a reality that is greater and stronger than our individual identities; hence I will recognize your suffering as my suffering, you will recognize mine as yours, and we will all want to do what we can to reduce the suffering we see in the (human as well as animal) world. It thus becomes impossible to turn away from suffering on the grounds that it isn’t I who suffer: for Schopenhauer, identity and individuality are illusory, so that a single creature’s suffering properly belongs to all creatures. While optimism, for Schopenhauer, entrenches us in our personal interests and desires and makes us insensitive to the suffering of others, pessimism grounds an ethic of extreme compassion, of suffering-with and feeling-with the other. Far from a glorification of suffering, it is an extremely compassionate philosophy. True “goodness of heart”, says Schopenhauer, “identifies all beings with its own nature.”

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Of course, there is still reason to be uncomfortable with almost every aspect of Schopenhauer’s philosophy of pessimism, and especially with his ethic of resignation, the giving up of any hope of happiness altogether. Schopenhauer calls this resignation, but it sounds rather like despair.

Contrary to this, there is much to be said for an optimist ethic that tells us to look for the good, the lighter side in all things; one that warns us against focusing too much on what Schopenhauer calls “the terrible side of life”, lest we lose heart and hope, lest we forfeit our capacity for goodness and kindness and for joy itself. Such an ethic would remind us that we must always believe, even in the darkest of times, that things can get better – which is a view that Schopenhauer does not allow us, though other pessimists do. This is also what Chomsky is getting at in his eulogy of optimism over despair. The question is whether what he is getting at is really optimism, or rather hope.

Could the two not go together, then? Could there be such a thing as hopeful pessimism, as John Gray suggests (which to many of us would seem like an oxymoron) – and could such hopeful pessimism not perform the same tasks as Chomsky’s optimism, and perform them better? I think it can – and should.

While it is deeply mistaken to suggest that pessimism is the same as fatalism or giving up, the concern behind this suggestion is nevertheless a valid one. This is the concern, voiced most clearly by Chomsky, that if we become too convinced that things are going to get worse whatever we do, we’ll end up doing nothing at all. But, as I have argued, this is not at all the point of pessimism, properly understood. If even that strand of pessimism most oriented towards resignation (Schopenhauer’s version) retains a profound ethical orientation; if even here the recognition of suffering in the world is tightly linked to the commitment to lessening that suffering – what this tells us about pessimism is that this is a philosophy that sees itself as charged with the highest ethical potential. Far from dissuading us from ethical or political action, the point of pessimism is to motivate us.

More importantly, the fatalistic concern raised by Chomsky goes both ways, and cuts optimism with the same blade. If it can be said that pessimism risks demotivation, it could also be said that, if we are too optimistic, too convinced that things will turn out fine in the end, whatever we do, we’ll equally end up doing nothing. Why worry ourselves about a complex problem such as climate change if we already believe everything will sort itself out in the end; that progress will prevail? How is such an attitude more likely to motivate us than one that takes seriously the reality of damage, the reasonableness of due concern?

This is of course as unfair a representation of optimism as the opposing view is of pessimism. Again, the point behind both viewpoints and philosophies is their ethical drive: both are directed towards a common orientation, which is to make sense of suffering, to offer hope as well as consolation; and, at least to some extent, to try to improve the human condition insofar as it can be improved. The difference between both traditions resides in the kinds of moral sources that are prioritized. To remain with the example of climate change, the optimists believe we will be best motivated if we draw from humanity’s success stories, such as new technologies and the vast human potential for change and innovation, while not focusing too much on the reasons we have for despair. In contrast to this, the pessimists hold not only that ethics demands we do justice to the reality of suffering and evils (including the possibility of impending disaster), but also that this is exactly what will motivate us to want to make a difference: it is precisely a recognition of the dire state of affairs in the world that is needed to impel us to action. The disagreement, then, is ultimately over what is most capable of morally paralysing us: overemphasizing our capacity or rather our incapacity?
 
 
Throughout the ages, the tension between optimism and pessimism has had to do with the conflicting demands of their double orientation: towards hope and, at the same time, towards consolation. On the one hand, this means to do justice to the reality of human suffering, without which, as especially pessimism recognizes, consolation is impossible. And, on the other, to offer a perspective that opens up new possibilities, new perspectives for the future, without which, as especially optimism recognizes, hope is impossible. This tension rises again and again in literature as well as the history of philosophy. I will point out merely two passages, one as subtle in its optimism as the other is in its pessimism.

​The first passage occurs at the end of Tolstoy’s War and Peace, where Pierre looks back at his past sufferings and draws from them a lesson that, without discounting or playing down these hardships, nevertheless manages to place them in a wider narrative of hope and meaning:

           “They say: sufferings are misfortunes,” said Pierre. “But if at once this minute, I was asked, would I remain what I was before I was taken prisoner, or go through it all again, I should say, for God’s sake let me rather be a prisoner and eat horseflesh again. We imagine that as soon as we are torn out of our habitual path all is over, but it is only the beginning of something new and good. As long as there is life, there is happiness. There is a great deal, a great deal before us.”
 
I believe there is great wisdom in this. But I also think this is something we should handle with great caution; something we should not make into too general a point. It is a wonderful thing when out of deep tragedies or great suffering comes “something new and good”; when bad experiences teach us new things, help us to reach beyond ourselves, to grow as persons. Speaking of the value of life, this is surely one of those things that makes life and living valuable to us: this possibility of bad things giving entry to the good. But while we should be deeply grateful when this is the case for us, it is not something we can count on, nor is it something that is dependent on our will. Not all that doesn’t kill us makes us stronger. Not all suffering gives way to the new and good; not all bad experiences help us to grow. Some diminish us, some tragedies make life stop short in its tracks. Some suffering cuts us off from the attainment of the “new and good”, and, in Hilary Mantel’s words, makes us “foreign to ourselves”:
 
            “All of us can change. All of us can change for the better, at any point. I believe this, but what is certainly true is that we can be made foreign to ourselves, suddenly, by illness, accident, misadventure, or hormonal caprice.”
 
These words are drawn from Mantel’s memoir, Giving up the Ghost, and they comprise the second passage I wanted to mention, which seems to stand as a kind of counterpoint to Tolstoy’s muted optimism: where Pierre counterposed light to darkness, Mantel counterposes darkness to light. My own pessimism, if it deserves the name, rises exactly at this point. I believe, with and perhaps beyond Mantel, that there are those to whom the path of happiness is closed – truly closed. That there are experiences that can cut us off from ourselves and from our very capacity for happiness: from the good and from the true. To recognize this is not to forfeit hope or to give up on such persons, let alone on ourselves: it is rather to acknowledge that this too is life; this too is what it means to be alive.







And this is the great risk, the original sin of any overly optimistic description of reality or of the human capacity to flourish: the suggestion that this flourishing is entirely up to us, entirely in our human hands. This very modern ethic has had its most victorious moment at the heart of the American Dream, according to which each of us can (and should) achieve our aspirations, if only we are willing; “you are responsible for your own happiness”. This ethic is echoed in pop culture as it is in many currents of new age spirituality, some of which trace back all our good and bad fortunes, even our illnesses, to our own will and consciousness, thus making each of us starkly responsible for that which in older days would be referred to fate. Whatever befalls us, so say such “philosophies”, does so because we have attracted it. This is also an ethic that fits snugly within the modern Facebook paradigm, where we are supposed (there is a strong ought here) only to show our happiest face, our sunniest side – regardless of whether such a side is real or even possible for us. The pressuring potential of optimism, if wrongly interpreted, reveals itself fully here.
 
While many have surely drawn hope from the belief that our happiness is entirely in our hands, this is not simply a message of hope. It can become an imperative, and as soon as it does, it reveals its ugly side, in this overburdening of the will. This, not incidentally, was precisely what early pessimists such as Bayle and Voltaire were reacting so strongly against: the idea that we are as responsible for our suffering as for our happiness. If this gains us hope, it fails in consolation.
 
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A few months ago I came across a bench by a beach in Scotland that had black balloons tied to it. The bench itself was dedicated to the memory of a boy who had died one year before that day. There were flowers on the bench, and beside the flowers, a bunch of papers, with hundreds of names of persons, followed by their ages: fifteen, seventeen, twenty-one, thirty-two. On the first page there was a handwritten and touchingly misspelled note, telling us that this was a list of people lost to suicide, and suggesting to us these three things:
 
                        “ Be kind to people.
                         Look out for loved ones.
                         Its ok to not be ok.”
 
And this is what the ethic of pessimism, in its strongest, clearest, cleanest form, most pivotally represents: that “It’s ok to not be ok.” That to make suffering a question primarily of our will is merely to increase suffering, by heaping guilt upon it. That it’s a wonderful thing to live a life rich in wonder, and meaning, and happiness; and we should be deeply grateful if we are so blessed. But that our own happiness should not excuse us either from an awareness of the fragility of life, happiness, and good itself, or from a due consideration and concern for those less fortunate, less blessed, less beloved, or the truly miserable among us, who also walk this world.
 
The message of pessimism is that this, too, is a part of life, and that it deserves a place in our language, our shared experience; that we are not justified, that it is never justified, to close our eyes to that other, darker, “terrible” side of life. This is also the meaning of compassion in the ethic of pessimism, which need not at all be in conflict with optimism, but should stand shoulder-to-shoulder beside it as its necessary complement and companion. As Schopenhauer wrote, this is how deep down we should greet each other, not as Madame or Monsieur, but as “fellow sufferer, compagnon de misère.”
 
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Noam Chomsky argues for optimism over despair. We might equally, and more meaningfully, argue for hope over optimism.
 
If optimism risks, on the one hand, an overburdening of the will, and on the other, an understatement of the reality of true and dire damage done to the world and to ourselves – could not pessimism serve us better as a moral source? And where pessimism risks stumbling into resignation – could not hope help us to mind the gap? If optimism and pessimism both have their faces turned towards a common goal, could we not find in both the materials by which to travel forwards?
 
Why, then, not a philosophy of hopeful pessimism to guide us into the future?
 
 
Pessimism. By Mara van der Lugt. The Philosopher  October 1, 2019.
 

 



Dark Matters: Pessimism and the Problem of Suffering. By Mara van der Lugt
 
An intellectual history of the philosophers who grappled with the problem of evil, and the case for why pessimism still holds moral value for us today.
 
Princeton University Press



Mara van der Lugt, Lecturer at  University of St.Andrews