06/01/2021

Machiavelli : Politics of Fear


 




 
Even if 2020 felt apocalyptic, it is reasonable to think we have not yet hit rock bottom. The threat of climate disaster and resource wars, the building of walls and refugee camps, the exorbitant wealth of powerful oligarchs alongside poverty and precarity—these will not go away with vaccines or new presidents. Amidst all this, no wonder Niccolò Machiavelli has returned to our reading lists. In his new biography of the Florentine Secretary, Machiavelli: The Art of Teaching the People What to Fear, originally published in French in 2017, historian Patrick Boucheron reminds us that there is always interest in Machiavelli in turbulent times “because he’s the man to philosophize in heavy weather. If we’re reading him today, it means we should be worried. He’s back: wake up.”
 
Born in 1469 in Florence, Machiavelli is a central figure in the Western canon of political philosophy. Though he is best known in the popular imagination as the conniving mastermind behind The Prince (written in 1513), which so many think of as a kind of House of Cards how-to guide for seizing and maintaining political power, we miss what is crucial when we reduce his political thought to the simplistic thesis that the ends justify the means. It is not this misunderstood consequentialism that is noteworthy in Machiavelli’s philosophy; what really makes his writing so radically distinctive is his class-based, materialist outlook. He came from an impoverished household, and his philosophy disrupted naturalized hierarchies and the hegemonic ideas that reproduce them. John Adams would rightly describe him as the founder of a “plebeian philosophy” that marshaled strong arguments for embracing popular control over government.
 
Though the Machiavellis seem to have had an illustrious past and Niccolò’s father, Bernardo, trained as a lawyer, inherited debts effectively excluded the family from wealth, privilege, and political power. They lived in a deteriorated palazzo on the Via Romana and relied mainly on yields from their farm located at the outskirts of Florence. This relative material deprivation left an imprint on the young Niccolò, who would anchor his political philosophy on a plebeian point of view—giving voice to the claims of those who want to live free from oligarchic domination. In his dedication letter to The Prince, Machiavelli described himself as part of the populace, “a man of low and humble station” who, given his position “low down on the plain,” could discern clearly the nature of those who are “high up on mountain tops.”
 
Despite his modest upbringing, Machiavelli received a good education and inherited, in addition to his father’s debts, his precious library. Growing up in an oligarchic republic controlled by the Medici—financiers who owned the biggest bank in Europe—he found that a career in public office for someone like him, lacking connections with the grandi, had been foreclosed. But when the Medici were ousted from power in 1494 after losing the war against Charles VIII of France, new possibilities arose. In 1498 Machiavelli was appointed as secretary of the second chancellor of Florence, in charge of the republic’s military forces. During the fourteen years he served the republic, he wrote foreign affairs reports and some poetry on the side, traveled as a diplomatic envoy, and set up a citizen army to replace an expensive and dangerous system of defense that relied on mercenary soldiers paid through loans from the financial oligarchy. But his political trajectory was cut short when the Medici returned to power in 1512. Machiavelli was ousted from his post, tried for conspiracy, tortured, imprisoned, and then relegated to private life in the countryside, which afforded him the time to write his most famous and consequential works—not just The Prince but also the Discourses on the First Decade of Titus Livy (written in 1517) and The Art of War (written in 1519–20)—from the point of view of a political praxis forged in turbulent times.
 
As part of his view of a self-aware and socially engaged history, Boucheron offers a Machiavelli who is a “scout”: someone able to think from uncharted and dangerous territory, and thus someone who needs to be read “not in the present but in the future tense.” Boucheron’s forward-looking analysis is anchored in the past­—in his studies of the relation between political power and urban transformations in medieval Milan—and aimed at broadening the limits of historical interpretation. In his previous book, Léonard et Machiavel (2008), Boucheron combined historiography and literature, imagining a meeting between Leonardo de Vinci and Machiavelli based on scarce and fragmentary traces of their probable encounters. In the new book he also undertakes a hybrid format in an “attempt to harmonize in style” with Machiavelli’s “art of thinking” by fusing poetry and politics. The result is a series of intimate snapshots of Machiavelli’s life and work. They are not only accurate (even though no sources are cited) but also intriguing and playful. Each of the thirty chapters is only three pages long and is paired with an evocative image—from portraits of Machiavelli, Lorenzo de’ Medici, and friar Girolamo Savonarola to a copy of Machiavelli’s original dedication in The Prince and a picture of Machiavelli’s tomb in the Basilica of Santa Croce.
 
The introduction to the English edition of The Art of Teaching the People What to Fear, written in June 2019 for readers in the United States, begins with the theme of fear in politics and an issue of Time magazine with Trump on the cover. Boucheron argues that the United States had entered a “Machiavellian moment”—“the dawning realization of the inadequacy of the republican ideal”—in the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks and that today, under “Trumpian America,” a fusion of politics and fiction has allowed for techniques of domination to be perfected, setting “a general disregard for the ‘actual truth of the matter.’” Referencing George Orwell’s 1984, Boucheron sees the United States as captured by a propaganda machine that has undermined reality and common sense—“that sixth sense Machiavelli spoke of, the accessory knowledge that the people have of what is dominating them.” Given the pervasive lack of realism in U.S. politics today, it is clear that the republic would appear to Machiavelli as a corrupt order, not because the powerful few break the rules or because a faction attempts to undermine the integrity of elections, but because the people have been “either deceived or forced into decreeing their own ruin.” Perhaps the most important part of Machiavelli’s wisdom for our own time is that republics tend to become oligarchic, giving the powerful few indirect control over government.
 
In the first five chapters of The Art of Teaching People What to Fear, Boucheron blends biographical details and the diverse interpretations of Machiavelli’s work. To illustrate the wide range of interpretations and the general animosity toward the teachings of the Florentine Secretary, he references Émile Littré’s nineteenth-century tendentious description of Machiavelli as an author theorizing “the practice of violence and tyranny used by the petty tyrants of Italy” and as a figure referring to “any statesman lacking principles.” Boucheron also dispels a common misattribution: that is was Jesuit Giovanni Botero and not Machiavelli who invented the concept of “reason of state,” the idea that the state has no law other than self-preservation. The section ends with a crucial chapter on the source of Machiavelli’s materialist thought: Lucretius’s six-book poem De rerum natura, or On the Nature of Things, which comes to disrupt Neoplatonism by discussing a “world that has no creator, where nature constantly reinvents itself.” Just as Lucretius’s dangerous poem “swerves” and “derails the world and knocks it off its hinges,” Machiavelli’s books are allies in revolution.
 
A second section discusses Machiavelli’s encounter with the political reality in Florence and his role as a diplomat. Boucheron argues that it was the failure of Savonarola’s regime against vanity and excess that prompted Machiavelli to engage with the themes of leadership, the use of force, and states of emergency, “to take up his political plan at the point where [Savonarola] left off.” During his time in diplomacy, Machiavelli “could observe, discuss, and compare” the inner workings of power in different states, learning “about the speed needed in making decisions, the art of surprising the world around him, and the ruthlessness required of a ruler in conducting politics.” Because he was “always to be disappointed by the statesmen he met,” he was free of the intellectual blunting that is inevitable in those who “become entranced with a powerful figure” and surrender their intelligence. The closest he got to endorsing a leader was with Cesare Borgia, illegitimate son of Pope Alexander VI and brilliant military commander. But after the death of the pope and Borgia’s consequent failure to secure his control over the Romagna, Machiavelli sets him as an example of the weakness that befalls those who are reliant on others rather than on their own resources.
 
Machiavelli’s downfall and his most famous work, The Prince, are analyzed in the third section. For Boucheron, the most revolutionary element in Machiavelli’s work is his realism, his commitment “to describe accurately how things happen, and to leave the task of drawing up the ensuing rules of action to others.” Boucheron thus reads The Prince as an exercise on typology in which Machiavelli classifies the principalities that have been “conquered, by force, by guile, or by luck: those principalities, in effect, that come under the sway of bold heroes of fortune, new princes.” As for Machiavelli’s “rules of action,” Boucheron writes, they “have no other end than their utility: use them or not according to necessity.” Therefore, a new prince, as an “unscrupulous virtuoso of his own self-preservation,” should always expect “the worst from those he governs.” Even a powerful new prince, backed up by the support of the common people, cannot be secure; conspiracies and treason come with the territory. For Machiavelli, relying only on the love of those who support you is a recipe for disaster.
 
The following section, “Politics of Writing,” departs from Machiavelli’s political work to focus on his private life and his theater writings. For example, Boucheron offers an analysis of The Mandrake (1524)—a play in which a plebeian, Callimaco, with the help of a friar, seduces Lucrezia, the young wife of Nicia, a senile noble. For Boucheron, the drama is a political allegory in which a corrupt Florence is being robbed of its liberty by the Medici. Boucheron further pursues Machiavelli’s picaresque and dingy edge by following him from the theatrical stage to the brothel. Silently judging, he pairs Machiavelli’s correspondence with his wife, Marietta Corsini, with whom he had five children, with a letter to his friend Luigi Guicciardini in which he describes “his ‘desperate rut’ with an old and atrociously ugly prostitute.” Trying to stay in an indeterminate space, Boucheron attempts to disrupts his own judgment by recognizing that “to present obscenity is to make visible what normally occurs out of sight” and that this means to be “the bearer of bad tidings.” This makes Machiavelli not only a “scout” of dangerous territory but also “an unsavory character,” who disrupts traditional notions of morality. Even if Boucheron seems uneasy with the Florentine Secretary’s deplorable sexual conduct, he dwells in this uncomfortable zone, refusing to shy away from the gruesome features that accompany Machiavelli’s genius.
 
Leaving behind the home and the brothel, Boucheron dedicates the next section, “Republics of Disagreement,” to an analysis of Machiavelli’s Discourses on the First Ten Books of Titus Livius and his “energetic attempt to derive from the materials of history a practical art of freedom.” From the point of view of democratic politics, this is the most interesting section of this little book. Boucheron describes the republic as a government that takes into account popular opinion, unveiling Machiavelli as a partisan of the people. “The populace can govern,” Boucheron writes, because
 
   “ it is capable of truth. The people know what they want, or, more accurately, they know what they don’t want: to be dominated. Through this knowledge, the people arrive at the truth, which is the truth of domination.”
 
Within this framework, pro-justice laws are not the result of adequate legislative procedures, but rather the result of conflict, the product of the people’s pushback against domination.
 
 
While analyzing the strength of republics, Boucheron makes an observation that seems crucial to understanding contemporary popular regimes that have fallen or corrupted due to their own reaction to conspiracy and rebellion. If we take the case of Hugo Chávez in Venezuela, who was elected in a landslide on a redistributive platform and survived an oligarchic coup three years into his presidency, Machiavelli’s insights allow us to understand the process of political action and reaction and their unforeseen effects in the relative strength of the post-coup regime. Thinking with Machiavelli, Boucheron concludes that
 
    ‘coups strengthen the state they are meant to undermine. And yet . . . in making itself stronger, the state makes itself weaker. . . . conspiracies give the prince reason to fear, and fear gives him reason to secure himself, and securing himself gives him reason to harm others, from which arises hatred and, often enough, the prince’s ruin.”
 
Digging deeper into the relation between foundational violence and politics in Machiavelli’s thought, Boucheron states that “coups reveal what states normally keep hidden, which is their constituent violence,” and when this violence is exercised and exposed, the strength of the state, paradoxically, diminishes. A failed coup compels a new prince to fortify himself and engage in preemptive violence; this show of force inevitably weakens the foundations of any good regime, even if it assures its survival.
 
Although violence can be necessary, this does not mean that Machiavelli thought that the end justifies the means. As Boucheron notes, the Florentine Secretary never wrote those words that made him so infamous. In fact, endorsing this motto would be contrary to his political philosophy. As Boucheron puts it, because Machiavelli’s “philosophy of necessity rests on the principle of the changeableness of the times and the unpredictability of political action,” the end cannot but remain unknown. This view chimes with Machiavelli’s thought, but arguably what remains unknown is not the end itself—understood as the final cause of political action—but rather the success of the enterprise. Machiavelli states that the aim of a new prince is to set republican foundations that would allow plebeians to live in liberty, free from the domination of the oligarchy. Only a lasting constitutional order would justify unlawful and violent means. However, since at the time of the founding there is no way to know if the new order will be able to endure, unlawful action can only be justified ex post facto, after a considerable amount of time has passed. There are no justified, irreproachable means in the present tense, only necessary ones.
 
In the final section of this biographical portrait, Boucheron engages with Machiavelli’s final years and describes him as a “public historian” who was commissioned by the Florentine Academy to write “the official chronicle” of the city-state. Following his realist approach to politics, in his History of Florence (published posthumously in 1532), Machiavelli described not only “the full extent of the strife, the discord, the enmity that played out in his city’s politics” but also the plight of plebeians, making visible what usually is excluded from official accounts. When referring to the 1378 revolt of the ciompi (wool workers) that overthrew the government and briefly installed a plebeian revolutionary regime, Machiavelli includes a speech by an anonymous rebellious workman stating the radical equality between nobles and plebeians, “made by nature in the same way.” Presented at turns as the philosophical scout and unsavory fellow, Machiavelli now ends up as public historian, writing a history aimed at “giving equal dignity to the ciompi and the Medici, in giving those who have no voice a hearing, in saying in plain terms that this took place, this was possible.” By documenting the popular insurrection and its voices, by giving it space in the official history, Machiavelli was a trailblazer for historians of social history who attempt to capture multifaceted narratives and to democratize knowledge by bringing the common people into the main storyline.
 
 
Machiavelli died rather suddenly in 1527, about a month after Rome was sacked by the Visigoths, the Medici were overthrown, and a popular uprising restored the popular Republic in Florence. His works were published a few years later in three volumes, authorized by Pope Clement VII. But the Church’s benediction would not last long. Three decades later, after the “Jesuits orchestrated what amounted to an anti-Machiavellian campaign in Italy,” his works were forbidden. Shortly thereafter his name was turned into an “-ism” that became a synonym of tyranny, and his teachings slowly became “as invisible as a mist.”
 
Boucheron ends the book by showing how this mist has been gathered in puddles and even streams every time Machiavelli is read “when a storm is threatening”—from the Jacobins during the French Revolution to Antonio Gramsci, Louis Althusser, and the readers of today. As an “awakener” whose thought can lash out, like a raging river, against the fortresses containing “the opacity of representation, what we would call today the fatigue of democracy,” Machiavelli seems a good companion for these turbulent times in which the institutional order is being put into question in the United States and the economic devastation of the pandemic threatens to linger for years to come. “When capsize seems inevitable,” as Boucheron writes, Machiavelli’s realism, irreverence, and commitment to the liberty of the common people can lead us to safe harbor.
 
Our Machiavellian Moment. By Camila Vergara. Boston Review, January 5, 2021.




 

 “Real power is – I don’t even want to use the word – fear.”
 
This sentence could have been written by Niccolò Machiavelli. It was spoken by Donald Trump in March 2016 when Trump was still only a candidate for the US presidency, and these words now appear as the epigraph to Bob Woodward’s book Fear: Trump in the White House.
 
Is a more off-putting introduction to our subject imagin­able? If we are tempted to assign words spoken by Don­ald Trump to Machiavelli, it’s not just because many western leaders have, and for a long time, bolstered their sense of their own power by affecting a cynical and crafty tone in the belief that it represents the last word in Machiavellian thought. It’s because we literally don’t know what to think of Machiavelli. Should we admire him or not, is he with us or against us, and is he still our con­temporary or is what he says ancient history?
 
My little book doesn’t pretend to resolve these questions; nor is it addressed to those who will read it to feel that they have right on their side – whether that side is answerable to justice or to power. On the contrary, this book tries to stay in that uncomfortable zone of thought that sees its own indeterminacy as the very locus of politics.
 
I should, at this stage, give a few explanations – who is speaking, and to whom. I don’t con­sider myself a historian of political ideas, but I approached Machiavelli a decade ago, yoking him with Leonardo da Vinci in an essay on contemporaneousness. Unexpect­edly, I found Machiavelli a useful guide and support – I’d almost say a faithful friend, one whose intelligence never failed me.
 
My conversations with Machiavelli became more regular and fruitful as I approached topics of which the Florentine author was, in his day, the most clear-sighted analyst. This happened first as I researched the political meaning of the architecture of the quattrocento. Machia­velli taught me to see it less as a representation of power than as a machine for producing political emotions: per­suasion, in the public buildings of the republican city-states; and intimidation, in the fortified strongholds that the princes built to keep those states in line. In every case, Machiavelli proved a worthy brother-in-arms who, because he had thrown light on his own times, threw light on ours – proving himself a contemporary in the very best sense.
 
During the summer of 2016, I gave a series of daily talks on French public radio in which I tried to articu­late this capacity of Machiavellian thought to sharpen our understanding of the present. My little book col­lects those texts, which in their biting brevity and direct address attempt to harmonize in style with Machiavelli – not simply his manner of writing but his art of thinking, which brings to flashpoint the fusion of poetry and politics.
 
Only one of these talks was not broadcast on the France Inter network during the summer of 2016, the fifth, focused on Machiavelli’s reading of Lucretius’s De natura rerum, “a dangerous and deviant book that makes the world jump its rails and come off its hinges”. The plan was to air the episode on Friday 15 July, but it was swallowed up by the sorrow, anger and numbness that followed the terrorist attack on the Promenade des Anglais in Nice on 14 July, France’s national holiday, when 86 peo­ple were killed and more than 400 wounded. Although this book restores the text to its original place, there is still a gap left by the lasting stamp of fear.
 
Is that why I have chosen to give prominence in the book’s American edition to the politics of fear? Not solely. As I write this preface, I am remembering a dia­logue that I had with the political scientist Corey Robin, the author of a major book in 2004, Fear: The History of a Political Idea.
 
“One day,” he wrote, “the war on terror­ism will come to an end. All wars do. And when it does, we will find ourselves still living in fear: not of terrorism or radical Islam, but of the domestic rulers that fear has left behind.” Our discussion, which led to the publica­tion in 2015 of L’exercice de la peur: usages politiques d’une émotion (Spreading fear: the political uses of an emo­tion), asked whether the American way of fear might be exported around the world.
 
We touched on Hobbes, of course, De Tocqueville and Hannah Arendt, but also Machiavelli, who continually inquired about the fears of those who govern: what makes them truly afraid? When justice stops being effective (or when crimes of corruption stop being punished) and when political vio­lence is no longer a threat, there is nothing left to cause fear in those who govern shamelessly, that is, buoyed by a mood they aren’t in control of and that no one is on hand to countervail. What will then happen to the repub­lic? This question inevitably arises when anxiety is felt about democracy, because the republic loses its stability when it no longer reflects a pacified equilibrium between the different fears that divide it.
 
In 1975, JGA Pocock defined that loss of equilib­rium as “the Machiavellian moment”, when there is daylight between a republic and its values. American his­torians have since associated Machiavelli’s name with that form of political crisis, a practice I have followed in this book. And today we are undeniably living through another Machiavellian moment, again bringing the Flor­entine author close to the core of American reality.
 
Living in unstable times, Machiavelli was keenly aware that the old political lexicon, which the Mid­dle Ages had inherited from Aristotle, no longer served him adequately. He defined the intellectual’s task as a kind of resoluteness toward truth – being unmoved by the dazzle of words to “go straight toward the actual truth of the matter”.
 
This experience, which is profoundly Machiavellian in nature, is one that recurs again and again in history, whenever the words for expressing the things of politics become obsolete. What do we do when confronting adversaries we can’t put a name to? We call them “fascists”, for want of a better term – just as in Italy’s medieval communes, the people called the lords “tyrants”. We intend to confound them, to abash and bring them down, when we should in fact be examining what they say closely for its fascist potential. One thing is certain: when we use words from the past, we are show­ing our inability to understand the present.
 
Since the summer of 2016, in France but also in the United States and elsewhere, every political forecast has been systematically proven wrong. In the past few years it seems that the perverse pleasure that the pub­lic takes in contradicting pollsters – who minimize the voters’ ability to choose by presenting developments as foreordained – has turned to fierce vindictiveness. Looking only at electoral results, from the United King­dom’s Brexit vote on 23 June 2016, on whether to remain in the European Union, to Donald Trump’s election to the US presidency on 8 November of that same year, the qualità dei tempi has definitely turned to storms.
 
The consequences for the French electoral cycle, starting in January 2017, were similarly astounding. Following a series of extraordinary circumstances that eliminated all the expected candidates one after another – those picked either as favorites or as dead certainties – the election gave the presidency to Emmanuel Macron, a man who happened in his philosophical youth to have written an essay on Machiavelli. When a journalist asked me about this electoral smash-and-grab, so characteristic of the boldness commended by the author of The Prince, I glibly described Macron as a “Machiavelli in reverse”, meaning that the French president had abandoned philosophy for politics, whereas Machiavelli chose to make his mark in philosophy when politics abandoned him.
 
 What import does a virtuoso of political ruses like Machiavelli have for us? If he were nothing more than the wily and unscrupulous strategist that a hostile pos­terity has portrayed him to be, then not much at all. In these troubled times, when the stutterers can’t be told from those who are talking of the future, the last peo­ple anyone wants to hear from are the so-called experts at predicting trends, who reduce all the indeterminacy in political life to a few elementary rules of collective action. The simplicity of those rules has everything to do with the experts’ lack of imagination.
 
Machiavelli is that thinker of alternatives who dissects every situation into an “either/or”, drawing a crossroads of meaning at every stage of historical development. But if he is captivating, it’s because he lets us see how the social energy of political configurations always spills out of the neat constructs in which it’s meant to stay put. His sentences invariably run away with him; he has no sooner declared that there are only two avenues than he proceeds down a third. When we try to work out whether a particular political situation is going to turn out one way or another, it’s well to remember that it is carried along by a general movement that has already occurred. Perhaps this is what awaits many European and other world nations: they are so worried about a pending catastrophe that they won’t understand when it has already happened.
 
People who see history as primarily tragic have always felt that the scenes of our disarray might well have been penned by a ghostly Shakespeare. But as “the grotesque wheels of power” (in Michel Foucault’s phrase) grind into motion, it seems that the coarsening of public discourse we are now experiencing got its start on a less exalted stage – none other than that misleadingly named feature of Trumpian America known as “reality TV”. It is there that a general disregard for the “actual truth of the matter” was patiently nurtured. Not for the first time have upcoming politics had their start in fiction.
 
That’s why, in 2017, there was such a surge of interest in the United States in George Orwell’s Nineteen Eighty-Four. Literature doesn’t predict the future any more than it protects us from its threats. It warns, yes, in the sense that it sounds the alert about a catastrophe that generally doesn’t hap­pen, or not in the way it was imagined. Ever since 1984 came and went without bearing out Orwell’s dystopian predictions, we no longer read his novel as a foreshad­owing or preview of a totalitarian regime. At this stage, we know that totalitarianism is a category not so much meant to describe a political reality as to make that real­ity fit into a pre-established form – for instance, at the end of the second world war, when the liberal democracies were intent on demonstrating that communism would pur­sue nazism by other means.
 
In a sense, totalitarianism is a political fiction. It had its first trial in George Orwell’s 1949 fable and was then given a theoretical analysis by Hannah Arendt in 1951. We now know that what came after, what obtains today, took its place without receiving a name. Orwell imag­ined the tyranny of a “Ministry of Truth” but that’s not what happened, and we don’t yet know if it’s for better or worse. “The Party told you to reject the evidence of your eyes and ears,” Orwell’s hero, Winston Smith, says in Nineteen Eighty-Four. And: “Not merely the validity of experience, but the very existence of external reality was tacitly denied.” What the novel describes is the capacity of propaganda to hollow out a receptive space in people by undermin­ing reality and sense experiences. “The evidence of one’s eyes and ears” referred to by Orwell could be common sense; it could also be that sixth sense Machiavelli spoke of, the accessory knowledge that the people have of what is dominating them.
 
Admittedly it was not the Party, as imagined by anti-totalitarian writers, that spoke when Sean Spicer, the White House press secretary, declared, “Our inten­tion is never to lie to you,” before adding “sometimes we can disagree with the facts.” It’s not a Party, but it’s something else that we don’t know what to call, a fiction that is taking on body under our eyes. And what we need to understand is: what is this taking on of body, and how can our own society come to embody monstrousness? Gramsci read Machiavelli’s The Prince replacing the word “prince” with the word “party”. We could in turn read Orwell and replace “party” with “prince”. Either way, Machiavelli needs to be read not in the present, but in the future tense.
 
Should we look in Machiavelli’s work for the art of coming to terms over our disagreements or look instead for that skill the dominated have of recog­nizing the science of their domination? And in that case, why not look at his theater, his histories, even his love poetry?
 
I tried during the summer of 2016 to reconstruct the face of Machiavelli hidden by the mask of Machiavel­lianism; and if that face turned out to be as changeable as a storm-tossed sky, it’s because its owner hardly had the time to choose among his different talents. They all brought him back to his art of naming with precision that which was happening, his ability to take stock implaca­bly, inextricably joining poetry and politics.
 
Three years later, what is the sense of spending fur­ther time with Machiavelli? The same sense, perhaps, that Walter Benjamin attributed to the very ambition of history: “To articulate the past historically does not mean to recognize it ‘the way it really was’. It means to seize hold of a memory as it flashes up at a moment of danger.”
 
This is an edited extract from Machiavelli: The Art of Teaching People What to Fear by Patrick Boucheron, published in the US by Other Press.
 
 
'Real power is fear': what Machiavelli tells us about Trump in 2020. By Patrick Boucheron. The Guardian,  February 8, 2020. 













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