Nancy
Lindisfarne and Jonathan Neale write: A lot of nonsense about Afghanistan is
being written in Britain and the United States. Most of this nonsense hides a
number of important truths.
First,
the Taliban have defeated the United States.
Second,
the Taliban have won because they have more popular support.
Third,
this is not because most Afghans love the Taliban. It is because the American
occupation has been unbearably cruel and corrupt.
Fourth,
the War on Terror has also been politically defeated in the United States. The
majority of Americans are now in favor of withdrawal from Afghanistan and
against any more foreign wars.
Fifth,
this is a turning point in world history. The greatest military power in the
world has been defeated by the people of a small, desperately poor country.
This will weaken the power of the American empire all over the world.
Sixth,
the rhetoric of saving Afghan women has been widely used to justify the
occupation, and many feminists in Afghanistan have chosen the side of the
occupation. The result is a tragedy for feminism.
This article
explains these points. Because this a short piece, we assert more than we
prove. But we have written a great deal about gender, politics and war in
Afghanistan since we did fieldwork there as anthropologists almost fifty years
ago. We give links to much of this work at the end of this article, so you can
explore our arguments in more detail.[1]
A
military victory
This is
a military and political victory for the Taliban. It is a military victory
because the Taliban have won the war. For at least two years the Afghan
government forces – the national army and the police – have been losing more
people dead and wounded each month than they are recruiting. So those forces
are shrinking.
Over the
last ten years the Taliban have been taking control of more and more villages
and some towns. In the last twelve days they have taken all the cities.
This was
not a lightning advance through the cities and then on to Kabul. The people who
took each city had long been in the vicinity, in the villages, waiting for the
moment. Crucially, across the north the Taliban had been steadily recruiting
Tajiks, Uzbeks and others.
This is
also a political victory for the Taliban. No guerilla insurgency on earth can
win such victories without popular support.
But
perhaps support is not the right word. It is more that Afghans have had to
choose sides. And more of the Afghan people have chosen to side with the
Taliban than have chosen the American occupiers. Not all of them, just more of
them.
More
Afghans have also chosen to side with the Taliban than with the Afghan
government of President Ashraf Ghani. Again, not all of them, but more than
support Ghani. And more Afghans have chosen to side with the Taliban than with
the old warlords. The defeat of Dostum in Sheberghan and Ismail Khan in Herat
is stunning evidence of that.
The
Taliban of 2001 were overwhelmingly Pushtuns, and their politics was Pushtun
chauvinist. In 2021 Taliban fighters of many ethnicities have taken power in
Uzbek and Tajik dominated areas.
The
important exception is the Hazara dominated areas in the central mountains. We
come back to this exception.
Of
course, not all Afghans have chosen to side with the Taliban. This is a war
against foreign invaders, but it is also a civil war. Many have fought for the
Americans, the government or the warlords. Many more have made compromises with
both sides to survive. And many others were not sure which side to take and are
waiting with different mixtures of fear and hope to see what will happen.
Because
this is a military defeat for American power, calls for Biden to do this or
that are simply silly. If American troops had remained in Afghanistan, they
would have had to surrender or die. This would be a even worse humiliation for
American power than the current debacle. Biden, like Trump before him, was out
of options.
Why so
many Afghans chose the Taliban
The fact
that more people have chosen the Taliban does not mean that most Afghans
necessarily support the Taliban. It means that given the limited choices
available, that is the choice they have made. Why?
The
short answer is that the Taliban are the only important political organization
fighting the American occupation, and most Afghans have come to hate that
occupation.
It was
not always thus. The US first sent bomber planes and a few troops to
Afghanistan a month after 9/11. The US was supported by the forces of the
Northern Alliance, a coalition of non-Pushtun warlords in the north of the
country. But the soldiers and leaders of the Alliance were not actually
prepared to fight alongside the Americans. Given the long history of Afghan
resistance to foreign invasion, most recently to the Russian occupation from
1980 to 1987, that would just be too shameful.
On the
other side, though, almost no one was prepared to fight to defend the Taliban
government then in power. The troops of the Northern Alliance and the Taliban
faced each other in a phony war. Then the US, the British and their foreign
allies began to bomb.
The
Pakistani military and intelligence services negotiated an end to the
stalemate. The United States would be allowed to take power in Kabul and
install a president of their choice. In return, the Taliban leaders and rank
and file would be allowed to go home to their villages or into exile across the
border in Pakistan.
This
settlement was not widely publicized in the US and Europe at the time, for
obvious reasons, but we reported on it, and it was widely understood in
Afghanistan.
For best
evidence for this negotiated settlement is what happened next. For two years
there was no resistance to the American occupation. None, in any village. Many
thousands of former Taliban remained in those villages.
This is
an extraordinary fact. Think of the contrast with Iraq, where resistance was
widespread from Day One of the occupation in 2003. Or think of the Russian
invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, met with the same wall of anger.
The
reason was not simply that the Taliban were not fighting. It was that ordinary
people, even in the Taliban heartland in the south, dared to hope that the
American occupation would bring Afghanistan peace and develop the economy to
end the terrible poverty.
Peace
was crucial. By 2001 Afghans had been trapped in war for twenty-three years,
first a civil war between communists and Islamists, then a war between
Islamists and Soviet invaders, then a war between Islamist warlords, and then a
war in the north of the country between Islamist warlords and the Taliban.
Twenty-three
years of war meant death, maiming, exile and refugee camps, poverty, so many
kinds of grief, and endless fear and anxiety. Perhaps the best book about what
that felt like is Klaits and Gulmanadova Klaits, Love and War in Afghanistan
(2005). People were desperate for peace. By 2001 even Taliban supporters felt a
bad peace was better than a good war.
Also,
the United States was fabulously rich. Afghans believed the occupation could
lead to development that would rescue them from poverty.
Afghans
waited. The US delivered war, not peace.
The US
and UK military occupied bases throughout the villages and small towns of the
Taliban heartland, the mainly Pushtun areas of the south and east. These units
were never told of the informal settlement negotiated between the Americans and
the Taliban. They could not be told, because that would shame the government of
President Bush. So the US units saw it as their mission to root out the
remaining “bad guys”, who were obviously still there.
Night
raids crashed through doors, humiliating and terrifying families, taking men
away to be tortured for info about the other bad guys. It was here, and in
black sites all over the world, that the American military and intelligence
developed the new styles of torture that the world would briefly glimpse from
Abu Ghraib, the American prison in Iraq.
Some of
the men detained were Taliban who had not been fighting. Some were just people
betrayed to the Americans by local enemies who coveted their land or held a
grudge.
The American
soldier Johnny Rico’s memoir Blood Makes the Grass Grow Green provides a useful
account of what then happened next. Outraged relatives and villagers took a few
potshots at the Americans in the dark. The American military kicked in more
doors and tortured more men. The villagers took more potshots. The Americans
called in airstrikes and their bombs killed family after family.
War
returned across the south and east of the country.
Inequality
and corruption spiraled.
Afghans
had hoped for development that could lift both the rich and the poor. It seemed
like such an obvious, and such an easy thing to do. But they did not understand
American policy abroad. And they did not understand the deep dedication of the
1% in the United States to spiraling inequality in their own country.
So
American money poured into Afghanistan. But it went the people in the new
government headed by Hamid Karzai. It went to the people working with the
Americans and the occupying troops of other nations. And it went to the warlords
and their entourages who were deeply involved in the international opium and
heroin trade facilitated by the CIA and the Pakistani military. It went to the
people lucky enough to own luxury, well-defended homes in Kabul they could rent
out to expatriate staff. It went to the men and women who worked in
foreign-funded NGOs.
Of
course people in these groups all overlapped.
Afghans
had long been used to corruption. They both expected it and hated it. But this
time the scale was unprecedented. And in the eyes of the poor and middle income
people, all the obscene new wealth, no matter how garnered, seemed to be
corruption.
Over the
last decade the Taliban have offered two things across the country. The first
is that they are not corrupt, as they were also not corrupt in office before
2001. They are the only political force in the country this has ever been true
of.
Critically,
the Taliban have run an honest judicial system in the rural areas they have
controlled. Their reputation is so high that many people involved in civil
lawsuits in the cities have agreed that both parties will go to Taliban judges
in the countryside. This allows them swift, cheap and fair justice without
massive bribes. Because the justice was fair, both parties can live with it.
For
people in Taliban-controlled areas, fair justice was also a protection against
inequality. When the rich can bribe the judges, they can do anything they want
to the poor. Land was the crucial thing. Rich and powerful men, warlords and
government officials could seize or steal or cheat their way into control of
the land of small farmers, and oppress the even poorer sharecroppers. But
Taliban judges, everyone understood, were willing to rule for the poor.
Hatred
of corruption, of inequality, and of the occupation merged together.
20 Years
On
2001,
when the Taliban fell to the Americans after 9/11, is twenty years ago now.
Enormous changes happen to political mass movements over twenty years of war
and crisis. The Taliban have learned and changed. How could it be otherwise.
Many Afghans, and many foreign experts, have commented on this. Giustozzi has
used the useful phrase neo-Taliban.[2]
This
change, as publicly presented, has several aspects. The Taliban have realized
that Pushtun chauvinism was a great weakness. They now emphasize that they are
Muslims, brothers to all other Muslims, and that they want and have the support
of Muslims of many ethnic groups.
But
there has been a bitter split in Taliban forces over the last few years. A
minority of Taliban fighters and supporters have allied themselves with Islamic
State. The difference is that Islamic State launch terror attacks on Shias,
Sikhs and Christians. The Taliban in Pakistan do the same, and so do the small
Haqqani network sponsored by Pakistani intelligence. But the Taliban majority
have been reliable in condemning all such attacks.
We
return to this division later, as it has implications for what will happen
next.
The new
Taliban have also emphasized their concerns for the rights of women. They say
they welcome music, and videos, and have moderated the fiercest and most
puritanical sides of their former rule. And they are now saying over and over
again that they want to rule in peace, without revenge on the people of the old
order.
How much
of this is propaganda, and how much is truth, is hard to tell. Moreover, what
happens next is deeply dependent on what happens to the economy, and on the
actions of foreign powers. Of that, more later. Our point here is that Afghans
have reasons for choosing the Taliban over the Americans, the warlords and
Ashraf Ghani’s government.
What
About Rescuing Afghan Women?
Many
readers will now be feeling, insistently, but what about Afghan women? The
answer is not simple.
We have
to start by going back to the 1970s. Around the world, particular systems of
gendered inequality are entangled with a particular system of class inequality.
Afghanistan was no different.
Nancy
did anthropological fieldwork with Pushtun women and men in the north of the
country in the early 1970s. They lived by farming and herding animals. Nancy’s
subsequent book, Bartered Brides: Politics and Marriage in a Tribal Society,
explains the connections between class, gender and ethnic divisions at that
time. And if you want to know what those women themselves thought about their
lives, troubles and joys, Nancy and her former partner Richard Tapper have recently
published Afghan Village Voices, a translation of many of the tapes that women
and men made for them in the field.
That
reality was complex, bitter, oppressive and full of love. In that deep sense,
it was no different from the complexities of sexism and class in the United
States. But the tragedy of the next half century would change much of that.
That long suffering produced the particular sexism of the Taliban, which is not
an automatic product of Afghan tradition.
The
history of this new turn starts in 1978. Then civil war began between the
communist government and the Islamist mujahedin resistance. The Islamists were
winning, so the Soviet Union invaded late in 1979 to back up the Communist
government. Seven years of brutal war between the Soviets and the mujahedin
followed. In 1987 the Soviet troops left, defeated.
When we
lived in Afghanistan, in the early 1970s, the communists were among the best
people. They were driven by three passions. They wanted to develop the country.
They wanted to break the power of the big landowners and share out the land.
And they wanted equality for women.
But in
1978 the communists had taken power in a military coup, led by progressive
officers. They had not won the political support of the majority of villagers,
in an overwhelming rural country. The result was that the only ways they could
deal with the rural Islamist resistance were arrest, torture and bombing. The
more the communist led army did such cruelties, the more the revolt grew.
Then the
Soviet Union invaded to prop up the communists. Their main weapon was bombing
from the air, and large parts of the country became free fire zones. Between
half a million and a million Afghans were killed. At least another million were
maimed for life. Between six and eight million were driven into exile in Iran
and Pakistan, and millions more became internal refugees. All this in a country
of only twenty-five million people.
When
they came to power, the first thing the communists tried to do were land reform
and legislation for the rights of women. When the Russians invaded, the
majority of communists sided with them. Many of those communists were women.
The result was to smear the name of feminism with support for torture and
massacre.
Imagine
that the United States was invaded by a foreign power who killed between twelve
million and twenty-four million Americans, tortured people in every town, and
drove 100 million Americans into exile. Imagine also that almost all feminists
in the United States supported the invaders. After that experience, how do you
think most Americans would feel about a second invasion by another foreign
power, or about feminism?
How do
you think most Afghan women feel about another invasion, this time by the
Americans, justified by the need to rescue Afghan women? Remember, those
statistics about the dead, the maimed and the refugees under Soviet occupation
were not abstract numbers. They were living women, and their sons and
daughters, husbands, brothers and sisters, mothers and fathers.
So when
the Soviet Union left, defeated, most people breathed a sigh of relief. But
then the local leaders of the mujahedin resistance to the communists and the
invaders became local warlords and fought each other for the spoils of victory.
The majority of Afghans had supported the mujahedin, but now they were
disgusted by the greed, the corruption and the endless useless war.
The
Class and Refugee Background of the Taliban
In the
autumn of 1994, the Taliban had arrived in Kandahar, a mostly Pashtun city and
the largest in southern Afghanistan. The Taliban were like nothing before in
Afghan history. They were products of two quintessentially twentieth century
innovations, aerial bombing and the refugee camps in Pakistan. They belonged to
a different social class from the elites who had governed Afghanistan.
The
Communists had been the sons and daughters of the urban middle classes and the
middle level farmers in the countryside with enough land to call their own.
They had been led by people who attended the country’s sole university in
Kabul. They wanted to break the power of the big landowners and modernize the
country.
The
Islamists who fought the Communists had been men of similar class backgrounds,
and mostly former students at the same university. They too wanted to modernize
the country, but in a different way. And they looked to the ideas of the Muslim
Brotherhood and Al-Alzhar University in Cairo.
The word
Taliban means students in an Islamic school, not a state school or a
university. The fighters of the Taliban who entered Kandahar in 1994 were young
men who had studied in the free Islamic schools in the refugee camps in
Pakistan. They had been children with nothing.
The
leaders of the Taliban were village mullahs from Afghanistan. They did not have
the elite connections of many of the imams of city mosques. Village mullahs
could read, and they were held in some respect by other villagers. But their
social status was well below that of a landlord, or a high school graduate in a
government office.
The
Taliban were led by a committee of twelve men. All twelve had lost a hand, a
foot or an eye to Soviet bombs in the war. The Taliban were, among other
things, the party of poor and middling Pushtun village men. [3]
Twenty
years of war had left Kandahar lawless and at the mercy of warring militias.
The turning point came when the Taliban went after a local commander who had
raped a boy and two (possibly three) women. The Taliban caught and hung him.
What made their intervention striking was not just their determination to put
an end to the murderous infighting and restore people’s dignity and safety, but
their disgust at the hypocrisy of the other Islamists.
From the
first the Taliban were funded by the Saudis, the Americans and the Pakistani
military. Washington wanted a peaceful country that could house oil and gas
pipelines from Central Asia. The Taliban stood out because they brooked no
exceptions to the injunctions they sought to impose, and the severity with
which they enforced the rules.
Many
Afghans were grateful for the return of order and a modicum of security, but
the Taliban were sectarian and unable to control the country, and, in 1996, the
Americans withdrew their support. When they did so, they unleashed a new, and
deadly, version of Islamophobia against the Taliban.
Almost
overnight, Afghan women were deemed helpless and oppressed, while Afghan men –
aka the Taliban – were execrated as fanatical savages, paedophiles and sadistic
patriarchs, hardly people at all.
For four
years before 9/11 the Taliban had been targeted by the Americans, while
feminists and others clamored for the protection of Afghan women. By the time
the American bombing started, everyone was meant to understand that the Afghan
women needed help. What could possibly go wrong?
9/11 and
the American War
The
bombing began on October 7th. Within days, the Taliban had been forced into
hiding – or were literally castrated – as a photograph on the front page of the
Daily Mail crowed. The published images of the war were truly shocking in the
violence and sadism they portrayed. Many people in Europe were appalled by the
scale of the bombing and the utter carelessness of Afghan lives.[4]
Yet in
the United States that autumn, the mixture of vengeance and patriotism meant
dissenting voices were rare and mostly inaudible. Ask yourself, as Saba Mahmood
did at the time, ‘Why were conditions of war, (migration, militarization) and
starvation (under the mujahideen) considered to be less injurious to women than
the lack of education, employment and most notably, in the media campaign,
western dress styles (under the Taliban)?’ [5]
Then ask
again even more fiercely – how could you possibly ‘save Afghan women’ by
bombing a civilian population that included, along with the women themselves,
their children, their husbands, fathers and brothers? It should have been the
question that ended the argument, but it was not.
The most
egregious expression of feminist Islamophobia came little over a month into the
war. A vastly unequal war of revenge doesn’t look very good in the eyes of the
world, so better to be doing something that looks virtuous. In anticipation of
the American Thanksgiving holiday, on the 17th of November 2001, Laura Bush,
the President’s wife, loudly lamented the plight of the veiled Afghan women.
Cherie Blair, the British Prime Minister’s wife echoed her sentiments a few
days later. These wealthy war-mongers’ wives were using the full weight of the
Orientalist paradigm to blame the victims and justify a war against some of the
poorest people on earth. And ‘Saving Afghan Women’ became the persistent cry of
many liberal feminists to justify the American war.[6]
With the
election of Obama in 2008, the chorus of Islamophobia became hegemonic among
American liberals. That year the American anti-war alliance effectively
dissolved itself to aid Obama’s campaign. Democrats and those feminists who
supported Obama’s war hawk Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, could not
accept the truth that Afghanistan and Iraq were both wars for oil.[7]
They had
only one justification for the endless wars of oil – the sufferings of Afghan
women. The feminist spin was a clever ploy. It precluded comparisons between
the undoubted sexist rule of the Taliban and sexisms in the United States. Far
more shocking, the feminist spin domesticated and effectively displaced the
ugly truths about a grossly unequal war. And it separated those notional ‘women
to be saved’ from the tens of thousands of actual Afghan women, and men and
children killed, wounded, orphaned or made homeless and hungry by the American
bombs.
Many of
our friends and family members in America are feminists who believed with decent
hearts much of this propaganda. But they were being asked to support was a web
of lies, a perversion of feminism. It was the feminism of the invader and the
corrupt governing elite. It was the feminism of the torturers and the drones.
We
believe another feminism is possible.
But it
remains true that the Taliban are deeply sexist. Sexism has won a victory in
Afghanistan. But it did not have to be that way.
The
communists who sided with the cruelties of the Soviet invaders had discredited
feminism in Afghanistan for at least a generation. But then the United States
invaded, and a new generation of Afghan women professionals sided with the new
invaders to try to win rights for women. Their dream too has ended in
collaboration, shame and blood. Some were careerists, of course, mouthing
platitudes in exchange for funding. But many others were motivated by an honest
and selfless dream. Their failure is tragic.
Stereotypes
and Confusions
Outside
Afghanistan, there is a great deal of confusion about stereotypes of the
Taliban elaborated over the last twenty-five years. But think carefully when
you hear the stereotypes that they are feudal, brutal and primitive. These are
people with laptops, who have been negotiating with the Americans in Qatar for
the last fourteen years.
The
Taliban are not the product of medieval times. They are the product of some of
the worst times of the late twentieth century and early twenty-first century.
If they look backward in some ways to an imagined better time, that is not surprising.
But they have been moulded by life under aerial bombardment, refugee camps,
communism, the War of Terror, enhanced interrogation, climate change, internet
politics and the spiralling inequality of neoliberalism. They live, like
everyone else, now.
Their
roots in a tribal society can also be confusing. But as Richard Tapper has
argued, tribes are not atavistic institutions. They are the way that peasants
in this part of the world organise their entanglement with the state. And the
history of Afghanistan has never been simply a matter of competing ethnic
groups, but rather of complex alliances across groups and divisions within
groups.[8]
There is
a set of prejudices on the left which incline some people to ask how the
Taliban could be on the side of the poor and anti-imperialist if they are not
“progressive”. Leave aside for the moment that the word progressive means
little. Of course the Taliban are hostile to socialism and communism. They
themselves, or their parents or grandparents, were killed and tortured by
socialists and communists. Moreover, any movement that has fought a twenty-year
guerrilla war and defeated a great empire is anti-imperialist, or words have no
meaning.
Reality
is what it is. The Taliban are a movement of poor peasants, against an imperial
occupation, deeply misogynist, supported by many women, sometimes racist and
sectarian, and sometimes not. That’s a bundle of contradictions produced by
history.
Another
source of confusion is the class politics of the Taliban. How can they be on
the side of the poor, as they obviously are, and yet so bitterly opposed to
socialism? The answer is that the experience of the Russian occupation stripped
away the possibility of socialist formulations about class. But it did not
change the reality of class. No one has ever built a mass movement among poor
peasants that took power without being seen as on the side of the poor.
The
Taliban talk not in the language of class, but in the language of justice and
corruption. Those words describe the same side.
None of
this means that the Taliban will necessarily rule in the interests of the poor.
We have seen enough peasant revolts come to power in the last century and more,
only to become governments by urban elites. And none of this should distract from
the truth that the Taliban intend to be dictators, not democrats.
A
Historic Change in America
The fall
of Kabul marks a decisive defeat for American power around the world. But it
also marks, or makes clear, a deep turning away from the American empire among
Americans.
One
piece of evidence is the opinion polls. In 2001, right after 9/11, between 85%
and 90% of Americans approved of the invasion of Afghanistan. The numbers have
been dropping steadily. Last month, 62% of Americans approved of Biden’s plan
for total withdrawal, and 29% were opposed.
This
rejection of the war is common on both the right and the left. The working
class base of the Republican Party and Trump are against foreign wars. Many
soldiers and military families come from the rural areas and the south where
Trump is strong. They are against any more wars, for it is they and those they
loved who served, died and were wounded.
Right
wing patriotism in America now is pro-military, but that means pro-soldier, not
pro-war. When they say ‘Make America Great Again’, they mean that America is
not great now for Americans, not that the US should be more engaged in the
world.
Among
Democrats, too, the working class base is against the wars.
There
are people who support further military intervention. They are the Obama
democrats, the Romney republicans, the generals, many liberal and conservative
professionals, and almost everyone in the Washington elite. But the American
people as a whole, and especially the working class, black, brown and white,
have turned against the American Empire.
After
the fall of Saigon, the American government was unable to launch major military
interventions for the next fifteen years. It may well be longer after the fall
of Kabul.
The
International Consequences
Since
1918, 103 years ago, the United States has been the most powerful nation in the
world. There have been competing powers – first Germany and Japan, then the
Soviet Union and now China. But the US has been dominant. That ‘American
Century’ is now coming to an end.
The
long-term reason is the economic rise of China and the relative economic
decline of the United States. But the covid pandemic and the Afghan defeat make
the last two years a turning point.
The
covid pandemic has revealed the institutional incompetence of the ruling class,
and the government, of the United States. The system has failed to protect the
people. This chaotic and shameful failure is obvious to people around the
world.
Then
there’s Afghanistan. If you judge by expenditure and hardware the United States
is overwhelmingly the dominant military power globally. That power has been
defeated by poor people in sandals in a small country who have nothing but
endurance and courage.
The
Taliban victory will also give heart to Islamists of many different sorts in
Syria, Yemen, Somalia, Pakistan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan and Mali.
But it will be true more widely than that.
Both the
covid failure and the Afghan defeat will reduce the soft power of the US. But
Afghanistan is also a defeat for hard power. The strength of the informal
empire of the United States has relied for a century on three different
pillars. One is being the largest economy in the world, and domination of the
global financial system. The second is a reputation in many quarters for
democracy, competence and cultural leadership. The third was that if soft power
failed, the United States would invade to support dictatorships and punish its
enemies.
That
military power is gone now. No government will believe that the US can rescue
them from a foreign invader, or from their own people. Drone killings will
continue and cause great suffering. But nowhere will drones on their own be
militarily decisive.
This is
the beginning of the end of the American century.
What
Happens Now?
No one
knows what will happen in Afghanistan in the next few years. But we can
identify some of the pressures.
First,
and most hopeful, is the deep longing for peace in the hearts of Afghans. They
have now lived through forty-three years of war. Think how only five or ten
years of civil war and invasion have scarred so many countries. Now think of
forty-three years.
Kabul,
Kandahar and Mazar, the three most important cities, have all fallen without
any violence. This is because the Taliban, as they keep saying, want a country
at peace, and they do not want revenge. But it is also because the people who
do not support, indeed those who hate the Taliban, also chose not to fight.
The
Taliban leaders are clearly aware they must deliver peace.
For that
it is also essential that the Taliban continue to deliver fair justice. Their
record is good. But the temptations and pressures of government have corrupted
many social movements in many countries before them.
Economic
collapse is also quite possible. Afghanistan is a poor and arid country, where
less than 5% of the land can be farmed. In the last twenty years the cities
have swelled immensely. That growth has been dependent on money flowing from
the occupation, and to a lesser extent money from growing opium. Without very
substantial foreign aid from somewhere, economic collapse will threaten.
Because
the Taliban know this, they have been explicitly offering the United States a
deal. The Americans will give aid, and in return the Taliban will not provide a
home for terrorists who could launch attacks like 9/11. Both the Trump and
Biden administrations have accepted this deal. But it is not at all clear that
the US will keep that promise.
Indeed,
something worse is entirely possible. Previous US administrations have punished
Iraq, Iran, Cuba and Vietnam for their defiance with long running and
destructive economic sanctions. There will be many voices raised in the US for
such sanctions, to starve Afghan children in the name of human rights.
Then
there is the threat of international meddling, of different powers supporting
different political or ethnic forces inside Afghanistan. The United States,
India, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Iran, China, Russia and Uzbekistan will all be
tempted. It has happened before, and in a situation of economic collapse it
could provoke proxy wars.
For the
moment, though, the governments of Iran, Russia and Pakistan clearly want peace
in Afghanistan.
The
Taliban have also promised not to rule with cruelty. That is easier said than
done. Confronted with families who have amassed great fortunes through
corruption and crime, what do you think the poor soldiers from the villages
will want to do?
And then
there is climate. In 1971 a drought and famine across the north and center
devastated flocks, crops and lives. It was the first sign of the effects of
climate change on the region, which has brought further droughts over the last
fifty years. Over the medium and long term, farming and herding will become
more precarious.[9]
All
these dangers are real. But the often insightful security expert Antonio
Giustozzi is in touch with the thinking among both the Taliban and foreign
governments and the Taliban. His article in The Guardian on August 16 was
hopeful. He ended it:
Since
most of the neighbouring countries want stability in Afghanistan, at least for
the time being any fissures in the new coalition government are unlikely to be
exploited by external actors to create rifts. Similarly, the 2021 losers will
struggle to find anybody willing or able to support them in starting some kind
of resistance. As long as the new coalition government includes key allies of
its neighbours, this is the beginning of a new phase in the history of
Afghanistan.[10]
What Can
You Do? Welcome Refugees.
Many
people in the West now are asking, “What can we do to help Afghan women?”
Sometimes this question assumes that most Afghan women oppose the Taliban, and
most Afghan men support them. This is nonsense. It is almost impossible to
imagine the kind of society in which that would be true.
But
there is a narrower question here. Specifically, how can they help Afghan
feminists?
This is
a valid and decent question. The answer is to organize to buy them airplane
tickets and give them refuge in Europe and North America.
But it
is not just feminists who will need asylum. Tens of thousands of people who
worked for the occupation are desperate for asylum, with their families. So are
larger numbers of people who worked for the Afghan government.
Some of
these people are admirable, some are corrupt monsters, many lie in between, and
many are just children. But there is a moral imperative here. The United States
and the NATO countries have created immense suffering for twenty years. The
least, the very least, they should do it rescue the people whose lives they
have wrecked.
There is
another moral issue here too. What many Afghans have learned in the last forty
years has also been clear in the last decade of the torment of Syria. It is all
too easy to understand the accidents of background and personal history which
lead people to do the things they do. Humility compels us to look at the young
communist woman, the educated feminist working for an NGO, the suicide bomber,
the American marine, the village mullah, the Taliban fighter, the bereaved
mother of a child killed by American bombs, the Sikh money changer, the
policeman, the poor farmer growing opium, and to say, there but for the grace
of God go I.
The
failure of the American and British governments to rescue the people who worked
for them has been both shameful and revealing. It is not really a failure, but
a choice. Racism against immigration has weighed more strongly with Johnson and
Biden than the debts of humanity.
Campaigns
to welcome Afghans are still possible. Of course such a strong moral argument
will come up against racism and Islamophobia at every turn. But in the last
week the governments of Germany and Netherlands have both suspended any
deportations of Afghans.
Every
politician, anywhere, who speaks in support of Afghan women must be asked,
again and again, to open the borders to all Afghans.
And then
there is what might happen to the Hazaras. As we have said, the Taliban have
stopped being simply a Pushtun movement and have gone national, recruiting many
Tajiks and Uzbeks. And also, they say, some Hazaras. But not many.
The
Hazaras are the people who traditionally lived in the central mountains. Many
also migrated to cities like Mazar and Kabul, where they worked as porters and
in other low paid jobs. They are about 15% of the Afghan population. The roots
of enmity between Pushtuns and Hazaras lie partly in long standing disputes
over land and rights to grazing.
But more
recently it also matters a good deal that Hazaras are Shias, and almost all
other Afghans are Sunnis.
The
bitter conflicts between Sunnis and Shias in Iraq have led to a split in the
militant Islamist tradition. This split is complicated, but important, and
needs a bit of explanation.
In both
Iraq and in Syria the Islamic State have committed massacres against Shias,
just as Shia militias have massacred Sunnis in both countries.
The more
traditional Al Qaeda networks have remained staunchly opposed to attacking
Shias and argued for solidarity between Muslims. People often point out that
Osama Bin Laden’s mother was herself a Shia – actually an Alawite from Syria.
But the necessity of unity has been more important. This was the main issue in
the split between Al Qaeda and the Islamic State.
In
Afghanistan the Taliban have also argued strongly for Islamic unity. The sexual
exploitation of women by Islamic State is also deeply repugnant to Taliban
values, which are deeply sexist but puritanical and modest. For many years the
Afghan Taliban have been consistent in their public condemnation of all terror
attacks on Shias, Christians and Sikhs.
Yet
those attacks happen. The ideas of Islamic State have had a particular
influence on the Pakistani Taliban. The Afghan Taliban are an organization. The
Pakistani Taliban are a looser network, not controlled by the Afghans. They
have carried out repeated bombings against Shias and Christians in Pakistan.
It is
Islamic State and the Haqqani network who have carried out the recent racist
terror bombings of Hazaras and Sikhs in Kabul. The Taliban leadership have
condemned all those attacks.
But the
situation is in flux. Islamic State in Afghanistan is a minority breakaway from
the Taliban, largely based in Ningrahar province in the east. They are bitterly
anti-Shia. So are the Haqqani network, a long-standing mujahedin group largely
controlled by Pakistani military intelligence. Yet in the present mix, the
Haqqani network have been integrated into the Taliban organization, and their
leader is one of the leaders of the Taliban.
But no
one can be sure what the future holds. In 1995 an uprising of Hazara workers in
Mazar prevented the Taliban gaining control of the north. But Hazara traditions
of resistance go much deeper and further back than that.
Hazara
refugees in neighboring countries may also be in danger now. The government of
Iran are allying with the Taliban, and begging them to be peaceful. They are
doing this because there are about three million Afghan refugees already in
Iran. Most of them have been there for years, most are poor urban workers and
their families, and the majority are Hazaras. Recently the Iranian government,
in desperate economic straights themselves, have begun deporting Afghans back
to Afghanistan.
There
are about a million Hazara refugees in Pakistan too. In the region around
Quetta more than 5,000 of them have been killed in sectarian assassinations and
massacres in the last few years. The Pakistani police and army do nothing.
Given the long support of the Pakistani army and intelligence for the Afghan
Taliban, those people will be at greater risk right now.
What
should you do, outside Afghanistan? Like most Afghans, pray for peace. And join
protests for open borders.
We will
leave the last word to Graham Knight. His son, Sergeant Ben Knight of the
British Royal Air Force, was killed in Afghanistan in 2006. This week Graham
Knight told the Press Association the UK government should have moved quickly
to rescue civilians:
“We’re not surprised that the Taliban have
taken over because as soon as the Americans and the British said they were
going to leave, we knew this was going to happen. The Taliban made their intent
very clear that, as soon as we went out, they would move in.
As for
whether people’s lives were lost through a war that wasn’t winnable, I think
they were. I think the problem was we were fighting people that were native to
the country. We weren’t fighting terrorists, we were fighting people who
actually lived there and didn’t like us being there.” [11]
REFERENCES
Fluri,
Jennifer L. and Rachel Lehr. 2017. The Carpetbaggers of Kabul and Other
American-Afghan Entanglements. Athens OH: University of Georgia Press.
Giustozzi,
Antonio. 2007. Koran, Kalashnikov and Laptop: The Neo-Taliban Insurgency in
Afghanistan. London: Hurst.
—, ed.
2009. Decoding the New Taliban: Insights from the Afghan Field. London: Hurst.
—, 2021.
‘The Taliban have retaken Afghanistan – this time, how will they rule it?’ The
Guardian, August 16.
Gregory,
Thomas. 2011. ‘Rescuing the Women of Afghanistan: Gender, Agency and the
Politics of Intelligibility.’University of Manchester PhD thesis.
Hirschkind,
Charles and Saba Mahmood. 2002. ‘Feminism, the Taliban and the Politics of
Counterinsurgency.’ Anthropological Quarterly, 75(2): 339-354.
Hughes,
Dana. 2012. ‘The First Ladies Club: Hillary Clinton and Laura Bush for the
Women of Afghanistan.’ ABC News, March 21.
Jalalzai,
Zubeda and David Jefferess, eds. 2011. Globalizing Afghanistan: Terrorism, War,
and the Rhetoric of Nation Building. Durham: Duke University Press.
Klaits,
A. & G. Gulmanadova-Klaits. 2005. Love and War in Afghanistan, New York:
Seven Stories.
Kolhatkar,
Sonali and James Ingalls. 200. Bleeding Afghanistan: Washington, Warlords, and the Propaganda of
Silence. New York: Seven Stories.
Lindisfarne,
Nancy. 2002a. ‘Gendering the Afghan War.’ Eclipse: The Anti-War Review, 4: 2-3.
—.
2002b. ‘Starting from Below: Fieldwork. Gender and Imperialism Now.’ Critique
of Anthropology, 22(4): 403-423, and in Armbruster and Laerke, 23-44.
—. 2012.
‘Exceptional Pashtuns?’ Class Politics, Imperialism and Historiography.’ In
Marsden and Hopkins.
Lindisfarne,
Nancy and Jonathan Neale, 2015. ‘Oil Empires and Resistance in Afghanistan,
Iraq and Syria.’ Anne Bonny Pirate.
—. 2019.
‘Oil, Heat and Climate Jobs in the MENA Region.’ In Environmental Challenges in
the MENA Region: The Long Road from Conflict to Cooperation, edited by Hamid
Pouran and Hassan Hakimian, 72-94. London: Ginko.
Manchanda,
Nivi. 2020. Imagining Afghanistan: The History and Politics of Imperial
Knowledge. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Marsden,
Magnus and Benjamin Hopkins, eds. 2012. Beyond Swat: History, Society and
Economy along the Afghanistan-Pakistan Frontier. London: Hurst.
Mihailovič,
Konstantin. 1975. Memoirs of a Janissary. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan
Press.
Mount,
Ferdinand. 2008. Cold Cream: My Early Life and Other Mistakes. London:
Bloomsbury.
Mousavi,
Sayed Askar, 1998. The Hazaras of Afghanistan: An Historical, Cultural,
Economic and Political Study. London: Curzon.
Neale,
Jonathan. 1981. ‘The Afghan Tragedy.’ International Socialism, 12: 1-32.
—. 1988.
‘Afghanistan: The Horse Changes Riders,’ Capital and Class, 35: 34-48.
—. 2002.
‘The Long Torment of Afghanistan.’ International Socialism 93: 31-59.
—. 2008.
‘Afghanistan: The Case Against “the Good War”.’ International Socialism, 120:
31-60.
Nojumi,
Neamatollah. 2002. The Rise of the Taliban in Afghanistan. New York: Palgrave.
Rico,
Johnny. 2007. Blood Makes the Grass Grow Green: A Year in the Desert with Team
America. New York: Presidio.
Tapper
(Lindisfarne), Nancy. 1991. Bartered Brides: Politics, Gender and Marriage in
an Afghan Tribal Society. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Tapper,
Richard, ed. 1983. The Conflict of Tribe and State in Iran and Afghanistan.
London: Croom Helm.
Tapper,
Richard, with Nancy Lindisfarne. 2020. Afghan Village Voices: Stories from a
Tribal Community. London: I.B. Tauris.
The
Guardian, 2021. ‘Afghanistan Live News.’ August 16.
Ward,
Lucy, 2001. ‘Leader’s Wives Join Propaganda War.’ The Guardian, Nov 17.
Zaeef,
Abdul, 2010. My Life with the Taliban. London: Hirst.
Zilizer,
Barbie. 2005. ‘Death in Wartime: Photographs and the ‘Other War’ in
Afghanistan.’ The Harvard International Journal of Press/Politics, 10(3):
26-55.
[1] See
especially Nancy Tapper (Lindisfarne), 1991; Lindisfarne, 2002a, 2002b and
2012; Lindisfarne and Neale, 2015; Neale, 1981, 1988, 2002 and 2008; Richard
Tapper with Lindisfarne, 2020.
[2]
Giustozzi, 2007 and 2009 are especially useful.
[3] On
the class basis of the Taliban, see Lindisfarne, 2012, and many chapters by
other authors in Marsden and Hopkins, 2012. And see Moussavi, 1998; Nojumi,
2002; Giustozzi, 2008 and 2009; Zareef, 2010.
[4]
Zilizer, 2005.
[5]
There is a vast literature on saving Afghan women. See Gregory, 2011;
Lindisfarne, 2002a; Hirschkind and Mahmood, 2002; Kolhatkar and Ingalls, 2006;
Jalalzai and Jefferess,2011; Fluri and Lehr, 2017; Manchanda, 2020.
[6]
Ward, 2001.
[7]
Lindisfarne and Neale, 2015
[8]
Richard Tapper, 1983.
[9] For
the drought in 1971, see Tapper and Lindisfarne, 2020. For more recent climate
change, see Lindisfarne and Neale, 2019.
[10]
Giustozzi, 2021.
[11] The
Guardian, 2021.
Afghanistan:
The End of the Occupation. By Nancy Lindisfarne and Jonathan Neale. Anne Bonny Pirate, August 17, 2021
