Showing posts with label neuroscience. Show all posts
Showing posts with label neuroscience. Show all posts

09/09/2022

Why We Need a Universal Declaration for Neurorights

 




 
BRAD EVANS: I would like to begin this conversation by asking about a recent claim you made concerning how we are within a decade of producing technologies that will be able to read a person’s mind. Can you talk more about the scientific basis for this assertion, which for many would seem to belong to the realm of science fiction?
 
RAFAEL YUSTE: With laboratory animals, neuroscientists have already been able to decode brain activity to different degrees and even manipulate this activity. We have shown it is possible to take control over the functioning of the brain, which is a process that’s been in operation for more than a decade now. And we see it becoming an increasingly powerful possibility, especially as the technologies to intervene are becoming more advanced. One example that draws upon the work we do in our laboratory uses optical neurotechnology, which allows us to study vision in mice; by monitoring the activity of neurons in the visual cortex we can actually decode what the animal is looking at, and by activating those neurons we can take it a stage further and make the animal see what they are not seeing.
 
This is just an example of what you can do with animals, which can have a profound impact on what they perceive and how they respond to manufactured stimuli. Decoding brain activity in this way could lead to the controlling of behavior, by altering perception and recoding the images in the mind. What we can already do with mice today, we will no doubt be able to do with humans tomorrow. It’s unavoidable. So, what matters now is how we learn to regulate it and ensure it is not abused in any way.
 
My colleagues at Stanford recently showed how it is now possible to decode speech in paralyzed patients up to some 20 words per minute with 95 percent accuracy, just by recording neuroactivity with implanted devices. In terms of stimulating and controlling brain activity, there is also a longer history of interventions for medical conditions such as Parkinson’s disease and depression that reveals the ways the brain is receptive to these technologies. While these procedures haven’t set out to control behavior, studies have shown that in some cases they can cause alienation and an alteration in the identity of the patients.
 
BE : I appreciate here that you are not raising your concerns with the active manipulation of the mind as a critical thinker but as a practicing neuroscientist. When did the alarm bells first ring for you concerning this issue?
 
RY : In the past I wasn’t at all working in ethics, but my passion was really to try and understand how the brain works. This was driven by a commitment that I still have, to do the very best for my patients. Through this I helped launch the US BRAIN Initiative back in 2013 during the Obama administration. It was during the conversations we had at the early stages of this initiative that I started to become more and more concerned with the commercial applications of neurotechnologies, which I realized could easily veer away from medical applications and be adapted for wider social usage. This prospect increasingly worried me as a scientist who was committed to exploring fully their medical capabilities. There seemed to me to be a fundamental disconnect between using neurotechnologies to save a person’s life, as opposed to their wider rollout for profits and everyday consideration.
 
So, my first response was the join the ethical council of the US BRAIN Initiative, to really try and push forward a discussion on an issue that nobody was really talking about. Following this, I helped organize a grassroots meeting held at Columbia University in 2017, which featured 25 experts from all over the world including neuroscience, neurosurgery, medical ethics, AI, and other areas, and representing different international brain initiatives. The ambition was to map out the potential ethical and societal challenges caused by neurotechnology and, more importantly, consider what we could do as a collective response. Through our discussions we concluded that what we were dealing with wasn’t an issue simply for medical ethics; it was a human rights problem that demanded an urgent solution. The brain is not just another organ. It is the organ that generates all our mental and cognitive abilities. After all, is there a more defining right than the rights we have to our mind and intellectual faculties?
 
BE : What you are proposing would seem to be rather self-evident in terms of protecting the integrity of the mind, and yet it also proposes a remarkable shift in how we might also conceptualize violence. We still often think about human rights violations as representing an assault on the body, and while there has been a notable shift in recent times to recognize the lasting psychological effects of violence and trauma, our analysis still often remains wedded to bodily concerns. What you seem to be suggesting is a shift in the very order of importance for rights, which I understand you have been trying to codify with the NeuroRights Foundation?
 
RY : The mind is the essence of what makes us human. So, if this is not a human rights issue, then what is a human rights issue? The NeuroRights Foundation began precisely from this ethical standpoint. This led us to identify the five neurorights we felt needed legal protections, which included the rights to mental privacy, personal identity, free will, fair access to mental augmentation, and protection from bias. What brings all of them together is the necessity to see the integrity of the mind as central to any human rights deliberations, which led to the publication of an article in the journal Nature that dealt with the ethical priorities faced as we started to come to terms with neurotechnology and AI, along with instigating more advocacy work with international organizations and countries.
 
Working with Jared Genser who is a leading human rights lawyer, and his team, we have been putting our energies into raising awareness about the issue of neurorights and pushing for legislation that can mitigate against potential abuses before they have the chance to arrive, at which point it may be too late to act with any effectiveness. A notable success has been in Chile, which in 2021 became the first country to officially ratify neuroprotections, by approving a constitutional amendment, with unanimous support, that protects brain activity and the information extracted from it.
 
I should stress that these concerns have been a direct response to the development of the technologies, which have in turn inspired a number of conversations in which we have sought to bring together human rights law with the ethical ideas as founded in the Hippocratic Oath. It required those of us working in the medical or biomedical professions to be alert to the potential dangers and reach out to those working in the legal fields. It became very obvious to us that we were not going to resolve this by relying upon medical ethics alone. It needed to be framed more as a policy issue, which required speaking with those who had vast experience of working to mitigate against some of the worst human rights abuses. Jared, for example, worked with victims of torture and tries to help free persons who are being politically detained by authoritarian regimes. In the beginning, you don’t think of such expertise when you first encounter neurotechnologies, but you eventually realize the evident crossovers. That was a real breakthrough for me, learning to see how we could both gain in terms of our responses.
 
I should also add: this is not just about neurotechnologies. We have all these other disruptive technologies being introduced, which have the potential to dramatically alter the human condition. The Metaverse, robotics, gaming, surveillance technologies, the internet, genetic engineering, and artificial intelligence — these will all require us to think more rigorously about their impacts and what it means to be human. Surely if what it means to be human changes, then so must our conception of the rights humans should be entitled to? Such issues cannot be left to soft-law regulations as we see them in the culture of medical ethics alone. We need to develop and incorporate legal provisions that can protect humans of the future.
 
BE : I am very taken here by this idea of the broadening of the framework for human rights to account for what William Connolly once termed the “neuropolitical.” Mindful of this, I would like to press you more on the problem of violence. We often think of violence in very invasive ways; yet what also seems to concern us is the anticipated arrival of noninvasive technologies that might also demand a rethinking of what violation actually means?
 
RY : Our angle is exactly to look at the abusive use of noninvasive technologies as representing a new kind of psychological violence. From World War II onward, our conception of human rights, as you mentioned, has been tied to concerns with violence and mobilized to physically protect people from harm. We are entering a world, however, where technologies no longer simply threaten our bodies. They are directly affecting our minds. But maybe we shouldn’t look at this negatively. Just as the human rights framework has provisions that positively help improve the human condition, so we might also see the protection of neurorights as part of an attempt to expand the freedom of thought. So, it’s not only about violence, but also reveals something deeper about the essence of the human.
 
We really try to deal with this through our commitment to mental privacy that should be guaranteed for all. If mental privacy was to be recognized as a human right, for example, by appealing more broadly to the legislation concerning psychological violence and torture, similar to those horrific cases we hear about where people suffer unimaginable abuse in the attempts to extract information from the brain, we would already be prepared to face up to the challenge of unwarranted mental interventions. Consent would be needed before the integrity of the mind was brought into question.
 
BE : Despite what you are saying and my full agreement, it strikes me that a major challenge we are going to need to confront with the commercial application of such technologies (as seen in the ambitions of companies such as Neuralink) is the seduction and appeal they will have in creating so-called better augmented humans?
 
RY : This is a major issue. Let’s track back here. We can potentially use neurotechnologies to read, write, code, and manipulate the activity of the mind. This is a formidable power. But we should remember, at this stage, neurotechnologies for reading are far more advanced than those which might manipulate. But if we can set the frameworks in place now to protect mental privacy, then what will be possible in the coming decades will already be partially legislated against. The problem, however, is that the conversation and legislation regarding social deployments is regulated by the field of consumer electronics, which are not focused on human rights. This becomes a more pressing concern when we start to properly consider the potential for mental augmentation.




 
The moment this ability arrives, it will be inevitable and its consequences unavoidable. We will all be required to augment, or else we face the prospect of creating some dual kind of citizenship based on new mental aptitudes. What kinds of discriminations might this produce? Will we end up producing a new hybrid species? Could this create new fractures and divisions that further exacerbate existing inequalities? And what will it mean for us personally and for the societies in which we live? Are we really prepared to wash away an intellectual system that’s upheld civilizations for a few millennia? Now is the time to have these conversations. We have to know in advance what we are giving ourselves over to and think very clearly about what to do before commercial augmentation happens. And this is a conversation that urgently needs to be taken out of the realm of consumer electronics.
 
We are already starting to learn painful lessons about what happens when we rush to introduce technologies without properly considering their full ethical implications. Social media is perhaps the most obvious example here. How many of its applications would properly pass considered and rigorous ethical scrutiny, given what we now know about their impacts on mental health, addiction, and wider social harms, which are affecting billions of people around the world? There are stark warnings to be learned about following the technology-first-ethical-considerations-later approach for sure.
 
BE : As a political theorist, whenever somebody talks about the wonders of any new technology, my instinct is to immediately ask about their political and military applications. Do these also factor into your immediate concerns?
 
RY : Given the forces at work, the uses you mention are invariably a pressing and deeply troubling concern. It’s not been our primary focus as we have sought to begin by having a more civil public conversation, but it is something that is really worrisome in terms of the longer-term possibility for a new neurotechnological arms race. Let me just give you a couple of examples of the weaponization of neurotechnologies that have already been considered by military leaders and strategists. First, in the United States, is the N3 project launched by DARPA to develop wireless and noninvasive BCIs (Brain-Computer Interfaces) for soldiers to be better equipped on the battlefield. This is about improving performance and the maneuverability of intelligently designed weapons systems. Secondly, in China, there is an extensive state-sponsored brain initiative, which is supposedly three times larger than the one that was instigated in the United States, but, crucially, run by the military. Supposedly, its primary purpose is to merge neuroscience and AI to enhance the power of the security state.
 
Next to where I am speaking to you from right now at Columbia University is Pupin Hall, where the first atomic reactor was built, which started the Manhattan Project. The atomic bomb was planned in close proximity to where I am sat. I am reminded of this every single day as I go to work, mindful of the consequences. It is also worth remembering that the physicists who built the bomb were the first to advocate for guidance on the use of atomic energy, and because of their advocacy, the Atomic Energy Commission was established in Vienna by the UN. I work in this shadow, realizing technologies are neutral and can be used for good or bad.
 
Though, to be honest, at this stage I am more concerned with the big corporations and what it might mean to have economies modeled around the ambition of drawing brain data. It’s not just like eavesdropping on emails, or monitoring and even manipulating social media feeds and the rest. Mental privacy is the sanctuary of our minds. What we are dealing with are fundamental questions concerning our sense of self and how we live together in this world. Right now, I think we are seeing the first steps towards living in what we might call “the neurotechnological age,” which will place monumental responsibilities upon our shoulders.
 
BE : To conclude, I would like to ask you to consider more the work you do in light of the horrors caused by the Manhattan Project. As a scientist, do you ever step back and think the risks to the work you do might outweigh the benefits?
 
RY : I am an optimist and bullish about neurotechnology and its future, but, unfortunately, the world is not perfect. And of course, I wish that bad intentions did not exist, but we could confront potential negative scenarios for humanity. Mindful of this, we shouldn’t stop trying to develop tools that will push forward and help humanity because they could be used for alternative or nefarious uses. Instead, we need to be vigilant to those uses and legislate against them to the best of our abilities. As a medic, I am duty-bound to try to help people to the best of my professional ability. While it is a duty I take very seriously, I know in my flesh the real devastation caused by mental trauma and illness, so it’s something I care very passionately about in terms of finding solutions.
 
Almost every day I get an email from a patient, mother, or friend asking whether neurotechnology might help cure their disease or save the life of someone they love. And it’s heartbreaking to continually read them. These are people who urgently need our help. If anybody could make any kind of breakthrough in terms of how we might better understand the brain to assist those in need, I would encourage them to work 24/7 without hesitation. So, when I look at the Manhattan Project, I want to see what ethical lessons can be learned and how we can work in advance to preempt negative outcomes. We need to set up commissions prior to a neurotechnological disruption in society, for example, in terms of the mental privacy, identity, or agency of its citizens. We need to protect our minds from technology, something that previous generations did not have to worry about. It is precisely the way the technology could diminish the essence of our humanity that compels me to insist upon a universal framework for the protection of neurorights.
 
 
Histories of Violence: Why We Need a Universal Declaration for Neurorights. By Brad Evans. Los Angeles Review of Books, September 5, 2022.
 







On the evening of Oct. 10, 2006, Dennis DeGray’s mind was nearly severed from his body. After a day of fishing, he returned to his home in Pacific Grove, Calif., and realized he had not yet taken out the trash or recycling. It was raining fairly hard, so he decided to sprint from his doorstep to the garbage cans outside with a bag in each hand. As he was running, he slipped on a patch of black mold beneath some oak trees, landed hard on his chin, and snapped his neck between his second and third vertebrae.
 
While recovering, DeGray, who was 53 at the time, learned from his doctors that he was permanently paralyzed from the collarbones down. With the exception of vestigial twitches, he cannot move his torso or limbs. “I’m about as hurt as you can get and not be on a ventilator,” he told me. For several years after his accident, he “simply laid there, watching the History Channel” as he struggled to accept the reality of his injury.
 
Some time later, while at a fund-raising event for stem-cell research, he met Jaimie Henderson, a professor of neurosurgery at Stanford University. The pair got to talking about robots, a subject that had long interested DeGray, who grew up around his family’s machine shop. As DeGray remembers it, Henderson captivated him with a single question: Do you want to fly a drone?
 
Henderson explained that he and his colleagues had been developing a brain-computer interface: an experimental connection between someone’s brain and an external device, like a computer, robotic limb or drone, which the person could control simply by thinking. DeGray was eager to participate, eventually moving to Menlo Park to be closer to Stanford as he waited for an opening in the study and the necessary permissions. In the summer of 2016, Henderson opened DeGray’s skull and exposed his cortex — the thin, wrinkled, outermost layer of the brain — into which he implanted two 4-millimeter-by-4-millimeter electrode arrays resembling miniature beds of nails. Each array had 100 tiny metal spikes that, collectively, recorded electric impulses surging along a couple of hundred neurons or so in the motor cortex, a brain region involved in voluntary movement.
 
After a recovery period, several of Henderson’s collaborators assembled at DeGray’s home and situated him in front of a computer screen displaying a ring of eight white dots the size of quarters, which took turns glowing orange. DeGray’s task was to move a cursor toward the glowing dot using his thoughts alone. The scientists attached cables onto metal pedestals protruding from DeGray’s head, which transmitted the electrical signals recorded in his brain to a decoder: a nearby network of computers running machine-learning algorithms.
 
The algorithms were constructed by David Brandman, at the time a doctoral student in neuroscience collaborating with the Stanford team through a consortium known as BrainGate. He designed them to rapidly associate different patterns of neural activity with different intended hand movements, and to update themselves every two to three seconds, in theory becoming more accurate each time. If the neurons in DeGray’s skull were like notes on a piano, then his distinct intentions were analogous to unique musical compositions. An attempt to lift his hand would coincide with one neural melody, for example, while trying to move his hand to the right would correspond to another. As the decoder learned to identify the movements DeGray intended, it sent commands to move the cursor in the corresponding direction.
 
Brandman asked DeGray to imagine a movement that would give him intuitive control of the cursor. Staring at the computer screen, searching his mind for a way to begin, DeGray remembered a scene from the movie “Ghost” in which the deceased Sam Wheat (played by Patrick Swayze) invisibly slides a penny along a door to prove to his girlfriend that he still exists in a spectral form. DeGray pictured himself pushing the cursor with his finger as if it were the penny, willing it toward the target. Although he was physically incapable of moving his hand, he tried to do so with all his might. Brandman was ecstatic to see the decoder work as quickly as he had hoped. In 37 seconds, DeGray gained control of the cursor and reached the first glowing dot. Within several minutes he hit dozens of targets in a row.
 
Only a few dozen people on the planet have had neural interfaces embedded in their cortical tissue as part of long-term clinical research. DeGray is now one of the most experienced and dedicated among them. Since that initial trial, he has spent more than 1,800 hours spanning nearly 400 training sessions controlling various forms of technology with his mind. He has played a video game, manipulated a robotic limb, sent text messages and emails, purchased products on Amazon and even flown a drone — just a simulator, for now — all without lifting a finger. Together, DeGray and similar volunteers are exploring the frontier of a technology with the potential to fundamentally alter how humans and machines interact.



 
Scientists and engineers have been creating and studying brain-computer interfaces since the 1950s. Given how much of the brain’s behavior remains a mystery — not least how consciousness emerges from three pounds of electric jelly — the aggregate achievements of such systems are remarkable. Paralyzed individuals with neural interfaces have learned to play simple tunes on a digital keyboard, control exoskeletons and maneuver robotic limbs with enough dexterity to drink from a bottle. In March, a team of international scientists published a study documenting for the first time that someone with complete, bodywide paralysis used a brain-computer interface to convey their wants and needs by forming sentences one letter at a time.
 
Neural interfaces can also create bidirectional pathways of communication between brain and machine. In 2016, Nathan Copeland, who was paralyzed from the chest down in a car accident, not only fist-bumped President Barack Obama with a robotic hand, he also experienced the tactile sensation of the bump in his own hand as the prosthesis sent signals back to electrodes in his brain, stimulating his sensory cortex. By combining brain-imaging technology and neural networks, scientists have also deciphered and partly reconstructed images from people’s minds, producing misty imitations that resemble weathered Polaroids or smeared oil paintings.

 

Most researchers developing brain-computer interfaces say they are primarily interested in therapeutic applications, namely restoring movement and communication to people who are paralyzed or otherwise disabled. Yet the obvious potential of such technology and the increasing number of high-profile start-ups developing it suggest the possibility of much wider adoption: a future in which neural interfaces actually enhance people’s innate abilities and grant them new ones, in addition to restoring those that have been lost.
 
In the history of life on Earth, we have never encountered a mind without a body. Highly complex cognition has always been situated in an intricate physical framework, whether eight suction-cupped arms, four furry limbs or a bundle of feather and beak. Human technology often amplifies the body’s inherent abilities or extends the mind into the surrounding environment through the body. Art and writing, agriculture and engineering: All human innovations have depended on, and thus been constrained by, the body’s capacity to physically manipulate whatever tools the mind devises. If brain-computer interfaces fulfill their promise, perhaps the most profound consequence will be this: Our species could transcend those constraints, bypassing the body through a new melding of mind and machine.
 
On a spring morning in 1893, during a military training exercise in Würzburg, Germany, a 19-year-old named Hans Berger was thrown from his horse and nearly crushed to death by the wheel of an artillery gun. The same morning, his sister, 60 miles away in Coburg, was flooded with foreboding and persuaded her father to send a telegram inquiring about her brother’s well-being. That seemingly telepathic premonition obsessed Berger, compelling him to study the mysteries of the mind. His efforts culminated in the 1920s with the invention of electroencephalography (EEG): a method of recording electrical activity in the brain using electrodes attached to the scalp. The oscillating patterns his apparatus produced, reminiscent of a seismograph’s scribbling, were the first transcriptions of the human brain’s cellular chatter.



 
In the following decades, scientists learned new ways to record, manipulate and channel the brain’s electrical signals, constructing ever-more-elaborate bridges between mind and machine. In 1964, José Manuel Rodríguez Delgado, a Spanish neurophysiologist, brought a charging bull to a halt using radio-controlled electrodes embedded in the animal’s brain. In the 1970s, the University of California Los Angeles professor Jacques Vidal coined the term brain-computer interface and demonstrated that people could mentally guide a cursor through a simple virtual maze. By the early 2000s, the Duke University neuroscientist Miguel Nicolelis and his collaborators had published studies demonstrating that monkeys implanted with neural interfaces could control robotic prostheses with their minds. In 2004, Matt Nagle, who was paralyzed from the shoulders down, became the first human to do the same. He further learned how to use his thoughts alone to play Pong, change channels on a television, open emails and draw a circle on a computer screen.
 
Since then, the pace of achievements in the field of brain-computer interfaces has increased greatly, thanks in part to the rapid development of artificial intelligence. Machine-learning software has substantially improved the efficiency and accuracy of neural interfaces by automating some of the necessary computation and anticipating the intentions of human users, not unlike how your phone or email now has A.I.-assisted predictive text. Last year, the University of California San Francisco neurosurgeon Edward Chang and a dozen collaborators published a landmark study describing how a neural interface gave a paralyzed 36-year-old man a voice for the first time in more than 15 years. Following a car crash and severe stroke at age 20, the man, known as Pancho, lost the ability to produce intelligible speech. Over a period of about 20 months, 128 disk-shaped electrodes placed on top of Pancho’s sensorimotor cortex recorded electrical activity in brain regions involved in speech processing and vocal tract control as he attempted to speak words aloud. A decoder associated different patterns of neural activity with different words and, with the help of language-prediction algorithms, eventually learned to decipher 15 words per minute with 75 percent accuracy on average. Although this is only a fraction of the rate of typical speech in English (140 to 200 words a minute), it is considerably faster than many point-and-click methods of communication available to people with severe paralysis.
 
In another groundbreaking study published last year, Jaimie Henderson and several colleagues, including Francis Willett, a biomedical engineer, and Krishna Shenoy, an electrical engineer, reported an equally impressive yet entirely different approach to communication by neural interface. The scientists recorded neurons firing in Dennis DeGray’s brain as he visualized himself writing words with a pen on a notepad, trying to recreate the distinct hand movements required for each letter. He mentally wrote thousands of words in order for the system to reliably recognize the unique patterns of neural activity specific to each letter and output words on a screen. “You really learn to hate M’s after a while,” he told me with characteristic good humor. Ultimately, the method was extremely successful. DeGray was able to type up to 90 characters or 18 words a minute — more than twice the speed of his previous efforts with a cursor and virtual keyboard. He is the world’s fastest mental typist. “Sometimes I get going so fast it’s just one big blur,” he said. “My concentration gets to a point where it’s not unusual for them to remind me to breathe.”
 
Achievements in brain-computer interfaces to date have relied on a mix of invasive and noninvasive technologies. Many scientists in the field, including those who work with DeGray, rely on a surgically embedded array of spiky electrodes produced by a Utah-based company, Blackrock Neurotech. The Utah Array, as it’s known, can differentiate the signals of individual neurons, providing more refined control of connected devices, but the surgery it requires can result in infection, inflammation and scarring, which may contribute to eventual degradation of signal strength. Interfaces that reside outside the skull, like headsets that depend on EEG, are currently limited to eavesdropping on the collective firing of groups of neurons, sacrificing power and precision for safety. Further complicating the situation, most neural interfaces studied in labs require cumbersome hardware, cables and an entourage of computers, whereas most commercially available interfaces are essentially remote controls for rudimentary video games, toys and apps. These commercial headsets don’t solve any real-world problems, and the more powerful systems in clinical studies are too impractical for everyday use.
 
With this problem in mind, Elon Musk’s company Neuralink has developed an array of flexible polymer threads studded with more than 3,000 tiny electrodes connected to a bottlecap-size wireless radio and signal processor, as well as a robot that can surgically implant the threads in the brain, avoiding blood vessels to reduce inflammation. Neuralink has tested its system in animals and has said it would begin human trials this year.
 
Synchron, which is based in New York, has developed a device called a Stentrode that doesn’t require open-brain surgery. It is a four-centimeter, self-expanding tubular lattice of electrodes, which is inserted into one of the brain’s major blood vessels via the jugular vein. Once in place, a Stentrode detects local electric fields produced by nearby groups of neurons in the motor cortex and relays recorded signals to a wireless transmitter embedded in the chest, which passes them on to an external decoder. In 2021, Synchron became the first company to receive F.D.A. approval to conduct human clinical trials of a permanently implantable brain-computer interface. So far, four people with varied levels of paralysis have received Stentrodes and used them, some in combination with eye-tracking and other assistive technologies, to control personal computers while unsupervised at home.
 
Philip O’Keefe, 62, of Greendale, Australia, received a Stentrode in April 2020. Because of amyotrophic lateral sclerosis (A.L.S.), O’Keefe can walk only short distances, cannot move his left arm and is losing the ability to speak clearly. At first, he explained, he had to concentrate intensely on the imagined movements required to operate the system — in his case, thinking about moving his left ankle for different lengths of time. “But the more you use it, the more it’s like riding a bike,” he said. “You get to a stage where you don’t think so hard about the movement you need to make. You think about the function you need to execute, whether it’s opening an email, scrolling a web page or typing some letters.” In December, O’Keefe became the first person in the world to post to Twitter using a neural interface: “No need for keystrokes or voices,” he wrote by mind. “I created this tweet just by thinking it. #helloworldbci”
 




Thomas Oxley, a neurologist and the founding C.E.O. of Synchron, thinks future brain-computer interfaces will fall somewhere between LASIK and cardiac pacemakers in terms of their cost and safety, helping people with disabilities recover the capacity to engage with their physical surroundings and a rapidly evolving digital environment. “Beyond that,” he says, “if this technology allows anyone to engage with the digital world better than with an ordinary human body, that is where it gets really interesting. To express emotion, to express ideas — everything you do to communicate what is happening in your brain has to happen through the control of muscles. Brain-computer interfaces are ultimately going to enable a passage of information that goes beyond the limitations of the human body. And from that perspective, I think the capacity of the human brain is actually going to increase.”
 
There is no technology yet that can communicate human thoughts as fast as they occur. Fingers and thumbs will never move quickly enough. And there are many forms of information processing better suited to a computer than to a human brain. Oxley speculated about the possibility of using neural interfaces to enhance human memory, bolster innate navigational skills with a direct link to GPS, sharply increase the human brain’s computational abilities and create a new form of communication in which emotions are wordlessly “thrown” from one mind to another. “It’s just the beginning of the dawn of this space,” Oxley said. “It’s really going to change the way we interact with one another as a species.”
 
Frederic Gilbert, a philosopher at the University of Tasmania, has studied the ethical quandaries posed by neurotechnology for more than a decade. Through in-depth interviews, he and other ethicists have documented how some people have adverse reactions to neural implants, including self-estrangement, increased impulsivity, mania, self-harm and attempted suicide. In 2015, he traveled to Penola, South Australia, to meet Rita Leggett, a 54-year-old patient with a very different, though equally troubling, experience.
 
Several years earlier, Leggett participated in the first human clinical trial of a particular brain-computer interface that warned people with epilepsy of imminent seizures via a hand-held beeper, giving them enough time to take a stabilizing medication or get to a safe place. With the implant, she felt much more confident and capable and far less anxious. Over time, it became inextricable from her identity. “It was me, it became me,” she told Gilbert. “With this device I found myself.” Around 2013, NeuroVista, the company that manufactured the neural interface, folded because it could not secure new funding. Despite her resistance, Leggett underwent an explantation. She was devastated. “Her symbiosis was so profound,” Gilbert told me, that when the device was removed, “she suffered a trauma.”
 
In a striking parallel, a recent investigation by the engineering magazine IEEE Spectrum revealed that, because of insufficient revenues, the Los Angeles-based neuroprosthetics company Second Sight had stopped producing and largely stopped servicing the bionic eyes they sold to more than 350 visually impaired people around the world. At least one individual’s implant has already failed with no way to repair it — a situation that could befall many others. Some patients enrolled in clinical trials for Second Sight’s latest neural interface, which directly stimulates the visual cortex, have either removed the device or are contemplating doing so.
 
If sophisticated brain-computer interfaces eventually transcend medical applications and become consumer goods available to the general public, the ethical considerations surrounding them multiply exponentially. In a 2017 commentary on neurotechnology, the Columbia University neurobiologist Rafael Yuste and 24 colleagues identified four main areas of concern: augmentation; bias; privacy and consent; and agency and identity. Neural implants sometimes cause disconcerting shifts in patients’ self-perception. Some have reported feeling like “an electronic doll” or developing a blurred sense of self. Were someone to commit a crime and blame an implant, how would the legal system determine fault? As neural interfaces and artificial intelligence evolve, these tensions will probably intensify.
 
All the scientists and engineers I spoke to acknowledged the ethical issues posed by neural interfaces, yet most were more preoccupied with consent and safety than what they regarded as far-off or unproven concerns about privacy and agency. In the world of academic scientific research, the appropriate future boundaries for the technology remain contentious.




 
In the private sector, ethics are often a footnote to enthusiasm, when they are mentioned at all. As pressure builds to secure funding and commercialize, spectacular and sometimes terrifying claims proliferate. Christian Angermayer, a German entrepreneur and investor, has said he is confident that everyone will be using brain-computer interfaces within 20 years. “It is fundamentally an input-output device for the brain, and it can benefit a large portion of society,” he posted on LinkedIn last year. “People will communicate with each other, get work done and even create beautiful artwork, directly with their minds.” Musk has described the ultimate goal of Neuralink as achieving “a sort of symbiosis with artificial intelligence” so that humanity is not obliterated, subjugated or “left behind” by superintelligent machines. “If you can’t beat em, join em,” he once said on Twitter, calling it a “Neuralink mission statement.” And Max Hodak, a former Neuralink president who was forced out of the company, then went on to found a new one called Science, dreams of using neural implants to make the human sensorium “directly programmable” and thereby create a “world of bits”: a parallel virtual environment, a lucid waking dream, that appears every time someone closes their eyes.
 
Today, DeGray, 68, still resides in the Menlo Park assisted-living facility he chose a decade ago for its proximity to Stanford. He still has the same two electrode arrays that Henderson embedded in his brain six years ago, as well as the protruding metal pedestals that provide connection points to external machines. Most of the time, he doesn’t feel their presence, though an accidental knock can reverberate through his skull as if it were a struck gong. In his everyday life, he relies on round-the-clock attention from caregivers and a suite of assistive technologies, including voice commands and head-motion tracking. He can get around in a breath-operated wheelchair, but long trips are taxing. He spends much of his time reading news articles, scientific studies and fiction on his computer. “I really miss books,” he told me. “They smell nice and feel good in your hands.”
 
DeGray’s personal involvement in research on brain-computer interfaces has become the focus of his life. Scientists from Stanford visit his home twice a week, on average, to continue their studies. “I refer to myself as a test pilot,” he said. “My responsibility is to take a nice new airplane out every morning and fly the wings off of it. Then the engineers drag it back into the hangar and fix it up, and we do the whole thing again the next day.”
 
Exactly what DeGray experiences when he activates his neural interface depends on his task. Controlling a cursor with attempted hand movements, for example, “boils the whole world down to an Etch A Sketch. All you have is left, right, up and down.” Over time, this kind of control becomes so immediate and intuitive that it feels like a seamless extension of his will. In contrast, maneuvering a robot arm in three dimensions is a much more reciprocal process: “I’m not making it do stuff,” he told me. “It’s working with me in the most versatile of ways. The two of us together are like a dance.”
 
No one knows exactly how long existing electrode arrays can remain in a human brain without breaking down or endangering someone’s health. Although DeGray can request explantation at any time, he wants to continue as a research participant indefinitely. “I feel very validated in what I’m doing here,” he said. “It would break my heart if I had to get out of this program for some reason.”
 
Regarding the long-term future of the technology in his skull, however, he is somewhat conflicted. “I actually spend quite a bit of time worrying about this,” he told me. “I’m sure it will be misused, as every technology is when it first comes out. Hopefully that will drive some understanding of where it should reside in our civilization. I think ultimately you have to trust in the basic goodness of man — otherwise, you would not pursue any new technologies ever. You have to just develop it and let it become monetized and see where it goes. It’s like having a baby: You only get to raise them for a while, and then you have to turn them loose on the world.”
 
The Man Who Controls Computers With His Mind. By Ferris Jabr. The New York Times, May 12, 2022.




In 2019, Rafael Yuste successfully implanted images directly into the brains of mice and controlled their behavior. Now, the neuroscientist warns that there is little that can prevent humans from being next.
 
If used responsibly, neurotechnology — in which machines interact directly with human neurons — can be used to understand and cure stubborn illnesses like Alzheimer's and Parkinson's disease, and assist with the development of prosthetic limbs and speech therapy.
 
But if left unregulated, neurotechnology could also lead to the worst corporate and state excesses, including discriminatory policing and privacy violations, leaving our minds as vulnerable to surveillance as our communications.
 
Now a group of neuroscientists, philosophers, lawyers, human rights activists and policymakers are racing to protect that last frontier of privacy — the brain.
 
They are not seeking a ban. Instead, campaigners like Yuste, who runs the Neurorights initiative at Columbia University, call for a set of principles that guarantee citizens' rights to their thoughts, and protection from any intruders, while taking advantage of any potential health benefits.
 
But they see plenty of reason to be alarmed about certain applications of neurotechnology, especially as it attracts the attention of militaries, governments and technology companies.
 
China and the U.S. are both leading research into artificial intelligence and neuroscience. The U.S. Defense department is developing technology that could be used to tweak memories.
 
It's not just scientists; firms, including major players like Facebook and Elon Musk's Neuralink are making advances too.
 
Neurotech wearables are now entering the market. Kernel, an American company, has developed a headset for the consumer market that can record brain activity in real time. Facebook funded a project to create a brain-computer interface that would allow users to communicate without speaking. (They pulled out this summer.) Neuralink is working on brain implants, and in April 2021 released a video of a monkey playing a game with its mind using the company’s implanted chip.
 
“The problem is what these tools can be used for,” he said. There are some scary examples: Researchers have used brain scans to predict the likelihood of criminals reoffending, and Chinese employers have monitored employees' brainwaves to read their emotions. Scientists have also managed to subliminally probe for personal information using consumer devices.
 
“We have on the table the possibility of a hybrid human that will change who we are as a species, and that's something that's very serious. This is existential,” he continued. Whether this is a change for good or bad, Yuste argues now is the time to decide.
 
Inception
 
The neurotechnology of today cannot decode thoughts or emotions. But with artificial intelligence, that might not be necessary. Powerful machine learning systems could make correlations between brain activity and external circumstances.
 
“In order to raise privacy challenges it’s sufficient that you have an AI that is powerful enough to identify patterns and establish correlative associations between certain patterns of data, and certain mental states,” said Marcello Ienca, a bioethicist at ETH Zurich.
 
Researchers have already managed to use a machine learning system to infer credit card digits from a person’s brain activity.
 
Brain scans have also been used in the criminal justice system for diagnostics and for predicting which criminals are likely to offend again, both of which at this stage — like lie detector tests before it — offer limited and at times flawed information.
 
That could have dire consequences for people of color, who are already likely to suffer disproportionately from algorithmic discrimination.
 
“[W]hen, for example, lie detection or the detection of memory appears accurate enough according to the science, why would the public prosecutor say no to such kind of technology?” said Sjors Ligthart, who studies the legal implications of coercive brain reading at Tilburg University.
 
With brain implants in particular, experts say it's unclear whether thoughts would be induced, or originate from the brain, which poses questions over accountability. “You cannot discern which tasks are being conducted by yourself and which thoughts are being accomplished by the AI, simply because the AI is becoming the mediator of your own mind,” Ienca said.
 
Where is my mind?
 
People have never needed to assert the authority of the individual over the thoughts they carry, but neurotechnology is prompting policymakers to do just that.
 
Chile is working on the world’s first law that would guarantee its citizens such so-called neurorights.
 
Senator Guido Girardi, who is behind Chile’s proposal, said the bill will create a similar registration system for neurotechnologies as for medicines, and using these technologies will need the consent of both the patient and doctors.
 
The goal is to ensure that technologies such as “AI can be used for good, but never to control a human being,” Girardi said.
 
In July, Spain adopted a nonbinding Charter for Digital Rights, meant to guide future legislative projects.
 
“The Spanish approach is to ensure the confidentiality and the security of the data that are related to these brain processes, and to ensure the complete control of the person over their data,” said Paloma Llaneza González, a data protection lawyer who worked on the charter.
 
“We want to guarantee the dignity of the person, equality and nondiscrimination, because you can discriminate people based on on his or her thoughts,” she said.
 
The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, a Paris-based club of mostly rich countries, approved nonbinding guidelines on neurotechnology, and lists new rights meant to protect privacy and the freedom to think one's own thoughts, known as cognitive liberty.
 
The problem is that it's unclear whether existing legislation, which did not have neurotech in mind when drafted, is adequate.
 
“What we do need is to take another look at existing rights and specify them to neurotechnology,” said Ligthart. One target might be the European Convention of Human Rights, which ensures, for example, the right to respect private life, which could be updated to also include the right to mental privacy.




 
The GDPR, Europe’s strict data protection regime, offers protection for sensitive data, such as health status and religious beliefs. But a study by Ienca and Gianclaudio Malgieri at the EDHEC Business School in Lille found that the law might not cover emotions and thoughts.
 
Yuste argues that action is needed on an international level, and organizations such as the U.N. need to act before the technology is developed further.
 
“We want to do something a little bit more intelligent than wait until we have a problem and then try to fix it when it's too late, which is what happened with the internet and privacy and AI,” Yuste said.
 
Today’s privacy issues are going to be “peanuts compared to what's coming.”
 
Machines can read your brain. There’s little that can stop them. By Melissa Heikkilä. Politico,
August 31, 2021. 




Recording memories, reading thoughts, and manipulating what another person sees through a device in their brain may seem like science fiction plots about a distant and troubled future. But a team of multi-disciplinary researchers say the first steps to inventing these technologies have already arrived. Through a concept called “neuro rights,” they want to put in place safeguards for our most precious biological possessions: our mind.

 
Headlining this growing effort today is the NeuroRights Initiative, formed by Columbia University neuroscientist Rafael Yuste. Their proposition is to stay ahead of the tech by convincing governments across the world to create “neuro rights” legal protections, in line with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, a document announced by the United Nations in 1948 as the standard for rights that should be universally protected for all people. Neuro rights advocates propose five additions to this standard: the rights to personal identity, free will, mental privacy, equal access to mental augmentation, and protection from algorithmic bias.
 
It’s a long way to go from theoretical protections to actual policy, especially when it comes to technology that doesn’t (yet) exist, but the movement has promise. The National Congress of Chile recently approved an amendment to add such protections to the Chilean constitution, becoming the first country ever to specifically include neural rights as protected by law. Chile, though, already had a branch of government dealing with protections regarding health (which reached out to the NeuroRights Initiative and Yuste on its own, seeking their advice). The reasons and methods for protections in other countries, including the U.S. for example, may differ.
 
Since brain data can now be tracked remotely and Elon Musk is forging ahead with Neuralink brain implants, it’s not so much fiction as it is fledgeling technology. Neuro rights advocates aim to convince disparate government policy makers, fellow researchers, and the public that it’s vital to stay ahead of the game, rather than wait for neurotechnology to become a problem.
 
The seeds of the movement began when Yuste became part of the Obama administration’s BRAIN Initiative, a program that linked a national network of neuroscience labs that would investigate brain-machine interfaces and related tech (which is now, in part thanks to Yuste, a global endeavor). But the ambitious nature of the initiative gave Yuste pause. While medical codes of ethics and neuroscience guidelines exist in various forms, there is no current unifying ethical code for neurotechnology.
 
“In the very first memo we sent to Obama, we highlighted the need for ethical regulation of all this technology,” Yuste said in a video interview. The BRAIN Initiative pooled research endeavors, from cell biology to brain mapping; some work included ways to decode or record thoughts or safely implant microchips into the brain. Recent NIH BRAIN initiative-funded projects include learning how the brain plans movements and how to do things like read minds using ultrasound.
 
Many neuro rights advocates are academics—including scientists whose own experiments have convinced them of the need for greater legal protections. In 2017, Yuste hosted informal talks and a workshop with independent volunteers from around the world called The Morningside Group. They huddled in a cramped classroom, almost shoulder to shoulder as they took turns writing on a chalkboard and sharing ideas (just one building away, Yuste likes to point out, from where Manhattan Project scientists realized, in 1939, that nuclear technology would change the world). Their fields spanned law, ethics, sciences, and philosophy, and by all accounts, it was exciting. “For three days, essentially, it was a closed meeting, and we came up with a series of ethical guidelines, also with the reflection that this is a human rights problem,” said Yuste.
 
They grappled with some big questions: How can we ensure that access to cognition-enhancing devices isn’t restricted to the very rich? Who owns the copyright to a recorded dream? What laws should exist to prevent one person from altering the memory of another through a neural implant? How do we maintain mental integrity separate from an implanted device? If someone can read our mind, how do we protect the read-out of our thoughts as our own?
 
These questions seem incredibly theoretical, but some arose from these researchers’ own experiments. One such project worked on by Yuste aimed to understand how groups of neurons work together in the visual cortex of the brain, but it incidentally let scientists alter the perception of mice, making them see things that were not actually there. After tracking which neurons were activated when the mice saw vertical bars on a screen, scientists could trigger just those neurons—and the mice, which had been trained to lick a water spout when they saw the bars, displayed the same behaviour when the neurons were triggered. The researchers could make the mice “see” the vertical bars even if none were there.
 
Once he realized the implications of being able to change another being’s perception, Yuste was both excited to have learned more about the brain and gravely concerned. He warns that even if this technique doesn’t work yet in human beings, now that the basic premise of manipulating perception is doable, all someone has to do is build on it.
 
Likewise, when scientist Jack Gallant and his team developed a side project to better understand the human visual system, they ended up creating some of the groundwork for “reading” or “decoding” some types of thoughts, such as mental images, using fMRI and an algorithm. In one of their many experiments, human participants watched short silent films while scientists monitored an area of their visual cortices. The information was handed over to an AI that was trained on YouTube videos but not the participants’ films. From the data retrieved from brain scans, the AI pieced together and reproduced the general scenes that participants saw. While the reproductions were far from perfect, they represented a first step in decoding information from a human mind.
 
Since then, multiple experiments working with similar technology have joined ranks with this work, and neuro rights advocates believe that it’s only a matter of time before this technology could be used in a consumer market—for example, for recording dreams, ideas, or memories. Elon Musk’s company Neuralink has been working on neural implants intended to one day help treat brain disorders, allow people to control external devices with their minds, and even boost intelligence and memory (so far, an early version of Neuralink has allowed a monkey to play a videogame with its mind).
 
Even though each brain operates a bit differently based on individual experiences and quirks, the general organization of the brain is the same across nearly all people. At a recent virtual workshop discussing neuro rights, scientists repeated in their presentations, again and again: The ability is there, and all that’s needed is enough brain data from an individual to create a custom model of their brain. With issues of the public not fully understanding or reading informed consent and social media terms of service agreements, it’s already easy to side-step data protections in various ways.



 
“This is a new frontier of privacy rights, in that the things that are inside of our heads are ours. They’re intimate; we share them when we want to share them. And we don’t want that to be made into a data field for experience,” said Sara Goering, professor of philosophy and co-lead for the Neuroethics Group for the Center of Neurotechnology at University of Washington, in a phone interview.
 
Goering, who studies the effects of brain-machine interface technologies on patients as part of her ethics and philosophy work, also pointed out that while she believes future neurotech could ultimately be liberating for many people, even current brain-machine interface devices don’t always give users enough transparency on how they are working. Brain-machine interfaces that let people move computer cursors with their minds and deep brain stimulation (DBS) devices for Parkinson’s disease and depression are wonderful tools, but according to interviews conducted by Goering and her colleagues, users of this tech sometimes wonder about who is truly in control. One person used a DBS for Parkinson’s for mobility and occasionally placed his foot where he did not intend. He had no way of telling if the device had malfunctioned or if he simply misstepped—often, he would think that the DBS was now more in control of his body than he was.
 
“So this [device] followed my action and I intended to do something. But did I do that, or did the device help me do it, or did we do it together?” Goering posed. Neuro rights could begin conversations around developing useful tech that puts emphasis on giving the user more direct agency and sense of self, or providing feedback on when and how a device is working. 
 
And since advanced neurotechnology has the potential to help people who are currently disadvantaged or suffering, holding back these technologies is also ethically questionable. This could especially be an issue if devices are designed for people who can’t communicate their consent to using the tech, as with covert consciousness and cognitive motor disorder, terms used for a range of conditions in which patients appear to be unconscious but can still think and perceive. Currently, technologies like fMRI can help identify people who are conscious while in a vegetative state and, sometimes, their ability to respond to words, but actual communication of the patient’s thoughts is not yet a reality.
 
“It turns out that 14%, 15% of people who look unconscious are not. If you test them with the imaging or EEG, and those with families know that their loved ones are conscious, they make different kinds of decisions about care,” Joseph Fins, an ethicist, author, and physician at Weill Cornell in New York, said in a video interview. Physicians and neuropsychologists make multiple specialized bedside assessments to determine a patient’s consciousness status (though there have been experimental uses of fMRI or deep-brain stimulation). These patients would be unable to give consent to having their minds read, but future neurotechnological advances could help them and those with aphasias or other communication issues, opening their lives to interacting with the rest of the world. If the concept of neuro rights takes off, policy makers will have to consider the nuances of how rights would be applied in medical settings.
 
But neuro rights advocates are more concerned with brain-machine interfaces in non-medical, consumer settings—assuming scientists or companies can get the devices to market and vetted to work. This has already been a challenge with transcranial direct-current brain stimulation devices (tDCS), which left the realm of scientific experimentation and came to market in the past decade with little to no regulation via DIY-ers, now with some guidelines on safety and even possible military applications. “And that’s where your rights could come in. The minute that you talk about the brain, you cannot avoid going into human rights, because the brain is what makes us human,” said Yuste.
 
“We’re still at the very early stages of this,” warned Fins, recalling that unregulated tDCS in untrained hands can potentially cause seizures, emotional dysregulation, and brain tumours. “So the other thing is the risk of quackery. You know, the late 19th century was all about electromagnetism, and it did nothing.” In many ways, neuro rights would be the Frankenstein’s monster of protections: part FDA, part privacy act, part pioneer of legal definitions—like what it actually means to own your sense of self.
 
What Yuste doesn’t want to happen is for no one to pay attention to the issue until it’s too late to regulate—similar to what’s happened with social media, which has ballooned into a privacy, security, and ethical nightmare with very little oversight.
 
“Maybe we can be a little bit smarter with this neurotech,” Yuste said, “and from the outset, we can have ethical guidelines that agree with our humanity.”
 
The Movement to Protect Your Mind From Brain-Computer Technologies. By Natalie Zarrelli. Gizmodo, May 31, 2021.








Out-of-body experiences recur throughout spiritual literature. Thought to signify a spiritual “essence” co-existing alongside biology, OBEs began to be viewed in a different light when they were replicated in a laboratory in 2007. University College London researchers induced OBEs in volunteers through the use of head-mounted video displays. Other means for inducing OBEs include electrical and magnetic stimulation of the brain.
 
If a well-placed magnet causes you to “leave” your body, what else is possible with a little transcranial stimulation?
 
This question is of growing concern as wearable scanners become increasingly common. Last week, Columbia University neuroscience professor Rafael Yuste advocated for the United Nations to adopt “neuro-rights” into its Universal Declaration of Human Rights thanks to a burgeoning industry promising to alter—some would say manipulate—consciousness.
 
As Yuste phrased it during an online conference,
 
“If you can record and change neurons, you can in principle read and write the minds of people. This is not science fiction. We are doing this in lab animals successfully.”
 
Neurotechnology is a growing field that includes a range of technologies that influence higher brain activities. Therapeutics designed to repair and improve brain function are included in this discipline—interventions for sleep problems, overstimulation, motor coordination, epilepsy, even depression.
 
So are more insidious intentions, however. You can imagine such devices in the hands of a cult leader, for example. Or perhaps a political leader steeling up their base. If the human imagination can create an idea, it can be transformed into reality, and not all humans are benevolent.
 
The ethical question is not new. For example, the debate over embryonic stem cells raged for years. Promises of trait enhancement concerned people who thought scientists would play the role of a god. While that debate has mostly died down, the use of neurotechnology by militaries and tech companies—particularly concerning privacy—will be contentious for decades.
 
Cognitive liberty is a term assigned to those who believe every individual must be allowed to maintain their own agency. An extension of the concept of freedom of thought, cognitive liberty is defined as “the right of each individual to think independently and autonomously, to use the full power of his or her mind, and to engage in multiple modes of thought,” as written by neuroethicist Dr. Wrye Sententia and legal theorist Richard Glen Boire.
 
The challenges to cognitive liberty include privacy, which they argue must encompass the domain of inner thought; autonomy, so that thought processes remain the province of the individual; and choice, provided that the individual is not harming others.
 
Yuste believes the U.N.’s declaration, which was created in the wake of World War II in 1948, needs immediate revision. Deep brain stimulation is already an FDA-approved procedure. Whereas social media creates its own addiction and mental health problems, a sense of agency still exists. When tech has the capability to get “under the skull and get at our neurons,” as Johns Hopkins professor of neurology and neuroscience, John Krakauer, says, a sense of urgency exists.
 
For Yuste it’s completely a matter of agency—and liberty.
 
“This is the first time in history that humans can have access to the contents of people’s minds. We have to think very carefully about how we are going to bring this into society.”
 
Scientists urge UN to add ‘neuro-rights’ to Universal Declaration of Human Rights. By Derek Beres. Big Think, December 9, 2020. 













18/12/2020

Sigmund Fraud : Frederick Crews' Unmaking of the Myth of Sigmund Freud

 




Was Freud a megalomaniacal, greedy, cocaine-addled opportunist and psychoanalysis a pseudoscience that has reigned tyrannically over 20th-century thought? Making use of Freud’s extensive letters to Martha Bernays, Crews paints a “damning portrait” (Esquire) of a money hungry, adulterous, and uncaring man.
 
How can this portrait be reconciled with the radically meaningful and deeply transformative process many of us know psychoanalysis to be? Is the tyranny of rationality preferable to the tyranny of myth? Does the unmaking of the myth of the man undo the gift of his work?
 
In this interview Frederick Crews responds to questions of what it means to have an empirical attitude, how we should “test” the process of healing, what’s so tempting about Freud, and what should become of psychoanalysis today. The Crews of the Freud wars is back again, and he’s going in for the kill shot.
 
Frederick Crews talks with Cassandra B. Seltman. New Books Network podcast. 
 
Was Freud a Scam Artist? LitHub , November 25, 2020.



In a recent column, “Why We’re Still Fighting Over Freud,” I commented on a debate at NYU about the scientific status of psychoanalysis, which Freud invented more than 100 years ago. I reiterated my why-Freud-isn’t-dead argument: yes, psychoanalysis is profoundly flawed, but so are all other paradigms for explaining and treating the mind, from behaviorism to psychopharmacology. Afterwards I got an email from Freud’s sharpest critic, literary scholar Frederick Crews, professor emeritus at the University of California Berkeley. Crews has been eviscerating Freud with flair for decades, most recently in Freud: The Making of an Illusion(Metropolitan, 2017; Picador, 2018). I profiled Crews in my 1999 book The Undiscovered Mind, in a chapter titled “Why Freud Isn’t Dead.” I said his “superficially reserved, even shy manner concealed a ferocious resolve and self-assurance.” Below is Crews’s response to my Freud column. – John Horgan
 
John Horgan and I can trace our acquaintance to April 1998, when we met in New Haven on the eve of a Yale University conference, “Whose Freud? The Place of Psychoanalysis in Contemporary Culture.” In that instance, as it happens, the question “whose Freud?” had been settled in advance: Freud belonged exclusively to his admirers. Among twenty-four invited speakers, all of whom were known for their views about depth psychology, I was the only doubter of psychoanalytic doctrine.
 
I remember one portion of the two-day event very well. My brief talk, which can be read in a subsequent book with the same title (Yale University Press, 2000), was greeted by anomalous gales of laughter bursting out in mid-sentence. It was from John Horgan’s write-up of the proceedings that I learned the reason. A fellow panelist on the stage, the psychoanalyst and eminent Cornell professor Robert Michels, had provoked the audience’s hilarity by making funny faces during my presentation.
 
I am grateful to John for that bit of enlightenment. From the first, however—even before the Yale meetings began—he and I found ourselves somewhat at odds over Freud’s claims about the mind. For me, a scientifically chastened ex-Freudian, psychoanalytic theory amounted to a pseudoscience. (More about that below.) John, in contrast, already held the position he recently summarized on this blog.
 
On that occasion John was describing still another Freud debate, this one scrupulously balanced between two defenders and two skeptics. John was reluctant to dispute even the most damaging charges of the naysayers: that Freud misstated his therapeutic results, faked his alleged discoveries, and put forward hypotheses that were so vague and confused as to be operationally meaningless. Nevertheless, he insisted that we cannot yet dispense with Freud.
 
Two considerations have prompted John to hold steadfastly to that opinion from the 1990s until now. First, he has noted that an assortment of worthy figures, including some neuroscientists as well as grateful patients, remain loyal to the founder of psychoanalysis. This point, however, smacks of circularity. We need to inquire whether those diehard Freudians have expressed independently sound justifications for their loyalty. On that score, the examples John recently provided are not reassuring.
 
A formerly psychotic legal scholar, John relates, “overcame schizophrenia with the help of psychoanalysis and medications”—leaving us uncertain about the contribution of the former and equally unsure whether that contribution was enabled by validated Freudian postulates. Again, John passes along one debater’s citation of the Nobelist Eric Kandel’s warmth toward Freud. But Kandel’s Freudian affinity was formed in his prescientific Viennese youth, and his brilliant work on the molecular basis of memory owed nothing to psychoanalysis. Yet again, John is impressed by the brain researcher Mark Solms’s likening of Freud to Newton and Darwin. Does John know that Solms is a practicing psychoanalyst who, in contravention of sound empirical procedure, scours neurological data for signs of convergence with the Freudian ideas he already accepts? Solms’s would-be discipline of “neuropsychoanalysis” rests entirely on that epistemic quicksand.
 
John’s other motive for shielding Freud is more substantive and more widely shared, but it is no less illogical. Like more avid Freudians than himself—the philosopher Jonathan Lear especially comes to mind—John believes that psychoanalytic lore is the sole remaining recourse for those of us who hold out against a mechanistic and pharmacological impoverishment of mental life. “Freud lives on,” we read, “because science hasn’t produced a mind-body paradigm potent enough to knock him off once and for all.”
 
The unstated premise here is that only Freud offers a properly holistic overview of the psyche. If so, that would be surprising. Hundreds of extant psychotherapies are accompanied by pretensions to plumb the psychological depths. Why single out Freud, who, despite his Romantic poetizing about the seething cauldron of the unconscious, was himself a neurological determinist and reductionist? In the eyes of the lay public, for whatever that is worth, it is the mystical, upbeat Jung and not Freud who cornered the psychological market on soulfulness.
 
John may want to insist, with Lear, that the Freudian psychical model is uniquely intricate and nuanced. Complexity, however, is of zero value if, as in Freud’s case, it is generated merely by methodological rote. Freud’s standard bag of tricks, not his observations, prompted him to invert apparent motives, decree that every mental event is a “compromise formation” with “overdetermined” causes, and perceive genital symbolism, incest wishes, and latent homosexuality wherever he turned. The only knowledge that can be extracted from such trademark practices is knowledge about Freud. He granted himself an absolute license to “Freudianize” without concern for more plausible explanations, and he routinely misattributed his personal obsessions to others.

 Is it true, in any case, that we must cling to nebulous and arbitrary psychological propositions until the mind-body problem has been definitively resolved? We may feel strongly, as John does, that there are features of the psyche beyond those that have thus far survived rigorous testing. But both science and social justice encourage us to ensure, insofar as possible, that baseless propositions not be allowed to yield further inferences. Within living memory, psychologists, psychiatrists, educators, childrearing authorities, and judges and juries derived ill-advised conclusions from psychoanalytic folklore that was later found to be sheer prejudice. In favoring a special indulgence for Freud, John seems almost to welcome a reversion to those times.
 
If I were a science journalist myself, I would still want to draw lessons from Freud, not about the unconscious but about the classic ingredients of a pseudoscience. Freud, we need to realize, created the most ingenious and thoroughgoing pseudoscience ever devised. To grasp its slippery rationale is to be forearmed against similar enterprises that may happen along.
 
As the late philosopher Frank Cioffi convincingly maintained, a pseudoscience can be recognized not by its false claims but by the behavior of its proponents when one of their beliefs is disconfirmed or shown to be vacuous. Then the defenders will either dispute the refutation, cite imaginary proofs, slander the critic, co-opt the criticism by attaching ad hoc provisos to their doctrine, or pretend that their theory meant something else altogether.
 
Freud prolifically employed all five tactics, with the result that, even within his lifetime, psychoanalytic discourse became a vast jumble of contradictions, rhetorical dodges, and escape clauses. But Freud went farther still, first by invoking uniquely self-confirming rules of interpretation and then by nullifying all objections in advance of hearing them. He included, within his theory itself, a “clinical diagnosis” of the pathological urge to “resist” psychoanalytic truth. Neither astrology nor Mesmerism nor phrenology ever approached this apogee of combined delusion and deception.
 
Partisans of psychoanalysis are fond of saying that they have left Freud largely behind by now. Of course they have; such concepts as penis envy, the vaginal orgasm, innate female masochism, and the death instinct have outworn their social welcome. But the question to ask—and I hope John Horgan will finally take an interest in it—is whether the analysts have come to grips with their master’s fatal willfulness of method. Have they forsworn the advancing of hypotheses by means of self-serving anecdotes? Do they subject those hypotheses to impartial evidential review, weighing alternatives from nonpsychoanalytic sources? Do their training institutes now teach scientific method as opposed to the local directors’ gospel? And are they prepared to contemplate the likelihood that the whole Freudian edifice was a house of cards? If not, we needn’t lend further credence to any of their claims. -- Frederick Crews
 
Why Freud Should Be Dead.  By John Horgan. Scientific American, June 12, 2019.

 



Did unconscious urges compel me to attend a debate at New York University on whether psychoanalysis, the theory/therapy invented by Freud, is relevant to neuroscience? Maybe, who the hell knows? But I definitely had conscious motives for going.

 
I try to make all the events of the NYU Center for Mind, Brain and Consciousness, because directors Ned Block and David Chalmers have great taste in topics and speakers. [See Further Reading for my reports on previous meetings.] The debate also gave me an excuse to trot out my old “Why Freud Isn’t Dead” meme, to which I’ll return below.
 
Long Live Freud!
 
First, an overview. The event featured four speakers, two critics of Freud and two boosters. I’ll begin with the boosters. Neuropsychologist Mark Solms of the University of Capetown in South Africa employs psychoanalysis as well as brain scans to understand brain-damaged patients. Solms quoted neurologist/author Oliver Sacks, who once write that “neuropsychology is admirable but it excludes the psyche—it excludes the experiencing, active, living ‘I.’”
 
Solms agreed, adding that modern psychiatry, with its tendency to view mental illnesses as chemical problems requiring chemical solutions, has become “proudly mindless." Psychoanalysis, Solms argued, can bring the psyche back into brain and mind science and remind us “what it is like to be a person.” Solms compared Freud to Newton and Darwin, pioneers who sketched out vast territories that others have mapped in more detail.
 
Like Solms, Christina Alberini has training in psychoanalysis as well as in neuroscience. She was a postdoc under Eric Kandel, who won a Nobel Prize for discovering the molecular basis of memory in snails. Kandel thinks psychoanalysis has much to offer modern mind-body researchers, and so does Alberini. She called psychoanalysis is a “rich source of information” about our unconscious and maladaptive urges.
 
Alberini runs a lab at NYU that explores the neural basis of memory in rodents, and psychoanalysis inspires this empirical work. For example, a fundamental Freudian tenet is that traumatic childhood experiences of which we have no explicit memory can nonetheless influence our behavior. Alberini has published evidence that shocks administered to rats in infancy, before they can form lasting memories, nonetheless have an enduring effect on their behavior.
 
Down with Freud!
 
Heather Berlin, a cognitive neuroscientist at Mount Sinai Hospital, is sympathetic toward psychoanalysis, more so than most neuroscientists. But the evidence for psychoanalysis is thin, she said, consisting mostly of anecdotes rather than systematic tests.
 
Psychoanalysts cite Freud as though they are quoting “scripture,” Berlin complained, and yet his ideas are so poorly defined that they are difficult to test. Concepts like “ego” and “id” are nothing but “placeholders,” like “black bile” and other humors with which medieval doctors once explained illness. Psychoanalysis seems to be no more effective at treating mental disorders than other psychotherapies, such as cognitive-behavioral therapy.
 
Freud’s ideas, notably penis envy, Berlin asserted, reflected his biased, male perspective of his patients, primarily affluent Austrian women. When female analysts objected to the penis-envy hypothesis, Freud accused them of being in denial. Berlin was drawing attention to Freud’s obnoxious heads-I-win-tails-you-lose tactic. If you agree that you suffer from penis envy, he’s right, and if you disagree, he’s still right!
 
Problems like these, Berlin said, explain why modern neuroscientists rarely cite Freud or other psychoanalysts. “Neuroscience does not need psychoanalysis to validate it or to give context to its findings,” she said.
 
Robert Stickgold, a professor of psychiatry at Harvard, seemed especially intent on provoking Freudians in the audience. Psychoanalysis is about as useful to neuroscience, he suggested, as creationism is to evolutionary biology. The Freudians booed, but Stickgold plunged ahead. He said that Freud, who aggressively defended his theories in spite of a lack of evidence, would have been at home in the Trump administration. More boos and groans.
 
Freud’s ideas are not defined rigorously enough to be scientifically tested, Stickgold argued. Psychoanalysis offers no help to scientists trying to understand the brain and mind. Perhaps Freud’s ideas inspire scientists like Alberini and Solms, but so do novels and plays, and we don’t grant them scientific status.
 
Will Freud Ever Die?
 
Stickgold concluded by wondering, with exasperation, “why we’re talking about Freud.” Good question. Critics have been bashing Freud for more than a century now. And the complaints of Berlin and Stickgold are mild compared to those of, say, literary scholar Frederick Crews. He depicts Freud as a cocaine-fueled egomaniac who built his reputation by “boasting, cajoling, question begging, denigrating rivals, and misrepresenting therapeutic results.” [Seemy recent conversation with Crews on Meaningoflife.tv.]
 
But why, if Freud is so bogus, are scientists still arguing about him? Why do serious scholars still defend him, people like Solms, Alberini, Kandel and Sacks? Why does neuroscientist Christof Koch mention Freud favorably in his memoir Consciousness: Confessions of a Romantic Reductionist? Freud’s fans contend that he endures because was a pioneering genius. They see confirmations of his ideas everywhere, and they aren’t entirely delusional.
 
My favorite corroboration of Freud is a 1998 report in Nature, “Mothers Determine Sexual Preferences.” Kendrick et al describe an experiment in which baby goats were raised by sheep moms and baby sheep by goat moms. The baby goats, when they matured, preferred to copulate with female sheep, and the baby sheep with female goats. The study “indirectly supports Freud’s concept of the Oedipus concept,” the researchers remarked.

 But Freud’s merits, such as they are, can’t entirely account for his endurance, and that brings me to my why-Freud-isn't-dead thesis. Freud lives on because science hasn’t produced a mind-body paradigm potent enough to knock him off once and for all. Freud’s critics are right, psychoanalysis is terribly flawed, but so are rival mind-body paradigms, including behaviorism, cognitive psychology, evolutionary psychology and behavioral genetics.
 
Neuroscience has generated voluminous findings, but theorists have failed to organize these data into a coherent, satisfying theory of the mind and brain. NYU has recently hosted workshops on Bayesian and information-based models of the mind. Each has its merits, but neither is remotely powerful enough to solve the mind-body problem once and for all.
 
The dominant mental-health paradigm is psychopharmacology, which views depression and other disorders as physical problems requiring physical solutions, notably medications. This is what Solms referred to as “mindless psychiatry.”
 
Psychopharmacology has enriched pharmaceutical companies and psychiatrists over the past few decades. But the causes of mental illness remain as obscure as ever, and there is evidence that psychiatric medications--over the long run--harm more people than they help.
 
If medications for mental illness were as effective as shills claim, maybe Freud would be dead. Or maybe not, because even in a world without depression and schizophrenia, we still might turn to Freud when we’re trying to make sense of our lives, just as we turn to Shakespeare and Jane Austen.
 
I first floated my “Why Freud Isn’t Dead” meme in Scientific American in 1996. I have reiterated it several times since then, most recently in my book Mind-Body Problems. Chapter Five, “The Meaning of Madness,” focuses on Elyn Saks, a legal scholar who overcame schizophrenia with the help of psychoanalysis and medications.
 
Saks has tried rival treatments, such as cognitive-behavioral therapy, but she finds psychoanalysis “richer and deeper.” She calls it “the best window into the mind” and the “most interesting account of what it is to be human.” Freud was “an amazing writer,” Saks added, whose case studies “read like novels.”
 
Will we ever discover a paradigm potent enough to make us forget Freud? One that will satisfy our yearning to know who we really are? I hope not, because to be human means to undergo an identity crisis. I think Freud said that somewhere.
 
Why We're Still Fighting over Freud. By John Horgan.Scientific American,  May 13, 2019.





For a century or more, Sigmund Freud has cast a long shadow not just over the field of psychoanalysis but over the entire way we think of ourselves as human beings. His theory of the unconscious and his work on dreams, in particular, retain a firm grip on the western imagination, shaping the realms of literature and art, politics and everyday conversation, as well as the way patients are analysed in the consulting room. Since Freud’s death in 1939, however, a growing number of dissenting voices have questioned his legacy and distanced themselves from his ideas. Now Freud is viewed less as a great medical scientist than as a powerful storyteller of the human mind whose texts, though lacking in empirical evidence, should be celebrated for their literary value.
 
The following debate, conducted through emails, was prompted by the forthcoming publication of Frederick Crews’s book Freud: The Making of an Illusion, which draws on new research materials to raise fresh questions about Freud’s competence and integrity.
 
Susie Orbach: Some of us come to Freud early, some late. You are in the earlier category, I am in the later one. You claim you left Freud 30 years ago but your continued obsession with the man, with his work, with proving that Freud was contradictory, goes to show the continuing significance, not of Freud the man per se, but of his ideas and impact on a wider, cultural level. His work has had an impact of such magnitude that it’s not possible for us to think about what it means to be human, what motivates us, what we yearn for, without those very questions being Freudian.
 
Freud’s conceptions of the human mind and its complexity, whether exactly accurate, are not at issue here. What is worth talking about is the way in which late-20th-century and early-21st-century culture have taken up what they have understood of his ideas.
 
It is very easy to dismantle the specific interpretations of Freud. Every generation does and I have done so myself. That is not to do away with Freud. Rather, it shows the strength of the edifice he created. Many aspects of public policy, from understandings of social and interpersonal violence and racism to the construction of masculinity, sexuality, gender, war, use psychoanalytic ideas not as the explanation but as an explanatory tool aiding economic and statistical understandings of why we do the things we do.
 
 
Frederick Crews: No one disputes the enormous extent of Freud’s influence. The question before us is whether we ought, on balance, to be grateful for it. You revere Freud because he helped to make us the sages we are pleased to be – people who can’t even “think about what it means to be human” in non-Freudian terms. But perhaps it is time now to remove those blinders and think afresh.
 
If, as you say, psychoanalytic theory has functioned as a powerfully shaping “explanatory tool”, surely it matters whether Freud’s explanations ever made empirical sense. If they didn’t, the likelihood is considerable that he raised false hopes, unfairly distributed shame and blame, retarded fruitful research and education, and caused patients’ time and money to be needlessly squandered. Indeed, all of those effects have been amply documented.
 
In your writings, you assert that Freud’s emphasis on the Oedipus complex was androcentric and wrong; that he misrepresented female sexual satisfaction and appears to have disapproved of it; that envy of the penis, if it exists at all, is not a key determinant of low self-esteem among women; and that his standard of normality was dictated by patriarchal bias, thus fostering “the control and subjugation of women”.
 
This list, which could be readily expanded, constitutes an indictment not only of harmful conclusions but also of the arbitrary, cavalier method by which they were reached. Yet elsewhere in your texts, you refer to Freud’s “discovery of the unconscious” and to his “discovery of an infantile and childhood sexuality”. Were those alleged breakthroughs achieved in a more objective manner than the “discovery” of penis envy? What are the grounds on which any of Freud’s claims deserve to be credited?
 
SO: We are on different planets here. My job is to listen, to engage with the world of the analysand, to hear their difficulties, confusions, conflicts, agonies and questions. These don’t come pre-formed. There is nothing formulaic about the conversation in the consulting room. It is a space of exploration.
 
Knowledge is provisional. It is not static, and the kinds of knowledge of the consulting room exquisitely express this. This is not to say we don’t know anything. Therapists build up considerable knowledge about the way the human mind deals with the indigestible. People don’t come because they are happy, they come because their life has stalled. They perceive themselves to have got stuck, they feel emotionally constipated. They suffer with intrusive self-critical thoughts. Addressing these things is the meat and potatoes of our work. It is out of this engagement that our understandings emerge. Subjectivity, particularly in the process of self-reflection and potential change, is not empirical per se. It is a lived experience, and analysis provides a frame for the individual to investigate their modes of being, feeling and thinking. Psychoanalysis is the study of human subjectivity. It is a clinical practice. It theorises the vicissitudes of human attachment, of the psychological development of mind and body that occur within a relational, cultural field.
 
FC: But weren’t we talking about Sigmund Freud? Unexpectedly, you have provided the man with an “invisibility cloak”, not only by ceasing to mention him but also by sidestepping all of his novelties, both theoretical and clinical. In your prose, psychoanalysis has ballooned into the cosmically huge and vague “study of human subjectivity” – and who would dare complain about that? Likewise, Freud’s practice disappears within your own, which, as you characterise it, consists of an empathetic listening that is free of preconceptions. That’s admirable if true, but it means that your approach is exactly opposite to that of Freud. Notoriously, he contradicted, discomfited and harangued his patients in the hope of breaking their “resistance” to ideas of his own – ideas that he presumptuously declared to be lurking within the patients’ own unconscious minds.
 
I find it striking that Freud vanished from your discourse as soon as I asked you to say why we ought to believe any of his propositions. That issue is crucial to an assessment of his legacy. His unsupported claims – for example, that repressed incidents from the first years of life can be reliably unearthed; that, thanks to phylogenetic programming, all toddlers wish to kill their same-sex parent and copulate with the other one; that women are biologically inferior, childlike, devious and masochistic – have yielded many noxious consequences.
 
One such consequence has been an ongoing disregard, by psychoanalysts and their academic allies, of the principle that hypotheses ought to be held accountable to a preponderance of evidence. Freud’s psychological writings contain not a single item of raw data. We meet only “psychoanalytic findings”, suave stories, evasions and heroic posturing. That charade has seduced many an unwary professor, including yours truly 50 years ago. Even today, regrettably, the Freudian vogue in its least rational (Lacanian) form remains entrenched in the humanities.
 
Freud, though not on hand to defend himself, has a lot to answer for. What can you enter on the other side of the ledger?
 
SO: Here’s what I see as our difficulty, – you want the world to see Freud as a scoundrel and a bully, and you want me to repeat my own difficulties with his specific interpretations of unconscious processes. I’m not a throw-the-baby-out-with-the-bathwater type. Just as Newtonian physics has been superseded and Darwin was not the only person working on evolution, physicists and biologists don’t need to trash their predecessor in order to move the field along. The 1950s was a terrible time for psychoanalysis: it turned ideological and was used to send women back to the home after the social changes of the second world war. That’s why the infusion of 70s feminism was so critical to psychoanalysis’s reinvigoration and rethinking. Out of that has grown a more nuanced understanding of early attachment and how its impact is elaborated, of the complicated feelings and identities children have towards their parents, of the way in which mothers are not simply the failing objects of their children but are women struggling with their own legacies and subjectivity, of the fragility of masculinity.
 
Freud can be easily attacked for his understanding of homosexuality but have you looked at his understandings of primary bisexuality? Of course you have and you know how much early experience and our cultural, familial, class and geographic setting contributes to our personal understandings of who we are and can be.
 
I can see that the colonisation of literary criticism by aspects of psychoanalysis must have been wearying for you. It always amuses and sometimes irritates me when other fields take up psychoanalysis, for they tend to freeze it and use concepts that practitioners have either jettisoned or contested. I know physicists and mathematicians who groan when their work is appropriated by literary types and used as metaphor, so I empathise with your annoyance, but an argument about a Freud that I don’t use makes no sense to me when there is so much in the Freud legacy that does. Yes. I still find him illuminating.
 
 FC: The main reason why we’re having trouble connecting is that we perceive Freud from sharply different angles – so much so that he appears to be two distinct personages. In your judgment, he founded a tradition that has survived into this century not because of any truths he unearthed but because feminists and others have successfully adapted his clinical procedure to goals, values and ideas largely alien to his own.

 For this role of ghostly ancestor, the actual man Freud isn’t needed or even wanted. But the historical Freud is the one whose legacy we are supposed to be debating. Did he tell the truth about his achievements? Were his methods ever trustworthy? And what effects have his dogmas wrought not just on therapy but also on social attitudes, psychological research, academic discourse and public health?

 Beginning around 1970, independent scholars such as Henri F Ellenberger, Frank Cioffi, and Paul Roazen began to chip away at the legendary Freud who had been canonised in the 1950s by Anna Freud, Ernest Jones, and others. The process has continued to this day. Freud, we now know, regularly lied about his breakthroughs, double-crossed benefactors, and slandered his rivals, and through ad hoc tinkering with a dubious theory, he created a great jumble of conflicting notions, bordering at times on mysticism.

 Until fairly recently, the psychoanalytic community put up a united front against all such “Freud bashing”. Now, occasionally, we see Freud accurately depicted as a peremptory, undisciplined and power-hungry speculator – or, as he put it himself in a letter that his daughter suppressed, as “not at all a man of science, not an observer, not an experimenter, not a thinker” but just a headlong “conquistador”. Some honest Freudians even grant that Freud was a sick man who tried to saddle the whole human race with his anxious fantasies. But the necessary next step – to admit that psychoanalysis never had a sound raison d’être – isn’t taken, because to do so would deprive the Freudian authors of their worldview and, paradoxically, of their chosen technique for deconstructing Freud’s psyche.

 The peril of trying to be specific about Freud without keeping up with the scholarship may be illustrated by your mention of one notion that ought to please me: “primary bisexuality”. I don’t think you have considered how Freud’s apprehension of that phenomenon differed from your own. More important, it wasn’t Freud’s idea at all. He lifted it directly from the wild theorising of his madcap friend Wilhelm Fliess.

 SO: I am not such an ignorant person that I would lump Cioffi with Roazen and Ellenberger. Yes, Roazen revealed the Freud who fell out spectacularly with many colleagues, the Freud who analysed his daughter and so on, but he credits Freud with a seminal place in the history of the human mind, and documented his life and work in his many books.

 Ellenberger demonstrated in 1970 that the notion of the “talking cure” and the revelation of the “pathogenic secret” have their roots in ancient time, and that far from detracting from Freud his work can thus be set in a wide historical context. He sees Freud as deserving pride of place for the work he undertook to conceptualise hidden secrets, repressed memories and the like in a systematic fashion, which then linked to a formalised method of treatment. Yes, Ellenberger discovered that Breuer’s case Anna O did not have a swift or straightforward recovery, but for him that didn’t invalidate psychoanalysis or Freud.

 Nor does your accusation that the good ideas are simply other people’s ideas. Indeed, this is inevitable. Ideas are an outcome of time, place and connection. I’m not naively saying there is no envy, competition or theft in intellectual ideas, but I can’t go with the malevolent version.

 Freud himself might have wryly remarked that it is the job of the next generation(s) to dismantle the work of the father, the progenitor, and yet for the work to still stand. And so it does. The listening/talking cure is alive and well and growing.

 FC: Thanks, Susie, for your part in a civil dialogue. Not surprisingly, we haven’t changed each other’s minds. I hope, though, that some readers will have grasped why such differences are inevitable. So long as Freud is prized as an iconic leader who lent his blessing to one’s own therapeutic tradition, he is bound to remain at least partly veiled in myth.

 The Freud who lived and breathed was by no means the progenitor of empathetic talk therapy. A better candidate for that honour would be the Swiss Paul Dubois, who addressed himself not to his patients’ supposed infantile memories or to their hothouse “transference” but to their here-and-now insecurity within their life situations. If Dubois remains in outer darkness today, it isn’t because he failed – all varieties of cognitive treatment are indebted to him – but because Freud bested him in the art of unrelenting gamesmanship and self-promotion.

 Henri Ellenberger was no admirer of Freud’s; he regarded him as having stolen major credit from Pierre Janet. As Paul Roazen wrote, “The theme of plagiarism can be found almost everywhere one turns in Freud’s career.” This was a question not of occasional borrowing, and still less of openly shared endeavour, but of chronic dishonesty and the malicious sabotage of others’ reputations. Without such behaviour on Freud’s part, he might be as unknown today as the meritorious Paul Dubois.

 

How we feel about Freud: Susie Orbach and Frederick Crews debate his legacy. The Guardian. August 20, 2017.