Showing posts with label religion and science. Show all posts
Showing posts with label religion and science. Show all posts

12/11/2023

Levitating Saints

  




Levitation was the last thing Teresa of Avila wanted. It drew the wrong kind of attention and embarrassed her in public. She tried to remain grounded, clinging to furniture when the weightlessness set in, and then suddenly, it stopped for good. Carlos Eire reads Teresa's autobiographic Vida and finds the 16th-century saint complaining to God about the aethrobatic miracles that he forced her to endure.
 
One of the best-known levitators of the early modern age, and one of the most unwilling, is Saint Teresa of Avila. Teresa de Ahumada y Cepeda (1515–1582) became a Carmelite nun in her teens, at the Convent of the Incarnation in her native Ávila, a walled city in Old Castile. During her twenties she was plagued by an illness no doctor could properly diagnose or cure. Brought to death’s door, literally, she was taken for dead and readied for burial but regained consciousness only a few hours before being lowered into her grave. Teresa remained paralyzed afterward for quite some time and eventually recovered, albeit slowly and painfully. A lukewarm nun for many years after returning to her convent — according to her own disparaging estimation — Teresa began to experience visions and raptures in her forties. As these intensified quickly and dramatically, she naturally came under suspicion of being either demonically influenced or a brazen fraud. At the same time, however, many around her were convinced that her experiences were genuinely divine in origin. Consequently, her superiors ordered her to write a detailed account of her life and her ecstasies, under the watchful eye of the Inquisition. That text, which came to be known as her Vida, or “autobiography”, is an attempt to convince everyone that her remarkable experiences are truly supernatural. And an essential part of the narrative is Teresa’s constant emphasis on her own humility and on the pain and embarrassment caused by the ecstasies she experienced in public, or which became public knowledge, especially those ecstasies in which she levitated.
 
Teresa’s raptures and levitations are unique for several reasons, three of which are most significant. First, no other Christian levitator has provided as full a first-person account or described and analyzed the experience in as much detail as Teresa. Second, no other levitator has complained as often and as loudly about levitating as Teresa. And third, few other levitators have brought about an end to levitations as suddenly and dramatically as Teresa. Obviously, her detailed analysis of her own levitations cannot be taken as empirical “proof ” of the reality of her levitations, but they do provide an exceptionally clear window into her perceptions, or at least into how she wanted others to understand the phenomenon. And as of yet, no other Christian levitator has ever surpassed Teresa on this account.
 
In her Vida Teresa tends to use the term “arrobamiento”, or rapture, for the experiences that take her into the heavenly realm of the divine. Sometimes, however, she also uses “arrebatamiento”, or ravishment, for such experiences or suggests that arrebatamiento is in fact a kind of arrobamiento, as she does when she says, “While I was reciting a hymn, there came to me an arrebatamiento so sudden that nearly took me out of myself: something I could not doubt, for it was so clear. This was the first time that the Lord had granted me the favor of any kind of arrobamiento.” Regardless of the term used, Teresa makes it clear that whether one levitates or not during an arrobamiento, the body is often affected intensely, even violently, primarily through sense deprivation and paralysis and a lapse into a trance-like state accompanied by physical aftereffects that linger for a while. “Let us now return to raptures [arrobamientos], and to their most common traits. I can attest that after a rapture my body often felt so light that it seemed to weigh nothing at all: and sometimes this was so overwhelming that I could hardly tell if my feet were touching the ground. For, during the entire rapture, the body remains as if dead and unable to do anything itself.” And in whichever way it was positioned when seized by the rapture, that is how the body stays: whether standing, or sitting, or with the hands open or clasped.
 



 
This state of suspended animation brings the body close to death and takes quite a toll on it. In one passage, Teresa says that during these raptures one can feel “like someone who is being strangled, with a rope around their neck, still struggling to catch a breath.” Again and again, Teresa stresses the physical dimension of her raptures, probably because it was the visibly alarming way her body behaved that drew attention to her mystical experiences. She needed to explain what others were witnessing as something inherently spiritual rather than any of the awful alternatives: demonic fits, mere fakery, mental illness, or a physical malady. Based on her own descriptions of her body’s responses to rapture, others could easily mistake such reactions — which would instantly paralyze her and leave her as rigid and insensate as a marble statue — for mere cataleptic seizures: “The hands get freezing cold and sometimes stretched out stiffly like pieces of wood, and the body stays in whatever position it is when the rapture hits, be it standing or kneeling . . . and it seems as if the soul has forgotten to animate the body.”
 
Teresa also claims that all sensory input ceases to function, as if the connection between body and soul is temporarily sundered. At the highest point of rapture, she says, “one will neither see, nor hear, nor perceive”, and this is because the soul is then so “closely united with God” that “none of the soul’s faculties are able to perceive or know what is taking place.” Even if the eyes remain open, she adds, “one neither perceives nor notices what one sees.” Elsewhere, she also highlights the effects of this near-death experience on the body, not only while the event is unfolding but also afterward: “Occasionally, I come close to losing my pulse altogether, according to those of my sisters who have sometimes found me like this . . . with my ankles disjointed, and my hands so stiff that sometimes I cannot even clasp them together. Until the next day my wrists and my body will continue to hurt, as if my joints had been torn asunder.”
 
 



Stressing the raw physicality of these experiences alongside their exalted spiritual nature — and again flummoxed by the inadequacy of human language — Teresa also dwells repeatedly on the paradoxical intertwining of pain and bliss, both bodily and spiritual. “These raptures seem like the very threshold of death”, she avers, “but the suffering they cause brings such joy with it that I do not know of anything comparable.” Consequently, she adds, these raptures are “a violent, delectable martyrdom.” Elsewhere, Teresa confesses that during those days when her arrobamientos were constant, she went about “as if stupefied” (embovada) and adds: “I did not want to see or speak with anyone, but only to hug my pain, which caused me greater bliss than can be found in the whole of creation.”
 
Discerning when Teresa is speaking of the spiritual effects of rapture rather than the physical ones is often difficult, if not impossible. But in some passages she explains that trying to resist arrobamientos takes intense physical effort, further reinforcing her claim that body and soul share in these events with equal intensity and making it abundantly clear that levitations are nearly as impossible to resist as purely spiritual raptures.
 
    “I have wanted to resist many, many times, and have put all my strength behind it, especially with raptures in public, and often also with ones in private, when I feared I was being deceived. Sometimes I could resist somewhat, at the edge of exhaustion. Afterwards I would be completely worn out, like someone who has fought against a powerful giant. At other times resisting has been impossible, and my soul has been carried away instead, and quite often my head too, along with it, without being able to stop it, and sometimes my whole body too, which has even been lifted off the ground.”
 
In other instances, Teresa explicitly refers to levitations, and what she has to say about her inability to resist these “favors”, as well as the physical trauma involved in resisting, is basically identical. “When I tried to resist these raptures”, she says, “it seemed to me that I was being lifted up by a force beneath my feet so powerful that I know nothing to which I can compare it, for it came with a much greater intensity than any other spiritual experience and I felt as if I were being torn to shreds, for it is a mighty struggle, and, when all is said and done, there is no point to it if this is the Lord’s will, for His power can never be overcome by another.”
 
 
Teresa’s stress on the irresistibility of raptures and levitations ultimately needs to be placed in the context of the power relationship between her and her confessors and superiors, as much as in the context of whatever she might have felt or thought about the power relationship between her and God. Urged to resist her raptures when they first began and blamed by her confessors for not preventing them, Teresa needed to highlight this issue of resistance in the autobiographical account she was ordered to write.  And she also needed to underscore the point that she continually begged God to refrain from showering her with arrobamientos, especially those in which she levitated in the presence of eyewitnesses who would immediately broadcast news of the wondrous miracle they had just seen. As Teresa saw it, the wider that tales of her levitations spread and the more that adulation of her intensified, the worse for her and the church as a whole. Outlining the experiences that can be expected in the penultimate stage of the mystical ascent — the sixth of the seven mansions that she charts in The Interior Castle (1577) — Teresa has this to say: “In this mansion arrobamientos occur continually without any way of avoiding them, even in public, and then the persecutions and murmurings follow, and even though the soul wants to be free from fears, she is never free of them, because so many people foist them on her, especially her confessors.”
 
Teresa’s efforts to control her levitations were much more than purely verbal or limited to prayer. According to eyewitnesses, there was a brute physicality to her resistance. Domingo Bañez, a prominent Dominican theologian who served as one of Teresa’s spiritual advisors, said he and many other people once saw Teresa levitate immediately after receiving communion and that she clung to a grille in the church, “greatly distressed”, and begged God, out loud: “Lord, for something that is as unimportant as putting an end to these favors with which you shower me, do not allow a woman as wicked as me to be mistaken for one that is good.” Others, too, would testify that they saw her clinging to the mats on the choir floor and rising up in the air with them in her hands, which she did to signal the other nuns to pull on her habit and bring her back down.




 
When all is said and done, one of the most remarkable aspects of Teresa’s levitations is her attitude toward them and how much she complained about them, not just to those around her but to God Himself. As she says in The Interior Castle, speaking of herself in the third person: “She does nothing but beg everyone to pray for her and beseech His Majesty to lead her by another road, as she is advised to do, since the road she is on is very dangerous.”15 Much like Saint Catherine of Siena, who received stigmata that were invisible, Teresa preferred to receive raptures that were hidden from others’ eyes.
 
According to her and to those around her, she suddenly stopped levitating, and her nonlevitating public raptures became much less frequent. Although she mentions this in the Vida and says that it happened when she was writing the final version of the twentieth chapter, she does not dwell on the subject. In fact, this information is easy to miss, tucked away as it is in a long rambling narrative, somewhat cautiously, almost as an aside. Chances are that Teresa did not want to press her luck, for she would not want her superiors and confessors to think that she was boasting in any way or that she was underestimating God’s omnipotence and His absolute control of her ecstasies. “I often begged the Lord not to grant me any more favors with visible external signs”, she explains, “for I was weary of having to contend with such worries and, after all, His Majesty could grant me such favors without anyone knowing it. Apparently, He, in His kindness, was inclined to hear my pleas, for up until now — even though in truth it has only been a short while — I have never again received any such favors.”
 
Yet no matter how much Saint Teresa sought to distance herself from levitation, belief in this phenomenon would only intensify among Catholics after her death, thanks in no small measure to her fame. During the seventeenth century, the beginning of the so-called Age of Reason, levitators kept popping up throughout the Catholic world, not just in Europe but also in those places where Spain, Portugal, and France had colonies. And quite a few of them walked the earth — or hovered over it — at the same time as Isaac Newton was using empiricism and inductive reasoning to come up with his law of universal gravitation. Many of these baroque aethrobats followed the paradigms established by the likes of Saint Teresa. Others, however, flew higher and more spectacularly than ever before.
 
Excerpted and adapted from They Flew: A History of the Impossible by Carlos Eire, new from Yale University Press, 2023.
 
The Reluctant Levitator: Teresa of Avila’s Humble Raptures. By Carlos M. N. Eire. The Public Domain Review, November 8, 2023. 






 
 
While strolling in the garden one day…a priest said to him, ‘Father Joseph, oh, how beautiful God has made heaven!’ Then Joseph, as if he had been called to heaven, gave a loud shriek, leapt off the ground, flew through the air, and knelt down atop an olive tree, and—as witnesses declared in his beatification inquest—that branch on which he rested waved as if a bird were perched upon it, and he remained up there about half an hour” (Paolo Agelli, Vita del Beato Giuseppe di Copertino, 1753).
 
What kind of nonsense is this? Who is this liar quoted above? Human beings can’t fly or kneel on slender tree limbs like little birds. So, how is it that in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries—the very era that gave birth to aggressive skepticism and empirical science—countless people swore that they had witnessed such events? And how is it that some of these sworn testimonies are legal records, archived alongside lawsuits and murder trials, from all sorts of people, not just illiterate peasants but also elites at the apex of the social, intellectual, and political hierarchy?
 
Reports of flying or hovering humans reached a peak at the dawn of modernity, along with reports of other phenomena also deemed impossible by many in our own day and by some doubters back then. Unlike spontaneous healing miracles, which really do occur with some frequency, levitations and bilocations are extremely rare events that are seldom taken seriously outside certain belief systems. They are but two of several physical phenomena that have been linked to mystical ecstasy in various cultures and religions around the world for thousands of years. They are also among the oddest of wonders, not just because they seem to happen infrequently but also because they appear to serve no practical purpose other than confirming the special status of the person who levitates or bilocates. In a religious context—and most accounts of levitations and bilocations have religious origins—the unseen force is usually ascribed to some higher being, but it can also be ascribed to the levitators and bilocators themselves, who are so obviously unlike most of their fellow human beings, for whom the tug of gravity within a single location is inescapable. In Christianity, that higher being could be God or the devil, and levitators could be viewed as either holy or diabolical, or, in some cases, as clever frauds. As awesome displays of raw unnatural power, the phenomena of levitation and bilocation have few equals.
 
But how is it possible to speak about something that can’t possibly happen? Acts of levitation or bilocation are “wild facts,” to use a term coined by William James over a century ago. As he defined it, a wild fact is any occurrence that has “no stall or pigeonhole” into which “the ordinary and critical mind” can fit it. The alterity of any such phenomenon is so extreme, said James, that it becomes “unclassifiable” as well as an unimaginable “paradoxical absurdity” that must be considered inherently untrue as well as impossible. Such wild facts puzzle scientists so much, he observed, that they “always prove more easy to ignore than to attend to.” James was intensely interested in psychic and mystical phenomena and greatly pained by the dismissive attitude his fellow scientists displayed toward these phenomena. Most of them, he quipped, thought that passing “from mystical to scientific speculations is like passing from lunacy to sanity.”
 
The situation James described long ago has not changed much, and in some respects has worsened for anyone who wants to take wild facts such as levitation and bilocation seriously. This leaves the historian or anyone with a critical mind in a tight spot. If wild facts are “paradoxical absurdities,” are there any facts whatsoever left to study? The answer is yes. The fact we can explore is not the act of levitation itself, the wild fact that is inaccessible to us. The fact we can deal with is the testimony. This issue is as brutally simple as it is brutally circumscribed: since we have no films or photographs to analyze for authenticity with the latest cutting-edge technology, all we have is the fact that thousands of testimonies exist in which human beings swore they saw another human being hover or fly, or suddenly materialize in some other location. Consequently, a history of the impossible is a history of testimonies about impossible events. Our dominant culture dismisses these testimonies as unbelievable and merely “anecdotal”—that is, as accounts that have no point of reference beyond themselves, no wider context, and little or no credibility. So why not call it a history of lying, a history of hallucinations, or a history of the ridiculous? Because the testimonies themselves self-consciously accept the impossible event as impossible, as well as bafflingly and utterly real—even terrifying—and of great significance. Moreover, the sheer number of such testimonies is so relatively large, so widespread across time and geographical boundaries, and so closely linked to civil and ecclesiastical institutions that they most certainly do have a broader context into which they fit. And that is a very rare and credible kind of evidence, as unique as the events confirmed by it.
 
 
Levitation is one of the best of all entry points into the history of the impossible, principally because it is an event for which we have an overabundance of testimonies, not just in Western Christianity but throughout all of world history. Yet levitation is still a subject that attracts disparagement and repels serious inquiry: the very claim that any human being can defy the laws of gravity seems way too absurd nowadays, more than two centuries after Newton, despite the existence of high-speed trains that employ magnetic levitation to hover and fly forward while suspended just a few centimeters above their tracks. Human levitation seems incompatible with seriousness. Even a crank such as Marcelino Menéndez y Pelayo, a Spanish historian who eagerly defended absurd notions—including the claim that Catholic orthodoxy was genetically transmitted among pure-blooded Spaniards—had no patience with levitation and other physical phenomena associated with mystical ecstasy. What this most unreasonable man had to say long ago about levitation and other related phenomena, such as stigmata, is still very much in line with prevailing thought: “Leave all these cases lying in oblivion. Let them be brought to light, in due course, by those who are researching folk customs, or those who wish to satisfy a childish sort of curiosity.”
 
 
Bilocation is another entry point into the history of the impossible and another subject that Menéndez y Pelayo would have wanted to sink into oblivion. Like levitation, it is a phenomenon found in many religions and cultures from ancient times to the present. But, like levitation, it seems incompatible with seriousness, and therefore it receives an equal amount of disrespect and contemptuous dismissals. Testimonies of bilocations are fewer in number than those of levitations in Christian history, and the phenomenon is impossible in a double way: not just as something that “cannot” happen but also as something that no one can ever witness in both locations simultaneously. Verifying its occurrence requires matching up eyewitness accounts from different locations ex post facto, something that makes all testimonies less immediate and therefore more open to the likelihood of fraud. But there is no denying the fact that such corroborations have been recorded and accepted as factual, as in the case of the bilocation of St. Ignatius Loyola to the bedside of the ailing Alexander Petronius.





 
If the past itself includes bizarre events and beliefs, are these to be dismissed simply because they seem illogical or because our current frame of reference differs so much from that of previous centuries? The easiest path is to say, yes, of course. But a wiser path to take might be to say, no, of course not. As Lucien Febvre, a very savvy historian, once said: “To comprehend is not to clarify, simplify, or to reduce things to a perfectly clear logical scheme. To comprehend is to complicate, to augment in depth. It is to widen on all sides. It is to vivify.” And this vivifying requires not only embracing what might seem strange in the past but accepting the strangeness as an essential rational feature of the past, not as something irrational. As Darren Oldridge has observed: “However peculiar they now seem, the beliefs of pre-modern people were normally a rational response to the intellectual and social context in which they were expressed.”
 
Levitations are among the most ambiguous of mystical phenomena in Catholic Christianity for two reasons: because of the belief that they can be caused by the devil rather than God and because of the fact that they can also be faked and have been regularly faked for millennia by all sorts of wizards and hucksters. Contrived acts of levitation performed under tightly controlled conditions can seem real indeed when those performing them are experts at creating illusions and at fooling their audience’s senses. It matters little if the illusion is performed on a stage as entertainment or in a chapel or some dimly lit parlor as deceit. Reports of bilocations are even more vulnerable to dismissal than levitations. To fake a bilocation seems easy enough. All one needs to do is to recruit or bribe expert liars at both locations. Consequently, believing in reports of bilocations requires a more intense leap of faith than believing in levitations.
 
The likelihood of deceit haunts levitations and bilocations in yet another way, for not too long ago these phenomena became intensely linked with ghosts and spirits rather than God or the devil. This happened due to a rise in popularity of the quasi-religious occult movement known as Spiritualism, which spread like wildfire across North and South America, Europe, and other corners of the Western world between the 1860s and the 1920s. Spiritualism had its detractors, for sure, especially among the Christian clergy, professional illusionists, and an array of skeptics, but it was not restricted to quirky outcasts on the margins of respectability. Quite the contrary. As hard as it might be to imagine nowadays, Spiritualism attracted a broad spectrum of devotees, some of whom belonged to the upper echelons of society, such as the eminent chemist and physicist Sir William Crookes; novelist Sir Arthur Conan Doyle, the creator of the hyper-rational and immensely popular fictional character Sherlock Holmes; evolutionary biologist Alfred Russel Wallace, Charles Darwin’s closest collaborator and competitor; the Nobel laureates Pierre and Marie Curie, pioneers in the study of radiation; and Mary Todd Lincoln, the wife of American president Abraham Lincoln, who regularly held séances at the White House.
 
The term “levitation” was coined by spiritualists in the nineteenth century. Although accounts of hovering or flying men and women stretch back to antiquity, no specific term had ever been applied to the phenomenon. But, given its centrality in spiritualist ritual, especially during séances at which mediums levitated objects, their own bodies, or those of others—ostensibly through the agency of spirits—the amazing feat needed a name, and “levitation” seemed to suit the cult’s quasi-scientific needs perfectly. Derived as it was from the Latin levitas, or “lightness,” the exact opposite of “gravitas,” or “heaviness,” the newly minted term had a distinctly Newtonian feel to it, evoking his law of universal gravitation and empirical objectivity while conveying a sense of the mysteriously spiritual and otherworldly. “Bilocation” was another quasi-scientific term favored by spiritualists, who believed that the human body had an “astral double,” a spiritual component that could leave the physical body and appear elsewhere.
 
Spiritualism never disappeared completely. In fact, the ever-popular Ouija board, still a best-selling game, made and marketed as a toy by Hasbro, the same company that makes Monopoly, is a spiritualist device. But as Spiritualism’s heyday waned, so did interest in levitation and bilocation. By 1928, when Olivier Leroy published the one and only comprehensive history of levitation written in the twentieth century, the popularity of Spiritualism was already fading fast. And no comparable effort was ever made to cover the history of bilocation. Doyle, who died in 1930, seemed to embody the cult’s decline in his final years. His zealous defense of communication with the dead and of photographs of ghosts and fairies had by then become more of a disposable Victorian curiosity than a set of beliefs to embrace, and since levitation and bilocation were part of the spiritualist package deal, they, too, gradually vanished into the cobwebbed attic of the public’s imagination.
 



 
Levitation and bilocation might have had a shady lineage to overcome, but they nonetheless had—and continue to have—a very different past upon which to claim legitimate significance. Within the Catholic tradition, levitation and bilocation have an immensely rich history, especially in the lives of the saints. Because holy levitation and bilocation are considered miracles in Catholicism—that is, supernatural gifts, or “charisms,” that accompany mystical ecstasy and can be markers of exceptional sanctity—they have never completely lost their luster and are not likely to lose it. The Greek term charisma denotes any gift bestowed on humans through God ’s benevolent love (charis). Belief in such gifts is as old as Christianity itself and was initially given theological shape by the apostle Paul, who delineated their function in the shaping of the Church:
 
    “There are different kinds of gifts, but the same Spirit distributes them. There are different kinds of service, but the same Lord who works all things in all. Now to each one the manifestation of the Spirit is given for the common good. To one there is given through the Spirit a message of wisdom, to another a message of knowledge by means of the same Spirit, to another faith by the same Spirit, to another gifts of healing by that one Spirit, to another miraculous powers, to another prophecy, to another distinguishing between spirits, to another speaking in different kinds of tongues, and to still another the interpretation of tongues. All these are the work of one and the same Spirit, and he distributes them to each one, just as he determines. “ (Corinthians 12:4–11)
 
Among such extraordinary supernatural gifts, some not mentioned by Paul were later recognized as legitimate, including levitation, bilocation, and several others that accompanied mystical ecstasy. During the Middle Ages, a long list of these divine mystical gifts evolved, especially through the process of evaluating the holiness of candidates for sainthood and of writing narratives of their lives as part of that process. By the thirteenth century, when bilocation and levitation accounts begin to appear regularly in Western hagiographies, many supernatural phenomena were believed to be definite signs of sainthood, but there was no fixed list of the miraculous physical phenomena that could accompany mystical ecstasy in the life of any saint. Much in the same way that a medical text might contain lists of all the known symptoms for specific maladies, this list of miraculous mystical gifts or charisma would have simply catalogued those known to occur, but the primary characteristic of holiness was always a virtuous life, rather than any miraculous mystical phenomena—those were just a bonus. In the seventeenth century, this attitude deepened in the Catholic Church as the process of canonization was revamped and “heroic virtue” came to be emphasized more than miracles.
 
No holy mystic was ever expected to have all the charisms that could be listed, and these charisms could manifest themselves in varying degrees: some saints could levitate more often or higher than others; some might just hover; others might actually fly. All these gifts were wild cards of sorts, and so were the particular combinations any mystic might be dealt by God. The most significant of these charisms could be sorted into two categories: first, those phenomena that were overtly physical and visibly involved the body; second, those phenomena that were not visible but could be conjoined with mystical ecstasy.
 
In the first category, there were at least fifteen overtly physical phenomena commonly linked with holiness and mystical experiences. Visible ecstasies, raptures, and trances: when the body enters a cataleptic state and becomes rigid, insensible, and oblivious to its surroundings. Levitation: when the body rises up in the air, hovers, or flies. Weightlessness: when the body displays a total or nearly total absence of weight during trances and levitations or after death. Transvection: when the body is transported through the air from one location to another in some indeterminate measure of time. Mystical transport or teleportation: when the body transverses physical space instantaneously, moving from one place to another without any time having elapsed, sometimes over great distances. Bilocation: when the body is present in two places simultaneously. Stigmatization: when the body acquires the five wounds of the crucified Christ or other wounds inflicted during his passion. Luminous irradiance: when the body glows brightly. Supernatural hyperosmia: a heightened sense of smell that allows the mystic to detect the sins of others. Supernatural inedia: the ability to survive without any food or with very little food at all. Supernatural insomnia: the ability to survive without much, if any, sleep. Visible demonic molestations: physical attacks by demons that wound the body. Odor of sanctity: when the body emits a unique and immensely pleasant smell. Supernatural incorruption: when the corpse of a saint does not decompose but remains unnaturally intact for many years, decades, or centuries. Supernatural oozing, or myroblitism: when the corpse of a saint discharges a pleasant-smelling oily substance capable of performing healing miracles directly or through cloths dipped in it.
 
And in the second category, holy mystics could have at least ten different kinds of otherworldly experiences not visible to others or supernatural powers with which they could be imbued. Some of these were physical gifts, some spiritual, and some mental. Visions, locutions, and apparitions: when the mystic has various sorts of encounters with the divine that are not visible to others, and the mystic receives communications from God that are visual, aural, or purely spiritual. Invisible demonic molestations: when the mystic is assailed by demons spiritually or mentally, sometimes with a visual component that is invisible to others. Telekinesis: the ability to move objects at a distance by nonphysical means, without touching them. Telepathy: the ability to read the minds and consciences of others or to communicate mentally. Prophecy: the ability to know and predict future events accurately, including one’s own death. Supernatural remote vision: the ability to see events that are occurring elsewhere. Supernatural dreams: the ability to receive divine communications while sleeping. Infused knowledge: learning directly from God, without formal education, through ecstasies, visions, locutions, and apparitions. Supernatural control over nature: the ability to command the behavior of weather, fauna, and flora and to communicate with animals. Discernment of spirits: the ability to distinguish whether any event is of divine or demonic origin.
 
Tellingly, only one of the phenomena listed above can be called genuinely and exclusively Christian: that of the stigmata, the miraculous duplication of the wounds of Christ on the mystic’s hands, feet, and torso, the first recorded instance of which involves St. Francis of Assisi in the thirteenth century. All other physical phenomena can be found in accounts from other cultures and religions, in which such gifts are linked to individuals with spiritual powers.
 
Naturally, fraud and delusion could certainly be involved in claims about such charisma and the miracles associated with them, and the likelihood of that could be obvious to anyone, but in cultures where such phenomena were assumed to be possible, it was belief in the charismata that had to be suspended rather than disbelief.
 
 
Accepting these phenomena as possible requires a certain way of thinking about the fabric of reality. It requires accepting as fact that the cosmos consists of two dimensions, the natural and the supernatural, and that these two dimensions, though distinct, are nevertheless intertwined in such a way that the natural is always subordinate to the supernatural. In this mentality or worldview, which was reinforced culturally by social custom and the political forces of church and state, the natural order could be constantly interrupted and overpowered by the supernatural. Any such irruption of the supernatural was a miracle (miraculum or prodigium), and the natural world constantly pulsated with the possibility of the miraculous.
 
This binary approach to reality extended to the human being, for humans were believed to have been created in “the image and likeness of God” and to be composed of a mortal material body and an immortal spiritual soul. Saints could tap into the supernatural because they were “holy”—that is, they were more spiritual than other human beings, more attuned to the sacred and divine. As individuals who embraced self-denial and focused intensely on spiritual realities rather than on the needs of their corruptible material bodies, they were able to avoid sinful behavior and live virtuous lives. This made them “holy” and therefore closer to God, and that closeness transformed their mortal bodies, imbuing them with supernatural abilities.
 
Such abilities were deemed celestial in origin: charisma granted to holy human beings in and through whom God worked miracles. Some of these charismata had dark parallels in pagan magic and witchcraft, so discerning the actual source of the gift was always necessary for Catholic Christians, and that process of discernment could be immensely complicated, awkward, and often painful. In essence, the process involved reckoning the difference between religion—that is, whatever was truly supernatural—and magic, which was never truly supernatural but rather involved the diabolical agency or some sort of humanly devised trickery.
 
Given this conundrum, and the inherent instability and ambiguity of the miraculous, every levitation or bilocation—no matter how wondrous—had an unavoidable tragic dimension, and all miracle-workers had to contend with it in various ways. The more extreme the miracle claim, the worse the ordeal that the miracle-worker had to face. Whether it was being grilled by the Inquisition, being confined to a small monastic cell like a prisoner, or having one’s writings destroyed or hidden away under lock and key, miracle-workers usually had to be refined in some sort of crucible. Magic, religion, and the demonic were too closely intertwined to allow Church authorities to approve of miracles instantaneously. Distinctions had to be maintained, and those distinctions were understood in precise terms by educated folk, especially the clergy tasked with the job of doing the discerning. But at street level, among the faithful, the line between religion and magic was anything but precise, especially when it came to popular piety and the ways in which most Christians approached what they believed to be supernatural.
 
 
The advent of the Protestant Reformation brought about a sudden redefinition of concepts such as religion, magic, superstition, and idolatry, as well as of assumptions about the relation between the natural and supernatural realms. Distinctions that had reigned largely uncontested in the Catholic Church of the West and the Orthodox Churches of the East since the first century suddenly began to be challenged in the early 1520s when an earth-shaking paradigm shift took place. The change in thinking resulting from this new Protestant take on reality was similar in scope and significance to the one caused by Copernicus in astronomy, but its impact was much more immediate and widespread. It gave rise to a disparate mentality that still saw reality in binary terms but drew the line between religion and magic differently, rejecting the intense intermingling of the natural and supernatural as well as of the material and the spiritual, thus placing much of Catholic ritual and piety in the realm of magic. Moreover, this Protestant mentality also redefined the concepts of holiness and sainthood, and rejected the assumption that self-denial and virtuous behavior could allow human beings to be gifted with supernatural powers.
 
As if this were not enough of an assault on medieval assumptions about the relation between the natural and the supernatural realms, Protestants of all stripes also rejected the proposition that God had continued to perform miracles beyond the first century, a doctrine that came to be known as “the cessation of miracles” or “the cessation of the charismata.” The miracles mentioned in the Bible had really occurred, they argued, but such marvels became unnecessary after the birth of the early Church and would never happen again. Consequently, all of those miraculous supernatural phenomena associated with holiness throughout the Middle Ages, including levitation, could not be the work of God. But by designating these phenomena “false”—that is, not attributable to God—Protestants did not declare them impossible. As most Protestant Reformers and their later disciples saw it, ecstatic seizures, levitations, luminous irradiance, and all such phenomena did in fact occur, but they were all diabolical in origin.




 
Given the religious, social, political, and intellectual turmoil caused by the advent of Protestantism and its great paradigm shift, it is not at all surprising that miracles became a marker of difference between Catholics and Protestants, as well as a flash point of discord and a polemical weapon. For Catholics, holy levitation could serve as proof of the divine source of their Church’s authority and of the truth of their teachings and sacraments. If miracles such as this occurred in the Catholic Church, could it really be the seat of the Antichrist, as Protestants argued? Protestants simply countered by insisting that if such weird phenomena were not fraudulent, they could only be demonic, their existence damning evidence of the falsehood of the Catholic Church, which employed the devil’s ability to easily fool the unwary. After all, witches hovered and flew too. As Thomas Browne argued in 1646, since Satan was a “natural Magician” he could “perform many acts in ways above our knowledge, though not transcending our natural powers.” Meanwhile, however, Protestants and Catholics alike continued to believe that witches hovered and flew and should all be exterminated.
 
At exactly the same time that Catholics were canonizing levitating saints and burning flying witches and Protestants were busy tossing flying witches into the flames, too—by the thousands—modern empirical science was emerging and creating paradigm shifts of its own. The peak period for flying humans in Western history coincides with the initial development of a new materialistic way of thinking about reality that would reject all this flying as absolutely impossible nonsense. One could say that the oddest fact about two of the most extreme exemplars of miraculous baroque Catholicism, Joseph of Cupertino (1603–1663), “the Flying Friar,” and María de Jesús de Ágreda (1602–1665), the bilocating and levitating nun, is that they walked the earth—and ostensibly hovered over it—at the same time as Isaac Newton (1642–1727).
 
 Beyond the factual historical dimension of baroque-era levitators, divine or demonic, one runs into more abstract issues in the metaphysical and epistemological dimension of these accounts. And the questions there make historians very uncomfortable. Did these people really float in the air? If so, how and why, and how could it be proved? As soon as these questions begin to pop up, we historians proudly bring out our brackets and wield them with all the epistemological brawn we can muster. “We bracket the question of whether this happened or not,” we say, and by that we mean that since we cannot prove that any of this hovering and flying happened, we put those questions aside. We limit ourselves to analyzing narratives and the beliefs expressed in those narratives but not the events reported in them. Those events remain suspended in an ether of their own, much like some stiff-jointed levitating saint, in that vast limbo where all unprovable and unusable testimonies get squirreled away. And all we are left with is the fact of the testimonies given and of the beliefs reflected in them.
 
The issue of whether so-and-so really flew cannot be addressed. And the same goes for bilocation or any other charisma associated with mystical ecstasy, for there is no way anyone today can prove that someone really hovered or flew or bilocated in the sixteenth or seventeenth century. No one’s testimony from the distant past can be taken as absolute proof, not for something as uncommon and unnatural a phenomenon as levitation, even if corroborated by hundreds or thousands of similar testimonies, for a simple reason: like all miracles, by definition, phenomena such as levitation and bilocation are totally unlike others in history. If in fact they have taken place, the number of witnesses has been far too small, relatively speaking. And the further back one goes in time, the more difficult it becomes to defend the credibility of those witnesses. The argument made by David Hume in 1748 about the impossibility of proving any miracle solely from testimony is worth quoting at this point:
 
    “A miracle is a violation of the laws of nature; and as a firm and unalterable experience has established these laws, the proof against a miracle, from the very nature of the fact, is as entire as any argument from experience can possibly be imagined…. Nothing is esteemed a miracle, if it ever happens in the common course of nature….  There must, therefore, be a uniform experience against every miraculous event, otherwise the event would not merit that appellation…. The plain consequence is (and it is a general maxim worthy of our attention), “That no testimony is sufficient to establish a miracle, unless the testimony be of such a kind, that its falsehood would be more miraculous, than the fact, which it endeavors to establish.”
 
Nonetheless, while it is ultimately impossible for anyone to prove that any levitation or bilocation actually took place, the fact that there are eyewitness testimonies of such instances is easy enough to prove. And those testimonies, which are often rich in detail, tell us something about the past that our present-day culture predisposes many people to overlook or deride. This brings us back to Febvre’s observation: “To comprehend is to complicate, to augment in depth. It is to widen on all sides. It is to vivify.” The testimonies of witnesses to impossible events, which are themselves full of complexities and ambivalences, vivify the past. They allow us a glimpse of the world as some of those who lived long ago actually saw it.
 
 
Making Sense of Levitating Saints : Historians must take the impossible seriously. By Carlos Eire. Commonweal Magazine, September 6, 2023. 







Accounts of levitation were far from uncommon in medieval Europe. In some cases, dozens of witnesses attested to the miraculous events.
 
The 17th-century English physician Thomas Browne confessed being “thankful that I lived not in the days of miracles, that I never saw Christ nor his Disciples; I would not have been one of those Israelites that passed the Red Sea.” A devout Anglican, Browne was not what we would call a skeptic. He believed the biblical miracles had happened, and he believed that witches roamed the Earth. He also was one of a growing number who thought that things like walking on water, levitation and resurrection no longer occurred.
 
Looking at Browne’s period, we might think that he wasn’t paying much attention to the world outside his Norwich medical practice. As Carlos Eire demonstrates in “They Flew,” the 16th and 17th centuries were bursting with the impossible. Levitations, bilocations, divine encounters, healings, demonic possessions—such things were the stuff of the daily gossip and the Sunday sermon. “They Flew” provides a bridge to a part of history that is rarely taken seriously today and challenges the well-worn narrative of “the triumph of rationality over primitive credulity and superstition.”
 
The author, a professor of medieval history at Yale, won the National Book Award in 2003 for his memoir, “Waiting for Snow in Havana.” Here he focuses on aethrobats (air walkers), using levitation as a case study of how we might better approach events that we consider to be impossible. Levitation as a reported phenomenon is quite old and crosses many religious and cultural boundaries. Aethrobats pop up throughout the historical record, as far back as ancient Greece and the ancient Near East. In the Christian world after the fifth century, levitation begins to appear more regularly. The 13th-century life of Francis of Assisi—whose levitations were one of his “many mystical gifts”—was a watershed, according to Mr. Eire.
 
Levitation was a popular preoccupation throughout late medieval and early modern Europe. Some levitations were only “modest hoverings.” Others were full-blown “flights.” Some lasted only a few minutes, while others went on for hours. A few people glowed while levitating, and many lost all sensation. Almost all aethrobats reported being in a trance, completely overcome by divine power and lost in contemplation. Importantly, such experiences were understood to be of a different order than things like demonic possession and witchcraft. They were, instead, seen as sacred gifts from God that demonstrated the individual’s piety.
 
While levitation accounts shared many common threads, there was a great deal of variety too. Mr. Eire follows three aethrobats to illustrate this variety. The levitations of St. Teresa of Ávila in the 16th century, and St. Joseph of Cupertino and María de Ágreda in the 17th century, are well documented, Mr. Eire reports. The dozens of witnesses to these events present significant challenges to any out-of-hand dismissal of these kinds of events.



 
The most well-known of these three, Teresa of Ávila began levitating during times of intense prayer. The frequency of her levitations increased to include more inconvenient moments, such as when she was in the kitchen cooking, “frying pan in her hand.” They became so regular, and public, that Teresa begged God to take them away (a request, Mr. Eire notes, that was granted). In the end, it seems that although levitation was evidence of the “ultimate levels of mystical ecstasy,” the attention it attracted was too embarrassing and shameful.
 
Teresa’s aversion to levitation is unusual among aethrobats. The author, who previously published a short biography of the saint, wonders why she turned away from levitation so completely. Her account of the experience is one of the most thorough; she described levitation as an extreme expression of divine love.
 
“They Flew” walks a fine line as it examines such accounts. Mr. Eire treats them with caution without being incredulous, and is not without his own doubts. At the same time, he points out that “every age and culture has its own unquestionable beliefs” and invites readers to consider how our own definitions of the impossible and the unquestionable are rooted in a particular way—as fallible as our forebears—of seeing the world.
 
Where Teresa was born to a wealthy merchant family, Joseph of Cupertino was born in a stable to a carpenter father. And Joseph, unlike Teresa, seems to have been fond of his mystical experiences, as well as a severe routine of self-mortification. A chapel in La Grottella in southern Italy played home to Joseph, known as “The Flying Friar.” His levitations and bilocations were witnessed by “high clergy and nobility” from across Europe, as well as countless others. His popularity even won him an audience with Pope Urban VIII, whom Joseph impressed, Mr. Eire reports, by floating above the Holy Father’s head while in a mystical trance.



 
Likewise, María de Ágreda was not as shy as Teresa about her experiences. As a child, she reported that she “often heard voices, saw visions, entered trance-like states, and talked to invisible beings.” Her mother transformed the family home into a nunnery, the Convent of the Immaculate Conception. When María began levitating, the family invited crowds to witness the unconscious, floating girl, turning a religious experience into what Mr. Eire calls a “carnivalesque display of supernatural power.”
 
Mr. Eire also raises an eyebrow at one of María’s most impressive feats, her bilocations to Mexico, where she claimed to have visited with and evangelized the Jumano tribe. The visits, however, coincided with other missionary journeys to the Jumanos, and Mr. Eire points out that it is very possible that María had access to those missionaries’ written accounts.
 
The author also notes the doubts of many people at the time. Few miraculous accounts were accepted without question, particularly by church authorities. The Catholic Church was not in the business of authorizing frauds, and there were plenty of fakes and tricksters unmasked during the period. Teresa, Joseph and María faced scrutiny from their confessors, and all three were investigated by the Inquisition. In fact, María barely avoided charges of heresy for her book on the Virgin Mary, which she reported had been given to her by direct revelation. It is very possible that King Philip IV of Spain’s support of María spared her a severe judgment from the church.
 
“They Flew” is historically rich and superbly written; it has only one real weakness. The author overstates the power of the Protestant Reformation as the major cause for the decline in impossible experiences. As Mr. Eire notes, “Protestants continued to believe . . . in impossible events such as levitation”; they were, however, far less willing to ascribe divine agency to these events. This is entirely true, but his account leaves little space to discuss the intellectual skepticism of the Renaissance as well as the emerging rationalist and empiricist philosophies of the 17th century, none of which had much time for the miraculous.
 
That, in the end, is the true subject of Mr. Eire’s study: the power of belief, and unbelief, in our experiences of reality. What we deem possible or impossible has less to do with what is happening than how we understand it to be happening. Whether we believe in God, human reason, science or Jedi mind tricks, belief shapes our perceptions of the world around us and the meaning we assign to it.
 
—Mr. Davis is a professor of history at Houston Baptist University.
 
‘They Flew’ Review: Hovering Saints, Floating Friars.  By David J. Davis. The Wall Street Journal, October 27, 2023. 




They Flew: A history of the impossible

 In this episode, Dr. Carlos Eire talks about his new book, They Flew: A History of the Impossible. The book explores the seemingly impossible physical phenomena of levitation and bilocation by Christian mystics, as well as some of the charlatans who managed to fake these feats. Dr. Eire's book also delves into malevolent mysticism, including witches and those who claimed to receive their powers from Satan.

 The Christian Mysticism Podcast, November 5, 2023




















22/10/2021

Occam's Razor

 



On the night of May 26th, 1328, three Franciscan friars slip out of the papal city of Avignon and ride south to the Crusader port of Aigues-Mortes. Two were senior members of the order whereas the third was a little-known English scholar, William of Occam. If captured, they could face excommunication, imprisonment or even a slow death on a burning pyre.
 
We know little of William’s early years, only that he was born in the Surrey village of Occam and given to the Franciscan order as a child. The Franciscans sent him to the University of Oxford to study the science of theology. That there was such a discipline seems very odd today, but throughout most of human history, there hadn’t really been a distinction between the natural and supernatural.
 
More than a thousand years earlier, Aristotle attempted to pull a thread of science out of observations such as “everything that moves is moved by another” But he also drifted into his metaphysics by arguing that, to avoid an infinite regress of movers, there had to be a first cause or prime mover. He also believed that some causes lay in the future, in the form of the purpose of objects or actions. So, the purpose of trees was to provide wood, the purpose of wood was to provide fire, the purpose of fire was to warm humans. He again capped this otherwise infinite regress with the prime mover.
 
Aristotle was also keen on categorising and provided the first stab at biological taxonomy by dividing plants and animals into categories. However, he based his categorisation on the notion of invisible but real universals, which are kind of invisible essences of objects. So cats became cats because they were filled with a feline universal, dogs with a canine universal and so on. He extended the universal idea into every category of being, so universals of redness, roundness, chairness, fatherness and so on was what made objects red, round, fathers or chairs.
 
Aristotle’s prime mover was more of an it than a him, but was nevertheless enthusiastically incorporated into Christianity by the greatest theologian of the Middle Ages, Thomas Aquinas. Aquinas imported Aristotle’s framework to construct a kind of scientific theology whose closest parallel today might be the “experimental theology” in Philip Pullman’s His Dark Materials novels. Its cornerstone was five proofs of God constructed with Aristotle’s chains of reasoning but the Christian God replacing both the prime mover and final cause. Aquinas also imported Aristotle’s universals as ideas in God’s mind so their study became a route to the divine, so theology became a science. By a clever manipulation of the universal idea, Aquinas even claimed to have incorporated the Eucharist miracle into his theological science.
 
Aquinas’s theology came to dominate Christianity. If its fusion with science had survived then science in the West might have suffered the same stagnation under the weight of dogma that it suffered in so many other parts of the world. Fortunately, William of Occam had a tool sharp enough to sever the link.
 
William of Occam is most famous for insisting that “entities should not be multiplied beyond necessity”. Occam’s razor advises that we should only accept the simplest solution to a problem, as long as it works. He used his razor to argue first that universals are entities beyond necessity because “fathers are fathers [simply] because they have sons”, dogs because they bark etc. With universals dismissed, scientific theology and its route to God tumbled. It collapsed completely after Occam went on to demolish all five of Aquinas’s so-called proofs of God. For example, he argued that final causes or purposes are also entities beyond necessity writing that “why does the fire heat the wood … it is its nature”.
 
 
Occam maintained that the only route to God is through faith, not reason, whereas reason, rather than faith, is the path to science. To assure the independence of science, he advised that “assertions, especially in physics, which do not pertain to theology should not be officially condemned or prohibited by anyone because in such things everyone should be free so that they may freely say what they please”.
 
As far I am aware, William is the first person in the history of the world to so clearly separate science from religion. Nearly all the greatest scientists up to the 20th century embraced Occam’s separation and his razor.
 
Back in the 14th century, William’s radical ideas caused consternation within the cloisters of Oxford. A former chancellor argued that his elimination of universals threatened the Catholic faith by knocking holes in Aquinas’s interpretation of the Eucharist miracle. About two centuries later, this same issue would precipitate the Reformation. Early in 1324, it precipitated a summons that arrived in Oxford, charging William to attend trial at the papal seat in Avignon to face charges of teaching heresy.
 
William reached Avignon probably early in the summer of 1324. His trial was lengthy and, in 1327, Pope John XXII issued a bull charging Occam with having uttered “many erroneous and heretical opinions”. However, by this time William had become embroiled in an even more dangerous conflict between the Pope and the Franciscan order.
 
Founded by St Francis, the Franciscans insisted that the surest way to holiness was to follow Jesus’s example of abandoning wealth to live in a state of apostolic poverty. The wealthiest man in Christendom, Pope John XXII, who was busy building the magnificent Palais de Papes in Avignon, disagreed. The dispute was pinned onto the seemingly trivial issue of whether Jesus owned a purse. The Franciscans were scandalised whereas Pope John insisted that Jesus not only owned a purse but, as the son of God, one filled with ownership of the world.
 
This was a pivotal notion in the Middle Ages because the papacy claimed that, on his death, Jesus had bequeathed ownership, or dominion – considered to be another universal – to St Peter who bequeathed it to succeeding popes, who bestowed it on Christian kings, who divided it out amongst their nobles. Nearly 200 years later and Pope Alexander VI claimed this same divine dominion to divide South America between the Spanish and Portuguese crowns.
 
Despite the heresy charges, as the cleverest scholar at their disposal, the Franciscans gave William the job of deliberating on John XXII’s arguments. Occam concluded that not only was the Pope wrong, but his writings proved him to be a heretic. This is what provoked the Franciscans’ flight, chased by a posse of Vatican soldiers. They escaped to board a ship which took them to Italy and the protection of the Holy Roman Emperor, who happened to be crowning a rival Pope in Rome at the time.
 
William spent the rest of his life under the protection of the Holy Roman Emperor. He continued to attack papal authority and was pursued by agents of several popes, one of whom threatened to burn down the town of Tournai in modern-day Belgium to capture the fugitive.
 
On the vexed question of apostolic poverty vs papal dominion, William upended the entire medieval world order by insisting that God has given everyone the same natural right to sustenance, safety and shelter. These rights were real, but money, property and dominion were entirely human inventions that, like the universal of fatherhood, only existed in the minds of people who believed in them. So, the Pope’s claim for worldly dominion was as empty as Jesus’s purse.
  
William also insisted that the authority of rulers derived from the ruled “from God through his people” and that “power should not be entrusted to anyone without the consent of all”. Since pagans and infidels were also descended from Adam and Eve, they had inherited the same natural rights as Christians.
 
William of Occam was excommunicated after fleeing Avignon, but this was rescinded by Pope Innocent VI in 1359. His razor, insisting on the simplest solutions, remains central to science and is an invaluable adversary against pseudoscience, dogma, conspiracy theories or general baloney.
 
As a fearless defender of natural rights against institutional authority and the first to clearly separate science from religion, he is a worthy contender for the title of patron saint of our secular world.
 
 
William of Occam: the patron saint of the modern secular world. By Johnjoe McFadden.  The Irish Times,  September 9, 2021.




It’s May 1964 and, on a low hillside in New Jersey, the physicists Robert Woodrow Wilson and Arno Allan Penzias are listening in on the Universe. They are standing beneath what looks like a gargantuan ear trumpet attached to a garden shed: the Holmdel Horn Antenna, built by Bell Laboratories to investigate microwaves as an alternative to radio waves for telecommunication. When interest in microwave communication waned, Bell lent out the Holmdel horn to interested scientists.
 
Penzias and Wilson were interested. Both aged around 30, they planned to map the sky with microwaves. But they were baffled: when they pointed the horn at a dark region beyond the galaxy and only sparsely populated with stars, instead of the silence they expected, they detected a kind of background hiss – a hiss that filled the entire sky.
 
Meanwhile, the physicist Robert H Dicke was working on a related puzzle. Two decades earlier, Dicke had invented the microwave detector. Now he and his lab were trying to develop sensitive instruments to test the cosmological predictions that emerged from Albert Einstein’s general theory of relativity, particularly how it related to Edwin Hubble’s astonishing discovery that the Universe is expanding. The reigning, steady-state theory claimed that the Universe had always been expanding, balanced by a continuous creation of new matter. The rival theorists, including Dicke, took expansion at its face value, running it backwards in time to propose that, about 14 billion years ago, the Universe burst into existence in a cataclysmic explosion from a very tiny point.
 
An exploding universe should have left a uniform faint cloud of microwave radiation, which Dicke’s team was determined to find. News of the group’s efforts reached Penzias and Wilson, prompting Penzias to give Dicke a call. Over a brownbag lunch, Dicke’s colleagues recall him picking up the receiver, repeating phrases such as ‘horn antenna’ and nodding. After hanging up, he turned to his group and said: ‘Well boys, we’ve been scooped.’ Dicke realised that Penzias and Wilson had discovered the Big Bang.
 
The uniformity of the cosmic microwave background (CMB) tells us that, at its birth, ‘the Universe has turned out to be stunningly simple,’ as Neil Turok, director emeritus of the Perimeter Institute for Theoretical Physics in Ontario, Canada, put it at a public lecture in 2015. ‘[W]e don’t understand how nature got away with it,’ he added. A few decades after Penzias and Wilson’s discovery, NASA’s Cosmic Background Explorer satellite measured faint ripples in the CMB, with variations in radiation intensity of less than one part in 100,000. That’s a lot less than the variation in whiteness you’d see in the cleanest, whitest sheet of paper you’ve ever seen.
 
Wind forward 13.8 billion years, and, with its trillions of galaxies and zillions of stars and planets, the Universe is far from simple. On at least one planet, it has even managed to generate a multitude of life forms capable of comprehending both the complexity of our Universe and the puzzle of its simple origins. Yet, despite being so rich in complexity, some of these life forms, particularly those we now call scientists, retain a fondness for that defining characteristic of our primitive Universe: simplicity.
 
 
The Franciscan friar William of Occam (1285-1347) wasn’t the first to express a preference for simplicity, though he’s most associated with its implications for reason. The principle known as Occam’s Razor insists that, given several accounts of a problem, we should choose the simplest. The razor ‘shaves off’ unnecessary explanations, and is often expressed in the form ‘entities should not be multiplied beyond necessity’. So, if you pass a house and hear barking and purring, then you should think a dog and a cat are the family pets, rather than a dog, a cat and a rabbit. Of course, a bunny might also be enjoying the family’s hospitality, but the existing data provides no support for the more complex model. Occam’s Razor says that we should keep models, theories or explanations simple until proven otherwise – in this case, perhaps until sighting a fluffy tail through the window.
 
Seven hundred years ago, William of Occam used his razor to dismantle medieval science or metaphysics. In subsequent centuries, the great scientists of the early modern era used it to forge modern science. The mathematician Claudius Ptolemy’s (c100-170 CE) system for calculating the motions of the planets, based on the idea that the Earth was at the centre, was a theory of byzantine complexity. So, when Copernicus (1473-1543) was confronted by it, he searched for a solution that ‘could be solved with fewer and much simpler constructions’. The solution he discovered – or rediscovered, as it had been proposed in ancient Greece by Aristarchus of Samos, but then dismissed by Aristotle – was of course the solar system, in which the planets orbit around the Sun. Yet, in Copernicus’s hands, it was no more accurate than Ptolemy’s geocentric system. Copernicus’s only argument in favour of heliocentricity was that it was simpler.
 
Nearly all the great scientists who followed Copernicus retained Occam’s preference for simple solutions. In the 1500s, Leonardo da Vinci insisted that human ingenuity ‘will never devise any [solutions] more beautiful, nor more simple, nor more to the purpose than Nature does’. A century or so later, his countryman Galileo claimed that ‘facts which at first seem improbable will, even on scant explanation, drop the cloak which has hidden them and stand forth in naked and simple beauty.’ Isaac Newton noted in his Principia (1687) that ‘we are to admit no more causes of natural things than such as are both true and sufficient to explain their appearances’; while in the 20th century Einstein is said to have advised that ‘Everything should be made as simple as possible, but not simpler.’ In a Universe seemingly so saturated with complexity, what work does simplicity do for us?
 
Part of the answer is that simplicity is the defining feature of science. Alchemists were great experimenters, astrologers can do maths, and philosophers are great at logic. But only science insists on simplicity. Many advances of modern science involved a succession of simplifications, either through unifying previously disparate phenomena or by eliminating superfluous entities. Probably the greatest simplification was provided by Newton, who unified trillions of motions, both on Earth and in the heavens, into just three laws of motion and one of gravity. Then in the late 19th century, Ludwig Boltzmann extended Newton’s laws into the microscopic realm to provide an economical explanation of heat as a measure of the motion of atoms. Einstein achieved perhaps the most radical simplification by unifying space and time within a single entity, spacetime. Charles Darwin and Alfred Russel Wallace had brought the entire natural world under a single law of natural selection; while the work of Louis Pasteur, Gregor Mendel, Hugo de Vries, James Watson, Francis Crick and many others dispensed with the vital principle to extend simple scientific laws into biology. Each scientist considered their advance to deliver a simplification that eliminated superfluous complexity. As Wallace, the co-discover of natural selection, put it: ‘The theory itself is exceedingly simple.’



 
Just why do simpler laws work so well? The statistical approach known as Bayesian inference, after the English statistician Thomas Bayes (1702-61), can help explain simplicity’s power. Bayesian inference allows us to update our degree of belief in an explanation, theory or model based on its ability to predict data. To grasp this, imagine you have a friend who has two dice. The first is a simple six-sided cube, and the second is more complex, with 60 sides that can throw 60 different numbers. Suppose your friend throws one of the dice in secret and calls out a number, say 5. She asks you to guess which dice was thrown. Like astronomical data that either the geocentric or heliocentric system could account for, the number 5 could have been thrown by either dice. Are they equally likely? Bayesian inference says no, because it weights alternative models – the six- vs the 60-sided dice – according to the likelihood that they would have generated the data. There is a one-in-six chance of a six-sided dice throwing a 5, whereas only a one-in-60 chance of the 60-sided dice throwing a 5. Comparing likelihoods, then, the six-sided dice is 10 times more likely to be the source of the data than the 60-sided dice.
 
Simple scientific laws are preferred, then, because, if they fit or fully explain the data, they’re more likely to be the source of it. With more knobs to tweak, arbitrarily complex models such as Ptolemy’s astronomical system could be made to fit any dataset. As the mathematician John von Neumann once quipped: ‘with four parameters I can fit an elephant, and with five I can make him wiggle his trunk’.
 
Is there more to simplicity than probability? Many of the greatest scientists and philosophers were devotees of what might be called a strong version of Occam’s Razor. This claims that the world is about as simple as it can be, consistent with our existence. The theoretical physicist and Nobel Laureate Eugene Wigner’s influential paper ‘The Unreasonable Effectiveness of Mathematics in the Natural Sciences’ (1960) argued that the extraordinary ability of mathematics to make sense of the world is a puzzle. An analogous case can be made for the success of simplicity in science. Why is Occam’s Razor so unreasonably effective? Why does simplicity work so well?
 
Consider how, when Einstein first attempted to incorporate gravity and acceleration into relativity, he eschewed any considerations of ‘beauty and simplicity’. Instead, he favoured what is called completeness: the incorporation of the maximum amount of available information into a model. Yet a decade of struggling with complex equations met with failure. He eventually changed tack to embrace Occam’s Razor, accepting only the simplest and most elegant equations, and later testing them against physical facts. This time, Einstein struck gold, unearthing his general theory of relativity in 1915. Thereafter, he insisted that ‘equations of such complexity … can be found only through the discovery of a logically simple mathematical condition that determines the equations completely or almost completely.’
 
But could it be simpler still? Why are there 17 particles in the Standard Model of particle physics when we are composed of only a handful? If the Universe is maximally simple, why are trillions of almost massless and electrically neutral neutrinos passing through our bodies every second? Surely neutrinos are entities beyond our necessity? Another candidate for an entity beyond necessity is the mysterious dark matter, of which our Universe appears to be chiefly composed. Why does a simple universe harbour so much apparently superfluous stuff?
 
In fact, both dark matter and neutrinos are essential for our existence. Neutrinos are a necessary byproduct of the stellar nuclear-fusion reactions that fuse protons to make helium nuclei, plus the heat and light that make life possible. One of physics’ laws of conservation demands that the total number of leptons (electrons, muons, tau particles and neutrinos) must remain constant. This can be satisfied in the stellar fusion reaction only through the release of massive numbers of neutrinos. Similarly for dark matter. In the early Universe, it acted as a kind of cosmological clotting agent that helped to coalesce the diffuse gas that emerged from the Big Bang into the lumpy clouds that became galaxies, stars, planets and eventually us. Haloes of dark matter at the edge of galaxies also act as galactic guardians, deflecting high-speed supernovae remnants rich in the heavy elements essential for life, from shooting off into the vast empty reaches of intergalactic space.
 
In my latest book, I propose a radical, if speculative, solution for why the Universe might in fact be as simple as it’s possible to be. Its starting point is the remarkable theory of cosmological natural selection (CNS) proposed by the physicist Lee Smolin. CNS proposes that, just like living creatures, universes have evolved through a cosmological process, analogous to natural selection.
 
Smolin came up with CNS as a potential solution to what’s called the fine-tuning problem: how the fundamental constants and parameters, such as the masses of the fundamental particles or the charge of an electron, got to be the precise values needed for the creation of matter, stars, planets and life. CNS first notes the apparent symmetry between the Big Bang, in which stars and particles were spewed out of a dimensionless point at the birth of our Universe, and the Big Crunch, the scenario for the end of our Universe when a supermassive black hole swallows up stars and particles before vanishing back into a dimensionless point. This symmetry has led many cosmologists to propose that black holes in our Universe might be the ‘other side’ of Big Bangs of other universes, expanding elsewhere. In this scenario, time did not begin at the Big Bang, but continues backwards through to the death of its parent universe in a Big Crunch, through to its birth from a black hole, and so on, stretching backward in time, potentially into infinity. Not only that but, since our region of the Universe is filled with an estimated 100 billion supermassive black holes, Smolin proposes that each is the progenitor of one of 100 billion universes that have descended from our own.
 
The model Smolin proposed includes a kind of universal self-replication process, with black holes acting as reproductive cells. The next ingredient is heredity. Smolin proposes that each offspring universe inherits almost the same fundamental constants of its parent. The ‘almost’ is there because Smolin suggests that, in a process analogous to mutation, their values are tweaked as they pass through a black hole, so baby universes become slightly different from their parent. Lastly, he imagines a kind of cosmological ecosystem in which universes compete for matter and energy. Gradually, over a great many cosmological generations, the multiverse of universes would become dominated by the fittest and most fecund universes, through their possession of those rare values of the fundamental constants that maximise black holes, and thereby generate the maximum number of descendant universes.
 
Smolin’s CNS theory explains why our Universe is finely tuned to make many black holes, but it does not account for why it is simple. I have my own explanation of this, though Smolin himself is not convinced. First, I point out that natural selection carries its own Occam’s Razor that removes redundant biological features through the inevitability of mutations. While most mutations are harmless, those that impair vital functions are normally removed from the gene pool because the individuals carrying them leave fewer descendants. This process of ‘purifying selection’, as it’s known, maintains our genes, and the functions they encode, in good shape.
 
However, if an essential function becomes redundant, perhaps by a change of environment, then purifying selection no longer works. For example, by standing upright, our ancestors lifted their noses off the ground, so their sense of smell became less important. This means that mutations could afford to accumulate in the newly dispensable genes, until the functions they encoded were lost. For us, hundreds of smell genes accumulated mutations, so that we lost the ability to detect hundreds of odours that we no longer need to smell. This inevitable process of mutational pruning of inessential functions provides a kind of evolutionary Occam’s Razor that removes superfluous biological complexity.
 



Perhaps a similar process of purifying selection operates in cosmological natural selection to keep things simple. Instead of biological mutations, we have tweaks to fundamental constants of universes as they pass through black holes. Let’s imagine that our Universe contains two black holes that are the proud parents of two baby universes. When the constants (the masses of particles, the charge of an electron and so forth) pass through the first black hole, they remain unchanged. As a consequence, a universe very like our own evolves, which we will call the 17P universe, reflecting the fact that it possesses 17 fundamental particles. However, in the second black hole, a tweak (mutation) to the fundamental constants generates a universe with one extra particle. This particle plays no role in black-hole formation, nor in the formation of stars or life, but instead merely hangs around, perhaps in intergalactic clouds. The 18th particle is an entity beyond necessity in this 18P universe.
 
Let’s additionally suppose that 18P’s extra particle has average mass and abundance for fundamental particles, so that it accounts for about one-18th of total mass in that universe. This locking away of mass in the intergalactic clouds of particle 18 will diminish the amount of matter/energy available for black-hole formation. As a consequence, the presence of particle 18 will reduce the number of black holes by one-18th, or about 5 per cent. Since black holes are the mothers of universes, the 18P universe will generate around 5 per cent fewer progeny than its sibling, the 17P universe. This difference in fecundity will continue into succeeding generations until, by about generation 20, descendants of the 18P universe will be one-third as abundant as descendants of the more parsimonious 17P universe. In the natural world, mutations that lead to just a 1 per cent reduction in fitness are sufficient to drive a mutant into extinction, so a 5 per cent decrease in fitness is likely to eliminate, or at least drastically reduce, the abundance of 18-particle universes, relative to their more parsimonious 17-particle universes.
 
It’s unclear whether the kind of multiverse envisaged by Smolin’s theory is finite or infinite. If infinite, then the simplest universe capable of forming black holes will be infinitely more abundant than the next simplest universe. If instead the supply of universes is finite, then we have a similar situation to biological evolution on Earth. Universes will compete for available resources – matter and energy – and the simplest that convert more of their mass into black holes will leave the most descendants. For both scenarios, if we ask which universe we are most likely to inhabit, it will be the simplest, as they are the most abundant. When inhabitants of these universes peer into the heavens to discover their cosmic microwave background and perceive its incredible smoothness, they, like Turok, will remain baffled at how their universe has managed to do so much from such a ‘stunningly simple’ beginning.
 
The cosmological razor idea has one further startling implication. It suggests that the fundamental law of the Universe is not quantum mechanics, or general relativity or even the laws of mathematics. It is the law of natural selection discovered by Darwin and Wallace. As the philosopher Daniel Dennett insisted, it is ‘The single best idea anyone has ever had.’ It might also be the simplest idea that any universe has ever had.
 
Why Simplicity Works. By Johnjoe McFadden. Aeon, October 11, 2021. 


What is Occam’s Razor?
 
Johnjoe McFadden, Professor of Molecular Genetics at the University of Surrey, joined  Seán Moncrieff on The Moncrieff Show. Newstalk, October 21, 2021. 




Astonishing where an idea can lead you. You start with something that 800 years hence will sound like it’s being taught at kindergarten: fathers are fathers, not because they are filled with some ‘essence of fatherhood’, but because they have children.
 
Fast-forward a few years, and the Pope is trying to have you killed. Not only have you run roughshod over his beloved eucharist (justified, till then, by some very dodgy Aristotelian logic-chopping); you’re also saying there’s no ‘essence of kinghood’, either. If kings are only kings because they have subjects, then, said William of Occam, ‘power should not be entrusted to anyone without the consent of all’. Heady stuff for 1334.
 
How this progression of thought gave birth to the very idea of modern science is the subject of what may be the most sheerly enjoyable history of science of recent years.
 
William was born around 1288 in the little town of Ockham in Surrey. He was probably an orphan; at any rate he was given to the Franciscan order at about the age of 11. He shone at Greyfriars in London, and around 1310 was dispatched to Oxford’s newfangled university. All manner of intellectual, theological and political shenanigans followed, mostly to do with William’s efforts to demolish almost the entire edifice of medieval philosophy.
 
It needed demolishing, and that’s because it still held to Aristotle’s ideas about what an object is. He wondered how single objects and multiples can co-exist. His solution: categorise everything. A cherry is a cherry is a cherry, and all cherries have cherryness in common. A cherry is a ‘universal’; the properties that might distinguish one cherry from another are ‘accidental’.
 
The trouble with Aristotle’s universals, though, is that they assume a one-to-one correspondence between word and thing, and posit a universe made up of a terrifying number of unique things — at least one for each noun or verb in the language. And the problem with that is that it’s an engine for making mistakes.
 
Medieval philosophy relied largely on syllogistic reasoning, juggling things into logical-looking relations. ‘Socrates is a man, all men are mortal, so Socrates is mortal.’ So he is, but — and this is crucial — this conclusion is arrived at more by luck than good judgment. The statement isn’t ‘true’ in any sense; it’s merely internally consistent. Imagine we make a mistake. Imagine we spring from a society where beards are pretty much de rigueur (classical Athens, say, or Farringdon Road). Imagine we said: ‘Socrates is a man, all men have beards, therefore Socrates has a beard’? Though one of its premises is wrong, the statement barrels ahead regardless; it’s internally consistent, and so, if you’re not paying attention, it creates the appearance of truth. But there’s worse: the argument that gives Socrates a beard might actually be true. Some men do have beards. Socrates may be one of them. And if he is, that beard seems — again, if you’re not paying attention — to confirm a false assertion.
 
William of Occam understood that our relationship with the world is a lot looser, cloudier and more indeterminate than syllogistic logic allows. That’s why, when a tavern owner hangs a barrel hoop outside his house, passing travellers know they can stop there for a drink. The moment words are decoupled from things they act as signs, negotiating flexibly with a world of blooming, buzzing confusion.
 
Once we take this idea to heart, then very quickly — and as a matter of taste more than anything — we discover how much more powerful straightforward explanations are than complicated ones. Occam came up with a number of versions of what even then was not an entirely new idea: ‘It is futile to do with more what can be done with less,’ he once remarked. Subsequent formulations do little but paint this lily.
 
His idea proved so powerful that three centuries later the French theologian Libert Froidmont coined the term ‘Occam’s Razor’, to describe how we arrive at good explanations by shaving away excess complexity. As Johnjoe McFadden shows, that razor’s still doing useful work.
 
Life is Simple is primarily a history of science, tracing William’s dangerous idea through astronomy, cosmology, physics and biology, from Copernicus to Brahe, Kepler to Newton, Darwin to Mendel, Einstein to Noether to Weyl. But McFadden never loses sight of William’s staggering, in some ways deplorable, influence over the human psyche as a whole. For if words are independent of things, how do we know what’s true?
 
Thanks to William of Occam, we don’t. The universe, after Occam, is unknowable. Yes, we can come up with explanations of things, and test them against observation and experience; but from here on in, our only test of truth will be utility. Ptolemy’s 2nd-century Almagest, a truly florid description of the motions of the stars and planetary paths, is not and never will be wrong; the worst we can say is that it’s overcomplicated.
 
In the Coen brothers’ movie The Big Lebowski, an exasperated Dude turns on his friend: ‘You’re not wrong, Walter,’ he cries, ‘you’re just an asshole.’ William of Occam is our universal Walter, and the first prophet of our disenchantment. He’s the friend we wish we’d never listened to when he told us Father Christmas was not real.
 
The great disrupter: how William of Occam overturned medieval thought. By Simon Ings. The Spectator, August 28, 2021.


Seven hundred years ago in a commentary on a religious tract, William of Ockham, a Franciscan friar, wrote that “plurality must never be posited without necessity.” Such is Occam’s razor.

 
A bit gnomic, you might think. A bit hard to see at first how it earned its status as one of the most prized intellectual tools in scientific endeavour. But in his new book Life is Simple, Johnjoe McFadden proclaims it world-changing, “cutting through the thickets of medieval metaphysics to clear a path for modern science.” In short, this is a book of hero-worship, and just possibly McFadden has a point.
 
For most of us, Occam’s razor is like a country we can’t quite place on the map; we know it’s something to do with simplicity, but we’re not sure exactly what. Cited widely in science, but often misunderstood, for some it’s invaluable, hinting at profound truths about the nature of knowledge. For others it’s worse than useless. The old line attributed to HL Mencken has it that for every complicated question there is an answer that is clear, simple and wrong.
 
At its heart is the idea that simplicity can in some way help us decide between competing theories, all else being equal. “It is futile to do with more what can be done with fewer,” as William put it elsewhere. Perhaps the most persistent of the confusions is that this means simpler wins every time, against any alternative. A more accurate paraphrasing might be “don’t add complications if you don’t have to.” That still leaves plenty of room for interpretation, not least about whether all else is ever really equal between two competing theories, giving us one of the most debated—and for my money intriguing—heuristics around. Mental shortcut or philosophical thicket? Questions about the razor’s true use and meaning abound. 
 
However, McFadden initially puts them aside, and begins with the man behind the metaphor, helping Occam to emerge as William, a fearless free-thinker who slashed even Aristotle down to size with cut-the-crap bravado; a bolshie radical whose afterlife as a vague abstraction means his impact is taken for granted, but who inspired the mother of all intellectual revolutions. We discover that he has been named as a plausible model for the character William of Baskerville, played in The Name of the Rose by an ex-James Bond, Sean Connery and, on this telling, that sounds about right. The Pope, who William accused of heresy, summoned him to Avignon for trial and fancied to burn him at the stake, only for Bond—I mean William—to be smuggled from under the papal nose in the dead of night onto a ship to who knows where, to flash his razor again.
 
We look on as intellectual shibboleths are brutally simplified by being cut out altogether. Take the universal essences that Aristotle said existed in all things—cherries with their essence of cherry-ness, fathers with some shared but elusive quality of father-ness. This metaphysical theory, like the related theory of forms posited by Plato, has provoked philosophical debate for millennia. Still, Slash goes William: a father has no universal essence of fatherhood; a father’s just a man with kids, and that’s all the definition we need.
 
In any case, if God is omnipotent, he can make cherries any way he likes; “cherry” is just the name people have chosen for them, says William, thus helping to distinguish the world of God from that of ordinary mortals—one the province of faith and the unknowable truth, the other of human thought—and slash, liberating science to think what it can, free from the binds of old religion.
 
Aristotle’s insistence that each thing was only of its kind meant that not even lines and circles could be thought connected, and that maths must stand apart from life. Slash goes William, pointing out that you can uncoil a circled rope to make a line, thus smoothing the incorporation of maths into science, with the former eventually pervading and guiding the latter.
 
“Really?” you ask as McFadden piles up William’s intellectual credits, “can we honestly attribute so much to one man?” But you suspend your doubts to enjoy the ride, as William despatches received wisdoms like villains in the alleyways of thought.
 
The bulk of the 350 pages tells the many stories of how various architects of different scientific breakthroughs are indebted to William, with a succession of names and discoveries that verges at times on the encyclopaedic: Copernicus, Kepler, Galileo, Boyle, Newton, Mendel, Einstein… and more, all cutting through old errors, discovering new and elegant laws, unifying the universe in some simplifying way—a fil rouge through the history of science from a practising scientist who is clearly comfortable with his vast material.
 
Here’s William in 1320, anticipating by more than 500 years, says McFadden, the theory that reduces nature’s variety to a simple process of natural selection acting on random variation: “The necessity of nature brings it about that the parts in some animals are conveniently arranged for the health of the whole. For example, the front teeth are sharp and apt for dividing food and the molars are flat and apt for mashing food… these parts do not exist because of such uses. Rather, when they come to be then the animals survive. The reason is this… these parts become apt for conserving the animal by chance.” 
 
It is hard not to marvel. But afterwards, the slight unease returns: a feeling that the all-encompassing story of William’s simplifying genius sounds a little too marvellous to be true. This is partly because McFadden has so far avoided most of the philosophical argument. The reader is asked instead to trust the historical examples of the razor’s efficacy, even though some have wondered if all these examples truly exemplify simplification.
 
Writers must make choices, or long books become longer. But the relative lack of philosophy is the price paid—because after all this is an idea—and you could be forgiven frustration when McFadden lobs in, in isolation, the sentence: “Not even simplicity is as simple as it might appear,” with a footnote pointing to another book, Elliott Sober’s Ockham’s Razors.
 
Indeed, his title Life is Simple topped of my list of provocations, since not even McFadden believes that’s what William meant. Occam’s razor, he writes in one of the few, brief forays into the thickets of its meaning, “contrary to many of its detractors, does not insist that the world is simple, only that in reasoning about it we should not multiply entities beyond necessity. If the existing entities cannot do the job, then you have free rein to add as many entities as needed, so long as they are not ‘beyond necessity.’”
 
If you’re now wondering how we’re supposed to tell how much complexity is necessary in judging or postulating a scientific theory, you’re not alone. Confusion whether Occam’s razor implies a fundamentally simple universe has dogged the idea for much of its long life. McFadden seems clear that it implies no such thing. The science writer and Prospect contributor Philip Ball agrees: “Occam’s razor was never meant for paring nature down to some beautiful, parsimonious core of truth.” So where is McFadden going with his title—apparently so at odds with his hero’s rule?
 
All becomes clear. If Occam’s razor emphatically does not insist that the universe is simple, McFadden, it turns out, emphatically does. He believes it really is innately “parsimonious,” or even “lazy,” taking the most direct route to achieving life and a viable universe. He calls this “strong Occam,” in contrast to the “weak Occam” William himself had in mind.
 
It’s bracing stuff. Simplicity becomes the fabric of life and the guiding principle of science, even if we may never know whether science has arrived at the final, definitive description of that simplicity. Weak Occam works, McFadden thinks, because it pecks at this deeper truth. For support, he leans partly on arguments from probability: simpler is simply more likely.
 
Is he right? No idea. Again, the case in the book is mostly sold, not weighed. But it’s an arresting thought. The question that will bother general readers, I think, remains one which has often haunted Occam. What do we do with this vision of simplicity? How do we use it? Does it strengthen the case for generally preferring simpler explanations? Or only under certain conditions?  



 
One prominent statistician—Andrew Gelman, working in social science—hates Occam, finding it useless for practical inquiry. When McFadden speaks of “life,” he means fundamental physics and biology. Gelman is interested in social life and politics. Does Occam work for one but not the other? Since the temptation to extend ideas of simplicity across the whole caboodle can end up feeding totalitarianism, some sense of the limits seems essential. 
 
Practical life is evidently not simple at all and trying to simplify it can do harm. Afghanistan, climate change, Covid? Even physics can quickly hit complexity. Consider the humble snowflake. Is that simple? Yes and no. Its hexagonal pattern apparently derives from nature’s most efficient way of joining H2O molecules. But as Ken Libbrecht has written: “The growth of snowflakes is a highly nonlinear, nonequilibrium phenomenon, for which subtle processes at the nanoscale can profoundly affect the development of complex patterns at all scales. Understanding their formation requires a rich synthesis of molecular dynamics, surface physics, growth instabilities, pattern formation and statistical mechanics.”
 
The upshot is that we cannot say how even a single damn snowflake will turn out. Even simple mechanisms, stuck together, quickly form a path to unfathomable complexity— which, by the way, can be as aesthetically seductive as simplicity. A sleek theory holds undoubted aesthetic appeal, but there can be exquisite beauty in complexity too, which makes life interesting, renders nature more mysterious and saves us from predictability.
 
This complexity is perfectly consistent with McFadden’s argument. A set of simple rules can have Byzantine, unpredictable consequences. But it does mean in the end that the book invites as many questions as it offers answers, especially as there’s so little space for doubters, or for real consideration of counter arguments. And you do wonder at times if McFadden has been on a rampant confirmation-bias trip, seeking any reference anywhere that suggests a loose affinity with William’s thought to claim that he was father to just about every great scientific idea since the 14th century.
 
But McFadden’s love for William is hard to resist. If you are at all interested in the history of ideas, this is a fabulous read. Even after you’ve taken a few detours through other material to become better oriented in the controversy over what exactly he’s good for, William plausibly still stands as a daring, original figure who deserves a place in the Pantheon, and McFadden has done a great service in bringing the whole William and his influence to wider attention. In short, Life is Simple is enthralling. But whether life is simple, and how or whether Occam can help, is another book.
 
Occam’s razor and the limits of simplicity. By Michael Blastland. Prospect,  September 15, 2021






William of Ockham is the medieval philosopher who gave us what is perhaps the world's only metaphysical knife. Raised by Franciscan friars and educated at Oxford in the late 13th century, he focused his energies on what can only be described as esoterica, topics spanning theology and politics. In service of this occupation, he clashed with Pope John XXII and was excommunicated by the Catholic Church.

 Ockham's exploration of the philosophical concept of nominalism and his preference for parsimony in logical arguments gave rise to the concept of Ockham's Razor (sometimes spelled "Occam"). Stated plainly, the Razor asserts that if two models equally explain a scenario, the simpler of the two is more likely.

 Remarkably, this principle has been applied and contested for seven-hundred years, though the metaphor of the Razor itself surfaced after Ockham's death. Yet the boundaries of science have expanded into the territories of quantum mechanics, human behavior, and artificial intelligence — complicated fields, where "simplicity" may not always apply. To that, one might reasonably ask if Ockham's Razor is still a useful principle when it comes to science. In other words: Is the Razor still sharp?

 The Value of the Razor

  In his book "The Demon-Haunted World," the late Carl Sagan introduces a thought experiment of a dragon in his garage. When Sagan convinces someone to come look at the dragon, the visitor opens the garage door and finds nothing there. Sagan then counters that "she's an invisible dragon," and, naturally, cannot be seen. The visitor suggests setting up an infrared camera to catch the thermal emissions from the dragon's breath, but Sagan's dragon gives off no heat. The visitor then suggests layering the floor with flour to detect the movement of the dragon, but Sagan's dragon floats serenely, leaving no footprints nor stirring the air. At this point, most would agree with the visitor's logical conclusion: Sagan's invisible, floating, thermally-neutral pet dragon is a fiction. Ockham's Razor cuts through the chaff of Sagan's dubious explanations to suggest that given the state of the evidence – an empty garage – the most prudent interpretation is that there is no dragon.

 For those who think the example above is far-fetched, consider instead some of the more outlandish conspiracy theories circulating on the internet. To their adherents, any rational challenge to them is met with a further amendment to the original theory. The theory becomes increasingly baroque and convoluted to respond to each subsequent challenge to its initial thesis.

 If conspiracy theories are often characterized by a surplus of cobbled together amendments to shore up the original thesis, the challenges of many modern scientific research studies are more akin to a criminal investigation. The researcher finds an empty garage, looks inside, and attempts to infer what has transpired. The imaginative can concoct many stories to explain what they find, but each explanation will be subject to the biases of the investigator.

 In his classic article, "Why Most Published Research Findings Are False" John Ioannidis explains why research that examines a "greater number and lesser preselection of tested relationships" is prone to this problem. Stated another way: "seek and ye shall find." Particularly in observational studies that capture vast numbers of predictor variables, it becomes quite possible that one or more of these many variables appears to have a relationship with the outcome due to chance alone. Preselection is important, as in the absence of a conjecture of what factors matter prior to the research, it is easier to concoct a story that links variables that may simply be random noise. This problem is compounded by modern statistical software packages that make it easy to test hundreds of variables against an outcome, even when the researcher has prior reason to believe that a given variable would be linked to the outcome.

 Ockham's Razor is useful in these situations by challenging research where "everything but the kitchen sink" is tested against one or more outcomes. Sometimes, the simplest explanation of unlikely results is that the study in question is inconclusive, and any apparent relationships are more noise than signal.

 The challenge of knowing where to cut

 In physics, Ockham's Razor has long been associated with aesthetics. Simplicity and parsimony as formulated by Ockham become elegance and truth among Einstein and his contemporaries. It is said that Einstein was indifferent when told that experimental findings found evidence to support his theory of General Relativity. The theory had to be correct, he reasoned, as it was simply too elegant to be wrong. Or, in his own words, "the only physical theories that we are willing to accept are the beautiful ones."

 But defining what is "beautiful" in science is as contentious as it is in art. Though Einstein's aesthetics were prescient, it is hard to build a scientific enterprise around such intuitions.

 The essayist and science writer Philip Ball points out that Ockham's Razor has been used both to advance the "Many Worlds" interpretation of quantum mechanics as well as to critique it. (The Many World interpretation posits that there are numerous parallel universes in which all possible outcomes of binary quantum mechanical measurements are realized.)The simplicity and elegance of the theory are contingent on how we define the terms. The assumptions of the Many Worlds hypothesis may be simple, but its predictions and implications are vast and complex. So which way should the Razor cut?

 It is also easier to apply the Razor when examining past paradigm changes in science than when using it to evaluate current scientific disputes. Take the renewed debate on whether COVID-19 began as a natural zoonotic illness or emerged from a lab. To apply Ockham's Razor we have to first be much more specific about what constitutes a simple explanation. We then have to ask an even more challenging question of which theory best fits the existing data. Such a question involves determining how hard it would be for COVID-19 to naturally evolve, examining both the molecular as well as the epidemiological evidence. The point being, invoking the Razor is often easier than applying it.

 Nicks in the blade

 Ironically the preservation of Ockham's Razor over the centuries may be due to its own internal simplicity. Simply by uttering the phrase "Ockham's Razor," it is possible to challenge everything from an interpretation of a new physics experiment, to the explanation of a social movement, to a possible account for a crime scene. The Razor has broad utility in pushing back against explanations that appear to be overly complicated or continue to amend their original thesis by layering secondary and contingent explanations in response to new challenges.

 Yet in science, the Razor is just one concept that researchers might use in considering a theory. How predictive is the theory? Is it falsifiable? How well does it align with other explanations that we believe are correct? How internally consistent is it? These and many more questions all are part of the discourse of science. Ockham's Razor in and of itself is not the sole criterion for finding the truth — and applying the Razor outside of the narrow realm of statistical model selection is not so simple.

 For scientists that would equate the Razor with beauty and elegance, this only sparks the question of who gets to define beauty? Past scientific revolutions have a habit of diminishing the centrality of humans; the heavens do not revolve around us, we were not created separate from the rest of nature, our minds are not perfectly rational in their function. Believing that the universe must accord with our own sense of the beautiful seems another case of hubris and unwarranted human exceptionalism.

 A close shave

 Let's revisit the dragon in the garage. Imagine you are told that this invisible dragon can induce fatal burns without the heat and smoke of fire. You investigate further and conclude that since there is no evidence of a beast, neither the dragon nor its deadly force can exist. Hours later, you succumb to radiation burns from your exposure in the garage.

 Though Okham's Razor may not be well suited to all types of knowledge, at the boundaries of scientific knowledge it offers a rubric to test hypotheses. The Razor continues to demonstrate utility to whittle down chaff at the margins. It would be convenient if the Razor alone was sufficient to settle all scientific debate. But the world, it turns out, is not so parsimonious.

  

As science advances, does Ockham’s Razor still apply? By Luke Shors and Amit Chandra. Salon, June 13, 2021.