Frames
within frames. A bed and an orange chair. The black-dressed figure kneels
against the bed. Her clothes capture light in folds. Her terribly pink face is
faceless—a flat surface missing its features. Her hands are fingerless. She is
plains of paint, just as she is flattened by kneeling. Grief, anguish, or
pleasurable submission, her facelessness refuses to show the emotional demand I
place on her. Just as the canvas frames what it frames, the chair frames the
body, frames the shape a body takes held in its rigidity. These frames—like the
white framing of the figure itself, that pleated light—become indistinguishable
from the flattened edges of the figure. Her body is a frame; she is flattened
and does not so much struggle to emerge from the frame but, curiously, becomes
the frame.
The more
I look, there is nothing to see but framing. The painting proposes “her” as a
frame, reflexively gesturing to the function of gender as frame. Framing as a
technology of representation. Also, framing as a setup: gender is a setup, even
those we choose or refuse (no-gender is also a gender setup). All these
framings discipline, something that this figure yields to. But in doing so, I
wonder if this figure also enacts a refusal to be known through the frame by
being known as a frame. That is to say, in fore-placing the work of framing,
the painting also gestures to what a frame never captures, never knows, never
can show.
About
her own painting, Erica Rutherford (1923–2008) writes: “Featureless faces
opened their mouths in silent screams, as if horror at their deformity. Bodies
were shockingly naked, with nothing to conceal their hermaphroditic lack of
differentiation. If they had arms, they flung these out in despair into the
surrounding darkness.”
Rutherford
finds her figures trapped between the absolutism of visibility (the role vision
has in classification) and embodiments that have no representation. A paradox:
overly visible and unseen. Existence that is nonexistence—that does not exist
as existence itself. This is not utopic or liberatory; it is catastrophic. Her
painted bodies witness the violence that the viewer (me, for instance) inflicts
upon them in wanting to know—simultaneously naked (transsexual women are always
already naked, contrived to be our sex first) and forced to scream out of
mouths that are not theirs, not ours. What better description is there for the
representation of transsexual women? “Her”—the race and sex that make this
pronoun mean—is a problem that is central to Rutherford’s self-portraits in the
1970s.
1.
Bodies
remain trouble. Irrefutable, unknowable, and seductive, bodies are what thought
wants to escape but never can. All thought emanates from bone, muscle, skin,
and nerve, and yet to think is as far as we can feel our own disembodiment.
Audre Lorde and Judith Butler puzzled over the contradictions of embodiment,
recognizing how systems of power and domination—particularly white supremacy
and patriarchy—shape and reshape bodies as well as the feeling of bodily life.
Even as they both suggested bodies are potentials—erotic and performative,
respectively—everywhere violence defines the concatenation of bodies. They
recognized that the unbearableness of bodily being thwarts every effort to
represent—to think—bodily potential or plentitude. It is no wonder that
thought—for this thinker—longs for a reprieve from—to literally, get out
from—the impossible demands of bodily existence. And yet, Lorde and Butler both
understood that disembodiment or transcendentalism were the very drive of white
supremacist patriarchy.
In trans
studies, body trouble is paramount. Through ever-changing names—transsexual,
transgender, trans, trans*, genderqueer, nonbinary, and gender
nonconforming—trans studies has no more central a problematic than embodiment.
Trans studies has followed the feminist principle that gender ought to be
capacious, disrupting the presumptions that biological assignment of sex
(male/female/intersex) scripts gender. Following this feminist tenet, trans
studies has shown: 1) gender is relational, shaped as much by sociohistorical
forces as by subjective processes; 2) nonbiological agencies override anatomy
and the material body, contesting ontological orders; 3) gender is a condition
of the autopoietic subject that can be invented and destroyed even as the
social order (patriarchy and white supremacy) hyper-invests in ever-narrowing
sex conscriptions.
Gender
promised a reprieve from the difficulty of bodies—from sexed and sexual
bodies—that thought wanted, especially in trans thinking. The capaciousness of
gender—indeed, its ability to suggest ideation, agency, and
sociality—emboldened proposals for trans heuristics. Trans is no longer obliged
to be about gender or bodies, subjects or identities. Trans now finds
attachment to any number of objects, disciplines, media, histories, and much
more.
Many of
these are arguably advancements in theory, but there remain reasons to question
how an ever-expanding trans—built upon a logic of dematerializing gender—has
made questions about bodies and sexes difficult to ask, even politically
precarious to pose. Are there differences between bodies framed by the general
term “trans”? For instance, are there material divergences between estrogenic
and androgenic hormonal changes to bodies, or for those trans subjects that
maintain their endogenous states? If not essential differences, might there be
consequential and material differences between, say, white transsexual women
(with a pronoun “she”) and brown gender nonconforming femmes (with a pronoun
“they”)? Do these differences shape livability, survivability, not only in
terms of racial embodiments but sexual ones as well? And most troubling for the
maxims of trans studies, does embodiment differently materialize the experience
of trans masculinity from femininity? How might the generalizability of trans
have enabled transsexual men to mis-conceptualize the lived experiences of
transsexual women? What attention is needed to think well about differences
that a trans theory simply distorts, often with transsexual women remaining
unthought or worse?
This
essay is an effort to think sexual differences—specifically, those of
transsexual women who became through estrogen and surgery, which is also to say
some women. Possibly, it means women who took canary-yellow Premarin® tablets
as an act of wanting one’s self so exquisitely that only the language of
necessity could approximate this desire. Needs are often primal wants that are
too unbearable to describe as lust. These estrogens might have been prescribed
with anti-androgen and progesterone pills. Likely, it means women who have been
oversubscribed, undersubscribed, or mis-subscribed to the point of panic
attacks, blood clots, strokes, unending nausea, and heart attacks. But also,
women who have experienced nongenital orgasms that feel like bones cracking
into lush velvet; a woman whose nipples achingly leak milk when she is afraid.
All these—and numerous other contradictory effects of medicalized anti-trans
violence, structural racism, and economic inequality—define them.
Premarin®
meant, as it did for me, a woman who is sensorially redone—not male to female,
but a sexed subject differently done in the effort to feel her body. Hormones,
in this way, are not the same as medicalized embodiment, but instead are a
supplemental register of sensation that is limited by sensory anatomy even as
senses are excited over the edge of themselves. Simply, hormonal change remakes
sensoria, and this begins to modify corporeality that subtends the senses.
Touch, smell, and sight are disarranged, but not in the manner of some
reductive “I see now as other women see”—that narrative is a hope for becoming
a woman through her re-essentialization. Instead, bodily sensoria are percussed
beyond our sense of sensed self. Sense vibrates, deranging the “feel of this”
or the “look of that.” These transsexual women do not become “more woman” with
hormonal change. No. But they do—I do—become another sex, not female and not
male, but no less materialized sexually. This sexuality is not biologism, not
essentialism, not absolutism. Which is not to say this sexuality is not
consequential, differential, and substantial.
The
bodies of these estrogenic women, these differently sexed women, are altered by
social forces responding to them just as they are anatomically reacting to
biochemical changes. Patriarchy and white supremacy—both are what make
gender/sex, they are also the materials that make her—are cataclysms that all
bodies are processed through no matter their resistances or privileges. Every
effort to resist sex is also a confirmation of the racism and sexism of
cultural and historical orders that translate such efforts.
Transsexual
women are no different; we too become through these same catastrophes, we
self-fashion with, from, and through the carnage of this violence. Even though
my transsexuality makes me other to female or male, other to essentialism but
no less material, my survivability (how I will die) is shaped by a very narrow
social translation of my otherwise-ness. And yet, this is not to say that the
desire to refuse social order is only purposeless, uninventive, or simply
regressive. This is one of the paradoxes of wanting to change sexual difference
into sexual differences.
Sexuality
and sensation are these transsexual women. Not just in euphoric or positivist
senses. Some wants are conscious and intentional fantasies that shape
decisions. While others—often held hidden within those choices—are
unrepresentable and intolerable, a negativity that magnetizes beyond what we
know but is no less than what we want. Sensation sounds luxurious, but it is
also the noise of “you fucking faggot” that vibrates into her body. A white
man’s fists punching as he rapes is also assembling, as did his earlier
oeillades. The systemic neglect of a neighborhood, planning decisions made to
immiserate and segregate, environmental degradation and other structural forces
are also the sensuousness that makes these women’s pharaonic bodies even as the
curvature of her eye is altered by estrogen, seeing differently her place in
this same neighborhood.
Both
want and sensation necessitate bodies, and even the wish to be bodiless is a
bodily fantasy. There is nothing new about this statement, but the discourse of
trans (from its study to its activism) is framed not by differences or
specificities but by generalities, sharedness, and cohesions. Dean Spade
recently posted on Twitter: “Black feminist thought and Black lesbian analysis
and organizing are and have been essential to trans liberation. We can’t build
a trans politics that actually improves trans lives (instead of just using
trans lives to justify and decorate the status quo) without it.” Rightly
invoking the centrality of black feminist and lesbian thought for thinking
about the racial logic of sex/gender systems, Spade’s “trans” and “we” eschew a
similar commitment to difference and specificity. Could it be that an unspoken
white trans masculinity is this “we”? Is this “trans liberation”? The very
distortions that Lorde diagnosed—a repudiation of difference—are evoked here in
a call for justice. This is not specific to Spade—he is but an example—but a
more extensive problem within trans discourse—so many different subjectivities
talking as one.
The
generalizability of trans—not unlike the whiteness of liberalism—Spade’s
point—obliterates the different (and often contradictory) organizing and
building required to improve transsexual women’s lives, to improve black and
brown transwomen’s lives. I agree with Spade: black, brown, and white
transsexual women must grapple with the problem that femininity is capacitated
through the fungibility of black femaleness. Femininity is a racial logic, and
the desire for femininity is made possible through the sexuating capacity of
antiblackness. This complexification of transsexual women’s lust for femininity
deserves attention; we deserve the work of nuanced and difficult thinking. We
can grapple with the racist logic of our own figuration—something that a
generalized “trans theory” or “trans liberation” or “we” cannot provide. It is
time to deconstruct “trans.”
2.
Frames
in frames. A frame splits the figural body and the rectilinear shapes,
canvases, pictures of the space the figure occupies, her space. “Her” is framed
through style, but it is no less a frame, no less a structure of perception.
What frames her space are fragmented language and blocks of color. The frame of
language is foregrounded through its fragmentation; since I do not know the
meaning of “new” or “ter pape,” I am confronted by the representational force
of language, its hold for meaning. Her pinkness, her color is repeated in
surrounding squares—surfaces that come to mean skin, epidermalization. Her and
her pinky-whiteness are framed as frames. The frame we call gender is here a
surface, an epidermalization. “Her” is produced out of surface, produced out of
the racialization of her surface. Everywhere the painting points to the
technologies of seeing, to the frame’s administration. And again, this faceless
figure is a refusal of the frames that make her up, but only through the
contradiction of becoming frame herself.
3.
How to
think about a transsexual woman’s differences? By “a,” I mean a specific
account among many. It could be called my transsexual method—I turn to art. For
me, there is artfulness in transsexuality, and it is not her physician’s. Trans
studies and activism advocate for the conservative position of transsexual
women as needy literalists. Given that anti-trans violence imbues the
sociopolitical climate, this position is understandable, but it conceals
lustier questions with ontological certitudes—it is anti-sexual. The very act
of her need for Premarin® or breast implants, or facial feminization and
orchidectomies, are wants in the form, style, and feel of one’s sensuous self.
The
misogyny and racism of surgeons and endocrinologists are obstacles for her
want. Medicalization does not define a transsexual woman—just ask her.
Medicalization is what repudiates her want even as it makes her otherwise to
herself and others. She is not plasticized through medicalization. On the
contrary, she is confronted with the limits of a cultural order (what
structures her consciousness and preconsciousness, and the authority of the
super ego) that materially translates her bodily sexuality, her art.
Transsexual women’s bodies are accretions of intimate and subjective want made
legible and experiential through the aesthetics of the cultural. What is art
but a constant fight with—if also a reliance on—the protocols of aesthetics?
Susan Stryker writes, “Nothing other than my desire brings Him [surgeon; but
also, Medicine] here.” She continues: “Materiality always resists the symbolic
frame. I beg it, then, to throw all language off and become ungendered flesh,
but language clenches this meat between its teeth in a death-grip.” Invoking
Lacanian terms, Stryker describes a paradox of transsexual women’s
“desire”—what we desire happens within materiality’s resistance to
representation, to representation’s commitment to the cultural. But,
transsexuality is not the return of a real materiality stripped of the
symbolic—of the really real—but about how sexuality intensifies and invents
matter, even as it is conscribed by the cutting relationship between symbolic
and real registers. In begging materiality, Stryker wants to reverse the
cutting relationship that the symbolic performs. But perhaps her desire reveals
that some women want what is also foreclosed—they want their want. If
transsexuality is sensuous intensity, it is so because of sexuality; what I
would call her artistry.
Art and
aesthetics produce a fractious join. Transsexuality is sexuality’s
inventiveness with an impoverished reality, nothing more than the alibi for a
brutalizing symbolic. It may be too contentious to say that transsexuality is
artistry with modifications of sex as indexical signs of wantonness, but I
offer this as an-other imaginary, an-other ego ideal for transsexuality. An
artfulness at lusty odds with (and within) the cultural. This conversation
risks but must avoid collapsing artistry into self-fashioning. Might her
transsexual art-making aim toward a reprieve from the technology of selfhood?
If art is the work of passion, her art also wants more than the cultural
prescribes, more than the frameworks provided her. The art of transsexuality
must not be confused with technologies of the self—seeing transsexuality as art
places it as intervention in the material, rather than as confirmation of the
reality’s authenticating and totalizing function. By “art,” here, I mean
transsexuality’s sexualization of the sexed body, and the fashioning of sex as
an act of artistry.
4.
In Nine
Lives: The Autobiography of Erica Rutherford, Rutherford documents her varied
life as an actor, filmmaker, theater designer, printmaker, painter, activist,
and professor in England, the United States, Spain, South Africa, and Canada. A
member of the Canadian Royal Academy of Arts, she painted for over forty years
and was shown in major galleries in North American and Europe. Rutherford’s
style ranged from abstract expressionism—murky fields of color that give way to
swaths of luminosity that defined her work in the 1960s—to an oneiric modernism
akin to Ken Kiff. Rutherford’s work in the dreamlike paintings of the 1990s
step past the divides between abstraction and figuration by suggesting that
fantasy is not opposite material reality but a contingent force in making the
world.
During
the late seventies, while undergoing sexual transition, Rutherford experimented
with self-portraiture. Starting with a posed photograph of herself, she would
paint from this photograph not to achieve realism, but to look at the function
of photography, particularly its frame. Her flattened figures seem to merge
with the apparatus of framing, both the photograph and the canvas. She pushes
against portraiture’s cromulent function, and with it a modern conception of
photography as capture. This period of work, I argue, refused photography’s
privileged relationship to rendering transsexuality visible: from linear
progressions of before and after to seeing transition as sexual binarism from
zero to oneness, male to female, and also the collapse of the referent to the
image-matter. Photographs accompanying transsexual memoires confirmed this
narrow understanding. For the reader, the photograph demonstrated a seeing
it—the indeterminate pronoun “it” working to materialize the transsexual
transition. In contrast, Rutherford’s painted-self challenges photography’s
conceit that it captures what really is.
In
Second Skins: The Body Narratives of Transsexuality, an inaugural text for
trans studies, Jay Prosser writes about the connection between Rutherford’s
paintings and her transition:
‘’A
painter, Erica Rutherford paints self-portraits based on photographs she first
takes of herself dressed as a woman—also concretizations of an imperceptible
self … These portraits begin by envisioning the woman Rutherford wishes to
become and are gradually transformed as she transitions into a record of that
becoming.’’
For
Prosser, Rutherford’s paintings are the sexual abstraction of her photographic
becoming—to be, to be a woman, is photographic. Through photography, a
transsexual emerges as a subject materialized into a real self. Here, Prosser
pivots around the photographic referent to cohere the transsexual real with
bodily matter.
In
discussing the above photograph in Rutherford’s autobiography, Prosser goes on
to say:
“A
painted self-portrait is situated behind the photographic Rutherford. In the
painting, the seated figure is feminized through body contour, posture, and
clothing, but the face is featureless—a blank space as undetailed by the feminine
as the still-masculine face of the photographic Rutherford seated before her.”
Prosser
continues: “The self-portrait is a blueprint for the transsexual subject in
transition: like the photographs in the autobiographies for readers, visual
means of making the transsexual’s gender real.” The real of her photograph, for
Prosser, is her feminine failure—a failure the painting does not record. But,
what if Rutherford’s painted portrait reflexively argues against the framework
that her transsexuality is forced to represent here? Might the photographs she
takes of herself be what Rutherford paints against, knowing that the photograph
aims to render her transsexuality in terms of male to female, a sexual
transition predicated on authentication and autopoiesis? Rather than collapsing
her material body with the photographic referent, or confusing the real with
matter, Rutherford’s paintings provocatively attend to the imperceptibility of
perceptual frames.
Prosser
understands how the apparatus of representation—for Second Skins, it is the
narrative form of biography, which values a linear timeline and conflict
resolution—attempts to capture the subject represented. Narrative progression
has few better tools than transsexual transition to organize time and the arc
of a story. However, Prosser concludes his book with the realness of sex as
photographic, showing how the indexicality of photography’s referent
substantiates the logic of sexual becoming. His study of “second skins” (his
theory of transsexuality) ends with photography to lend it its own narrative
resolution. Instead of recognizing the linear role photography plays in
biographical accounts of transsexuality, Prosser turns to the photographic
image as his theory of transsexual realness and bodily being. For Prosser,
transsexuality is photographic: to be (seen/skinned) is sex itself: “For
transsexuals surgery is a fantasy of restoring the body to the self enacted on
the surface of the body.” Taking literally Roland Barthes’s assertation that
photography is an indexical (literally “light … is a carnal medium, a skin”)
record of “that which has been,” Prosser’s account of transsexuality is about
that which is, about the realness of transsexuality as image, as photographic.
Prosser is certainly not alone in building an account of transsexuality on a
modern presumption of photography, but more consequentially, it seems to me
that much of trans studies—what we might call its canon, its political
orientations, its central commitments—has relied on an investment in the being
of trans that it draws from photography as its defense and—perhaps even more
impoverishing—as its logic. Trans studies has a photography problem.
Prosser’s
meditation on Rutherford initiates his argument about trans becoming that he
theorizes through a particular photographic reading of Freud’s enigmatic
statement about the ego as “not merely a surface entity, but … the projection
of a surface,” that ultimately collapses the image-matter of skin and
transexual being. In Prosser’s careful critique of Judith Butler, he
demonstrates how she misreads the distinction Freud makes between body and ego.
For Butler, the body becomes “itself the psychic projection of a surface.” For
Freud, Prosser notes, the ego is a “product of the body, not the body as a product
of the ego.” Butler conflates materiality with the mental projection of the
surface of the body—collapsing the differences between Lacan’s mirror stage and
Freud’s conception of the ego. Prosser makes the case that transsexual
phenomena “illustrate the materiality of the bodily ego rather than the
phantasmatic status of the sexed body: the material reality of the imaginary
and not, as Butler would have it, the imaginariness of material reality.”
In
structuring this critique, Prosser turns to the cinematic imagery of Jennie
Livingston’s Paris is Burning (1990) to show how Butler’s account of
transsexuality is metaphorized away from the sexed and raced materiality of the
body. In Butler’s own discussion of this film, she defines the camera as a
metaphor of transsexualization: Livingston’s camera performs phallic
maneuvering through transsexual women who want sex change (specifically,
genital surgery), turning black and Latina transsexuals into confusions of
phallus and penis. Prosser explains this confusion as a repetition of Butler’s
misreading of Freud, again de-literalizing transsexuality. But what is
interesting here is how similar Prosser’s turn to photography as metonymic of
transsexualization is to Butler’s cinematic approach.
If, as
Prosser suggests, the transsexual’s body image “is radically split off from the
material body,” then the description of feeling “trapped in the wrong body”
becomes uncannily similar to the capture of the referent in the emulsion of the
photograph. An interior negative of the body image is printed—with surgery and
hormones as processing fluids—onto and as the material body. “The skin is the
locale for the physical experience of body image and the surface upon which is
projected the psychic representation of the body.” Prosser recognizes the
problem of Lacan’s occularcentrism of subjectivity, noting that that Freud
emphasizes bodily sensations as forming the ego. However, he pursues the
substantiation of the transsexual feeling of wrong-bodiliness such that
‘’surgery
deploys the skin and tissues to materialize the transsexual body image with
fleshy prostheses in the shape of the sentient ghost-body. The surgical
grafting of materials endows the transsexual with the corporeal referents for
these imaginary and phantomized signifieds, restoring their substance.’
Photography,
it would seem, is the form of transsexuality, creating a photo-ontic. Haunted
by referents—appeals to the real—transsexuality happens between referentiality
and representation. The problem with transsexualization as photograph is
revealed in Prosser’s wish that the referentiality of transsexuality is
captured (trapped) in photography.
The
consequences of the photo-ontic of Prosser’s reading become clearer in his
later book Light in the Dark Room: Photography and Loss, where he critiques his
own autobiographical impulse in using a photograph of himself to end Second
Skins. Guided again by his reading of Barthes, Prosser recognizes that his
literal (what Barthes described as studium) reading of transsexual photographs
missed what photography cannot show (the photograph’s punctum) in its capture:
affect. In returning affect (punctum) to transsexual photographs, Prosser
writes, “This failure to be real is the transsexual real.” For Prosser,
transsexuals never achieve their referents, never achieve the longing for their
sexed referent. It is the un-becoming of sex bound with an overdetermined
sexual visibility that defines his transsexuality. Yet, transsexual being
remains, problematically, photographic.
Yes,
Prosser’s punctum allows for the affective, but it continues to rely on a
photo-ontic. By “photo-ontic,” I mean how the seduction of the photographic
referent produces a collapse between image-matter and being in theorizing
transsexuality. Even the trauma inflicted by the surgeon who cuts her up through
an acting-out of racialized sexism—any transwoman who has modified her body
knows exactly what I mean, either as fear or actuality—remains within this
photo-ontic framework for understanding transsexual beingness. Prosser writes
“The photograph incarnates because it takes the body of the referent ... I may
never recover my first skin. But the realization of that loss is my second
skin.” His photo-ontic: not being is transsexual being as enacted through the
logic of photography. Image-matter, even in its most evanescent and affective
form, defines transsexual being. The implications of transsexual-as-photograph
are that the transphobic logic of spectacular spectacle defines transsexuality,
obscuring other “bodily sensations” that mark the work of sexuality.
5.
Rutherford
writes:
‘’Then,
at the moment when they seemed most to threaten me, they staggered, dropped to
the floor and in helpless crouched postures withdrew themselves. In this
position, though smaller, they still thrived, fattening themselves, assuming
sensuous curves of a sexuality they could never know, growing breasts that
obtruded indecently from their infantile bodies until they appeared malformed
infants, aberrations of nature. Capriciously, they now assumed joyful colors,
reds and yellows, as if to ensure that no one could ignore their presence.’’
Instead—and
what I can read from Rutherford’s refusal—let us take seriously the sexuality
of sex change: the want that cannot be fully metabolized by the social (ego
ideals that refuse ideal egos) while modifying the real’s own becoming, its
ongoing materializations, sexualizations, and concatenations. Perhaps instead
of Rutherford’s paintings as naive accounts of her becoming a woman, her
painting proposes that photography is the naive technology for representing
transsexuality (let alone for modeling transsexuality on). Rutherford does not
show who she is becoming but shows what forces—and cultural aesthetics—are at
work in delimiting that emergence, that potential. Working against photography as
record, against becoming real through photographic logics, Rutherford’s
paintings draw attention to those technical modes of perception that limit what
the body is or might be. And more specific to Rutherford: What if a realist
theory of photography has produced reproducible narratives about transsexual
women’s lives—even to ourselves—that refuse bodily difference and those
experiences that exceed the sex/gender schema?
But
Freud continues to define “projection of a surface” as a sensuousness that is
derived from the body, but not as a literalization of the surface of that body.
Embodiment—the sense of feeling bodily—is a sensuous rapport between affective
states we might call inside and outside. At every point in this relay, fantasy
makes sense of sensations refracted through an inaccessible, but no less
significant, materiality. In other words, bodily sense is produced through
sensuous excess, not through a precise organ of sensation. Might, then,
transsexuality not be simply about skin—one organ dedicated to touch and
vision—but an excess that has no representative? Despite Prosser’s critique of
Butler’s imagistic (and as such, performative) reading of the body ego, he also
organ-izes the body ego through a phenomenology of photography (a studium-only
account of the body—what literally is present-ed—as described by Barthes in
Camera Lucida), with transsexuality as idealized example. The referential
surface—what I read Rutherford’s art working against—is the frame that delimits
transsexuality into a visibility, into a logic of the photo-self as sex. For
Rutherford, transsexuality is not ontologically a skin to be imagistically
realized. Instead, transsexuality is what infuses the body (even as limit) with
sexuality as a register of fantasy always aiming toward what is yet unknown,
the otherwise that designates transsexuality.
What
would it mean for Rutherford’s paintings if we returned sexuality (not
identity, but libido) to transsexuality? To “assume sensuous curves of a
sexuality [we] could never know”?
Painted Camera,
“”Her”. By Eva Hayward. e-flux. April
2021.