31/12/2023

Paul Hanley on Buzzcocks

 




Man of letters and drummer (The Fall, House Of All) Paul Hanley has written a book on Buzzcocks called Sixteen Again. A limited edition hardback is available from publishers Route now and a paperback will be available in April 2024.

Sixteen Again: How Pete Shelley & Buzzcocks Changed Manchester Music (And Me), to give it its full title, mixes together biography, interview, critique and social history to create a full picture of the legendary Manchester group, equally beloved of fans of punk, post punk and indie.

Route – who have also published Hanley's Leave The Capital: A History Of Manchester Music In 13 Recordings and the masterful Have A Bleedin Guess: The Story Of Hex Enduction Hour – have the following to say: "Paul Hanley's obsession with Buzzcocks peaked between the ages of 14 and 16, exactly the age when ‘favourite band’ actually means something important. An essential part of the charm of Buzzcocks to him were their proximity and approachability."

Taking a break from his current duties as one half of the drumming duo who power recent tQ Album Of The Year folk, House Of All, and co-host of the Oh! Brother podcast with kin Steve Hanley, Paul submitted to some quick fire questions about the book, Buzzcocks and OBOGFRS (other bits of general Fall-related stuff).

What really went on there? We only have this excerpt:

Why did you choose Buzzcocks?

Paul Hanley: Well, there’s the cultural significance of them bringing the Sex Pistols to Manchester twice, and kick starting indie music. Then there is the fact that Pete Shelley was a song writing genius who could say more in a three minute pop song than most writers could say in a whole album. But most importantly they were my favourite band between the ages of 14 and 16, which is about the only time in your life when it’s OK to have a favourite band.

What do you think of the Tony McGartland book, Buzzcocks: The Complete History and Pete and Louis Shelley's Ever Fallen In Love: The Lost Buzzcocks Tapes? I think they are the only other Buzzcocks books right?

PH: Yes, apart from Steve Diggle’s book [The Buzzcocks: Harmony In My Head]. I used all three in writing this, unsurprisingly. But there is a definite lack of books about Pete Shelley and Buzzcocks, certainly compared to The Clash and the Sex Pistols, which seems criminal to me. Hopefully this book is different from all the others. I wanted to combine telling the story with getting across just how much Buzzcocks meant to me

Did you perceive of some misconceptions about the band you were keen to tackle?

PH: Yes. There’s this slightly snide dismissal of Pete’s songs as ‘just love songs’ which they’re definitely not.

In that sense is their closest comparison The Undertones? Or can they be compared to anyone else?

PH: There’s definitely a lineage between Buzzcocks and The Undertones in their ability to convey the thrills and spills of youthful yearning over driving melody. I think The Undertones would happily acknowledge an influence. But Undertones aside I think a lot of bands influenced by Buzzcocks kind of missed the point.

Care to elaborate?

PH: Ok. Specifically, bands like Green Day. There’s a big difference between speaking to youth and just being childish.

Do you cover Shelley's solo albums?

PH: Yes. Not in as much detail but Pete’s journey away from Buzzcocks’ sound and then how he got back to it is fascinating.

Did you get to interview everyone you wanted for the book?

PH: Yes pretty much. I deliberately chose not to speak to Steve Diggle as I wanted to avoid getting too close and have it affect the story I wanted to tell. And I couldn’t speak to Pete obviously so it wouldn’t have been fair! I think the story of the Buzzcocks is the story of Steve and Pete; the story of how they maintained that relationship despite being very different characters is pretty key I think.

Were relations between The Fall and The Buzzcocks always cordial?

PH: Buzzcocks and Richard Boon were very supportive of The Fall in the early days, as they were with lots of Manchester acts. I think Mark certainly respected Pete even if he was a bit sniffy about Buzzcocks music.

Was Shelley's bisexuality ever a problem for the band?

PH: No I don’t think they cared. His lyrics were always gender fluid, and his sexuality was never part of the act, it was just who he was. He was years ahead of his time in that respect.

What are the unheralded songs you love that aren't on Singles Going Steady?

PH: 'Money'; 'Who’ll Help Me To Forget?'

You've completely changed in the last few years haven't you? Three books published and an English Literature degree completed since 2017. It's very impressive but are your friends and family surprised by it?

PH: Well I hope they’re not too surprised! They’ve been very supportive. The degree was a dream. I loved it. And I really got the bug for writing. When you’re doing a degree you always have a piece of writing on the go, so I just carried on!

How are you enjoying The House Of All?

PH: The gigs have been great actually. We seem to be going down very well and the footfall is very gratifying. It’s a real shame Pete [Greenway] wasn’t able to join us but Phil [Lewis] has done a great job.

 Do you feel at all Irish? Obviously Steve [Hanley] was born in Dublin. How long after his birth did your parents move to Manchester?

Paul: I do feel Irish in many ways. We were a fairly Irish household growing up. But I feel far more Dublinian – if that’s a word – than just generally Irish, in the same way I feel Mancunian rather than English. I think he was about a year old.

Sixteen Again: How Pete Shelley & Buzzcocks Changed Manchester Music (And Me) is available to buy from Route now

The Fall's Paul Hanley On Buzzcocks Book. By  Francisco Scaramanga. The Quietus, December  18, 2023.





Paul Hanley in conversation with John Robb at Louder Than Words Festival in Manchester, 11th November 2023.  Paul is discussing his book Sixteen Again: How Pete Shelley & Buzzcocks Changed Manchester Music (and me).

Route TV, November 18, 2023.




Route






Gelesen: 27. – 28.12.2023 (netto 267 Seiten, in Englisch – wird wohl ehr nicht auf Deutsch erscheinen)

#bookcollectorsarepreteniousarseholes – Ich habe mir für einen ordentlichen Batzen Geld eine “Advance Edition” geleistet: Signed, limited und vor dem Erscheinen im April 2024 pünktlich zu Weihnachten hier. Mit einem collen Badge (in alter Buzzcocks Tradition). Post-Brexit Porto und Zoll sind mehr als der Buchpreis, Danke Merkel!

2021 ist ja bereits ein Buch über Pete erschienen, daneben hatte Steve Diggle bereits 2002 eine “Biographie” von einem Journalisten schreiben lassen (die habe ich damals nach kurzem Querlesen nicht gekauft). Ansonsten gibt es kaum etwas, ehr als Abfallprodukt der Arbeiten von Malcolm Garrett, der mit seinen Designs für die Buzzcocks ja Plattencover, Poster und Badges für die Ewigkeit erschaffen hat.

Paul Hanley, der Autor, ist sowohl Fan als auch Kenner der Musik-Szene Nordenglands, er spielte 1980 bis 1985 bei The Fall. Und er schreibt dieses Buch aus der Sicht eines informierten Fans…

 


Und weil es aus der Fan Perspektive geschrieben ist fußt es aus O-Tönen, die er aus allen möglichen Quellen zusammengetragen hat (87 insgesamt, alle im Anhang verzeichnet). Und dabei zeichnet er ein ziemlich realistisches Bild einer Band, die früh dabei war (1976) und wie viele andere ebenso früh fertig war (mit sich, mit der Musik).

Spannende Fußnote: Fertig waren sie in der Markthalle, Hamburg, 23.01.1981. Danach war Schicht im Schacht – erstmal. Und Steve Diggle und Pete Shelley hatten sich erstmal 8 Jahre nix zu sagen.


Durch den Mix aus O-Tönen und dem kundigen Kommentar bzw. der persönlichen Einordnung ließt sich das Buch extrem gut, ich habe es mehr oder weniger verschlungen. Auch weil ich Fan geblieben bin.

Da Hanley selber Musiker ist (auch wenn er bei einer weniger Ohrenschmeichelnden Band) kann er das musikalische auch richtig verorten. Downstrokes galore!



Was er aber auch offen und ehrlich rüberbringt ist, wie die Band im Grunde verglüht ist und sowohl Pete (der mit mehr elektronischer Musik zumindest ein klein wenig Erfolg hatte) als auch Steve nutzen nach den Buzzcocks das immer noch ein wenig hereinkommende Geld um Soloideen nachzugehen. Die anderen beiden (John Maher, Steve Garvey) setzten sich in ein erfolgreiches und normales Berufsleben ab.

Und ab hier wird das Buch dann schonungslos ehrlich, die Reunion war wohl ehr dem Geld geschuldet (aber das daraus entstandene Konstrukt von Pete/Steve plus Tony/Phil gab es dann satte 13 Jahre und damit etliche Jahre mehr als die erste erfolgreiche Inkarnation.




Es war am Ende dann doch ein Beruf, bei dem es um regelmäßiges Einkommen ging. Privat wollte man nix mit den Kollegen zu tun haben.



Das es am Ende vor allem für Steve vor allem um Ego, Einkommenund Versorgung mit Champagner ging wurde spätestens 2019 klar: Die Buzzcocks hatten eine “40 Years of Singles Going Steady” show in der Royal Albert Hall geplant – der Herzinfakt von Pete kam im Dezember 2018 dazwischen. Steve nutzte den Termin dann für ordentlich Egopolitur:




Klasse Buch: Vergötterung wo erforderlich, Kritik wo angebracht. Mit viel detailliertem Fachwissen (eg. Petes Liebelieder kammen immer ohne mänlichen oder weiblichen Bezug aus, mit Absicht. Steve konnte oder wollte das nicht und durchbrach das in einem seiner Songs für die Buzzcocks).

 Und immer mit dem Blickwinkel der Working Class (die übrigens Spiral Scratch möglich gemacht hat, das nur am Rande). Und in Summe ein klarer Blick auf was Erfolg aus einem machen kann. Manchmal gutes. Manchmal schlechtes.

Soundtrack dazu: Buzzcocks – Singles Going Steady, immer noch – was sonst?

PS: Der Buchtitel löst natürlich wieder eine Träne – Sixteen Again war die ganz hervorragende Buzzocks Cover-Band von Helge (RIP).

PPS: #bookcollectorsarepretentiousarseholes #75/300 (um 2 falsch, Danke Merkel!)

Buch kann hier bestellt werden! Der Autor hat auch einen historischen (endet 2020) Blog mit (in eigenen Worten) Ruminations, accusations, felicitations, and that


Bücher, schnell gelesen: 1.676. By Dirty Old Sod.  Gehkacken, December 2023.





 

The conversation is usually the same. Regarding the UK, the best and most important acts of the first wave of punk are Sex Pistols and The Clash. Of course, everyone is entitled to their own opinion, but it seems a travesty that the discussion regularly forgets the band who were, in my mind, the finest of the lot, Buzzcocks.

Arguably the most boundary-pushing act of the first wave of British punk, from their music to setting up one of the first independent record labels, and even their instrumental role in bringing the Sex Pistols to Manchester – a night credited with kicking off the city’s musical boom – many aspects bolster this argument. Without Buzzcocks, punk and broader alternative music today, would lack some defining factors. This indicates just how important Buzzcocks were.

Buzzcocks were officially formed in February 1976 by college friends Howard Devoto and Pete Shelley. This pair travelled down to London to see the buzziest band of the day, Sex Pistols, and organise for them to play at Manchester’s Lesser Free Trade Hall in June 1976, one of the most consequential nights in modern British culture. They also intended to perform at this show, but Devoto and Shelley’s bandmates dropped out.

The band eventually got their wishes, and after recruiting bassist Steve Diggle and drummer John Maher, they made their debut performance opening for Sex Pistols when they returned to Manchester for their second show in the city in July. Things moved quickly, and Buzzcocks were now vital to a burgeoning movement. In September 1976, the group trekked to London to perform at the two-day bonanza, the 100 Club Punk Festival, organised by Sex Pistols manager Malcolm McLaren. The festival was the moment punk crystallised itself as a genuine cultural force, with other performers including Sex Pistols, The Clash, The Damned, Siouxsie and the Banshees, and Subway Sect.

By the end of 1976, Buzzcocks had found their rhythm, and they recorded the four-track EP Spiral Scratch, which arrived in January the following year. Produced by future Factory Records alumnus Martin Hannett, it arrived on Buzzcocks’ New Hormones label, meaning they were one of the first punk groups to establish an independent record label, second only to The Saints and Fatal Records, created to release ‘(I’m) Stranded’. This also saw the group insert themselves further into the story of punk, with the song ‘Boredom’ coherently explaining the movement’s rebellion against the man. Additionally, the band demonstrated their genuinely artistic edge on the record, with the minimalism of the two-note solo in ‘Boredom’ the pinnacle of this, averting the established tradition of this guitar part. Clearly then, even at this early point in their career, Buzzcocks had made history on numerous occasions.

Despite these triumphs, Devoto quit the group only a few months later, citing his displeasure at punk’s direction. He said in a statement: “I don’t like movements. What was once unhealthily fresh is now a clean old hat”. He returned to college for a year and then formed the widely influential post-punk outfit, Magazine. They became one of the key players in the genre that would shine a light on all of first-wave punk’s flaws and start to make real artistic progress by casting aside the barriers of labels.

Devoto leaving Buzzcocks also proved to be a significant moment for the band. It saw a sea change occur, after which they would enter a more distinctive and essential area, pushing the confines of punk to the absolute limit. Pete Shelley took on the vocal duties, with his high-pitched, melodic vocals presenting a stark contrast to the gruff delivery many punks employed due to their origins in the blues-influenced pub rock. With Shelley taking over vocals and continuing to play guitar, Diggle switched over to the six-string from the bass, with Garth Davies, the original bassist rejoining. Steve Garvey eventually replaced him the following year, a four-string hero who would give the quartet the busy undercurrent needed for their increasingly dynamic sound.

Despite the undoubted importance of Spiral Scratch, after Devoto left, Buzzcocks took things up a level. Over the rest of their first chapter, which ended in 1981, they pushed back against social and punk mores, writing music for the future well ahead of its era. Arguably, it was more in line with what their heroes, The Stooges and The Velvet Underground had done, with there also taboo-busting similarities to the work of David Bowie.

When Shelley, bandmate Steve Diggle and manager Richard Boon sat down at the British Library in June 2016 to discuss their career, they explained how bands like The Velvet Underground and The Stooges inspired their iconoclasm. Shelley said: “Myself and Howard (Devoto), we were listening to… well, separately, but we had a mutual interest, things like The Velvet Underground, The Stooges, Can, I mean, a lot of the German… yeah Neu! I mean things that, really, when you put on you can clear a room.”

He continued: “In those days, it was a whole different country. It was music which nobody liked at all. Everybody was into sort of like heavy metal, but it wasn’t as widdly-widdly… I mean, things like Black Sabbath and Deep Purple, there was a lot of blues, and it was all to do with how many notes you could fit into your 20-minute guitar solo. Where, I liked the things which were more on the noisy side, but were funny as well. So that’s basically what we tried to do… In fact, we were making the most uncommercial form of music that we thought possible… We even had swearing in it. Nobody did that.”

It was a much different, more creative space to that of their most prominent punk peers, Sex Pistols and The Clash, after Devoto left. Mainly inspired by the innovation of The Stooges and more experimental acts such as The Velvet Underground and Can, Shelley’s lyrics had much greater depth than almost everyone’s. A wholesale affront to the machismo of punk, he showed it to be futile, as he discussed personal feelings, sex and homosexuality in a wickedly comedic way, a complete departure from the immediate moves of Sex Pistols.

Much of this separation from the punk scene was due to Shelley. An open bisexual, his discussions of love, sex, and other taboo issues pushed back against punk’s standards and that of the mainstream. His lyrics set an example by sticking a stout middle finger up to tradition and providing solace for listeners hiding their true selves from the public. This significance cannot be overstated; 1970s Britain was a completely different time to our own. It was a much less welcoming place for anyone who dared to veer off the beaten track.

Early singles such as ‘Orgasm Addict’, ‘What Do I Get?’ and the iconic ‘Ever Fallen in Love (With Someone You Shouldn’t’ve)’ remain highlights of this approach. While the first wave of punk was mostly concerned with external issues, Shelley was an adept songwriter who could fuse the personal with outside forces such as the political, going far beyond that of other punk songwriters, including The Clash’s Joe Strummer, someone credited with addressing the most important issues of his day.

Shelley said more in one song than many of his contemporaries managed to do in their whole career; that’s how incisive his prose was. ‘Everybody’s Happy Nowadays’, ‘Autonomy’, ‘Lipstick’ and ‘Whatever Happened To…?’ are four more examples of the frontman’s lyrical flair. He was afraid of no issue, and had a knack for combining the mundane and severe, something his heroes Iggy Pop and Lou Reed were masters at that.

Of course, Buzzcocks’ music was much more impactful than their peers’ too. The guitars were more muscular, the melodies were more prominent, and the band did exciting things with their songwriting. This isn’t to say bands like The Clash and Siouxsie and the Banshees didn’t; I just think that what they were doing had more weight for the time. The likes of ‘Why Can’t I Touch It?’ with its unbelievably groovy bassline and the power pop of ‘Promises’ are two further examples of Buzzcocks’ scope. To use a football analogy, they were well-ingratiated in the men’s team when their peers were still languishing in the academy.

Musically, Shelley and Buzzcocks augmented the punk formula. They didn’t confine themselves to playing just three power chords, and because of this, it wouldn’t be excessive to label them more art-rock than punk. Ironically, there’s room for them to be described as the first post-punk band, as they were railing against the genre even when they were deeply embedded within it. Following this, there are more parallels between them and Magazine, XTC and Squeeze than with the likes of Sex Pistols and The Clash. It also says everything that many subsequent alternative heroes such as The Smiths, Nirvana, Pixies, Pearl Jam and Green Day cite as them an influence due to their creative prowess. There was real depth to Buzzcocks, and that was always their power.  

Hear Me Out: Why Buzzcocks are the best first-wave punk band. By Arun Starkey. Far Out Magazine, July 20, 2023. 






In January 1977 a young punk band called Buzzcocks walked into the Manchester branch of Virgin with a box of singles they wanted to sell. They had set up a label called New Hormones and paid for the records themselves with an early form of crowdfunding – borrowing £500 from a couple of friends and the guitarist’s dad – and their only ambition was to sell enough of the 1,000 copies they had pressed to be able to repay the loans. The Spiral Scratch EP ended up selling 16,000 copies and reaching the top 40 – there was no problem with the loans. More importantly, though, it proved that it was possible for artists to be in complete control of their music, from production to distribution, and in the process invented indie.

These days, there’s nothing unusual about bypassing the record industry. Chance the Rapper self-released his music and has become a breakout star and Barack Obama’s guest at the White House. In 1977, though, Spiral Scratch was game-changing. In its wake came a wave of British independent labels and a distribution network that meant that, as Rough Trade founder Geoff Travis puts it, “anyone could compete with the big boys, but that only happened because it was an undeniably great record”.

Few who saw the first Buzzcocks show on 1 April 1976 would have felt they were in the presence of people who were about to reshape pop. Peter McNeish and Howard Trafford (who would become Pete Shelley and Howard Devoto) fronted a makeshift version of the band at Bolton Institute of Technology’s students’ union – they were studying there – and managed to annoy not just the venue, but their bandmates, too.

After the venue pulled the plug, their drummer – who had never rehearsed with them before – laid into Shelley and Devoto. “He said: ‘I’m at this level’ – and held his hands very high,” Shelley, remembers, “‘and you’re down there.’”

Shelley and Devoto had been inspired to form Buzzcocks seven weeks earlier, when they read a live review in NME that would transform their lives. The headline, “Don’t look over your shoulder, but the Sex Pistols are coming!”, was enough to convince them to borrow a little Renault and drive 200 miles to High Wycombe in Buckinghamshire to see the Pistols support Screaming Lord Sutch on 21 February.




“Seeing the Pistols changed everything,” Devoto says. “We started to realise what songs we ourselves could write.”

At this point, the Pistols were some way from becoming the band who outraged a nation. They were so short of bookings that their manager, Malcolm McLaren, agreed to the offer Shelley and Devoto put to him: they would put his charges on in Manchester, if they could be the support band.

 The problem was, the pair didn’t have a band. And when the night of the gig at the Lesser Free Trade Hall arrived – 4 June 1976, with Shelley and Devoto having paid £32 to rent the room – they still lacked a permanent bassist and drummer and had to drop off the bill. But they quickly recruited bassist Steve Diggle and drummer John Maher, who joined while doing his O-levels as a way of avoiding “aggro” from his neighbours, and when the Pistols returned to the Lesser Free Trade Hall on 20 July, Buzzcocks were ready.

“I thought if I could join a band, I could get the drum kit out of the house,” Maher says. “How was I to know that my first gig would be supporting the Sex Pistols?”

Shelley, who was 22, remembers the show for its “complete lack of adult supervision. We were literally doing it ourselves. McLaren said: ‘If Buzzcocks aren’t onstage in 10 minutes, you’re not going on.’ But he was shrewd enough to bring music journalists.” When the journalists’ reviews appeared, Buzzcocks were catapulted to national attention.

Initially, they had no plans to make a record, but after the Pistols’ appearance on Thames TV’s Today show – swearing at the host, Bill Grundy – landed them on tabloid front pages and major labels started signing punk bands, Buzzcocks realised they had to make their mark or risk being passed by.

“Record company scouts just didn’t venture up to Manchester,” says Richard Boon, their manager. “The place felt like the tide had gone out.” But what other options were there? To Shelley, the idea of manufacturing a record themselves felt “as unfeasible as making a computer in your front room”.

There were already British independents: the Damned’s New Rose had been released on Stiff, but that label had the advantage of being run by people with lots of experience in the music business, and the contacts that came with that experience. It was a rather different matter for a pair of students whose only experience of records was buying them and listening to them. “The Drones told us: ‘Don’t do it!’” Shelley says. “Because they’d gone the vanity publishing route in a previous incarnation and ended up with boxes of records in the garage.”

However, the band’s new booking agent, Martin Hannett, wanted to become a producer and saw an opportunity in Buzzcocks. Boon started investigating pressing plants, to see whether they really could make a record, and as things started moving, Shelley began to think: “We can actually do this.”

It helped that by now they had a set of songs that matched those of any London punk band, led by Boredom (“You know me – I’m acting dumb / The scene is very humdrum / Boredom! Boredom!” Devoto sings, while Shelley picks out a two-note solo). Devoto wrote the lyrics during night shifts at a tile factory, and Shelley wrote the tunes on his Woolworth’s guitar.

 “We were chalk and cheese,” Shelley remembers. “I said to him, ‘I never get around to things. I live in a straight line,’ That ended up in Boredom.” Shelly’s’s famous guitar solo – seen as the epitome of punk’s rejection of musicianship, and later resurrected by Edwyn Collins for Orange Juice’s Rip It Up – came “out of the blue and seemed to fit. After we’d finished it, we fell about laughing.”

Boredom, Breakdown, Time’s Up and Friends of Mine were recorded in 30 minutes just before Christmas 1976, with Hannett at the controls. Spiral Scratch launched his career, too, and he would go on to produce Joy Division and New Order, the Psychedelic Furs, U2, Happy Mondays and many more – including Buzzcocks after Devoto left, and Devoto’s next group, Magazine.

 “My impression was that Martin didn’t know what he was doing,” Maher says. “But neither did we.” Devoto says of Spiral Scratch’s ramshackle, lo-fi sound: “As amateurs even we found it a bit amateurish sounding.”




Boon thinks the amateurishness is all part of the EP’s charm: Buzzcocks were the anti-Fleetwood Mac, the antithesis of big-budget music. He took Spiral Scratch’s cover photo of the band on a Polaroid instant camera and the band assembled at Devoto’s shared flat in Lower Broughton to slide 1,000 singles into their budget picture sleeves.

The first shop to take copies was Virgin in Manchester, which accepted 25 copies and sold them for 99p each (of which 60p went to the band). In London, Travis had just opened his Rough Trade shop. He took an initial 50, then ordered 200 more just two days later. “I knew I could sell them,” he says. “It was a sensational record.”

Boon didn’t have the money to press more copies, so Jon Webster, the manager of the Manchester branch of Virgin, lent him £600 from the shop’s sales of coach tickets to a Status Quo gig. “So indirectly, the first British independent success story was financed by the Quo,” Boon says, laughing. Webster remembers those pioneering punk days as “the best time of my life”, and notes that, back then, a record shop could be a catalyst for spreading new music. “Because there was no distribution, almost no shops had these records,” he says. “When we handed out a photocopied list of all our punk singles at the [venue] Electric Circus, we were deluged with people from all over the north.”

Soon enough, a copy of Spiral Scratch reached John Peel, who duly played it; it became single of the week in the music papers, and sales exploded via mail order. After Mancunian photographer Kevin Cummins gave Marc Bolan a copy and photographed him holding it, Boon’s landline started “ringing off the hook”.

Spiral Scratch provided evidence that punk was having an effect nationwide, that it wasn’t just confined to a small coterie in London. The cultural historian Jon Savage had just started his first fanzine when it was released, and it made him think Manchester punk “seemed more interesting than London punk, which was full of people with leather jackets and cocaine habits”. Just as important, the means of Spiral Scratch’s release epitomised liberation through DIY. “Suddenly the gap between wanting to do something and actually doing it seemed small,” Savage says.

Devoto’s idea of providing recording details on the sleeve – “Breakdown, third take, no overdubs” and so on – further demystified the process of making records, making it seem accessible to scores of young groups. Two months after Spiral Scratch was released, the Desperate Bicycles formed, and released a first single with a sleevenote that read: “The Desperate Bicycles were formed in March 1977 specifically for the purpose of recording and releasing a single on their own label.” That note inspired Green Gartside of Scritti Politti to form his own band and release a debut single on which he itemised the costs of production and manufacturing. Buzzcocks had started something that couldn’t be stopped.

Indie labels began to spring up nationwide: in 1978, ZigZag magazine published a list of 120 labels that had punk acts on their roster; the vast majority of them were from outside London. Alongside the labels came a new breed of band: Webster remembers Ian Curtis coming into Virgin and declaring: “I’ve formed a band!” Then Rough Trade set up the indie distribution network that gave these new labels and bands some of the muscle their counterparts on the major labels had previously monopolised. “You could have a No 1 record and have nothing to do with the record industry,” he says. “It was tremendously empowering.”




Buzzcocks Mk 1 didn’t survive their own earthquake. Devoto returned to college, and later formed Magazine. The new lineup of Buzzcocks, with Shelley singing, signed to United Artists and produced some of the best loved-music of the punk era. Forty years on, although there have been breaks along the way, Shelley and Diggle continue to lead Buzzcocks, and celebrated the band’s 40th anniversary with a world tour.

And all these years on, there are young bands doing exactly what Buzzcocks did. “I recently met the grime act Tough Squad, who told me how they press up 200 records, take them to shops and then go back for the money,” Boon says. “Just like we did.”

“It just shows what can happen if you’re stupid enough to believe that you can do something,” Shelley adds. “History is made by those who turn up.”

 Spiral Scratch (40th anniversary reissue) is released on Domino on 27 January. Time’s Up, an album of 1976 demos, is being reissued on 24 February.

 

How Buzzcocks invented indie (with help from the Sex Pistols, a Renault and the Quo). By  Dave Simpson. The Guardian,  January 12, 2017. 






Pete Shelley and his band Buzzcocks became indelibly linked to the UK’s punk movement when they played their first gig supporting the Sex Pistols at the Lesser Free Trade Hall in Manchester in July 1976, but they never conformed to any of punk’s cliches about rage, anarchy and rebellion. Shelley, who has died of a heart attack aged 63, proved to be a songwriter of wit and subtlety, able to probe the angst and confusion of adolescent love and lust with shrewd insight.

He was innovative musically as well as lyrically, taking inspiration from David Bowie, Brian Eno, Roxy Music and the Velvet Underground, as well as from German bands such as Neu and Can. While the music of many of the punk bands remains firmly of its time, Buzzcocks’ best songs still sound fresh and inventive, mixing dense guitar patterns with infectious melodies. Their influence can be heard on bands from Primal Scream and the Jesus and Mary Chain to REM and Nirvana. Gary Kemp of Spandau Ballet said: “Pete was one of Britain’s best pure pop writers, up there with Ray Davies.”

Buzzcocks achieved success with their first recording, the Spiral Scratch EP, which was released on their own label, New Hormones, in January 1977 (the band having supported the Sex Pistols on their Anarchy tour in late 1976). It was one of the first independent releases of the punk era, and to the band’s surprise sold its first thousand copies in four days. “We made quite a bit of money from Spiral Scratch,” Shelley recalled. “It ended up selling about 16,000 copies and we were able to buy some new equipment.”

They then signed to United Artists. Their first single, Orgasm Addict, was released in November 1977 but the BBC declined to play it because of its subject matter and it did not make the charts. The follow-up, What Do I Get, released in February 1978, reached 37, and their debut album, Another Music in a Different Kitchen (1978) climbed to 15. Their second album, Love Bites, which came out later that year, contained what remains their best-known hit, the zingingly propulsive Ever Fallen In Love (With Someone You Shouldn’t’ve), which made No 12. Shelley borrowed the title from a line in the musical Guys and Dolls. The 1979 album A Different Kind of Tension reached 26 in the UK.

Continued singles success came with Promises (20), Everybody’s Happy Nowadays (29) and Harmony in My Head (32). However, growing tensions in the band coupled with friction with EMI, which had purchased United Artists, prompted Shelley to break up Buzzcocks in 1981.

He was born Peter McNeish in Leigh, Lancashire. His father, John, was a fitter at Astley Green colliery, and his mother, Margaret, a former mill worker. Peter began writing songs while still at Leigh grammar school, and while studying for an HND in electronics at Bolton Institute of Technology he bought a Tandberg four-track reel-to-reel tape recorder and began making recordings of his own songs. (“I think of my career in music more as a songwriting career than anything else,” he said in 1983.) He formed a group called Jets of Air, the name inspired by a college lecture on Newtonian physics, and while “we played only about six gigs in three years”, Shelley built up a stockpile of songs.

He then dabbled in a project called Sky, where he experimented with electronic music and recorded the album Sky Yen, released later, in 1980, on his own label, Groovy Records. He subsequently tried making “heavier, more rhythmic” music with Smash, which he described as “a non-existent group”, but which supplied more raw material for Buzzcocks.

The band came about when Shelley spotted an advertisement on a college noticeboard from Howard Devoto (real name Howard Trafford), wanting to form a band in the vein of the Stooges and the Velvet Underground. “That was much in line with the Smash idea, so I phoned him up straight away,” said Shelley. Buzzcocks originally planned to make their debut at the first Sex Pistols concert at the Lesser Free Trade Hall in June 1976, but the bass player and drummer pulled out.

For their eventual appearance the following month, Shelley and Devoto were joined by the drummer John Maher and the bassist Steve Diggle. When Devoto quit after the release of Spiral Scratch and went on to form Magazine, Shelley became lead vocalist, Diggle switched to guitar and the original bass player, Garth Smith, rejoined temporarily, later replaced by Steve Garvey.

In 1981 Shelley launched his solo career with the single Homosapien, from the album of the same name, produced by the Buzzcocks producer Martin Rushent (who was about to help make Human League’s electropop epic Dare). Shelley had returned to his earlier fondness for electronica, and found himself in controversial waters when the BBC banned Homosapien for its “explicit reference to gay sex”. In 2002 Shelley commented that his sexuality “tends to change as much as the weather”. The track reached 14 on the US dance chart.

 In 1983 his second solo album, XL1, brought him a minor hit single with Telephone Operator. In 1987 he contributed the song Do Anything to the soundtrack of the John Hughes movie Some Kind of Wonderful.

In 1989 Buzzcocks reformed and toured the US, and released Trade Test Transmissions (1993), the first of a series of albums, the most recent of which was The Way (2014). In 2002, Shelley reunited with Devoto to record the album Buzzkunst. “Devoto is not the life and soul of the party or a born raconteur, but he sees things as funny and I think that’s how we hit it off with each other,” Shelley observed drily. “I always had this idea that me and Devoto were like Gilbert and George. As long as you approach it from that angle you can do anything you want, and you just call it art.”

In 2005, following the death of the DJ John Peel, Shelley recorded a tribute version of Ever Fallen In Love with a multi-platinum lineup of stars including Elton John, Robert Plant, David Gilmour and Roger Daltrey.

In 2012 he moved to Tallinn, Estonia, with his second wife, Greta. She survives him, as do his younger brother, Gary, and a son from his first marriage.

 Pete Shelley (Peter Campbell McNeish), musician, singer and songwriter, born 17 April 1955; died 6 December 2018.

Pete Shelley obituary. By Adam Sweeting. The Guardian, December 7, 2018. 


 

Buzzcocks' Pete Shelley – a life in pictures. The Guardian, December 7, 2018. 










24/12/2023

Why The Wars On Terror, Drugs And Migration Never Succeed

 



War rhetoric is everywhere in our volatile politics: from Ukraine to the resurrection of the war on terror in Gaza, from the ‘wars’ on human smugglers, drugs and crime, through to more metaphorical culture wars, ‘war on motorists’, on a virus – even on climate change. Keir Starmer accuses Rishi Sunak of prosecuting a ‘one-man war on reality’ while ‘anti-woke’ campaigners decry a war on Christmas. Some of these wars are spurious (last time we looked, Christmas is still happening). Others are all too real.

What’s clear is that war rhetoric is attractive either to rally one’s troops or to smear one’s opponents. No surprise: war mobilises. If a politician were to proclaim ‘a mild push on climate change’ or ‘a moderately important attempt to curtail migration,’ they’d get few plaudits from the ranks. But, as my colleague Ruben Andersson and I found in our book Wreckonomics, our addiction to waging (or announcing) war on everything has brought underhand benefits for politicians and massive problems for the rest of us.

For a start, politicians frequently use the spectacle of war to direct attention away from their deeper failures. Israel’s Gaza onslaught, after major security failings, may be a notable example. In the more metaphorical war on smugglers, we might think of Sunak’s renewed noises over small boats in face of record immigration figures. Diversionary tactics abound. Just two weeks after 9/11, Donald Rumsfeld suggested: ‘Look, as part of the war on terrorism, should we be getting something going in another area, other than Afghanistan, so that success or failure and progress isn’t measured just by Afghanistan?’ The Iraq invasion followed, with New Labour support. Amid the subsequent quagmire, one former Foreign Office worker told me of pressure to ensure things were seen to be working in Afghanistan so as to provide a distraction from things going so badly in Iraq.

Another problem rears its head here: war – whether in rhetoric or practice – tends to create more enemies. When politicians sought to frame measures against Covid-19 as a just war of sorts, opponents reacted and belligerence grew. As for real war, figures from the Global Terrorism Index show that in the context of the multi-trillion dollar global war on terror, the number of terrorist attacks rose rapidly: from around 3,300 in 2000 to almost 30,000 by 2015. Israel would do well to heed the warning.

War creates rich opportunities for those who want to game it for purposes of their own. The classic case is Vietnam, where American General William Corson observed that the South Vietnamese government’s power was ‘based on the US presence, and since that in turn is based on the level of violence it is to their advantage to orchestrate the war at the appropriate level.’ More recently, regimes from Syria to Sri Lanka and China have used the idea of a ‘war on terror’ as convenient cover for repressing their own populations. Meanwhile, from Gaddafi’s Libya to Turkey and Niger, ‘partner states’ have been able to use the threat of mass migration to leverage aid money and to carve out immunity for repression.

To these perverse incentives, we can add one more: the ease with which its costs can be exported to others. In 1935, another US general, Smedley Butler, denounced war as a racket ‘in which the profits are reckoned in dollars and the losses in lives.’ Consider the war on drugs, which in the words of one report, has generated ‘mass incarceration in the US, highly repressive policies in Asia, vast corruption and political destabilisation in Afghanistan and West Africa, immense violence in Latin America, an HIV epidemic in Russia, an acute global shortage of pain medication and the propagation of systematic human rights abuses around the world.’ And all this at huge expense to the public purse.

War ushers in a self-righteousness that quashes dissent and constrains debate over its real costs. For years, the staggering failure in Afghanistan and Iraq was effectively hidden away. ‘We didn’t have the foggiest notion of what we were undertaking,’ admitted Douglas Lute, the Afghan war czar under the Bush and Obama administrations. For too long, no one dared call the emperor naked while he was leading his troops into battle. We see a similar pattern in rhetorical wars too – including in the fight against Covid-19 via lockdowns, whose highly unequal distribution of costs worldwide was frequently seen as beyond the scope of civilised discussion. ‘Net zero’ risks reproducing this, fuelling an unsavoury politics of grievance. Both those on the left and right would do well to dial down their righteousness and listen.

More insidious than the quashing of dissent is the manipulation of the information environment that war invites. In the war on terror, beating Isis became a ‘win’ – even though Isis owed its existence to the war itself. In the war on drugs, policymakers reel off metrics on narcotics intercepted and smugglers arrested, but the trade keeps growing. At the borders, each crackdown (at Calais, in the Mediterranean) promises a political pay-off but also stores up future trouble (the small boats, the Atlantic crossing). When wars are declared, politicians need to point so a ‘win’, but all too often this means we frequently end up in a hall of mirrors where underlying problems are renewed and where failure becomes a peculiar kind of success.

In all the war talk lurks the danger, too, of crying wolf. When a real war happens, whether in Ukraine or the Middle East, we may not fully recognise it for what it is — not least when it comes to the dangers of escalation and the quashing of dissent.

We must wean ourselves off the war fix. By opening our eyes to the real costs and ill-gotten benefits from both rhetorical and real wars, we have a chance to ditch the addiction. That will help us to focus on the more peaceful solutions that only emerge when dissent and debate are allowed a proper place in politics. 

Wreckonomics: Why It’s Time to End the War on Everything, by Ruben Andersson and David Keen, is out now

Why are politicians fixated with declaring war? By David Keen. The Spectator December 22, 2023. 





Just like the war on drugs and the war on terror, efforts at stopping population movement by force often just fuel the problem. But for many claiming to confront the perceived threat, that suits all too well

Look at the business of tackling the migration crisis in Europe, and you will find evidence not of some one-off failure to plan ahead, or a policy initiative gone wrong through unexpected circumstances. Rather, you face something akin to a complex crime scene where the damage, the ostensible “mistakes”, and the cover-ups have all been systematic. The perverse outcomes of the war on smuggling – including thousands of border deaths, escalating political brinkmanship and the professionalisation of the human smuggling business itself – are more than a blip or an anomaly. When policies persistently fail, we need to look not only at “what went wrong” but also at “what went right”– and at who is benefiting from the wreckage.

 The habit of waging “war” on everything has spread from the early days of the war on communism and the war on drugs to “fights” against crime, terrorism, irregular migration and many more complex political problems. These wars never seem to be won and often have disastrous results, yet politicians continue to declare them. What keeps such disastrous interventions and policies ticking over? What renders them acceptable? Why do they get reinvented from one era to another? And why do we never seem to learn? Using our backgrounds in anthropology (Ruben Andersson) and history/sociology (David Keen), over recent years, we have sought to get to the bottom of these questions. Nowhere illustrates the failure of “the war on everything” approach better than the fight against migration.

In 2010, when Ruben first arrived in Senegal to study migration to Europe, he was struck by something people kept telling him. Four years earlier, in one of Europe’s earlier “migration crises”, 30,000 west-African migrants had arrived at the Spanish Canary Islands in wooden fishing boats, sparking a large-scale deportation campaign. On the outskirts of Dakar, the capital of Senegal, one of those deported from the Canaries told Ruben that he was, as an anthropologist studying migration, part of a system that was profiting from the migrants’ misery. “There’s lots of money in illegal migration,” said the deportee, pointing out, on long walks through his seaside neighbourhood, all those who fed off this system: academics, journalists, NGOs and European and Senegalese maritime forces stationed just beyond this fishing community.

At the time, the word on the street was that Senegalese politicians, both locally and nationally, were using Spanish aid money – meant to ensure Senegal’s collaboration in deportations and border patrols – for their own private or political gain. In coming years, the pattern would be replicated as major partners in European immigration control – such as Libya, Turkey and Sudan – leveraged their promised cooperation, not just for a windfall of aid, but also for wider strategic and economic ends.

Seeing this system in action, we developed an analysis of the political economy of war and of security operations such as deportation and border patrols – asking the old question “Cui bono” (Who gains?), as well as “In whose wider interests are the operations staged?” There was an intriguing, if disturbing, challenge of joining the dots between various disastrous interventions, from the wars on drugs and smugglers to the war on terror, where we had observed a very similar pattern. In a variety of war-like interventions, regional powers have been gaming ostensible attempts to eliminate a perceived threat, carving out impunity and making a profit. At the same time, pursuing these various wars and fights has routinely fuelled – or simply displaced – the problem. For a wide range of actors who claim to confront the perceived threat, things keep going wrong in the right way.

Escalating the fights, escalating the demands

One of the most important gamers was Libya’s Col Muammar Gaddafi. By the early 2000s, he had already discovered that he sat on a prize possession. Amid the international arms embargo, the Brotherly Leader had turned his eyes to his African neighbours: sleeping in a great Bedouin tent in New York before the UN general assembly was all of a piece with his newfound role as chief spokesperson for downtrodden African nations breaking free from old colonial shackles. He had established close business links with states in the Sahel and invited African workers into Libya’s booming economy.

 As Italy and its northern neighbours anxiously began considering the Mediterranean for signs of migrant boats, however, Gaddafi started seeing his country’s African workers as a double asset. On the one hand, workers could still be exploited; on the other, they could be weaponised. By 2008, a Friendship Treaty had been struck between Gaddafi and Italy’s Silvio Berlusconi, which was worth $5bn over 20 years. Supposedly aimed at addressing colonial wrongs, it smoothed the path for outsourced border patrols in the central Mediterranean. Even so, Gaddafi, who had by now fully grown into Reagan’s caricature of him as the “mad dog of the Middle East”, escalated the rhetoric and threatened that Europe would “turn black” unless more favours were forthcoming. And come they did: Libya emerged from the international cold thanks in no small part to Gaddafi’s migration manoeuvres. He also succeeded in presenting himself as someone who could help in the “war on terror” – not least because of his role in stirring up terror.




Then came war. Amid the Arab spring, Nato and assorted Middle Eastern countries intervened militarily in the scramble for power in Libya. The violent removal of Gaddafi and the conflict that followed led to a cascade of displacement and migration; it also escalated the gaming and brinkmanship. Nato missiles had ended his previously cosy relationship with European leaders, but Gaddafi did not give up on his threats and cajoling in the dying days of his regime – quite the opposite. Europe would be “invaded” by migrants, he said, unless Nato backed down; his troops tried to make good on his threat, forcing African workers to board unseaworthy vessels at gunpoint.

In the following years, assorted warlords have kept up this tradition by simultaneously combating and facilitating migration, taking handsome rewards while threatening Europe with further “invasions”. In one notable episode, one militia leader in the north-western Libyan city of Zawiya, known as Al Bija, was found by journalists to be managing the smuggling market by taking a substantial cut from any departing boats before promptly “rescuing” those who had not paid, towing them back to land and imprisoning them in brutal detention centres run by his own tribe. The double game of migration control – extracting cash and impunity by issuing threats, while simultaneously offering to remedy them – was, by the time of Libya’s conflict, a high-stakes scramble for profit and power.

Gaming Europe’s migration fixation

The stakes were to rise higher still. In 2015, Turkey’s Recep Tayyip Erdoğan was in a tight spot: he had called snap elections and was under siege from all sides. But Erdoğan held the trump card: migration. Though the details were to remain murky, by spring 2016 it was becoming clear that threatening to turn on the tap of onward migration was an important tactic for the Turkish leadership. (Questions still remain over Russia’s role in fomenting the crisis as part of its Syria manoeuvres.) The 2015-16 border crisis would strengthen Erdoğan’s grip on power as he extracted promises from the EU – only partially met, but that did not particularly matter for short-term electoral purposes – on visa-free travel for Turkish citizens and billions of euros of financial support for Turkey’s refugee operations.

Selling yourself as an unreliable bulwark against migration had by 2015 become big business. “Weapons of mass migration” is how one scholar, Kelly Greenhill, has labelled this use of migrants as a geopolitical tool. Whatever we call this gaming of migration and forced displacement, it is a remarkably effective way for less powerful states to exert pressure on their stronger counterparts. One further example comes from Morocco, which in 2022 managed finally to shift Spain’s policy on occupied Western Sahara in its favour in exchange for further migration enforcement – halting, at least temporarily, the brinkmanship that had fomented politically motivated “border crises” at the Spanish enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla, as well as in the strait of Gibraltar, over previous decades. The costs of this bargaining were regularly borne by migrants; for instance, in June 2022 at least 37 migrants died between the Spanish and Moroccan fences at Melilla, where they had been trapped and teargassed in a security operation subsequently covered up by both sides.




In her study, Greenhill argues that certain features of liberal democracies – including respect for rights and open democratic debate – make them particularly vulnerable to being played. However, we have seen in Libya and Turkey how the illiberal tendency of treating migration as a threat has been a key part of the game. Once fighting migration has come to be seen as a paramount political objective in destination states, and once huge resources are being spent on this endeavour, buffer states will spot vulnerabilities and opportunities to play on this perceived existential threat, selectively closing and opening the gates.

UNHCR figures as of 2023 confirm a broader trend: 83% of refugees worldwide are hosted by low- and middle-income countries, and 72% by countries neighbouring conflict zones. Turkey, topping the list of global refugee hosts, can reasonably argue that it has done its “fair share” in hosting more than 3.6 million refugees, mostly from neighbouring Syria. When larger refugee hosts leverage human displacement, they are using the “weapons of the weak”, to use anthropologist James Scott’s term, against a more powerful counterpart. While border security has spectacularly failed to address international migration (and has generated a raft of destructive consequences), it has nevertheless “succeeded” in keeping refugees away from the protection that might have been provided by the richest states, at least for some time. Yet this is far from the only shortsighted gain for destination states. Another comes from the potent politics of distraction and drama that border control provides.

The burgeoning business of border security

It is worth reflecting on how swiftly borders became bulwarks against unwanted migration. The end of the cold war once promised, to optimistic liberal thinkers, a borderless world; instead, it gifted us an increasingly globalised border business. Not only are more and more partner states being enrolled in border security, but many countries are also instigating their own border security fixations. Barriers are today separating neighbours not just in the west but far beyond. While there were 15 walls at nation-state borders around the world at the end of the cold war, the total had risen to more than 70 barely three decades later. Unlike older border fortifications, the new ones are not built to keep state enemies away (or to keep citizens in, as in the case of the Berlin Wall): they are aimed at keeping people out.

Calls for “security” and “border protection” justify not just the building of walls but also a wider architecture of control, separation and surveillance at national borders, and well beyond them. Drones have been repurposed from the “war on terror” for border surveillance in the US and the Mediterranean; complex offshore detention and sea patrolling agreements have been rolled out from Australia to the Atlantic; advanced radar equipment and satellite surveillance have proven a boon for Europe’s defence industry; and in the increasing number of border security “expos”, security firms have presented their customers with ever more intrusive technologies– heartbeat scanners, oxygen detectors, ground sensors, online surveillance – in a market that, according to one estimate, will soon be worth more than $65bn. Meanwhile, the budget of the EU border and coast guard agency, Frontex, shot up from €19m in 2006 to more than €750m by 2022, a year in which it was facing mounting scandal over support for illegal Greek “pushbacks” at sea.




The US, as so often, has led the way in this trend while actively heating the global border security market – with the budget of the US Border Patrol increasing almost tenfold in the past three decades, from $363m in 1993 to nearly $4.9bn by 2021. While these sums are still small relative to military expenditure, the remarkable growth rate of the US Border Patrol’s budget is strongly related to the wider security marketplace, with great scope for synergies, “dual-use” technology, seed funding and more, across civilian policing and military sectors. At the heart of this complex sits the vast Department for Homeland Security bureaucracy.

Besides the escalating border security investments, politicians have put huge amounts of time, money and effort into the complicated business of getting tough on migration – and being seen to get tough.

Yet this has massively backfired on a practical level. Douglas Massey, a leading migration scholar, has found that, since the 1980s, vast expenditure on border security has gone hand in hand with a large growth of undocumented migration within the US.

The reason is remarkably simple: as it became much harder for seasonal migrant workers to circulate back “home”, owing to harsh border controls and barriers, people stayed. So why, if border controls were backfiring so spectacularly, were successive administrations so committed to them?

The political profits of fighting migration

The gap between rhetoric and reality in migration policy has been especially notable when it comes to fighting migration. The political gains from a strong stance on borders are clear, even when politicians fail to achieve the outcomes they seek. Some years ago in the US, the political scientist Peter Andreas described this as a “border game” with various layers: from the spectacle – and distraction – of border enforcement on the political level, to the institutional funding game, through to the cat-and-mouse game at the border itself.

Racism came to play a prominent role here, reflecting a longer history of racial exclusion, fed by a fear-based narrative. In 1985, President Ronald Reagan said undocumented migration was “a threat to national security”, with “terrorists and subversives ... just two days’ driving time” from the Texas border, and communist agents ready “to feed on the anger and frustration of recent Central and South American immigrants”. Massey is among those who have pointed out how, over the decades that followed, a racialised “Latino threat narrative was manufactured and sustained by an expanding set of self-interested actors who benefited from the perpetuation of an immigration crisis”. This new migration pattern also had clear winners within the wider economy, as an undocumented and deportable labour force was even more exploitable than its legal predecessors.




A large part of the incentive to keep escalating the fight, in the US and Europe, concerned the gains to be had from fixating on and fighting illegal migration. Especially in the US, border closures have brought economic gains in rendering the cross-border labour force increasingly exploitable. Meanwhile, the political gains are twofold. On the one hand, a tough nationalist message attracts voters; on the other, it provides a distraction from problems that governments cannot or do not want to solve, including inequality, economic insecurity and environmental catastrophe. Irregular migration by land and sea was a boon for this kind of politics in Europe. Yet the numbers have in general been relatively small, 2015 excluded. Most irregular migration in Europe occurs when people overstay their visas, as the European Commission itself acknowledges, while regular immigration dwarfs land and sea arrivals.

Governments and interior ministries have seen fit, for their own political and institutional reasons, to treat some human movement as a security problem to be solved with force. Instead of looking at the complex drivers of migration – including persistent demand for workers – all politicians had to do was to be seen to address the arrivals. Meanwhile, new actors spotted an opportunity.

How the war on migration feeds the smuggling business

European leaders have been keen to frame their border security efforts as a war on smugglers, especially since 2015, when smugglers (frequently mislabelled as mafia or traffickers) were conveniently assigned the blame for a set of horrific shipwrecks near the Italian and Maltese coasts. Of course, we shouldn’t paint smugglers in a rosy light; theirs is usually a cut-throat business. Yet it is a business that has grown larger and more violent on the back of border enforcement, not just in Europe but worldwide.

In north Africa and the Sahel, the small-scale smuggling of earlier years, often run by migrants themselves, has increasingly given way to organised criminal gangs. In Libya, smugglers have held migrants and refugees hostage and even tortured them until their families pay release fees. The taller the barriers, the more captive your market, as “customers” have nowhere left to turn except into the hands of professional criminal organisations.

We can put this in economic terms, as Customs and Border Protection (CBP) officials in the US are keen to do themselves. In presentations, CBP economists have asserted, like their European counterparts, that the aim of enforcement is to destroy the smugglers’ business model. This involves increasing the cost of smuggling to the point where revenue takes a hit, making it a less attractive business. Yet what this does in practice is favour smuggling economies of scale. A systemic view, if officials had wished to consider it, would tell them that the fight against migration and the war on smugglers would produce more of precisely that which they said they wanted to curtail: more dangerous migration scenarios and stronger criminal smuggling operations.

This is precisely what happened in Libya, after the fall of Gaddafi. As one report noted in 2017, “The coastguard, detention centres and key branches of the fragile Libyan state’s security apparatus are largely run by militias, some deeply involved in the illicit economy,” with these militias “creating a protection market around human smuggling before eventually taking over the business directly”. The political and economic games around European – especially Italian – relationships with the militias have been complex and murky. However, it was becoming clear around this time that external involvement and encouragement were strengthening the power of the militias, who, like many border guards, could play the dual role of poacher and gamekeeper along Libya’s coasts. The strengthening of militias and the ensuing turf battles among them were contributing to Libyan instability.

 In impoverished Mali and Niger, various political leaders have sent clear signals that unless they receive the required political support and economic capital, a migratory crisis will ensue. States such as Morocco and Turkey regularly turn on and off the migratory tap to strengthen their hand in negotiations with the EU. In all these cases, authoritarian leaders, interior ministries, and abusive security forces have been the big winners in the fight against migration – gaining power, recognition and money. Those who have suffered most have been migrants and citizens in these countries, while regional stability has been weakened.

In 2020, President Alexander Lukashenko of Belarus – despite his regime’s incipient working arrangement with the Frontex border agency – was channelling refugees to a frontier no-man’s-land where Polish guards fought them back. By this stage, EU leaders and the European Commission had cottoned on to what they called the “instrumentalisation” of migration. Their argument, probably quite correct, was that Lukashenko was seeking to destabilise the EU through uncontrollable migration flows. Yet instead of accounting for its own role in the blatant gaming at the borders, the EU used this incident to propose what amounted to pushbacks in cases where migration was being “instrumentalised”.

On the central Mediterranean migration route, it is not only Gaddafi’s successors who have continued to instrumentalise migration. So have Italian politicians, who have used these threats at face value to ramp up anti-migration rhetoric, to rally the voter base, and to put blame on the EU – and human smugglers – for the debacle.

This kind of crisis politics has been accompanied by a growing tendency to shift blame on to rescue initiatives on the open sea, with repeated shipwrecks and deaths as a result. On the southern border of the US, while Mexico has often been less willing to stoke the problem in the way Europe’s neighbours have done, this has in no way dented the political appetite in Washington DC for manipulating border crises and finding new groups to blame. A wide range of wars and fights – whether in relation to migration, terrorism, drugs or crime – has created perverse incentives. One is tempted to say that failure has become the new success.

This is an edited extract from Wreckonomics: Why It’s Time to End the War on Everything, published by Oxford University Press, 2023.

‘Weapons of mass migration’: how states exploit the failure of migration policies. By Ruben Andersson and David Keen. The Guardian, December 14, 2023. 






Oxford University Press


Oxford Academic





Security is one of the most important and challenging issues in the 21st century. It is the ability to protect and promote the well-being and dignity of people and communities, and to prevent and resolve conflicts and threats. But what does security really mean? And how can we achieve it in a complex and uncertain world? In this article, we will review the book Wreckonomics: Why It’s Time to End the War on Everything by Ruben Andersson and David Keen, two professors of international development and experts on conflict and security. The book is a critical and provocative analysis of why various wars and security interventions have persisted and prospered despite their disastrous failures and costs, and how we can end the war on everything and create a more peaceful and prosperous world.

If you want to learn more about security and development, and how to challenge and change the destructive policies and practices that fuel the war on everything, you should read this book. It will give you a new and holistic perspective on security and development, and help you find effective and ethical ways to address the complex and interrelated challenges and opportunities that we face in the world.

Recommendation

War is hell, the saying goes. For professors Ruben Andersson and David Keen, the truism evokes a different kind of hellscape. In this insightful analysis, they dissect the “war on everything,” by which they mean misguided fights against problems like terror, illicit drugs and illegal immigration. In every case, the warriors oversimplify the threat, use bogus metrics to measure their progress and then duly claim victory where none exists. Andersson and Keen focus not just on the hypocrisy of political leaders but also on the unintended victims of these wars. You’ll find that their thought-provoking work casts many of society’s issues in a new light.

Take-Aways

“Wreckonomics” is a perverse process by which a misguided policy targets an intractable problem.

Wreckonomics policies consist of five parts that describe the process.

The Cold War set the stage for decades of unwarranted wars.

The War on Terror played on fears while botching the broader mission.

Wreckonomics policies create their own destructive momentum.

The fight against illegal immigration contains echoes of the other wars.

The War on Drugs is the longest of the wreckonomics misadventures.

Four strategies can help make wreckonomics policies less devastating.

 

 

Summary

“Wreckonomics” is a perverse process by which a misguided policy targets an intractable problem.

In recent decades, Western governments have embarked on a variety of well-funded fights against various scourges. There was a War on Drugs and a War on Terror, along with fights against illegal immigration. But the cures proved worse than the diseases. These wars created unintended consequences without fixing the underlying problems. Despite the obvious failures of these wars, politicians keep fighting them and finding new enemies. Indeed, politics in the United States seem to be dominated by a never-ending search for new foes and a demand from the warriors that everyone become more indignant.

“This habit of waging ‘war on everything’ has spread from the early days of the war on Communism and the war on drugs to ‘fights’ against crime, terrorism, migration and many more complex political problems.”

One theme in these wars is that they underestimate the complexity of the challenge at hand. Politicians view themselves as crime scene investigators – they’re looking for the single culprit responsible for the problem. That mindset led to the manhunts for Osama bin Laden and Saddam Hussein. In wreckonomics, the good guys need one evil actor to blame, even if the underlying issue has many protagonists. In truth, any social issue is multifaceted and difficult to fix.

“One way of summing up this habit of wreck-and-fix is the old saying ‘If you have a hammer, everything looks like a nail’.”

That leads to another common theme: Wreckonomics policies often are championed by right-wing politicians. While conservatives aren’t entirely to blame for wreckonomics policies, the right has specialized in simplifying and weaponizing complicated issues.


Wreckonomics policies consist of five parts that describe the process.

The wreckonomics ethos can be summed up with the acronym WRECK:

W is for “war fix” – Warriors sell the miracle of the kill shot. In every wreckonomics policy, an ill-conceived notion that the targeted threat is simple and can be remedied through force dominates. Hitting the problem with a magic bullet will neutralize the threat, the warriors promise. Wreckonomics also provides a fix in that the misguided actions soon become addictive. Once the war starts, stopping it is nearly impossible.

R is for rigged – Wreckonomics policies are gamed to benefit certain players. In the war on everything, the fix is always in. No one ever comes out and says it, of course, but those crucial players speaking most loudly against the threat at hand are the ones who benefit most from the focus on it.

E is for externalization – Wreckonomics policies are expensive in terms of blood and treasure, but the interventions never hit the powerful as hard as they hit everyone else.

C is for cascade – The first three letters of WRECK set the stage for unexpected, unpredictable results. Just as an avalanche starts small and escalates quickly, the wreckonomics cascade is a result of the unacknowledged complexity of the task at hand. Costs quickly balloon, as do the opportunities for players to further corrupt the process.

K is for “knowledge fix” – Once the war is under way, its proponents set about twisting the truth: Any victories are exaggerated, any setbacks are downplayed. The distortions include overlooking the true costs of the intervention, and ignoring failures and unintended consequences.





The Cold War set the stage for decades of unwarranted wars.


The Cold War wrote the script for the wreckonomics policies that followed. The globe’s two great powers were embroiled in nonshooting wars against the other. Gaming became endemic. In the United States, huge sums flowed to defense contractors. The Soviet Union also ramped up its own armaments industry. Like all wreckonomics policies, the Cold War launched with a real conflict and sincere intentions: Two great powers aimed to spread their divergent ideologies. However, things quickly spiraled. Over the decades, the Cold War turned hot in proxy wars, perhaps most notably in Vietnam, but also in El Salvador, Indonesia and Angola. The specter of colonialism loomed over many of these hot spots, adding complexity to the system. What’s more, the architects of the Cold War lived in Washington, DC, and Moscow, places unburdened with the high body counts that were racked up in shooting wars in the developing world. One US infantry officer wrote the memoir Kill Everything That Moves, a title that summed up how a poor person living in Vietnam experienced the Cold War.

“Seen as a whole, the Cold War involved a very particular – and very skewed – distribution of costs”

As the Cold War sprawled across the globe, propaganda took over. Neither side gave an honest accounting of its victories and defeats; instead, both turned to spin and obfuscation. What’s more, America and the USSR assembled allies who were gaming the Cold War agenda not out of ideological purity but for their own advantage. The end of the Cold War underscored the addictive nature of wreckonomics: Optimists hoped for a “peace dividend” in the 1990s as the huge sums funneled toward arms, soldiers and spies could be redirected to schools and health care. Instead, the United States and Europe continued to spend heavily on their militaries, with the argument that cutting defense budgets amounted to a surrender to global threats.





The War on Terror played on fears while botching the broader mission.

The post-September 11, 2001, fight against global terrorism quickly devolved into a particularly effective version of wreckonomics. A defining feature of this policy was its appeal to emotion, particularly fear. Terror warriors became adept at manipulating public emotions to get what they wanted. The emotional appeal serves as an inoculation against uncomfortable questions – if the war pits good versus evil, then no right-minded person would question how it’s being waged or how widely it’s proliferating. The US War on Terror turned into an all-encompassing effort, as evidenced by the creation of the Department of Homeland Security, a bureaucracy that fought not just terror but also drug trafficking and border security.

“In our wars and fights, strong emotions have also effectively been stirred up and manipulated by political and security actors.”

 The Cold War created the prime conditions for the War on Terror that followed. A hot war in Afghanistan sowed the seeds of future insurgency. Then, when the Cold War ended and communism faded as an enemy, terrorism moved into the role. Terrorism didn’t become Public Enemy No. 1 until the 9/11 attacks. Then, the war machine sprang into action, with the United States invading Afghanistan and then Iraq.


Wreckonomics policies create their own destructive momentum.

Neither invasion was clearly supported, but both illustrated a reality of wreckonomics: The wars perpetuate themselves. A clear goal of the 9/11 terrorists was to provoke the United States into a heavy-handed response, which then served as evidence that America really was the iron-fisted power that the terrorists had portrayed all along. Afghanistan and Iraq, meanwhile, saw spikes in terror attacks after US troops arrived, acts that only seemed to reinforce the rationale for the American invasion and ongoing presence. As Democratic presidential candidate John Kerry said of George W. Bush, “Iraq was not even close to the center of the War on Terror before the president invaded it.”

“Many of the state actors we have considered – in Washington, Moscow, Damascus and Colombo – can cynically claim their wars have been ‘won’.”

As billions flowed into Afghanistan, the country remained unstable. A task force headed by General David Petraeus estimated $360 million in US aid had wound up in the pockets of the Taliban or Afghani criminals. To the credit of the terror warriors in the United States, one goal has been achieved: No attacks have occurred on US soil since 2001. But to hold up this fact as the only measure of success is to miss the broader failures. These include massive spending and a globally disruptive wave of violence not just in Afghanistan and Iraq but in Syria, Sri Lanka and elsewhere.




The fight against illegal immigration contains echoes of the other wars.

For decades, the United States had been trying to stem illegal immigration across the Mexican border. Brazen incursions across the frontier near San Diego in the 1990s led American authorities to build fences, which then pushed migration paths into more remote, hazardous terrain. Similarly, in the 2000s, an influx of illegal migrants into Spain led that country to build more fences. The migrants in turn took even more circuitous and dangerous routes to Europe. In true wreckonomics fashion, developing nations bordering wealthy powers figured out how to make money from their geographic position. Mexico partnered with the United States to crack down on illegal entries through Mexico’s southern border. Mauritania accepted investments from Spain, while Libya partnered up with Italy.

“Libya emerged from the international cold thanks in no small part to Gaddafi’s migration maneuvers.”

For opportunists south of the border, the fight against immigration is a lucrative leverage point. Libyan strongman Muammar Gaddafi grasped Europe’s fears of African migrants streaming in, and he threatened to allow Europe to “turn black” unless he received compensation. The gambit worked. Libya received billions in European aid. One scholar even labeled the strategy “weapons of mass migration.” As the Arab Spring and the Syrian war spurred a crisis, the wreckonomics playbook was in full force. Conservative policymakers embraced overly simplistic solutions that were doomed to fall short. Meanwhile, shrewd actors in the developing world figured out how to make the wreckonomics policies work for them. In Libya, for instance, a militia leader exacted a toll from each boat heading north. Those who declined to pay would be “rescued” at sea – and the boat’s occupants sent to prison camps. The spoils weren’t just for strongmen. Frontex, Europe’s border patrol agency, saw its annual budget soar, going from less than $22 million in 2006 to more than$750 million by 2022.




The War on Drugs is the longest of the wreckonomics misadventures.

In wreckonomics, the protagonists of the misguided policy invariably focus on the wrong measurements of success. In the Vietnam War, the US military leadership concentrated on body counts. In the drug war, the short-sighted focus is on arrest numbers. In both cases, the putative leaders of the policy initiatives are like gambling addicts pulling the lever over and over on a slot machine that’s rigged against them: They believe they’re on the verge of victory, even as the defeats pile up. In other words, the drug warriors themselves are addicted – not to narcotics but to the never-ending cycle of fighting a losing war. The Philippines provides an especially macabre version of the drug war. In 2016, President Rodrigo Duterte urged his citizens to kill drug addicts. In Duterte’s first six months in office, Amnesty International estimated, his regime killed some 7,000 people for drug offenses. In a bizarre twist, Duterte himself was addicted to fentanyl.

“The incentives of the environment in which the drug warriors operate keep pushing them toward compulsive behavior.”

Duterte upped the ante, claiming he wanted to unleash a holocaust that would kill millions of addicts. He paid bounties to police officers who murdered drug users. In a bromance between strongmen, US president Donald Trump praised Duterte’s “unbelievable job.” Duterte’s simplistic, brutal fight took a page from the early days of the drug war in the United States. Policymakers and law enforcement made no effort to understand why some people became addicted or why others entered the drug trade. Instead, they focused on mass arrests and heavy-handed tactics, often racially tinged. It was Richard Nixon who coined the phrase “War on Drugs” in 1971, a thinly disguised jab at his predecessor Lyndon Johnson’s War on Poverty. A decade later, Ronald Reagan doubled down. The result was soaring levels of incarceration, particularly for Black Americans. The uneven penalties for crack cocaine, seen as a drug favored by Black users, were clearly racist.


Four strategies can help make wreckonomics policies less devastating.

The wars on everything are costly. Here’s how to mitigate the damage:

Encourage dissent – A society on a war footing has a clear enemy, and no space for dialogue nor room for debate. But in the war on everything, the enemy is never clear-cut. That’s why it’s crucial that warriors make way for dissenting voices. Policy debates shouldn’t be stifled by an environment that mimics martial law.

Honestly assess the true costs – Those who fight wars on everything relish confusion and obfuscation. The “hall-of-mirrors” effect makes it difficult to tell how the war is progressing. To combat this syndrome, societies need robust and honest analyses of who’s really winning and losing in any given war.

Broaden the inputs – In Colombia, policymakers have shifted that nation’s costly war on drugs only after decades of experience and a willingness to listen to various voices, ranging from drug users and coca producers to academics and intellectuals. Groupthink and willful ignorance are part of wreckonomics; bipartisan solutions are a way to create “coalitions against complicity.”

Acknowledge complexity – As part of its rhetoric, every misguided policy war boils down the enemy to one overly simplistic factor. Never mind that drug addiction and mass migration are complicated, systemic issues. The warriors want to make it simple and then ignore every factor outside their narrow view.

About the Authors

Ruben Andersson is a professor of social anthropology at the University of Oxford. He is the author of No Go World and Illegality, Inc. David Keen is a professor of conflict studies at the London School of Economics and Political Science. He is the author of The Benefits of Famine and Useful Enemies.

Genres

Nonfiction, Politics, International Relations, Security, Development, Sociology, Economics, History, Philosophy, Ethics


Review

The book Wreckonomics is a critical and provocative analysis of why various wars and security interventions have persisted and prospered despite their disastrous failures and costs. The authors, Ruben Andersson and David Keen, are both professors of international development and experts on conflict and security.

They examine four cases of long-running and futile wars and fights: the Cold War, the war on terror, the fight against migration, and the war on drugs and crime. They argue that these wars and fights are not only ineffective and harmful, but also profitable and advantageous for various actors and interests, such as politicians, corporations, media, NGOs, and even criminals and terrorists.

They show how these actors and interests have exploited and manipulated the fears, emotions, and incentives of the public and the policymakers, and have created a system of feedback loops, distortions, and games that sustain and justify the wars and fights.

They also show how these wars and fights have eroded the values and principles of democracy, human rights, and justice, and have undermined the prospects of peace and development. They call for a radical change in the way we think and act about security, and propose a four-step approach to end the war on everything: 1) recognizing the costs and benefits of the wars and fights, 2) breaking the cycles of fixation and gaming, 3) creating space for dissent and dialogue, and 4) building alternative coalitions and solutions.

Wreckonomics is an insightful and compelling book that covers a wide range of topics related to security and development. The authors write in a clear and engaging style, using anecdotes, examples, and metaphors to illustrate their points and make them relevant and relatable to the reader. They also write in a balanced and nuanced manner, acknowledging the complexity and diversity of security and development issues, and avoiding simplistic or prescriptive solutions.

 The book is well-organized and well-researched, with references, notes, and a glossary at the end. The book is not only a valuable and authoritative source of information, but also a motivating and empowering story of how we can challenge and change the destructive policies and practices that fuel the war on everything.

The book is suitable for anyone who is interested in learning more about security and development, whether they are students, professionals, or curious readers. The book is also a useful resource for anyone who wants to understand the broader social and economic issues and trends that affect and shape security and development.

 

Summary: Wreckonomics: Why It’s Time to End the War on Everything by Ruben Andersson and David Keen. By Alex Lim. Paminy December 2, 2023. 








Wreckonomics, a study by two academics, argues that vested interests need ‘forever wars’. That may be true, but is there a solution?

Almost five years ago, it was reported that, according to some metrics, the United States of America had been at peace for only 17 years since 1776. It had thus, at that point, been at war for 93.5 per cent of its existence. What constitutes war – whether there must be nation-states on opposing sides; whether it includes covert or non-military operations – has long been a source of debate, but perpetual war is today the reality. One sobering indicator is the fact that, for several years now, a child born on September 11 2001 has been eligible to enlist in the “war on terror” that ensued. The latter is one of many ill-defined and catastrophic wars being waged in perpetuity around the world.

The human and financial cost of these wars, which are not limited to armed conflicts, is the subject of a new book by Ruben Andersson, a professor of social anthropology at Oxford, and David Keen, a professor of conflict studies at the London School of Economics. Wreckonomics is a deeply-researched and wide-ranging account of how, despite manifest failings, the wars on terror, drugs and migration are entrenched in Western policy as a kind of perma-crisis for which its principal architects are never held responsible.

The invasion of Afghanistan by the United States, where the war on terror and the war on drugs have converged, was a failure on a remarkable scale. The authors steadfastly demonstrate how the war on terror has done nothing but foment what it ostensibly sought to combat: the number of global terrorist attacks ballooned from a reported total of 3,300 so far in 2000 to almost 30,000 by 2015 – despite the spending of nearly $8 trillion dollars between 2001 and 2021.

Central to Wreckonomics is the question of identifying exactly who benefits from these wars going poorly. Beyond arms manufacturers wanting orders and bellicose senators wanting publicity, this includes aid groups and local authorities, whose under-scrutinised flow of funding depends on conflict and instability. To stay with Afghanistan, Andersson and Keen point, in relation to the war on drugs, to the example of poppy-growing areas under the protection of local warlords, in which the job of police chief could be sold for $100,000 despite paying $60 a month. If you then consider a recent UN report stating that since the Taliban declared a drug ban in April 2022, opium cultivation in Afghanistan has declined by 95 per cent, you’re left with two equally damning conclusions: either the US-led intervention into the drug trade was ineffectual, or it was never a true priority.

Time and again, this pattern repeats around the world, wherever local governments are disincentivised from bringing conflict to an end. In Mali and Sudan, foreign aid is tied to fighting Islamic insurgents, who are in fact working in concert with the military to prolong the discord and keep the money flowing. Through the example of the civil war in Sri Lanka, the authors show that even when a conflict ends, the spending may not: rather than demobilising, the army recruited 50,000 more soldiers, in large part to protect a system of kickbacks from arms contracts.

The Covid-19 pandemic – another “battle” the world had to win – provides a telling counterpoint. As early as May 2020, the IMF estimated that $9 trillion worldwide had been allocated to the fight. But as we enter the northern winter of 2023, governments have long since lost their appetite for spending in this area. One of the conditions of perpetual war, suggest Andersson and Keen, is that its active theatres, the locales where the death and turmoil are most keenly felt, must be at a remove from the nation waging them. Think of Turkey and Mauritania as chosen bulwarks against migration to Europe. By contrast, it was impossible to outsource the suffering of Covid-19 – which created a real desire to bring that crisis to an end.

Wreckonomics’s desire to present its subject as systematic and somewhat cyclical does, at times, hit a limit. For instance, the recent series of coups in west African nations would have benefited from a more nuanced, regional-specific approach. While it’s true, per the authors, that in some of those nations, there has been a change in leadership rather than a change in regime, in the likes of Burkina Faso, led by 35-year-old firebrand Ibrahim Traoré, something more radical may be afoot.

Andersson and Keen close a little quixotically, suggesting some steps towards ending the state of affairs they bemoan. They point to the need for strong dissenting voices, dialogue, and proper cost-and-benefit analyses before actors engage in new wars; they call for coalitions against the kind of complicity that makes war profitable, and stress the need to “unfix” the issues that originate them: overly simplistic (and often false) understandings of conflict that become the fixed terms of debate. It’s hard to disagree with any of these proposals – though it’ll remain much harder, you feel, to have such a dialogue over the roar of exploding bombs.

Why the wars on terror, drugs and migration may never succeed. By Samuel Rutter. The Telegraph, December 1, 2023.