24/09/2023

Women Who Rallied to the Republican Cause in Spain

 





The first thing I ever knew about the poet, journalist, and activist Nancy Cunard was a commanding broadsheet she dispatched in the summer of 1937, containing the challenge that, decades later, would spark the questions that prompted my book, Tomorrow Perhaps the Future. She addressed it to many of the most important writers of Britain and Ireland, sometimes sending multiple copies with the idea that they’d pass them on. It made its way to George Bernard Shaw and Evelyn Waugh; to T. S. Eliot, James Joyce, Samuel Beckett; to Rebecca West, Rose Macaulay and the Woolfs; to Cecil Day-Lewis, Stephen Spender, Louis MacNeice and W. H. Auden. It reached Aldous Huxley and George Orwell; Vita Sackville-West and Sylvia Pankhurst. It went to Vera Brittain and H. G. Wells; to Rosamond Lehmann and her brother, John; to Sylvia Townsend Warner and her partner, Valentine Ackland.
 
Nancy printed her missive in black and red and addressed it, broadly and grandly, to ‘the Writers and Poets of England, Scotland, Ireland and Wales’. Large type announced: THE QUESTION. Along the left-hand side of the sheet was added, vertically: SPAIN.
 
The Question (though technically there were two) appeared perfectly straightforward. ‘Are you for, or against, the legal Government and the People of Republican Spain? Are you for, or against, Franco and Fascism?’
 
Nancy assured her writers that she would publish the answers they chose to send, by which she meant: you are asked to state a position publicly. As far as she was concerned, not taking a position was impossible.
 
The project centered around her fundamental and appealingly simple belief in the value of taking sides, and on an arresting proposition: that history will sometimes present moments when convictions have to be decided upon, when lines are drawn that must be acknowledged.
 
The Spanish Civil War began in July 1936 when a group of disaffected generals – including Francisco Franco, who would emerge as their leader – attempted to launch a coup against their country’s elected government. Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany offered decisive material support to Franco’s side (the nationalists) while the Republican government received from its fellow democracies in France, the United States, and Great Britain only a queasy refusal to intervene. As the Republic battled to survive this well-resourced attack, relying on a tenacious popular resistance to the military takeover and on arms from Soviet Russia and Mexico, many observers understood the war as an opportunity to halt the global advance of fascism: one that their own governments seemed loath to take up.
 
Almost a year into the war, Nancy Cunard was framing things like this: ‘It is clear to many of us throughout the whole world that now, as certainly never before, we are determined or compelled, to take sides. The equivocal attitude, the Ivory Tower, the paradoxical, the ironic detachment, will no longer do.’
 
These were the questions I had in response: what happens when the stakes of political life have become so high that people no longer feel neutrality is an option? Can the mere act of declaring a ‘side’ be of any value? And do writers really have any particular responsibility – or, indeed, any special right – to weigh in on the causes of the day? By the time I finished the book, many writers around the world had been asking themselves that final question. Just last year, PEN America held an ‘Emergency World Voices Congress of Writers’ in response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, yet the crises deemed relevant to practitioners of literature went beyond the war. ‘In this moment of chaos and violence,’ the chief executive, Suzanne Nossel, said, ‘we can address what the role of the writer is, as we face down the rise of authoritarianism, disinformation run amok, social fissures that are widening here in this country, and a surge in book banning and threats against free speech.’ In the late 1930s, writers were mobilizing to address very similar trends, but not all of them agreed that it was their place to do so.
 
When the idea of a pamphlet announcing the partisanship of Britain and Ireland’s most eminent writers and intellectuals occurred to Nancy Cunard – who had already spent months in Spain as a journalist in 1936, and would return in 1937 and 1938 – she assembled twelve additional signatories (all of them male) to the questionnaire, but later claimed it solely as her own. It was she who drafted the questions, arranged for them to be printed in Paris, and came up with a list of recipients. Names kept on occurring to her, until she had mailed out over two hundred copies. The cooperation of the other signatories was in fact of little significance. ‘Had every one of them said “No”,’ she told a scholar in the sixties, ‘I should have made the little work all the same – and how! You see in those days there did exist ENTHUSIASM for what was felt to be good and right and true.’
 
Her enthusiasm, it turned out, was matched by others. The pamphlet eventually consisted of 148 replies, but at least twenty-five were left out for space, which implies that a great proportion of Nancy’s dispatches hit home. In London, the Left Review agreed to publish it. They printed 3,000 copies of Authors Take Sides on the Spanish War and immediately sold out.
 
Nancy had not limited her outreach to writers she knew or to those she assumed would agree with her, but she was convinced that the results would overwhelmingly favour the Republic, and she was right. Of the printed responses, only sixteen chose neutrality, and just five were against the Spanish government. (The responses left out for space were all pro-Republican.) In Paris, she had sorted the answers herself, categorising them as ‘For’ the Republic, ‘Against’ or ‘Neutral?’ without adhering to any particularly discernible method, just as her basis for approaching respondents had hardly been scientific. Some of those who ignored her commands and chose to equivocate were overruled and placed in the ‘For’ pile, when perhaps they intended to be ‘Neutral’. On the other hand, there were statements published under ‘Neutral’ that could convincingly have been designated as ‘For’. And at least Nancy did allow for Neutral. The phrasing of her questions had been unashamedly leading. The point of the questionnaire was not to achieve a balance of opinion. The intention was to publish a declaration.
 
‘It is to be hoped that some methodical person has made a collection of the various manifestos and questionnaires issued . . . during the years 1936–7,’ Virginia Woolf later remarked, taking a very dim view of the ‘inquisition’ to which she felt herself subjected in those days. ‘Private people of no political training were invited to sign appeals asking their own and foreign governments to change their policy; artists were asked to fill up forms stating the proper relations of the artist to the State, to religion, to morality . . .’
 
Some of the hostile responders assumed that Nancy was asking them to choose between fascism and communism, which she wasn’t; others assumed she would leave out anything unfavourable to her pro-Republican position (their responses duly appeared in the pamphlet). Not everyone was convinced that the simple act of declaring themselves could be of much use. Rebecca West, sending hers in, worried that ‘six lines is terribly little and it sounds very trite and boring’. E. M. Forster could not share Nancy’s conviction ‘that manifestos by writers carry any weight whatever’.
 
Nancy’s questionnaire was in a sense asking too much and asking too little. It is all too easy to sit down in some quiet place, compose a few lines, and settle back satisfied in the fulfilment of a civic duty. ‘To scribble a name on a sheet of paper is easy,’ Woolf pointed out in the book she was writing that summer, but an expression of opinion was not ‘positive help’. On the other hand, it’s easy to imagine intellectuals baulking at nailing their colours to the mast as publicly – or as simplistically – as Nancy wanted. A war in someone else’s country was surely more complicated than she was prepared to allow.
 
 
Yet it’s not difficult to see why Nancy thought the project important. At the League of Nations in Geneva, she had witnessed the Republic’s fellow democracies still refusing to confront Germany or Italy over their ‘invasion’ of Spain. ‘While the powers pass resolutions,’ she had reminded her readers, ‘international Fascism kills.’ With so much relying on changing the narrative outside of the country, harnessing the opinions of articulate public figures – the publishers listed forty of them down the front cover – and having them sound the alarm in their cumulative authority was a sensible, even inspired, contribution. Her pamphlet was a signal that what was happening in Spain was a matter of gravity and relevance. The following year, Donald Ogden Stewart took up the idea and canvassed American authors in Writers Take Sides: Letters About the War in Spain from 418 American Authors. John Steinbeck and William Faulkner were among those who put their opposition to Franco on record.



 
Nancy wasn’t asking her respondents to merely lament ‘how wicked it all is’, as George Orwell would accuse her, but, in stating a side, to do something more difficult: to forsake such unimpeachable generalisations in favour of specifics. But in the pamphlet that emerged, the particularity of Spain – its history and traditions; the nature of its political scene – often fell by the wayside. Many took Nancy’s cue in using it as an opportunity to voice their suspicion of the fascist powers in Europe. Nancy had set up a symbol that allowed her correspondents to continue their own debates. To read the pamphlet is to see a cohort of writers pondering their place in the world.
 
When Nancy asked James Joyce for a response to the pamphlet, she received a strident telling-off. Joyce would provide no such thing, she later told his biographer, ‘because it [was] “politics”’. ‘Politics’ was ‘getting into everything’. T. S. Eliot replied to her request with the opinion that ‘at least a few men of letters should remain isolated’, claiming a special position for writers – a place above the fray. The author and traveller Norman Douglas, one of her closest friends, boasted, ‘If Fascists annoy me, I hop it. If Communists annoy me, I hop it,’ turning neutrality into merely the good fortune of having options.
 
But Nancy’s exhortation to writers was more than just a statement of faith in their influence. She also saw in fascism an implacable enemy of the arts. Most of her responders regarded fascism – particularly as demonstrated in the regimes of Hitler and Mussolini – as not just hostile to intellectuals and repressive of artistic freedom but antithetical to culture: mere ‘barbarism’, as Leonard Woolf and others put it. (As it happened, ‘barbarism’ was also how Franco described socialism.)
 
The poet Valentine Ackland expected both ‘reason and tenacious courage’ from artists: attributes required for making a stand. After all, the deployment of reason alongside the imagination helps us to make sense of phenomena confronting us. Writers, whether identifying as intellectuals or artists, are dealers in trust. They have to be able to convince, on some level at least, if they want their creations to move and engage. This, I think, is why Nancy saw writers endowed with a special responsibility towards truth, why they were the natural enemies of fascist movements that warped and suppressed it.
 
As any censor knows and fears, in the arts there are secret languages which can encode, and thus protect, independence; that can entrench dissent in realms where it is difficult to identify and impossible to root out. ‘A press is very dangerous!’ Nancy once wrote of her time as a publisher in the 1920s. ‘It means the dissemination of ideas.’ Responding to her questionnaire, Cyril Connolly, the editor of Horizon magazine, pointed out that the aggressive aims of fascist states required a populace that was ‘rendered both warlike and servile’ – the ‘stultifying’, in other words, ‘of the human race’. When a system relies on the prevention of independent thought, the use of the intellect (the dissemination of ideas) becomes a primary form of resistance.
 
Adapted from Sarah Watling’s new book, Tomorrow Perhaps the Future: Writers, Outsiders, and the Spanish Civil War, published by Knopf


Sometimes Writers Have to Take Sides. By Sarah Watling. Time, July 13, 2023.




The Spanish war began in July 1936 when a group of disaffected generals—including Francisco Franco, who would emerge as their leader— attempted to launch a coup against their country’s elected government. The reaction of foreign powers was significant from the start.

 
Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany offered decisive material support to Franco’s side (the nationalists) while the Republican government received from its fellow democracies in France, the United States and Great Britain only a queasy refusal to intervene.
 
As the Republic battled to survive this well-resourced attack, relying on a tenacious popular resistance to the military takeover and on arms from Soviet Russia and Mexico, many observers understood the war as an opportunity to halt the global advance of fascism: one that their own governments seemed loath to take up.
 
Some months in, Nancy Cunard challenged her fellow writers to make public statements on the war in an urgent call that framed things like this:
 
”It is clear to many of us throughout the whole world that now, as certainly never before, we are determined or compelled, to take sides. The equivocal attitude, the Ivory Tower, the paradoxical, the ironic detachment, will no longer do.”
 
This was where the Spanish Civil War began to matter to me. It happened that, when I first found this eye-catching statement, I was living through an era of national and international upheaval that made Nancy’s 80-year-old challenge snatch up my attention.
 
It was possible, in her day, to see democracy as a teetering edifice, a system that had outlived, even failed, its potential. Alternatives vied for dominance. The Great Depression in America, that “citadel of capitalism,” had not only destabilized economies around the world but shaken faith in the capitalist system itself—proving, to some minds, the validity of the Marxist theory that had predicted its collapse.
 
The twenties and early thirties had seen military dictators or  non-democratic forms of government gain the upper hand in a raft of countries: Hungary, Poland, Yugoslavia, Romania, Japan, Portugal, Austria, Bulgaria, Greece and, of course, even earlier, Russia. By 1936, Germany and Italy had been governed by fascists for years. Their regimes found plenty of sympathizers in countries shaken by the First World War and ensuing Depression.
 
The British Union of Fascists, for instance, was already almost four years old. Nor was fascist aggression on the international stage something new. Italy had invaded Ethiopia in 1935; Germany was openly remilitarizing—something forbidden by the terms of the peace imposed at the end of the First World War. For some, the great dichotomy of the 1930s was provided by fascism and communism. For many others (including those who weren’t convinced of a meaningful difference between the two), Spain was perhaps simpler still: fascism or opposition to fascism.
 
By my day it had become fairly common to hear people drawing dark parallels with the 1930s: that decade in which Mussolini and Hitler crushed opposition and raised their armies, and Franco took over Spain, and “Blackshirts” marched in the streets of London. We thought we knew these facts, but it seemed they were losing their power to terrify or forewarn; that acknowledging them belonged to an old tyranny of decency and truth that others were ready to throw off.
 
It’s an absurd kind of grandiosity, in a way, to relate the darkest past to your own moment and its preoccupations. Yet I felt many of the things I had taken for granted dropping away around the time I first started reading about Nancy Cunard. Democratic processes, mechanisms of justice, truth itself: all were under renewed threat.
 
My country seemed a less moderate, less peaceful place than I was used to, and newly emboldened extremists were taking eagerly to the public stage. Inequalities of wealth and opportunity were widening. The urgency of the climate crisis felt increasingly clamorous. It was difficult not to simply feel hopeless; pinioned into a narrow space of outraged despair.
 
And yet, it was quite convenient to have so much out in the open. It was something to respond to. It gave Nancy’s uncompromising position a certain appeal—even offered, perhaps, a kind of permission. I kept remembering a feminist demonstration I had taken part in years before, when I was 21. Meeting friends in a park afterwards, one of them had punctured our exultant mood: the turn-out I’d bragged of was more or less meaningless, he opined, an act of preaching to the choir. What was the point when everyone on the march was already persuaded?




 
By 2019—a year in which, though abortion rights had just been extended in Ireland, the UN Deputy High Commissioner for Human Rights could describe US policy on abortion as “gender-based violence against women, no question” and the anti-feminist, far-right Vox party made unprecedented gains in Spain, raising the uncomfortable specter of  Franco—the response I should have made was becoming clearer to me. My 21-year-old self had marched to give notice of her resistance. There was nothing to be gained by trying to understand the point of view we were protesting (that the way women dressed could provoke rape), but much to be risked from letting that idea exist in the world unchallenged.
 
Nancy’s “taking sides” has an air of immaturity about it, perhaps precisely because of the playground training most of us receive in it. So much prudence and fairness is signified by resisting these easy allegiances, by seeing “two sides to every story”—a terminology that tends to imply that truth or moral superiority can only ever exist in not choosing either one. And it was becoming clear that polarization serves the extremes best of all.
 
But something about Nancy’s construction spoke to me. It suggested that there is power in the act of taking a side; that there are moments on which history rests, when nuance or hesitation (perhaps or tomorrow) will prove fatal, when it is vital to  know—and to acknowledge—which side you are on.
 
The worst times can take on an appearance of simplicity and war is exactly the kind of aberration that removes options, leaving the single choice of one side or another in its place. Yet when Nancy and thousands of other foreigners to Spain acted voluntarily in support of the Spanish Republic, they made their beliefs public. Their actions proposed the worst times as periods of opportunity, too: invitations to reclaim principles from the privacy of our thoughts and conversations and ballot boxes, and make them decisive factors in the way we live and act.
 
This is why my book is not about the Spanish experience of the war, but rather about the people who had the option not to involve themselves and decided otherwise.
 
Writers are good for thinking through. I was interested in the question of critical  distance—whether it is always possible or even, as I’d instinctively assumed, always   desirable—and I could think of no better individual to shed light on this than a writer (or intellectual) in war-time.
 
But people from all walks of life understood the Spanish war as a question, a provocation that demanded an answer. Thousands from across the world volunteered on behalf of the Republic, going so far as to travel to the country as combatants and auxiliaries. Others declared themselves through campaigning and fundraising. Martha Gellhorn defined herself as “an onlooker”: I wanted to explore, too, the experience of people whose commitment drew them closer to the action.
 
Alongside her in this book are the British Communist Nan Green and her husband, George, who wrenched themselves from their children to volunteer with medical and military units in Republican Spain. There is a young African American nurse named Salaria Kea who saw her service there as a calling. There is one of the boldest photographers to contribute to the memory of the war: Gerda Taro, a refugee from Germany for whom the fight against fascism was personal.
 
They left their own accounts of the conflict, whether through images or text, and following their stories taught me much about how historical narratives are formed in the first place; why leaving a record can be one of the most instinctive, and contested, human impulses.
 
They went because, as Martha Gellhorn put it, “We knew, we just knew that Spain was the place to stop Fascism.”
 
When I went looking for Salaria Kea, the negotiations and challenges her story had undergone became as interesting to me as the missing pieces. A woman of color deemed a political radical, a nurse and not a writer: hers was a voice that rarely received a welcome hearing. My book voices many of my questions, but with Salaria so much was unclear that I realized I could only tell her story by narrating the pursuit and leaving the questions open.
 
“Rebels,” like Franco, turn military might against the government they’re meant to serve. But I found that all the people I chose to follow fulfilled the word’s other definition, of those who “resist authority, control, or convention.” I wanted to know why they believed that the moment had come, with Spain, for taking sides.
 
Or, rather, I wanted to know how they recognized the Spanish war as the moment for doing something about the way their present was heading, and what “taking sides” had meant in practice. I wanted to know whether Nancy really thought the mere act of declaring a side could make a difference, as she suggested when she put out that urgent call. I wanted to know why she had addressed it specifically to “Writers and Poets.”
 
The Spanish war is often remembered for, and through, its  writers—and notably writers from outside the country. Of all the defeats in history, perhaps only Troy has been as well served by literature as Republican Spain was during and after the ascension of Franco, who would eventually rule in Spain for almost forty years. Countless novels and memoirs, a handful of them the greatest books by the greatest writers of their generation; reams of poetry, both brilliant and pedestrian, have preserved the memory of its cause.
 
As I read, I began to think that their authors’ position had something to say about the nature of writing itself. It seemed significant that each of the writers in this book saw themselves, whether at home or abroad, as an outsider. If not belonging was a fundamental part of that identity, taking sides on Spain only crystallized a series of pressing questions about the purpose and privileges of writers.
 
The 1930s was a decade of art colliding with politics, of artists determining to marry the two. Presented with the trauma of the Great Depression, the unavoidable phenomenon of Soviet Russia and the spread of fascism, there were journalists and poets alike who sought new modes and new material. Writers questioned their obligations to society, asked what art could achieve; they interrogated the intellectual life to expose its value and its limitations.
 
The list of foreigners who spent time in Spain during the war reads like a roll call of the most celebrated voices of the era: think of the Spanish war and I imagine you think of Ernest Hemingway and George Orwell, perhaps Stephen Spender, John Dos Passos, W. H. Auden. Delve a little further and you will find a far greater array of authors, including writers who were female, writers of color, writers who did not write in English (though the wealth of Spanish-language literature falls beyond the scope of a book interested in the outsiderness of writers).
 
They went because, as Martha Gellhorn put it, “We knew, we just knew that Spain was the place to stop Fascism,” or because they believed in the liberal project of the Republic and wanted to raise awareness of its plight, or because they wanted to observe, or even participate in, the cause célèbre of the moment. They saw history coming and went out to meet it.
 
__________________________________
 


 


From Tomorrow Perhaps the Future by Sarah Watling. By Sarah Watling. Excerpted by permission of Alfred A. Knopf, a division of Penguin Random House LLC.
 
Why the Spanish Civil War Mattered to Writers on Distant Shores. By Sarah Watling.LitHub, May 15, 2023.



In early 1935, the novelist Josephine Herbst arrived in Cuba under false pretenses, traveling with accreditation from moderate magazines like the American Mercury that she wouldn’t be writing for, intending to reach the resistance. But the whole point of an underground resistance is that it isn’t easy to find.

 
The pose was lady journalist researching the island’s sugar industry. The reality was a commission from the Marxist-aligned New Masses to report on dissent against the harsh regime overseen by Fulgencio Batista. At the time, Herbst was a fearless short story writer and novelist of growing reputation, a woman who compulsively fictionalized the traumas and grievances of her life and background in novels such as Pity Is Not Enough and The Executioner Waits, and who had just begun to distinguish herself as an intrepid, politically committed, as-far-left-as-you-can-go journalist. If only the world weren’t so clamorous, Herbst could have gotten back to the novels she was meant to be writing. But she also believed that, without the clamor of the world, there would be no novels.
 
It took her weeks to gain the trust of the Cuban underground in 1935, weeks she spent interviewing local politicians and American businessmen, compiling a portrait of a country at the mercy of the United States’ business interests. All the while, she was seeking a way up into the mountains, where peasant rebels in a region called Realengo 18 were said to be holding out against sugar companies’ attempts to seize their land. At first, her contacts would only take her as far as Santiago, where the scarred bodies of the activists she met were explanation enough for their caution. Then, finally, there was a five-day journey on horseback up to what she described as “the secret mountainsides of ‘Realengo 18.’”
 
The area was so remote that she was the first foreign journalist ever to meet the people there, yet, armed and friendly, they expressed no sense of their isolation: Instead, she believed, they saw their struggle as part of a worldwide movement for change. “The district of Realengo is small in comparison to Cuba, and Cuba is only a tiny island,” she wrote in one of her articles, “but no one in Realengo feels alone in the fight for freedom. They talk too much of what is going on in the world. They know too much to be alone.”
 
This knowledge and these connections were important to Herbst. Over the previous few years, while covering the Great Depression-era radical organizing of American farmers, she had remarked on surprising collaborations. What made a white man from an old farming family find common cause with an impoverished Black sharecropper from Alabama? “Nothing except the conviction that their struggle against mass ruin is the same,” she once declared. Within the right kinds of alliances, Herbst believed, and with the willingness to struggle, was a solution not just to economic inequality but to imperialism and racial prejudice, too.



 
By the time Herbst got back to Havana from the mountains, everything had escalated. A general strike called in opposition to Batista’s repression triggered a violent clampdown. She was in a theater when a bomb went off outside. Most people stayed where they were; Herbst dashed out to find pools of blood on the pavement. She wrote up her articles while gunfire spat in the streets, then had them smuggled out of the country when the authorities restricted the mail. She soon followed, unable to do anything more while her contacts were being hunted down and disappearing.
 
Fortunately, it was not far from Cuba to an old friend’s bolthole in Key West, Florida. She spent a few days recuperating with Ernest Hemingway, then it was onward to New York, where she was due to speak at a writers’ conference in April.
 
Onstage at the Mecca Temple, she knew why she’d been asked—last-minute panic. The event was a great gathering of progressive American writers, and they’d forgotten to arrange a female speaker for the opening night. This was typical of the various communist productions she’d appeared at; they wanted her for her profile more than for her opinions. In 1935, she was, in the words of biographer Elinor Langer, “a leading lady” of the country’s radical left. That was partly due to her own work and reputation, and partly because her estranged husband, John Herrmann, had shifted his focus from literature to communist organizing.
 
As the fascist threat in Europe, and Joseph Stalin’s wary eye on it, prompted a new mood of broad leftist cooperation—often heralded as a “popular front”—Herbst’s political connections were bringing her to larger audiences. Yet she hated the “smuggies” of the left’s “New York political elite,” who went around giving stirring speeches to strikers on lives they knew nothing about. “Don’t get me wrong,” she would write years later, when such things were dangerous to admit, “I went as far left as you can go,” but she never counted herself among those she called “the Faithful” (and there’s no evidence that she ever actually joined the Communist Party). Perhaps her skepticism showed: A sketch of the conference speakers has the 43-year-old grim-faced beneath a wide, unlovely hat.



 
But one thing that did convince her was the fascist threat in Europe, and her mind quickly turned to the next subject for her foreign reporting. She had lived in Berlin briefly in the 1920s, ashamed of the affluence her American dollars brought her in the inflation-stricken city, and she knew that much had changed in the hungry, unsettled capital she had known.
 
Since Adolf Hitler had come to power in Germany in 1933, voices of domestic opposition had been falling ominously silent. By 1935, the National Socialist German Workers’ Party was the only party allowed by law; Dachau, the Nazis’ first concentration camp for political prisoners, was already two years old. The Nuremberg Laws would be instituted that September, stripping German Jews of basic rights. It was said that the Nazis had wiped out their opponents entirely, and if there was no one standing up to Hitler at home, there seemed to be little appetite for confronting him internationally, either. Herbst negotiated an assignment from the New York Post and headed for Berlin.
 
Berlin was a risk. It could be dangerous to go there, and there was no guarantee she’d find anything to report. Exiles had furnished her with contacts, but these came with warnings attached: People might have disappeared, or her drawing attention could cause them to.
 
In Germany, it was summertime, and everything was now as neat and orderly as the world had been led to believe. Yet Herbst sensed “a changed and sick country,” a smothered one. Describing attributes that supposedly give dictatorships their appeal, she also confronted the costs at which they are achieved. “On the surface, things appear cheerful,” she reported. “Boys bicycle on country roads. Who sees a concentration camp? Yet silence is over the very countryside. … Talk does not bubble up anymore.”
 
Fear stalked her in Berlin, just as it had done in Cuba and would, for a time, in Spain, where she traveled the following year to witness the country being bombed by German and Italian planes during its civil war. The courage it took to find these stories came not from the absence of fear but the unceasing struggle with it. From Germany, she sent a letter to her old friend Katherine Anne Porter, knowing it was risky to write too freely, trying to psych herself into courage: “Everything very quiet, muzzled in fact, but no more of that until I see you again. I felt dreadfully depressed at first, did even this morning with a kind of horror of being alone that goes to the very bone. I’m not sure I can pull off the business here and am not going to be frightened if I don’t. I am not going to be terrified of failing for the moment.”
 




Herbst had gone to Germany intending to lay her ear to the ground and listen for the sound of resistance; eventually, at a whisper, she heard it. She set up secret meetings and was told about suppressed strikes and workers who defiantly attended the funerals of murdered comrades; she began to pick up jokes that expressed discontent with the regime and learned of opposition leaflets cascading from waterspouts into the street with the rain. She managed to uncover a hidden reality of opposition to the Nazis—not from the conservative aristocrats who would be commemorated for their belated intervention against Hitler, but from housewives on buses, industrial workers, brave leaflet circulators and slogan painters. She wrote a report that ran over five consecutive days on the New York Post front page, called “Behind the Swastika.” Long before many others realized the danger, she urged her readers to look behind the facade and question the image the dictatorship wanted the world to see, producing an outsider’s portrait of Germany under the Nazis that now stands as a warning against the dismantling of democracy.
 
Disillusionment, poverty and the hostilities of the McCarthy era would later do much to silence Herbst, but to the end of her life in 1969, she remained proud of her work before World War II. In 1942, she was removed from her job on the German desk of the war propaganda agency in Washington. Two investigators took her through a long list of accusations. (She was cleared of wrongdoing but never got her job back.) “There were a good many of these charges, linked to the events of the ’30s and the role I had played in connection with each,” she would later recall, “and given them in bulk, I was impressed by the record.”
 
Adapted from Tomorrow Perhaps the Future: Writers, Outsiders and the Spanish Civil War by Sarah Watling. Published by Knopf, 2023.
 
How Josephine Herbst, ‘Leading Lady’ of the Left, Chronicled the Rise of Fascism. By Sarah Watling. Smithsonian Magazine, May 8, 2023.  



 

There is a photograph taken by Gerda Taro in August 1936 that shows a woman kneeling on the sand of a beach outside Barcelona, holding a handgun. She is leaning forward, aiming directly out of the square frame of the shot, the barrel of the gun in a line with her mouth. The overalls she is wearing are baggy and a little rumpled, but the lines and angles her form creates are bold. The photo is taken from low down – I imagine Taro lying flat on the sand, facing her subject from the side – so that small stones by the woman’s bent leg stand out more sharply than the buildings smudged into the distance. The overcast sky and its gathering clouds, gives the picture a momentous feeling.
 
The photograph was first published in the French magazine Vu and it represents something of what felt, to contemporary observers, most revolutionary and most worth fighting for in the embattled Spanish Republic. Only a few weeks before it was taken, a group of military generals had attempted a coup to overthrow Spain’s elected government. Sufficient forces rallied to the defence of the government to prevent the coup from succeeding immediately, despite the fact that the rebels soon had substantial support from Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy. Instead, a civil war erupted, unleashing, in Catalonia, a simultaneous social revolution – one of the features of which was new liberties for women. The woman aiming a gun on the beach was a recruit for the militias being formed to defend the Republic. For the rest of the world, this was something shocking – something newsworthy – which is no doubt why Taro chose to capture the scene on her first wartime visit to Spain.
 
Taro was an antifascist and a refugee from Nazi Germany; the Republican cause mattered to her on a personal level. I think the subject of this picture would have excited her too. She was far from the only female press person to travel to Spain to cover the war (among photographers, the Hungarian-born Kati Horna springs to mind) and some of them – Taro perhaps most of all – took enormous risks to cover the conflict. One of the notable characteristics of the Spanish Civil War was the new way in which it was covered: technological advances gave photojournalists smaller, lighter cameras that could get them closer to the frontlines. Taro took the beachfront photo using a Rolleiflex with film that could be changed quickly and that focused quickly; she later switched to a Leica.

 
A photograph taken by Robert Capa in 1936 gives us a glimpse of the conditions. Capa and Taro had met in Paris, where they had both gone into exile, and soon lived and worked together. (It was in Paris that they put aside their birthnames of Gerta Pohorylle and Endre Friedmann for the new professional identities of Capa and Taro.) Capa’s photograph shows that not all of Taro’s pictures were taken from the safety of training sessions. This is an action shot. It shows Taro taking cover on the Cordoba front, crouching behind a Republican soldier. She looks up, eyes wide with anticipation – perhaps even fear – alert for danger overhead, her throat bared to the camera like an expression of her vulnerability. It’s all the more haunting when you know what followed: her mortal injury the following year, as she covered the chaotic Republican retreat from Brunete. She is thought to be the first female war photographer to have died in the field.
 
The romanticism of Taro’s picture of the militiawoman is, to me, powerful, but also troubling. War is not beautiful, yet the photograph is. There is something unseemly about viewing, for example, Taro’s photographs of refugees in Almería in a gallery setting – in admiring the excellence of the composition. This was never Taro’s intention. She saw herself as a journalist rather than an artist, calling on France, Britain and the United States to recognise what was being done to Spanish people by Franco and his allies, and to protest against it.
 
Taro’s reputation diminished after the war, at least partly because she was overshadowed by Capa’s fame, but a number of discoveries in recent years have helped to revise the picture. Taro’s biographer Irme Schaber has done much to illuminate the facts of her life, and when collections of Capa and Taro’s negatives from Spain emerged in the 2000s, many photographs that had been previously attributed to Capa were found to have been taken by Taro, helping to secure her reputation as one of the most interesting photographers to cover the conflict. The pictures she took in Spain chronicle moments of exhilarating possibility and of appalling tragedy – which also makes them a fitting chronicle of Taro’s life.
 
Tomorrow Perhaps the Future: Following Writers and Rebels in the Spanish Civil War by Sarah Watling will be published by Jonathan Cape in February.
 
The unflinching gaze of Gerda Taro. By Sarah Watland. Apollo Magazine, January 26, 2023. 






The most famous chroniclers of the Spanish Civil War may have been male writers such as George Orwell and Ernest Hemingway. But a new book reveals the contributions made by a band of brave and brilliant women. These include everyone from the maverick poet and activist Nancy Cunard to journalist Martha Gellhorn and the young Jewish photographer Gerda Taro.
 
Guest: Sarah Watling - journalist and author of of ‘Tomorrow Perhaps The Future: Following Writers and Rebels in the Spanish Civil War’ (Penguin)
 
Women writers and rebels in the Spanish Civil War.  Credits:  Sarah Dingle, Presenter; Julie Street, Producer
 
Australian Broadcasting Corporation, May 18, 2023.





‘We English,’ the prime minister Stanley Baldwin allegedly remarked following the outbreak of the Spanish Civil War in July 1936, ‘hate fascism, but we loathe bolshevism as much. So if there is somewhere where fascists and bolsheviks can kill each other off, so much the better.’
 
Initially, many in Britain probably agreed with Baldwin, seeing no reason to be drawn into another country’s civil war. But a sizeable minority thought very differently, believing that the conflict was not just a civil war but part of an ongoing struggle between democracy and fascism. To them, Spain became a rallying cry, and over the course of the war many thousands from around the world volunteered to join it. Most fought in the communist-controlled International Brigades, but others went to report on the conflict as part of ‘fact-finding missions’, or simply to show their support for the Spanish government’s cause.
 
The experiences of a number of these visitors, witnesses and reporters are described in Tomorrow Perhaps the Future (the title taken from W.H. Auden’s poem ‘Spain’), by Sarah Watling, the author of Noble Savages, the prize-winning biography of the bohemian Olivier sisters. Its characters are not the familiar ones of Auden, Ernest Hemingway, John Dos Passos and George Orwell. Instead, Watling’s study marks her determination to write women into the history books.
 
This is not to say, of course, that women have been invisible in the literature of the Spanish Civil War, particularly not this celebrity cohort, which includes the heiress to the Cunard shipping empire, the daughter of a baron, and a number of prominent writers. Nevertheless, as Virginia Woolf (one of the book’s subjects) remarked, war is generally a male affair, and women’s roles often get downplayed or glossed over. Watling points out that the German photojournalist Gerda Taro and the American war correspondent Martha Gellhorn were for many years overshadowed by Robert Capa and Hemingway, their more famous partners; and I suspect that few are aware that the first British volunteer to be killed in Spain was Felicia Browne, a sculptor from Slade School of Art.
 
Like almost all of those who went to Spain in the 1930s, the women portrayed in this book ‘had a choice not to involve themselves, and decided otherwise’. While Woolf’s inclination was to ‘fight intellectually’ (she tried unsuccessfully to dissuade her nephew Julian Bell from volunteering), others became more emotionally and practically immersed in the Spanish Republic’s struggle. They included Gellhorn, every bit as determined a supporter of the cause as Hemingway. Just as strong-minded was the eccentric Nancy Cunard, who, like Gellhorn, personally witnessed the war’s appalling realities. She frantically tried to spur others into feeling the same outrage, sending out an infamous questionnaire to 200 writers, demanding that they take sides. The overwhelming majority did, even if Orwell, scarred by his experiences of fighting in Spain and irritated by what he saw as Cunard’s simplistic, presumptuous questions, responded: ‘Will you please stop sending me this bloody rubbish.’
 
Given Orwell’s outrage over the partisan nature of the foreign media’s coverage of the war, it’s not surprising that many believed strongly that no one could really understand what was happening in Spain if they hadn’t been there. Watling quotes Josephine Herbst, an American novelist turned campaigning left-wing journalist, who explained: ‘I didn’t even want to go to Spain. I had to. Because.’ The radical lesbian and devout communist Sylvia Townsend Warner felt the same way, attending a congress of writers in Republican Spain alongside her partner Valentine Ackland. The couple discovered in revolutionary Barcelona the liberty to live their lives together in a way denied them at home.
 
Yet if going to Spain allowed some women freedoms and opportunities formerly forbidden them, it also presented familiar problems. There was not only a constant risk of unwelcome sexual attention, but also the fact that ‘closed doors could be found in the most open male minds’. The British communist Nan Green followed her husband George to the war, having reluctantly taken the heart-rending decision to leave their two children behind. Her sacrifice was rewarded by a vicious campaign against her by one of the most senior British communists in Spain, who falsely accused her of Trotskyism. Similarly depressing is the account of Salaria Kea, ‘the only female African-American nurse to volunteer in Spain’. The prejudice she suffered before, during and after her time there was shocking – though, as Watling dryly notes, ‘probably not very shocking to a black woman living in 1930s America’.
 
These are interesting and colourful characters, and Watling seems to have chosen them because they were all outsiders – individuals who ‘resisted in some way the lives they had been offered’ (though this could be said about most who volunteered.) She readily admits to ‘a weakness for people with an instinct for rebellion’; but while her portrayals are sympathetic, they are not uncritical.
 
She has researched her subjects carefully, and this is a serious, scholarly work, which also brings her group of writers, poets and activists vividly to life. As she explains: ‘I wanted to know what it had meant to take a side, and how it had been done, and I wanted to know what writing had to do with it.’ Many – and not just writers – will feel that these are questions well worth asking.
 
The women who rallied to the Republican cause in Spain.  By Richard Baxell. The Spectator, February 25, 2023. 





‘Me, I am going to Spain with the boys,’ Martha Gellhorn famously told a friend in 1937 as she boarded a ship sailing from New York to France. ‘I don’t know who the boys are, but I am going with them.’ She knew perfectly well with whom she was going: Ernest Hemingway, who was on the point of abandoning his second wife for her. They were off to cover the Spanish Civil War, where Franco’s Nationalists were making steady gains against the army of the legitimate republic. But it is the women, not the boys, about whom Sarah Watling writes here: the reporters, photographers and authors for whom the Spanish conflict became, in the later words of the American novelist Josephine Herbst, the most important event ‘in the life of the world’, a ghastly, menacing foreshadowing of the war to come.
 
Along with Herbst, fresh from writing about Batista in Cuba, and Gellhorn, now twenty-eight and the author of a much-praised book about the Depression, The Trouble I’ve Seen, there was Nancy Cunard, the daughter of an American heiress and an English peer; thin-lipped, with a small head, cropped hair and outlandish clothes, she went to Spain as correspondent for the Associated Negro Press. There were also a 22-year-old black American nurse, Salaria Kea, who had been working in a hospital in Harlem and fighting her own battles with racism; the bestselling novelist Sylvia Townsend Warner, ‘quick, dark and lean; bespectacled and frizzy of hair’, a lesbian and a communist with a ‘flair for heckling’, who travelled with her partner, Valentine; and Nan Green, who had run a second-hand bookshop in the Caledonian Market in London and whose husband was serving as an ambulance driver. And, in this war in which the picture was as important as the word, with magazines on both sides of the Atlantic giving considerable space to illustrations, there was the tiny – barely five foot – photographer Gerda Taro, who looked like a boy and had red-blonde hair. Taro, who had spent time in a prison in Leipzig for distributing anti-Nazi leaflets, travelled to Spain as the companion of the more famous Robert Capa. All of them, Watling writes, ‘saw history coming and went out to meet it’.
 
What drew Watling to these women was that they chose not to be dispassionate but to take sides, rejecting what Gellhorn dismissed as ‘all this objectivity shit’ in their support for the Republicans. Only Virginia Cowles, a secondary character here, whose book Looking for Trouble is one of the best memoirs of war reporting ever written, tried to cover both sides, which made her universally suspect. The rest of them filed stories and pictures about horrors and atrocities perpetrated by the Nationalists, of which there were many, and turned a blind eye to the cruelty of the Republicans, whose deep divisions (and many acronyms) left them confused. All extolled participation, along with the need to take note of and not run from what was happening in Spain.
 
In 1937, Cunard, who believed passionately in the power of the arts, sent a message to over two hundred well-known writers with a question: were they for or against the legal Republican government of Spain? Their answers, published as a pamphlet, Authors Take Sides on the Spanish War, were as positive as she had expected: only five of the 148 whose responses were printed declared themselves against it. ‘Every man to his battle,’ she wrote. ‘This is yours.’
 
Another of Watling’s characters is Virginia Woolf, not long back from driving with her pet marmoset through Germany, where she had become caught up in a deeply alarming rally welcoming Hermann Göring. Woolf did not go to Spain but thought about it obsessively. She filled her notebooks with clippings relating to the war, while mourning her nephew Julian Bell, killed driving an ambulance for the Republicans, and railing against the brutal, masculine culture that had nurtured war.
 
The women Watling has chosen to describe were brave. They made heroic efforts to get themselves to the front and sent back anguished reports of refugees strafed by Nazi bombers, small children killed as they played in the streets and liberated prisons where they had discovered evidence of torture. Herbst had trouble finding a niche for herself among the cliquish foreign reporters who gathered around Hemingway in the Hotel Florida in Madrid, where celebrities were revered and animosities simmered. When she finally reached the front line she found the earth often ‘streaked with the slime of dead things’. The intrepid, reckless Taro was killed when a tank collided with the car to which she was clinging. She was a remarkable photographer, though her true talent did not come to light until the 1990s, when a cache of her negatives was discovered.
 
Group biographies are notoriously hard to write. But Watling knits together with considerable skill the details of her characters’ lives and adventures in Spain, bringing them alongside each other in set pieces, then following them individually as they move through the war, file their stories, leave and return. She also intersperses her narrative with perceptive commentary. Each of these women, as she shows, battled with her own demons. Gellhorn fretted about getting old and not being able to write; Nan Green struggled with the loss of her husband, killed on the last day of the war; the extraordinary Cunard constantly feared that she might not be able to ‘tell the truth’ and wondered how to raise money for the defeated Republicans, many of whom crossed over the border into an unwelcoming France and later died in concentration camps.
 
Each of these women, too, in her own way, was sustained by a desire, in the words of Gellhorn, to make ‘an angry sound against injustice’. As Josephine Herbst would write, with wry hindsight, ‘People cared. It was a decade when people believed in the possibility of their own powers.’

Welcome to the Hotel Florida. By Caroline Moorehead. Literary Review, February 2023. 





 
Nigel Townson’s history of modern Spain begins with disaster – or, more specifically, with the Disaster. When an ignominious defeat in the 1898 Spanish-American war lost the country its last major colonies, a crisis of confidence followed, and the ‘Generation of 1898’ set about trying to diagnose Spain’s problem. Since the scope of Townson’s book runs from that year to ‘the present’ (roughly the spring of 2022), there are plenty of crises to cover.
 
Spain has been unfortunate in its governments. The Penguin History of Modern Spain is a chronicle of ineffectiveness and corruption at the highest levels, and of failures to implement reform. As such, it sometimes reads like a history of missed opportunities. The monarchical Restoration regime proved unable to rise to the challenges of the years after 1898 and was overthrown by General Miguel Primo de Rivera’s coup of 1923, returning the army to its position of ‘political protagonism’.
 
Authoritarianism gave way to the Second Republic and a ‘wave of euphoria’ in 1931 (sending Alfonso XIII into exile), only for those great hopes to degenerate into civil war five years later. Decades of the repressive Franco regime followed the Republic’s defeat in 1939, ending only with the dictator’s death in 1975. Even the triumphant return of democracy has been marked by economic turmoil, political scandal and violence (the rise of ETA is covered in detail).
 
But as Townson, who teaches at Complutense University of Madrid, is at pains to point out, this hardly sets Spain apart from the rest of Europe. Violence, political chaos, corruption and economic suffering may have been features of the country’s 20th century, but they were not uniquely Spanish. Townson diagnoses a widespread tendency to view the country as an anomaly within Europe. As he puts it: ‘Spaniards’ long-standing sense of failure was the product not only of comparisons with other nations but also of an awareness of the way in which foreigners viewed them.’ He takes foreign historians to task for their obsession with the Spanish Civil War (this reviewer may be implicated as the author of a recent book about people obsessed with it), and aims to provide instead a synthesis of the ground breaking work done by Spanish historians since Francoist censorship came to an end – much of which has yet to be translated into English. These historians are, it seems, less burdened by a conviction of national failure.
 
If, chapter after chapter, the point begins to feel somewhat laboured, treating Spain ‘in relation to the much broader reality of Europe’ is illuminating. A comparison of the country’s economy with that of other southern European nations reveals ‘the narrative of economic failure’ to be a myth. Setting the arrival of the Second Republic within the context of a Europe in which most of the new republics of the 1920s had already been ‘swept aside by a tsunami of right-wing authoritarianism’ is a useful reminder of just how vast the challenges facing it were both at home and abroad.
 
Indeed, Townson’s placing of Spain’s history in a wider setting exposes the fact that all too often when we talk about ‘Europe’, what we mean are France, Germany and Great Britain. (At other times, as when comparing the ‘far greater autonomy of the Spanish Church’ under Franco to its counterparts in the communist dictatorships of Eastern Europe, a divergence that is hardly surprising, the comparison feels less relevant.) Townson bludgeons the narrative that ‘Spain is different’ – as the 1960s tourist campaigns put it – so relentlessly that occasionally one feels an urge to whisper, asa mother to a child in a school competition: ‘but you are special!’
 
The book offers a detailed survey of political, economic and social history, illuminating many of the trends, tensions and power players that have influenced the course of Spain’s modern era. The Catholic Church, Catalan and Basque nationalism, a legacy of clientelism, an endlessly fractured left and frequently embattled middle ground, and the peaks and troughs of working-class activism all receive space. Townson’s attention to economic, political and structural developments means that he sacrifices some of the pleasures of narrative and character: there are too few individual portraits and little scene-setting. This can result in sudden leaps: Primo de Rivera, for instance, who ruled Spain between 1923 and 1930, is gone in a sentence. It’s clear why he was forced to resign, but readers might be interested to know what actually happened.
 
On the other hand, Townson has made an effort to look for Spanish women – easily disregarded in a patriarchal society – and finds them in observers, protestors and historical actors. He describes, for example, the women in Madrid in 1917 who blocked the city’s tram tracks with telegraph poles (and, where necessary, their own children) during a strike, without, according to a bewildered police agent, ‘letting a single man join their groups’; and the efforts of the nationalist Sección Femenina during the Civil War. He does not assume that the effects of any given phenomenon on Spanish men is the same as their effects on Spanish society, but broadens the picture (if only by sex) on numerous occasions.
 
Any vestiges of romance lingering over the Spanish Civil War are stripped away. Townson emphasises the Republican government’s failure ‘to uphold law and order or to govern in a democratic manner’ prior to the Nationalist coup (though the generals attacking it could hardly be seen as democracy’s saviours). Franco’s regime did not merely undo the progressive reforms the Republic had accomplished, thus returning the country to the 1920s, but represented ‘a political rupture that was far deeper than that of Primo de Rivera’ in its assault on ‘Spain’s constitutional, parliamentary and electoral traditions’ (not to mention its suppression of civil society itself).
 
Even so, Townson argues, rather than taking Spain out of step with Europe, this was more a kind of catching up with all the other lost democracies of the late 1930s. By the time the Allied victory in the second world war did make the Francoist repression (and Axis connections) look incompatible with the prevailing mood in western Europe, the Cold War allowed for Franco’s rebranding as a friendly fellow anti-communist, and for a corresponding ‘global integration’ for Spain, crowned by its entry to the UN in 1955. 
 
Even where Spain has been seen as a positive model for the world (as with its swift and relatively peaceful transition to the present democracy), Townson’s conclusion that it ‘fits well into the pattern of European democratisation’ may read a little deflatingly for what most would consider a remarkable achievement – though he is willing to admit that Spain’s transition was ‘sui generis’. In fact, the oversimplified view of an uneven and imperilled process as one of straightforward success, he implies, underplays the victory of Spaniards in preserving a democracy that they had overwhelmingly wanted.
 
The book’s conclusion is perhaps inevitably sombre, covering the 2008 recession, corruption scandals, 2017’s ‘far-reaching crisis’ in Catalonia, and Covid, not to mention a newly ‘fragmented political landscape’, from which both Podemos and Vox have emerged. That said, there have also been moments when Spaniards have, once again, provided a model of political engagement for outsiders. The ‘15-M’ youth protests of 2011 tapped into a disillusionment and outrage that was widespread internationally; their initiative of occupying sites in major cities was seized upon elsewhere, most famously in the Occupy Wall Street movement.
 
The ‘new era of hung parliaments and coalition governments’ may be alarming to anyone with an eye on history – Townson points out that Podemos and the PSOE’s coalition government, formed after the November 2019 election, is the first in Spain since the 1930s – but the country’s hard-won democracy is on firmer ground than it has ever been. Townson’s boast for Spain is that it is now a lot ‘like all other European democracies’ – which may not be a dazzling accolade, but is a success surely worth a little conformity.
 
The Penguin History of Modern Spain: 1898 to the Present/ Nigel Townson. Allen Lane, pp. 400, £30
 
The Spanish Civil War still dominates our perception of modern Spain. By Sarah Watling. The Spectator, April 8, 2023. 



















20/09/2023

Naomi Klein on The Mirror World

 




This past July, Merriam-Webster announced on X, the platform formerly known as Twitter, that “‘doppelgänger’ is currently one of our top lookups.”
 
The doppelgänger — defined by Merriam-Webster as a “person who resembles someone else, or a ghostly counterpart of a living person” — is suddenly unavoidable. Social media platforms are crowded with videos of that moment when a pair of uncanny look-alikes come face-to-face at a friend’s wedding or in a Las Vegas swimming pool or on a plane. A Taylor Swift doppelgänger has collected 1.6 million followers on TikTok, and the real Ms. Swift performs multiple alter-ego versions of herself in the “Anti-Hero” video. Rachel Weisz doubles herself in the remake of “Dead Ringers,” and Netflix’s latest season of “Black Mirror" begins with an episode wherein computer-generated versions of celebrities impersonate ordinary people.
 
There has even been a burst of doppelgänger-on-doppelgänger violence. Last year, a woman in Germany was accused of murdering her glamorous beauty-blogger look-alike with the aim of using the body to fake her own death. And in February, a Russian-born New Yorker was convicted of attempted murder: She had fed poisoned cheesecake to her doppelgänger in hopes of stealing her identity.
 
Though doppelgängers reliably elicit feelings of vertigo, I find the sudden prevalence of doubles oddly comforting. For years I struggled privately with a problem I considered rather niche: being perennially confused and conflated with another writer and outspoken political analyst named Naomi, Naomi Wolf, even though I bear only a passing resemblance to her. (And I would see the same thing happening to her.) Once best known for best-selling feminist books like “The Beauty Myth” and for a controversial role advising Al Gore’s presidential run, Ms. Wolf has more recently distinguished herself as an industrial-scale disseminator of vaccine-related medical misinformation, as well as a fixture on pro-Trump shows like the one hosted daily by Steve Bannon.
 
I sometimes wondered what I had done to deserve my doppelgänger woes. With popular culture feeling increasingly like a house of mirrors with duplicated and simulated and similar selves endlessly contorted, many more of us may soon be dealing with versions of doppelgänger confusion. What role is this proliferation of doubles, twins and clones playing? Doppelgängers, which combine the German words “doppel” (double) and “gänger” (goer), are often regarded as warnings or omens.
 
In an attempt to better understand the warnings carried by my doppelgänger experience, I spent many evenings immersing myself in the rich repertory of doppelgänger films. One that proved particularly helpful was Jordan Peele’s “Us.” This 2019 horror film imagines a society much like our own, only sitting on top of a shadowy underworld, inhabited by warped doubles of everyone living aboveground. Every move above is mirrored below in darkness and misery. Until the underground doppelgängers get tired of the arrangement and wreak havoc.
 
Who are these underground people? one terrified character asks.
 
“We’re Americans,” comes the gut punch of an answer.
 
The film has been interpreted as an allegory for capitalism’s entanglements with racial and other forms of oppression, with the comforts of the few requiring the exploitation of a shadow world. That understanding landed particularly hard during the pandemic, when I watched the film. Those of us who were part of the lockdown class were able to shelter in place because we were being served by essential workers, many of whom did not have the ability to call in sick. Doubles often play this role, offering viewers and readers uncomfortable ways into their own story. By showing us a character facing her doppelgänger, we are exposed to parts of ourselves we can least bear to see, but at a slight angle and through a warped mirror.
 
Perhaps that’s why representations of doubles seem to surge during moments of extreme violence and change. The first major piece of theoretical work on the subject was an essay, titled “Der Doppelgänger,” by the Austrian psychoanalyst Otto Rank, then a protégé of Sigmund Freud. Postulating that doppelgängers were tools to express sublimated desires and terrors, it was written in 1914, just as World War I began. In a reissue of the essay in 1971, Rank’s translator, Harry Tucker Jr., wondered, “Is there some relationship between extensive disruptions of society, with their concomitant unsettling effects upon the individual, and the interest of the literate public in descriptions of doubles imaginatively portrayed?”
 
Certainly, the rise of Nazism and the atrocities of the Holocaust inspired another such wave, as artists deployed doubles to grapple with the transformation of previously liberal and open societies. Children into soldiers. Colleagues into killers. Neighbors into mobs. As if a switch had been flipped. It’s the intimacy and familiarity of these transformations that are so ominous — and what is more intimate and familiar than a person’s double?
 
We are, once again, at a historical juncture where our physical and political worlds are changing too quickly and too consequentially for our minds to easily comprehend. This is why I decided to start regarding my own doppelgänger as a narrow aperture through which to look at forces I consider dangerous and that can be hard to confront directly.
 
Rather than worry about people thinking that she and I were one and the same, I got interested in the ways she seems to have become a doppelgänger of her former self. Because I have been getting confused with Ms. Wolf for close to a decade and half, I knew that she had been dabbling in conspiracy culture for years. (I would periodically get harangued online for positions she had taken.)
 
Before the pandemic, her underlying values seemed somewhat stable: feminism, sexual freedom, democracy, basic liberalism. Then, rather suddenly, they appeared less so. In a matter of months, I watched her go from questioning masks in schools to questioning election results alongside Mr. Bannon. Next she was engaging in Jan. 6 revisionism, condoning the Supreme Court’s assault on abortion rights, posting about her firearms and also warning that “war is being waged upon us.”
 
This is a phenomenon far larger than Ms. Wolf, of course. A great many of us have witnessed it in people we know, once respected and even still love. We tell one another that they have disappeared down the rabbit hole, lost to conspiratorial fantasies, embracing apocalyptic language, seemingly unreachable by affection or reason.
 
These changes are redrawing political maps, shifting parts of the traditional liberal and New Age left over to the hard right. Trucker convoys in Canada in January 2022. A conspiracy-fueled coup attempt in Germany at the end of that year. The war my doppelgänger keeps warning about in the United States.
 
Which brings me to the form of doppelgänger that preoccupies me most: the fascist clown state that is the ever-present twin of liberal Western democracies, perpetually threatening to engulf us in its fires of selective belonging and ferocious despising. The figure of the doppelgänger has been used for centuries to warn us of shadow versions of our collective selves, of these monstrous possible futures.
 
Have our doppelgängers overtaken us? Not yet, not all of us, anyway. But the pandemic, layered on top of so many other long-repressed emergencies, has taken humanity somewhere we have not been before, a place close but different, a kind of doppelgänger world. This is what accounts for the strangeness so many of us have been trying to name — everything so familiar and yet more than a little off. Uncanny people, upside-down politics, even, as artificial intelligence accelerates, a growing difficulty discerning who and what is real.
 
That feeling of disorientation — of not understanding whom we can trust and what to believe — that we tell one another about? Of friends and loved ones seeming like strangers? It’s because our world has changed but, as if we’re having a collective case of jet lag, most of us are still attuned to the rhythms and habits of the place and selves we left behind. It’s past time to find our bearings.
 
Doppelgängers, by showing us the supremacist values and violent behaviors that pose the greatest threats to our societies, can spur us to more stable ground.
 
 
To Know Yourself, Consider Your Doppelgänger. By Naomi Klein. The New York Times, September 13, 2023. 








For years the writer laughed off being mistaken for fellow author Naomi Wolf. Then her ‘double’ drifted into a world of conspiracy theories and became a favoured guest of Steve Bannon and Tucker Carlson. With the US standing on a political precipice, suddenly the stakes were a lot higher.
 
In my defence, it was never my intent to write about it. I did not have time. No one asked me to. And several people strongly cautioned against it. Not now – not with the literal and figurative fires roiling our planet. And certainly not about this.
 
Other Naomi – that is how I refer to her now. This person with whom I have been chronically confused for over a decade. My big-haired doppelganger. A person whom so many others appear to find indistinguishable from me. A person who does many extreme things that cause strangers to chastise me or thank me or express their pity for me.
 
I am referring, of course, to Naomi Wolf. In the 1990s, she was a standard-bearer for “third wave” feminism, then a leading adviser to US vice-president Al Gore. Today, she is a full-time, industrial-scale disseminator of unproven conspiracy theories on everything from Islamic State beheadings to vaccines. And the worst part of the confusion is that I can see why people get their Naomis mixed up. We both write big-idea books (my No Logo, her Beauty Myth; my Shock Doctrine, her End of America; my This Changes Everything, her Vagina). We both have brown hair that sometimes goes blond from over-highlighting (hers is longer and more voluminous than mine). We’re both Jewish.
 
There are too many instances and varieties of identity confusion to summarize here. Like the time I offended a famous Australian author by failing to remember our prior encounter at a Christmas party hosted by our shared publisher (it was Wolf’s publisher, not mine, and I had been to no such party). Or the time Jordan Peterson slammed me on his podcast for allegedly writing The Beauty Myth (to be fair, he also slams me for things I have written). Or the guy who tweeted that I had been losing my mind for years and now equated having to get a Covid vaccine with Jews in Nazi Germany having to wear yellow stars – linking, of course, to a statement by Wolf saying that very thing.
 
There was even a moment, while reading an article in the Guardian about her being arrested at a protest in New York, when I experienced the unmistakable chill of the doppelganger, an uncanny feeling Sigmund Freud described as “that species of the frightening that goes back to what was once well known and had long been familiar”.
 
“Her partner, the film producer Avram Ludwig, was also arrested.”
 
I read the sentence to my partner, the film director and producer Avram Lewis (who goes by Avi).
 
“What the actual fuck?” he asked.
 
 
“I know,” I said. “It’s like a goddamned conspiracy.”
 
Then we both burst out laughing.
 
Most confusingly, my doppelganger and I once had distinct writerly lanes (hers being women’s bodies, sexuality, and leadership; mine being corporate assaults on democracy and the climate crisis). But over a decade ago, she started talking and writing about power grabs under cover of states of emergency – and the once-sharp yellow line that divided those lanes began to go wobbly.
 
By early 2021, when she was casting nearly every public health measure marshalled to control the Covid pandemic as a covert plan by the Chinese Communist party, the World Economic Forum and Anthony Fauci to usher in a sinister new world order, I began to feel as if I was reading a parody of The Shock Doctrine, one with all facts and evidence carefully removed, and coming to cartoonishly broad conclusions I would never support. And all the while, my doppelganger troubles deepened, in part because I was relatively quiet in this period, isolated in my Canadian home and unable to perform so many of the activities that once reinforced my own public identity.
 
In those lonely months, I would wander online to try to find some simulation of the friendships and communities I missed, and find, instead, The Confusion. The denunciations and excommunication (“I can’t believe I used to respect Naomi Klein. WTF has happened to her??”). The glib expressions of sympathy (“The real victim in all this here is Naomi Klein” and “Thoughts and prayers to Naomi Klein”). It was an out-of-body experience: if she, according to this torrent of people, was me, who, then, was I?
 
All of this may help explain why I made the admittedly odd decision to follow my doppelganger into the rabbit hole of her rabbit holes, chasing after any insight into her strange behaviour and that of her newfound allies that I could divine. I recognize that this decision is somewhat out of character. After all, for a quarter of a century, I have been a person who writes about corporate power and its ravages. I sneak into abusive factories in faraway countries and across borders to military occupations; I report in the aftermath of oil spills and category 5 hurricanes. And yet in the months and years during the pandemic – a time when cemeteries ran out of space, and billionaires blasted themselves into outer space – everything else that I had to write or might have written appeared only as an unwanted intrusion, a rude interruption.



 
In June 2021, as this research began to truly spiral out of my control, a strange new weather event dubbed a “heat dome” descended on the southern coast of British Columbia, the part of Canada where I now live with my family. The thick air felt like a snarling, invasive entity with malevolent intent. More than 600 people died, most of them elderly; an estimated 10bn marine creatures were cooked alive on our shores; an entire town went up in flames. An editor asked if I, as someone engaged in the climate change fight for 15 years, would file a report about what it was like to live through this unprecedented climate event.
 
“I’m working on something else,” I told him, the stench of death filling my nostrils.
 
“Can I ask what?”
 
“You cannot.”
 
 
There were plenty of other important things I neglected during this time of feverish subterfuge. That summer, I allowed my nine-year-old to spend so many hours watching a gory nature series called Animal Fight Club that he began to ram me at my desk “like a great white shark”. I did not spend nearly enough time with my octogenarian parents, who live a mere half-hour’s drive away, despite their statistical vulnerability to the deadly pandemic that was rampaging across the globe and despite that lethal heat dome. In the fall, my husband ran for office in a national election; though I did go on a few campaign trips, I know I could have done more.
 
My deepest shame rests with the unspeakable number of podcasts I mainlined, the sheer volume of hours lost that I will never get back listening to her and her fellow travelers who are now in open warfare against objective reality. A master’s degree’s worth of hours. I told myself it was “research”. That this was not, in fact, an epically frivolous and narcissistic waste of my compressed writing time or of the compressed time on the clock of our fast-warming planet. I rationalised that Other Naomi, as one of the most effective creators and disseminators of misinformation and disinformation about many of our most urgent crises, and as someone who has seemingly helped inspire large numbers to take to the streets in rebellion against an almost wholly hallucinated “tyranny”, is at the nexus of several forces that, while ridiculous in the extreme, are nonetheless important, since the confusion they sow and the oxygen they absorb increasingly stand in the way of pretty much anything helpful or healthful that humans might, at some point, decide to accomplish together.
 
For most of the first decade of my doppelganger trouble, I didn’t bother much with correcting the record. I told myself that getting confused with Naomi Wolf was primarily a social media thing. My friends and colleagues knew who I was, and when I interacted with people I didn’t know in the physical world, her name did not used to come up; neither were we entangled in articles or book reviews. I therefore filed away Naomi confusion in the category of “things that happen on the internet that are not quite real”.
 
Back then, I saw the problem as more structural than personal. A handful of young men had got unfathomably rich designing tech platforms that, in the name of “connection”, not only allowed us to eavesdrop on conversations between strangers but also actively encouraged us to seek out those exchanges that mentioned us by name (AKA our “mentions”). When I first joined Twitter back in 2010, and clicked on the little bell icon signifying my “mentions”, my initial thought was: I am reading the graffiti written about me on an infinitely scrolling restroom wall.
 
As a frequently graffitied-about girl in high school, this felt both familiar and deeply harrowing. I instantly knew that Twitter was going to be bad for me – and yet, like so many of us, I could not stop looking. So perhaps if there is a message I should have taken from the destabilising appearance of my doppelganger, this is it: once and for all, stop eavesdropping on strangers talking about you in this crowded and filthy global toilet known as social media.
 
I might have heeded the message, too. If Covid hadn’t intervened, and upped the stakes of the confusion on pretty much every front.
 
 
 
“Really?” Avi asked. It was 11 o’clock on a warm night in early June 2021 and he had walked in on me doing yoga before bed, a nightly practice to help with back pain. When he arrived, I was in pigeon pose, breathing into a deep and challenging hip release. And, yes, OK, I was also listening to Steve Bannon’s daily podcast, War Room. Life had been hectic lately, with the end of the school year and Avi’s campaign for federal office heating up, so when else was I supposed to catch up on Other Naomi’s flurry of appearances?
 
A couple of months earlier, Wolf had released a video claiming that those vaccine-verification apps so many of us downloaded represented a plot to institute “slavery for ever”. The apps would usher in a “CCP-style social credit score system” in “the West”, she said – a reference to China’s all-pervasive surveillance net that allows Beijing to rank citizens for their perceived virtue and obedience, a chilling hierarchy that can determine everything from access to schools to eligibility for loans, and is one piece of a broader surveillance dragnet that pinpoints the location of dissidents for arrest and ruthlessly censors speech that casts the ruling party in a critical light. The “vaccine passports” were like all that, Wolf warned, a system that “enslaves a billion people”. The apps would listen into our conversations, track where and with whom we gathered, tell on us to the authorities. This, according to my doppelganger, is what Joe Biden was about to bring to the United States, using Covid as the cover story.
 
Having these incendiary claims come from a once-prominent Democrat was irresistible to the rightwing media. Suddenly she was everywhere: Fox’s (now canceled) Tucker Carlson Tonight, along with other shows on the network, as well as Bannon’s War Room and many lesser-known platforms. All of this activity meant that keeping up with my doppelganger was an increasingly time-consuming undertaking, thus the need to multitask while doing yoga.
 
 
My obsession had opened a growing gulf between Avi and me. And not just between us – it was intensifying my already deep pandemic isolation, cutting me off further from other friends and family. No one I know listened to War Room, and I felt increasingly that it was impossible to understand the new shape of politics without listening to it. Still, it had gone pretty far: for days, I had been unable to get the show’s rabidly anti-communist theme song out of my head (“Spread the word all through Hong Kong / We will fight till they’re all gone / We rejoice when there’s no more / Let’s take down the CCP”).
 
After the Bannon-yoga incident, I pledged to give it a rest, to put this least charming of pandemic hobbies aside. It seemed like the right time to reassess anyway. Twitter had just suspended Naomi Wolf’s account, seemingly permanently. I wasn’t comfortable with this kind of heavy-handed corporate censorship, but I told myself that Wolf losing her main tool of continuous disinformation surely meant that she wouldn’t be able to get herself (and me) into nearly so much trouble.
 
“I’ll block Twitter,” I told Avi. I promised to spend the whole summer not only helping more with the campaign but also focusing on our son and the rest of our woefully neglected family.
 
Here is how my relapse happened, and I’m not going to sugarcoat it. During a vacation in Prince Edward Island, the back pain had gotten worse, and I decided to seek professional help. I set off midmorning, under clear skies on a virtually empty two-lane road banked by sand dunes, red cliffs and crashing Atlantic waves. As I drove, I realized I was something I had barely been in 16 months: alone. Alone and surrounded by natural beauty. Elation flooded my body, down to the tips of my fingers clasping the steering wheel.
 
In that perfect moment, I could have listened to anything. I could have rolled down the windows and filled my ears with the surf and the gulls. I could have blasted Joni Mitchell’s Blue, which I had recently rediscovered thanks to Brandi Carlile’s cover. But I didn’t do any of that.
 
Instead, I touched the purple podcast app, pulled up War Room, and read the capsule summary of the most recent episode. It was a speech by Donald Trump, recorded live, in which he announced that he was suing the big tech companies for deplatforming him, followed by reaction from …
 
What? Why her?
 
I scrolled down and saw that I had missed several other recent appearances while abiding by my no-Wolf diet. I gulped them all, one after another. And that’s how I ended up on the side of the road, with my hazards on, late for a much-needed treatment, on my first vacation in two years, scribbling in a tiny red notebook as I tried to transcribe the words coming through my phone’s speaker: “black shirts and brown shirts”, “Fauci demonic”, “petrifying”, “your body belongs to the state”, “like China’s one-child policy and forced sterilization”, “geotracking”, “evil x2”.
 
In my meager defense, Wolf’s elevated status on Bannon’s podcast marked a major development in the life of my doppelganger. It’s one thing to be invited on to a flagship show of the Trumpian right to freestyle about vaccine passports or to trash Joe Biden – any semi-prominent self-described Democrat would be welcome to pull that stunt. It’s quite another to be the person whom Steve Bannon goes to for exclusive reaction to one of the first post-White House speeches by Donald Trump – a man whom the vast majority of Bannon’s listeners are utterly convinced is the rightful president of the United States (and whom Wolf had referred to, in her earlier life, as “a horrible human being, an awful person”). It’s not just that it sells books and subscriptions to her website. It signals real power – the ability to reach and potentially influence the behavior of millions of people.
 
“Action! Action! Action!” That is War Room’s mantra. Bannon repeats it often. It appears on a plaque behind his head when he broadcasts. He sends it with the pieces of content he pushes out on Gettr (“the Twitter killer”) and in his newsletter.
 
He means it. Unlike Fox News, which, despite its obvious bias, still has the trappings of cable news, War Room has built an explicitly activist media platform – or, more precisely, a militarist one. Rather than television’s airbrushed talking heads, Bannon cultivates a feeling that his audience is part of a rolling meeting between a commander and his busy field generals, each one reporting back from their various fronts: the Big Steal strategy (challenging the results of the 2020 election); the precinct strategy (putting ideological foot soldiers in place at the local level to prevent the next election from being “stolen”); the school board strategy (challenging the “woke” curriculum as well as masks and vaccine policies).
 
If Naomi Wolf was Bannon’s go-to guest not just to rail against vaccine mandates but now to live-spin Trump’s speeches, that meant she had crossed an entirely new threshold, becoming a full-blown player in this world. Shortly after, Wolf would go so far as to join Trump’s class-action lawsuit against Twitter as a co-plaintiff, challenging her own ousting from the platform (though she still claimed to “profoundly” disagree with Trump “ideologically”). It was there, on the side of that road, that I became convinced that whatever was happening with her wasn’t just relevant to me because of my admittedly niche doppelganger problem – it was far more serious than that. If someone like her could be shifting alliances so radically, it seemed worth trying to figure out what was driving that transformation – especially because, by then, it was also clear that quite a few prominent liberals and leftists were making a similar lurch to the hard right.
 
Even after following Wolf’s antics for years, or rather, after having them follow me, I was taken aback by the decisiveness of this boundary crossing. How did she – a Jewish feminist who wrote a book warning how easily fascism can throttle open societies – rationalize this alliance with Trump and Bannon? How, for that matter, did Bannon – a proud anti-abortion Catholic who was once charged with domestic assault and whose ex-wife told a court that he didn’t want their daughters “going to school with Jews” – rationalize teaming up with Wolf? (Bannon pleaded not guilty to the domestic assault charges, which were dismissed after his wife did not show up in court, and he denies the remark about Jews.)
 
Wolf was not merely a regular guest on Bannon’s War Room; she was fast becoming one of its most recognisable characters. At the peak of their collaboration, even as she ran her own DailyClout website, Wolf would appear on War Room nearly every single weekday for two weeks. They even partnered up on co-branded “Daily-Clout War Room Pfizer investigations” into various vaccine rabbit holes. Clearly, neither was letting past principles stand in the way of this union.
 
What I was trying to figure out was this: what does this unlikeliest of buddy movies say about the ways that Covid has redrawn political maps in country after country, blurring left/right lines and provoking previously apolitical cohorts to take to the streets? What did it have to do with the “freedom fighters” who were now threatening workers at restaurants that checked for proof of vaccination? Or blocking ambulances outside hospitals that required their staff to get vaccinated? Or refusing to believe the results of any elections that didn’t go their way?
 
Or denying evidence of Russian war crimes? Or, or, or …
 
The reshaping of politics that is one of Covid’s primary legacies is far bigger than Wolf and Bannon, of course. The hallucinatory period when the pandemic melded with economic upheavals and climate disasters accelerated all manner of strange-bedfellow coalitions, manifesting in large protests first against lockdowns and then against any sensible health measure that would have helped make the lockdowns unnecessary.
 
These formations bring together many disparate political and cultural strains: the traditional right; the QAnon conspiratorial hard right; alternative health subcultures usually associated with the green left; a smattering of neo-Nazis; parents (mainly white mothers) angry about a range of things happening and not happening in schools (masks, jabs, all-gender bathrooms, anti-racist books); small-business owners enraged by the often devastating impacts of Covid controls on their bottom lines. Significant disagreement exists inside these new convergences – Wolf, for instance, is neither a QAnon cultist nor a neo-Nazi. Yet, galvanised by large-platform misinformers like her and Bannon, most seem to agree that the pandemic was a plot by Davos elites to push a re-engineered society under the banner of the “Great Reset”.
 
If the claims are coming from the far right, the covert plan is for a green/socialist/no-borders/Soros/forced-vaccine dictatorship, while the new agers warn of a big pharma/GMO/biometric-implant/5G/robot-dog/forced-vaccine dictatorship. With the exception of the Covid-related refresh, the conspiracies that are part of this political convergence are not new – most have been around for decades, and some are ancient blood libels. What’s new is the force of the magnetic pull with which they are finding one another, self-assembling into what the Vice reporter Anna Merlan has termed a “conspiracy singularity”.




 
In Germany, the movement often describes its politics as Querdenken – which means lateral, diagonal, or outside-the-box thinking – and it has forged worrying alliances between new age health obsessives, who are opposed to putting anything impure into their carefully tended bodies, and several neofascist parties, which took up the anti-vaccination battle cry as part of a Covid-era resistance to “hygiene dictatorship”.
 
Inspired by the term, but taking it beyond Germany, William Callison and Quinn Slobodian, both scholars of European politics, describe these emergent political alliances as “diagonalism”. They explain: “Born in part from transformations in technology and communication, diagonalists tend to contest conventional monikers of left and right (while generally arcing toward far-right beliefs), to express ambivalence if not cynicism toward parliamentary politics, and to blend convictions about holism and even spirituality with a dogged discourse of individual liberties. At the extreme end, diagonal movements share a conviction that all power is conspiracy.”
 
Despite claims of post-partisanship, it is rightwing, often far-right, political parties around the world that have managed to absorb the unruly passions and energy of diagonalism, folding its Covid-era grievances into pre-existing projects opposing “wokeness” and drumming up fears of migrant “invasions”, alien abductions, as well as “climate lockdowns”. Still, it is important for these movements to present themselves as (and to believe themselves to be) ruptures with politics-as-usual; to claim to be something new, beyond traditional left/right poles. Which is why having a few prominent self-identified progressives and/or liberals involved is so critical.
 
When Wolf first started appearing on rightwing media outlets in 2021, her posture was reticent, anything but defiant. She talked about having voted for Biden, stressed that she used to write for the New York Times and the Guardian and appear on MSNBC, described herself as a liberal “media darling”. But now, she said, rightwing shows like Tucker Carlson’s and Steve Bannon’s were the only ones courageous enough to give her a platform.
 
For their part, every time a fiery rightwing show had Wolf on as a guest, the host would indulge in a protracted, ornate windup listing all of her liberal credentials, and professing shock that they could possibly find themselves on the same side. “I never thought I would be talking to you except in a debate format,” Carlson said the first time he had Wolf on. Then, referring to a tweet in which Wolf said that she regretted voting for Joe Biden, he added, “I was struck by the bravery it must have taken you to write it – I’m sure you lost friends over it, and for doing this [show].” Wolf smiled wistfully and nodded, accepting the hero’s welcome.
 
When she appeared on the podcast hosted by one of Britain’s most vocal climate change deniers and far-right provocateurs, James Delingpole, he began by saying, “This is so unlikely … five years ago, the idea that you and I would be breaking bread … I sort of bracketed you with the other Naomi – you know, Naomi Klein, Naomi Wolf, what’s the difference?” (Insert silent scream from me.) He went on: “And now, here we are. I mean, I think we are allies in a much, much bigger war. And you’ve been fighting a really good fight, so congratulations.” Once again, she drank it in, playing her demure role on these awkward political first dates.
 
As time went on, and Wolf became more of a fixture, she seemed to relish her new persona, eagerly playing the part of the coastal liberal elite that rightwing populists love to hate. The first time she went on his show, she told Bannon, “I spent years thinking you were the devil, no disrespect. Now I’m so happy to have you in the trenches along with other people across the political spectrum fighting for freedom … We have to drop those labels immediately in order to come together to fight for our constitution and our freedoms.”
 
That is the key message we are meant to take away from diagonalist politics: the very fact that these unlikely alliances are even occurring, that the people involved are willing to unite in common purpose despite their past differences, is meant to act as proof that their cause is both urgent and necessary. How else could Wolf rationalize teaming up with Bannon who, along with Trump, normalized a political discourse that dehumanized migrants as monstrous others – rapists, gang members and disease carriers? This is also why Wolf leans so heavily and continuously on extreme historical analogies – comparing Covid health measures to Nazi rule, to apartheid, to Jim Crow, to slavery. This kind of rhetorical escalation is required to rationalize her new alliances. If you are fighting “slavery for ever” or a modern-day Hitler, everything – including the companion you find yourself in bed with – is a minor detail.
 
 
 
People ask me variations on this question often: What drove her over the edge? What made her lose it so thoroughly? They want a diagnosis but I, unlike her, am uncomfortable playing doctor. I could offer a kind of equation for leftists and liberals crossing over to the neofascist and authoritarian right that goes something like: narcissism (grandiosity) + social media addiction + midlife crisis ÷ public shaming = rightwing meltdown. And there would be some truth to that bit of math.
 
The more I learn about her recent activities, however, the less I am able to accept the premise of these questions. They imply that when she went over the edge, she crashed to the ground. A more accurate description is that Wolf marched over the edge and was promptly caught in the arms of millions of people who agree with every one of her extraordinary theories without question, and who appear to adore her. So, while she clearly has lost what I may define as “it”, she has found a great deal more – she has found a whole new world, one I have come to think of as the Mirror World.
 
Feminists of my mother’s generation find Wolf’s willingness to align herself with the people waging war on women’s freedom mystifying. And on one level it is. As recently as 2019, Wolf described her ill-fated book Outrages as “a cautionary tale about what happens when the secular state gets the power to enter your bedroom”. Now she is in league with the people who stacked the US supreme court with wannabe theocrats whose actions are forcing preteens to carry babies against their will. Yet on another level, her actions – however sincere they may be – are a perfect distillation of the values of the attention economy, which have trained so many of us to assess our worth using crude, volume-based matrixes. How many followers? How many likes? Retweets? Shares? Views? Did it trend? These do not measure whether something is right or wrong, good or bad, but simply how much volume, how much traffic, it generates in the ether. And if volume is the name of the game, ex-leftist crossover stars who find new levels of celebrity on the right aren’t lost – they are found.
 
Wolf’s skills as a researcher may be dubious, but she is good at the internet. She packages her ideas in listicles for the clickbait age like her 2020 video “Fascist America, in 10 Easy Steps” and her event “Liberate Our Five Freedoms”. Her website, DailyClout, demonstrates Wolf’s success in mastering the art of internet monetization: not only collecting attention but turning that attention into money. She takes advertising; sells swag festooned with a stylized wolf logo (“The power is in the pack”); and charges $7 a month for a “premium” membership and $24.99 a month for a “pro” one.
 
Seen in this context, the name Wolf chose for her site is telling. Because what Wolf turned into over the past decade is something very specific to our time: a clout chaser. Clout is the values-free currency of the always-online age – both a substitute for hard cash as well as a conduit to it. Clout is a calculus not of what you do, but of how much bulk you-ness there is in the world. You get clout by playing the victim. You get clout by victimizing others. This is something that is understood by the left and the right. If influence sways, clout squats, taking up space for its own sake.
 
And if there is a pattern to the many, many conspiracies Wolf has floated in recent years – about National Security Agency whistleblower Edward Snowden, about the 2014 Ebola outbreak, about the arrest of former International Monetary Fund managing director Dominique Strauss-Kahn, about the results of the 2014 Scottish referendum on independence, about the Green New Deal – it is simply this: they were about subjects that were dominating the news and generating heat at the time.
 
And nothing had ever been nearly so hot, so potentially clout-rich, as Covid-19. We all know why. It was global. It was synchronous. We were digitally connected, talking about the same thing for weeks, months, years, and on the same global platforms. As Steven W Thrasher writes in The Viral Underclass, Covid-19 marked “the first viral pandemic also to be experienced via viral stories on social media”, creating “a kind of squared virality”.
 
In practice, this squared virality meant that if you put out the right kind of pandemic-themed content – flagged with the right mix-and-match of keywords and hashtags (“Great Reset”, “WEF”, “Bill Gates”, “Fascism”, “Fauci”, “Pfizer”) and headlined with tabloid-style teasers (“The Leaders Colluding to Make Us Powerless”, “What They Don’t Want You to Know About”, “Shocking Details Revealed”, “Bill Gates Said WHAT?!?”) – you could catch a digital magic-carpet ride that would make all previous experiences of virality seem leaden in comparison.
 
This is a twist on the disaster capitalism I have tracked in the midst of earlier large-scale societal shocks. In the past, I have written about the private companies that descend to profit off the desperate needs and fears in the aftermath of hurricanes and wars, selling men with guns and reconstruction services at a high premium. That is old-school disaster capitalism picking our pockets, and it is still alive and thriving, taking aim at public schools and national health systems as the pandemic raged. But something new is also afoot: disaster capitalism mining our attention, at a time when attention is arguably our culture’s most valuable commodity. Conspiracies have always swirled in times of crisis – but never before have they been a booming industry in their own right.

 

 

 
Almost everyone I talk to these days seems to be losing people to the Mirror World and its web of conspiracies. It’s as if those people live in a funhouse of distorted reflections and disorienting reversals. People who were familiar have somehow become alien, like a doppelganger of themselves, leaving us with that unsettled, uncanny feeling. The big misinformation players may be chasing clout, but plenty of people believe their terrifying stories. Clearly, conspiracy culture is fueled by deep and unmet needs – for community, for innocence, for inside knowledge, for answers that appear, however deceptively, to explain a world gone wild.
 
“I can’t talk to my sister any more.” “My mother has gone down the rabbit hole.” “I am trying to figure out how to get my grandmother off Facebook.” “He used to be my hero. Now every conversation ends in a screaming match.”
 
What happened to them?
 
When looking at the Mirror World, it can seem obvious that millions of people have given themselves over to fantasy, to make-believe, to playacting. The trickier thing, the uncanny thing, really, is that’s what they see when they look at us. They say we live in a “clown world”, are stuck in “the matrix” of “groupthink”, are suffering from a form of collective hysteria called “mass formation psychosis” (a made-up term). The point is that on either side of the reflective glass, we are not having disagreements about differing interpretations of reality – we are having disagreements about who is in reality and who is in a simulation.
 
For instance, in July 2022, Wolf went on a rightwing podcast carried by something called Today’s News Talk and shared what she described as her “latest thinking”. She had noticed that when she went into New York City, where the vast majority of the population has been vaccinated, the people felt … different. In fact, it was as if they were not people at all.
 
 “You can’t pick up human energy in the same way, like the energy field is just almost not there, it’s like people are holograms … It’s like a city of ghosts now, you’re there, you see them, but you can’t feel them.”
 
And she had noticed something even more bizarre: “People [who are vaccinated] have no scent any more. You can’t smell them. I’m not saying like, they don’t smell bad or they don’t smell – like I’m not talking about deodorant. I’m saying they don’t smell like there’s a human being in the room, and they don’t feel like there’s a human being in the room.”
 
This, she explained to the host, was all due to the “lipid nanoparticles” in the mRNA vaccines, since they “go into the brain, they go into the heart, and they kind of gum it up”. Perhaps even the “wavelength which is love” was experiencing this “gumming up … dialing down its ability to transmit”. She concluded, “That’s how these lipid nanoparticles work.”
 
That is not how lipid nanoparticles work. It is not how vaccines work. It is not how anything works. Also, and I can’t quite believe I am typing these words, vaccinated people still smell like humans.
 
This, obviously, is gonzo stuff, the kind of thing that makes those of us outside the Mirror World feel smug and superior. But here is the trouble: many of Wolf’s words, however untethered from reality, tap into something true. Because there is a lifelessness and anomie to modern cities, and it did deepen during the pandemic – there is a way in which many of us feel we are indeed becoming less alive, less present, lonelier. It’s not the vaccine that has done this; it’s the stress and the speed and the screens and the anxieties that are all byproducts of capitalism in its necro-techno phase. But if one side is calling this fine and normal and the other is calling it “inhuman”, it should not be surprising that the latter holds some powerful allure.
 
In my doppelganger studies, I have learned that there is a real medical syndrome called Capgras delusion. Those who suffer from it become convinced that people in their lives – spouses, children, friends – have been replaced by replicas or doppelgangers. According to the film historian Paul Meehan, the discovery of the syndrome likely inspired sci-fi classics like Invasion of the Body Snatchers and The Stepford Wives. But what is it called when a society divides into two warring factions, both of which are convinced that the other has been replaced by doppelgangers?
 
Is there a syndrome for that? Is there a solution?
 
To return to the original question: what is Wolf getting out of her alliance with Bannon and from her new life in the Mirror World? Everything. She is getting everything she once had and lost – attention, respect, money, power. Just through a warped mirror. In Milton’s Paradise Lost, Lucifer, a fallen angel, thought it “Better to reign in hell than serve in heaven”. My doppelganger may well still think Bannon is the devil, but perhaps she thinks it’s better to serve by his side than to keep getting mocked in a place that sells itself as heavenly but that we all know is plenty hellish in its own right.
 
 This is an edited extract from Doppelganger: A Trip into the Mirror World by Naomi Klein, published by Allen Lane on 12 September at £25.


Naomi Klein on following her ‘doppelganger’ down the conspiracy rabbit hole – and why millions of people have entered an alternative political reality.  By Naomi Klein. The Guardian, August 26, 2023.










In my defense, it was never my intent to write this book.”
 
So begins Naomi Klein’s Doppelganger: A Trip Into the Mirror World. It all began when Klein, the liberal activist and blockbuster writer behind bestsellers like The Shock Doctrine and This Changes Everything, became regularly mistaken for Naomi Wolf, the liberal feminist author of The Beauty Myth turned conspiracy theorist and anti-vaxxer. The similarities between Klein and “Other Naomi” seemed uncanny: “We both write big-idea books,” Klein writes, and “have brown hair that sometimes goes blond from over-highlighting.” At times, the overlap is stranger than fiction: for instance, both women are married to men named Avram. Amid a decade of defending her own reputation against Wolf’s escalating conservatism, Klein tail-spinned into obsession, tracking Wolf’s right-wing media appearances in a quest to understand her “flight from reality.” But the book’s outlook is far broader than Klein’s own doppelgänger trouble. “The book is not about my doppelgänger; my doppelgänger is just the white rabbit leading me down the rabbit hole,” she tells Esquire. It's very much about what I find down there, who else I find down there, and what it says about us.”
 
Klein’s doppelgänger trouble opens outward onto a roving survey of how doubling organizes our social and political lives. The concept of the doppelgänger, she insists, can help us understand our uncanny political moment, where “millions of people have given themselves over to fantasy.” Klein’s analysis includes a new taxonomy of useful coinages, like “the Mirror World,” the manic surreality inhabited by far-right movements, and “the Shadow Lands,” where our unseen doubles perform brutal labor in factories and fields to provide the conveniences we take for granted, like “our Amazon deliveries” and “our year-round fruit.” Doppelgänger is a lucid frame on conspiracy movements and digital doubling, but also a powerful implication of the double lives we choose to ignore. “What we’re not willing to look at is our own complicity in systems that are intimately connected with the genocides of the past, that are contributing our little bit of poison to the extinctions of the present and the future,” Klein tells Esquire.
 
Klein Zoomed with Esquire from her home in British Columbia to discuss double trouble in American politics, the surrealist nightmare of life online, and the importance of building "uncomfortable coalitions." This conversation has been edited for length and clarity.
 
ESQUIRE: What was the moment when your doppelgänger trouble began to suggest a broader political framework?
 
NAOMI KLEIN: I think when it started to manifest where I live. During the pandemic, I moved to a remote community—it’s three hours from the nearest city, including a ferry boat ride. It's called the Sunshine Coast, British Columbia. It's beautiful here, but it was always a place where I went to hide. I wrote The Shock Doctrine and other books here. When I moved here, I I had been lightly following what was going on with my doppelgänger—much of it not by choice, but because my social media feed would fill with blowback whenever she would do things. Then I started to see more examples of it in this small rural community where I live. There was the largest protest I've ever seen here on the coast: a “medical freedom” protest outside the hospital, opposing vaccine mandates for hospital staff. I also started to see signs and graffiti. I thought, “If it’s showing up even here, then it's worth examining, and it's bigger than me.” The book is not about my doppelgänger; my doppelgänger is just the white rabbit leading me down the rabbit hole. It's very much about what I find down there, who else I find down there, and what it says about us.
 
 
E: You write that doppelgängers have been understood as “warnings or harbingers” that suggest “something important is being ignored or denied—a part of ourselves and our world we do not want to see.” What are we hiding from?
 
NK : When I say “we,” I mean people who consider ourselves “not them,” and by “them,” I mean conspiracy theorists and MAGA people who seem to have taken flight from reality voluntarily. We spend a lot of time feeling smug that we aren’t “like them” and defining ourselves against them in a way that’s quite flattering. Doppelgänger literature shows that we may think we're confronting our doppelgänger, but in the end, we’re always confronting ourselves. What we’re not willing to look at is our own complicity in systems that are intimately connected with the genocides of the past, that are contributing our little bit of poison to the extinctions of the present and the future, that rely on Shadow Lands for our conveniences, our Amazon deliveries, our year-round fruit. Whatever it is, there is no them. We are in it. We are a part of it.
 
By projecting all of our worst selves onto others, we avoid looking at our own complicity. I'm not about making people feel bad about that—I'm about asking, “What do we do about it? How do we build a world that does not require these kinds of violences?” There are moments when it felt like that might be possible. Think about the racial justice uprising after the murder of George Floyd, or the huge numbers of people who participated in the climate strikes in 2019 before the pandemic. There are moments when it feels like we want to do better, but because we haven't figured out how to sustain those movements and turn them into material policies that improve people's lives, the need for distraction and projection remains.
 
E: At this point, many people have written off Steve Bannon as a fringe character, but you see him as someone with huge influence. Why do you see him as such a powerful figure?




 
NK : Underestimating Steve Bannon's influence is pretty much always a mistake. In general, I think there's an impulse to dismiss people who aren't present in mainstream liberal culture as basically of no importance. A lot of people responded to my doppelgänger that way—there was a lot of attention on her in the early pandemic because she was spreading misinformation, but once she was de-platformed, the attitude was basically like she'd been deleted from planet Earth. Because I was following where she was going, I was struck that she had a much larger following than she’d had in years. There’s a flattering comfort in pretending that we have the power to deny these people attention and therefore influence, but actually, their worlds are real. There are real people there, and they can change the real world that we all inhabit—as we saw with Trump's election. But we've also seen strange new political formations in Italy with the election of Giorgia Meloni, another of these diagonal characters who combines parts of our new age with authoritarianism. There was also an attempted coup in Germany, which had conspiratorial elements to it. So these movements have real world impacts.
 
Bannon has a huge following. I’ve talked to so many people who say, “I can't talk to my sister anymore.” Their uncle, their aunt—so many of us have people like this in their lives, who we don't understand where they're getting their ideas from. Chances are, it's from one of these podcasts that are being dismissed as not important. Bannon broadcasts every single day—some of his shows are three hours long. These are intimate relationships. He really gets in people's heads in a way that maybe traditional media doesn't.
 
E : How does your theory of the mirror world help us understand this moral panic about “cancel culture”? As you say, mainstream liberal culture considers people like Bannon and your doppelgänger “cancelled” or “deleted.” But as you point out in the book, “These people don't just disappear because we can no longer see them. They go somewhere else.”
 
NK : I don't use the term cancel culture because I think it's just become one of those terms that's not particularly useful. I'm really just talking about something simpler, which is that we should treat each other with more generosity. I talk about the mirror world being separated by one-way glass in the sense that we don't see them, but they're looking at us. Bannon is studying us very closely, including the issues that used to be traditional issues of the left, like opposition to free trade deals, consolidating corporate power, and opposition to Big Pharma and Big Tech. He’s seeing that mainstream liberalism isn’t offering much on these issues, so he's taking up these issues—not because he believes in it or cares about it, but because he sees that they are potent issues, in the same way he understood in 2016 that free trade was an issue that could bring a bunch of traditional democratic voters over to the MAGA side.
 
The other thing he notices when he looks at us is that a lot of people get discarded. A lot of people get excluded. He does this show of performative inclusion, saying, “We believe in debate.” Obviously these are the same people banning books. They don't believe in debate; they don't believe in free speech. But there's an overperformance of it as a way to exploit a real feeling that a lot of people have: that they're afraid of making a mistake, and there’s no leeway for screwing up. This is related to the way I write about the cost of personal branding. We create these online avatars or personal brands, which are sort of us, but not us. The problem with performing being a thing on a platform where countless other people are performing themselves as things is that we actually start to believe we aren't real, and that other people aren’t real. And if we aren't real, then all kinds of cruelties are possible.
 
E : You write that “many of us have begun to suspect that we are machine food,” as our private actions are “enclosed” and “extracted” by Big Tech. You warn how our digital selves are a kind of doppelgänger, partitioned off from the complete truth of who we are. Do you see any signs that people are waking up to these truths and pushing for change?
 
NK : I am seeing signs. My experience of teaching people in their twenties is that those people who have come to stand in for their generation are not representative of their whole generation. A lot of young people are very troubled, even the ones who are very online, by what this performed self is doing, and this idea of not knowing what’s performed and what’s real. This is anecdotal, but a lot of the young people who I talk to and who I teach have a very ambivalent relationship with the partitioning of the self required to be a good brand.
 



We're never going to not care about ourselves. I'm not calling for an annihilation of the self or the ego. I don't think that's possible or even desirable. But I do think we live in a culture where the self takes up too much space, and given the scale of the crises we are up against and the fact that we will only have a hope of doing anything about it if we can band together and organize ourselves into political constituencies, the labor of perfecting, optimizing, and performing the self really does rob necessary hours in the day when we might be doing things with other people.
 
E : As I was reading the chapter about our digital selves and our personal brands, I lamented that the book was completed before this current AI panic really gripped the culture, because it seems so germane to the topics at hand. Is there a doppelgänger lens on AI?
 
NK : Oh, absolutely. In the book, I write about the digital golems created with our data. There's the double self we consciously create, but then there's the self that the tech companies create by hoovering up our data trails and creating doubles that then target market to us. This also creates the possibility for AI doubles. AI is a mirroring and mimicry machine that seems to be creating something new, but all it can do is mirror ourselves back to us. I certainly have friends who are visual artists and musicians who have had that absolutely chilling, uncanny feeling of seeing doppelgänger versions of themselves that they did not create, that others created, that were trained on their art, who they now they have to compete with in order to make a living as an artist. It’s one thing to have to compete with other people, but it's quite another thing to have to compete with a counterfeit copy of yourself, whipped up by someone else. We can have a debate about whether or not art should be commerce, but we live under capitalism, and this is really a frightening state of affairs. I believe it’s a form of theft. I don't see why a private for-profit company should be allowed to train their algorithms on the work, the words, and the images of people, without their consent, then sell the tools to people who are going to use them to cut costs.
 
It very much relates to the drivers of conspiracy culture. We have malevolent actors like Bannon who want people not to believe what is right in front of them, because it's very helpful to the Donald Trumps of the world if people don't believe anything said about him is true. If you're going to break a whole bunch of laws, that’s pretty helpful. That’s why conspiracy culture supports elite actors, even though the people spreading these theories position themselves as anti-elite. When you introduce AI into this mix, it's not going to be helpful when it comes to sorting fact from fiction and trying to get ourselves to a shared reality. That’s the precondition for doing anything to combat the serious and very real things happening in the world today, including climate change.
 
 
E : The book arrives at an argument that to make systemic change, we have to work together and battle systems of uncare to build new systems of care. How do we start to think collectively and build these coalitions, especially the “uncomfortable coalitions,” as you call them? What does that look like in practice?
 
NK : Part of the cost of social media is that it doesn't create many coalitions. There's a lot of talk and there are a lot of takes, but there aren’t many spaces where there's strategic thinking about long-term strategy and goals. But there are attempts to create more of those spaces, like the work of Keeanga-Yamahtta Taylor, who started this new online journal called Hammer & Hope, which is a space to think critically about coalition work from a Black perspective. It very clearly looks at identity politics as a position from which to enter into struggle that recognizes that our positions are not the same—that we come to coalition with very different experiences and very different levels of risk. That’s not a reason not to be in coalition, but it informs how we see the world, which is the original meaning of the term identity politics from the Combahee River Collective.
 
I think we need a higher threshold for disagreement and debate. We need not to see disagreement as cataclysmic. We also need to give each other a little bit more grace, which isn’t an argument for not holding each other accountable, but for more democracy within our movements. In organizing spaces, if you don't like what somebody is doing and they're in a position of seeming leadership, there has to be a way to hold them accountable other than just the callout. That’s so often not the case when there's an organization and there are a few people at the top, but they're not accountable to a base.



 
As I say in the book, most things are easier said than done, but some things are easier done than said. That’s building on the work of wonderful labor organizer and theorist named Jane McAlevey, who writes about union organizing particularly in the teaching and nursing sectors, where there’s a lot of racial diversity and status differences. When there’s a clear goal across the board, like raises or benefits, the ability to be in those uncomfortable coalitions becomes more possible. Whereas if all you’re doing is sharing opinions on social media, it isn't clear what the goal is at all. If you don’t know what the point of the whole thing is, your differences are going to take you down. But if the point is clear and the strategy is clear, then your tolerance level for difference rises, because you understand why you're tolerating it. If you don't have a goal, then why tolerate anything?
 
E : What gives you hope that we’ll make it to this caring world you want to build?
 
NK : I think it's having been around for long enough to know that history can surprise you. For example: I wrote a book about the climate crisis that came out in 2014, called This Changes Everything. It called for a truly intersectional climate movement at a time when the mainstream climate movement was not interested in connecting the dots between racial justice, gender justice, disability rights, and Indigenous rights. When I wrote that book, I could not in a million years have predicted Greta Thunberg and the rise of the Climate Strike movement. In my wildest dreams, I could not have predicted The Squad and the Sunrise Movement doing so much on a Green New Deal that every presidential candidate felt they needed to stake out a position on it.
 
So history surprises you. Things happen that were not on your bingo card, for better and worse. I'm not somebody who's hopeful all the time, but I guess I would say that I'm humble enough to know that I don't know what's coming. There will be another moment when people have just had enough, and we better be ready, because in the Mirror World, they're ready with their plans, and their plans aren’t good. But I'm hopeful because I've been surprised enough times that I believe I will be surprised again. And I believe we have to be ready to sustain that moment and turn it into real action.
 
Naomi Klein's Double Trouble. By Adrienne Westenfeld. Esquire, September 12, 2023. 




Naomi Klein, author, professor, journalist, and contributing editor at The Intercept, has ventured into the far-right “mirror world,” exploring the movements and figures promoting conspiracy theories, misinformation, and its hold on large segments of society. This week on Deconstructed, we bring you a live conversation between Ryan Grim and Klein at the George Washington University Amphitheater, organized by Politics and Prose. Klein and Grim discuss Klein’s newest book, “Doppelganger: A Trip Into the Mirror World.” They discuss the labyrinthine world of conspiracy theories and how the right has effectively sowed confusion and capitalized on issues abandoned by the left.

Naomi Klein on Conspiracy Culture and  “The Mirror World. “  Host Ryan Grim.  Deconstructed, The Intercept September 15, 2023. 






Idly googling myself some years ago, I came upon an unusually glowing reference to one of my academic papers. “Masterpiece is an overused word,” the reviewer wrote, “but this Proustian evocation is indeed a masterpiece.”

 
Something was amiss. My paper was good, but not that good. And there was nothing particularly Proustian about it either. Whatever exquisite sensibility I might possess was well hidden beneath a scholarly armour of logic, evidence and jargon.
 
Reading further resolved the puzzle. “Nicky Haslam has known everyone from Greta Garbo to Cole Porter to the Royal Family.” Curses! I had been confused with my namesake, the famous British interior designer and scourge of vulgarity, and my paper with one of his books.
 
The experience of being confused with someone else is probably universal. Names and appearances are fallible markers of personal identity, especially as populations grow and we become exposed to a dizzying multitude of other people.
 
These confusions are usually trivial and droll, but sometimes they become sinister and destabilising. The idea that we have a double, someone who treads on the toes of our uniqueness, perhaps deliberately, can create deep anxieties and resentments.
 
The two Naomis

Such is the experience of Naomi Klein, Canadian author of a string of anti-capitalist blockbusters. No Logo (1999) attacked corporate malfeasance, The Shock Doctrine (2007) catalogued the exploitation of disasters to roll out neoliberal policies, and 2019’s On Fire marked her increasing focus on the climate crisis.
 
In her new book, Doppelganger, Klein makes her experience of being confused with another high-profile author, Naomi Wolf, the stimulus for an extended meditation on the nature of doubles, mirror-worlds, and the political and personal challenges of threatened identities.
 
Along the way, Klein returns to several of the animating themes of her previous books. Capitalism is the ultimate cause of the dire societal challenges we face, she argues, and people on both sides of the political mirror – right-wing conspiracists and liberal critics alike – fail to recognise it because they are mired in individualist ways of thinking.
 
The backbone of Klein’s personal story is simple enough. “Other Naomi”, her “big-haired doppelganger”, is the American author of feminist bestseller The Beauty Myth and was once a celebrated and very public figure on the broad left. Because Wolf was older and more established than Klein, being mistaken for her initially brought a frisson of celebrity.
 
That all changed when Wolf’s writing veered away from sexual liberation and female empowerment into conspiracies about Ebola, ISIS and (most recently) the COVID pandemic, complete with fear mongering about vaccines, mask mandates and impending tyranny.
 
Her transformation – or derailment, as Klein would have it – has seen her teaming up with far-right media personalities like Steve Bannon and issuing torrents of misinformation and paranoia.
 
Appalled at being confused with Wolf, Klein developed a dogged obsession. She followed Wolf’s social media, watched in horror her televised appearances, and pursued her down the rabbit hole – or through the looking glass – of conspiracist thinking. The intensity of Klein’s anti-crush and the tenacity of her pursuit seem to have surprised her, but it delivered insights into the nature of doubles and evil twins.
 
Doppelganger as ‘shadow self’
 
Translated from the German, a doppelganger is literally a “double-goer” or “double-walker”: someone who eerily accompanies us as a kind of shadow-self. Literary doppelgangers tend to be uncanny presences, violent alter egos, wicked impersonators or tormentors who sometimes turn out to be figments of their victim’s madness.
 
To philosophers and psychoanalysts, doppelgangers illuminate the existential wobbliness that goes with having our sense of unique selfhood undermined. As Golyadkin tells his replica in Dostoevsky’s The Double, “Either you or I, but both together we cannot be!”, not long before he is carted off to an asylum while his double blows mocking farewell kisses.
 
Klein’s response to other Naomi is similarly unsettled and goes beyond merely wishing to correct the record whenever she is misidentified. Klein feels her personal brand has been diluted, while acknowledging the irony of caring about her brand, given her fierce critique of corporate branding in No Logo (1999).



 
Nearly a quarter of a century later, she argues that personal branding, amplified by the growing desire to curate a unique digital self, entrenches fixed and phony selves and stands in the way of forming alliances with others.
 
Despite admitting she cares too much about her own brand, Klein deals with Wolf’s encroachment head-on by attacking her new politics. She takes aim at the “Mirror World” that congealed around resistance to vaccine and mask mandates, a new coalition of far-right MAGA folk and far-out health and wellness influencers and new-agers, united by a concern with body purity and a fondness for overheated rhetoric.
 
 
Calling out conspiracists
 
Klein bristles at anti-vaxxers’ claims of a genocidal “hygiene dictatorship” and their appropriation of Holocaust imagery, “as if the Nazi atrocity of treating human beings as germs and treating germs as germs was in any way the same thing”.
 
She also calls out bad-faith appropriation of civil rights discourse by white conspiracists, as when Wolf refers to one of her anti-mask protests as a lunch-counter sit-in, or when vaccination requirements are described as “medical apartheid”.
 
Klein also hears less-than-faint echoes of fascism and colonial callousness in arguments the pandemic was nature doing its work of thinning out the weak and infirm – and in the blind eye turned to disproportionate death rates among people of colour.
 
Mistaken beliefs linking vaccines and autism were a prequel to this dynamic, Klein suggests. In both cases, a health initiative takes the blame for troubling events: a diagnosis commonly taken as a tragedy in a society “that is very generous with diagnoses and awfully stingy with actual help” and a major economic and social disruption. A righteous hunt for villains ensues, heightened by the primal fear of shadowy, malevolent forces.



 
What might have driven Wolf into this parallel universe where Twitter, YouTube and Instagram are replaced by the far-right social media alternatives of Gettr, Rumble and Parler? Klein offers an equation: “Narcissism (Grandiosity) + Social media addiction + Midlife crisis ÷ Public shaming = Right-wing meltdown”. (Though surely the ÷ should be an ×: shaming exacerbates rather than dampens meltdowns.)
 
Klein argues Wolf is simply chasing clout and “digital dopamine”, a chase hardly confined to one side of politics.
 
 
Blame on both sides
 
Klein’s denunciations of Wolf and her allies are full-throated, but she doesn’t see her own side as blameless. Progressives have abandoned some issues to conservatives and have been overly reactive rather than setting their own agenda. Centrists have failed to deliver action to match their fine words.
 
Citizens of developed societies have quietly denied the magnitude of our dependence on – and complicity with – global injustice.
 
What needs to happen, according to Klein, is for people to realise the true source of their problems. Conspiracy theorists are half right: they “get the facts wrong but often get the feelings right”. The feeling others are profiting from human misery and withholding the truth is justified, but the cause is not evil individuals – it’s capitalism itself.
 
Doppelganger argues that capitalist “hyper-individualism” is the root of many of our troubles, and a value held by conspiratorial rightists and liberals alike. It breeds a culture that sees all failings as personal and stands in the way of us uniting to act for the greater good.
 
The solution, Klein maintains, in a tone that becomes increasingly prophetic as the book progresses, is to think systemically about oppression and inequality, and to decentre ourselves. “There is an intimate relationship between our overinflated selves and our under-cared-for planet,” she writes.
 
Later chapters take up this challenge, in discussions of settler colonialism, antisemitism and the climate emergency.
 
 
Doubling down too much
 
Klein’s book is a compelling critique of polarising trends in American and global politics, constructed around a relatable personal narrative. Its anti-capitalist message and sometimes utopian faith in socialist solutions will not be universally embraced, of course. But Klein delivers it with a powerful and passionate voice.
 
If Doppelganger has a weak point, it is in its organising idea, which strains under the load it is made to bear. The range of meanings “doppelganger” carries is extravagant, extending far beyond the realm of troublesome namesakes and lookalikes.
 
Our self-branding online selves are “an internal sort of doppelganger”. The ideal body we aspire to is a doppelganger, and so is the data footprint our online presence leaves behind, our “digital golems”. Thinking is a form of doubling, a “dialogue between me and myself”.
 
Stereotypes create doppelgangers by projecting images onto individuals:
 
“race, ethnicity, and gender create dangerous doubles that hover over whole categories of people – Savage. Terrorist. Thief. Whore. Property.”
 
Children are doppelgangers of parents who fail to see them as autonomous beings. We have a second, doppelganger body that represents all the harms we cause others and our planet.
 
It’s not just individuals that have doppelgangers, but also societies, religions, nations and places. Pluralist society has a fascist doppelganger. Jews and Christians are each other’s doppelgangers. Israel is a doppelganger of antisemitic European nationalisms. New South Wales is the doppelganger of South Wales. Indeed, we all live in a “doppelganger culture. A culture crowded with various forms of doubling.”
 
Strangely, in all this multiplication of doubling, Klein has little to say about other pressing forms of duplication, such as artificial intelligences, deepfakes and identity theft.



 
Her use of the doppelganger concept is so fruitful, so capable of capturing any kind of similarity and difference, that it becomes almost empty. Doppelganger succeeds despite the occasionally laboured use of this metaphor, rather than because of it.
 
In the end, Klein finds some almost grudging sympathy for her doppelganger, acknowledging an act of political bravery (a 2014 stand against Palestinian civilian casualties) and recalling an early starstruck meeting. Wolf is not a double of the haunting variety – she has apparently rebuffed Klein’s invitations for a public interview – but she has left her psychic mark and the reader is the better for it.
 
Ironically, being paired in this engrossing book leaves the two Naomis more conjoined than ever, like two magnets flipped from repulsion to a strange attraction.


In Doppelganger, Naomi Klein says the world is broken: conspiracy theorists ‘get the facts wrong but often get the feelings right’. By Nick Haslam. The Conversation, September 11, 2023.