29/09/2019

The Value of Going Unseen



In Alfred Hitchcock’s 1938 film, The Lady Vanishes, a young woman on a train becomes disturbed by the sudden disappearance of a kindly older woman, a governess and music teacher. The latter, a spinster, is introduced to the viewer when she writes the letters of her name in the condensation on one of the train’s glass windowpanes, only to have them evaporate almost instantly. Within minutes, she is gone, and the other passengers, steward, and conductor claim to have never seen her. Asked to describe her, the young woman can only say she was “middle-aged and ordinary,” before admitting, “I can’t remember.” Later in the film, the older woman is reduced to “a hallucination, a subjective image, a character in a novel subconsciously remembered,” and even “nothing but lumps of raw flesh,” all before she is revealed as a British spy, the movie’s ultimate heroine in the final scene.

Today, women appear—or disappear—in any manner of guises. In the photographer Patty Carroll’s series Anonymous Women, it is household artifacts and traditions—upholstery fabric, curtains, telephones, slabs of bacon, leaves of lettuce, a braided loaf of bread, rolls of wallpaper, pillows, and plates—into which each model disappears, swallowed whole by the python of domesticity. In Whitney Otto’s novel Now You See Her, the vanishing woman works in an office, present but unseen. Her cat is indifferent when she trips over it, and when she presses her palm to her forehead, it is “only to notice her hand fading away with the motion, from fingertips to forearm.” In the more recent film Hello, My Name Is Doris, Sally Field plays an older woman who develops a crush on a younger man with whom she shares an office; at the beginning of the story, he adjusts her crooked glasses. As the film critic Manohla Dargis wrote in The New York Times, the young man’s spontaneous gesture of kindness is transformative: Wrinkles, apparently, “have a way of making women disappear one crease at a time,” and when she is noticed momentarily by a younger man, such recognition evidently “makes her visible, most importantly to herself.”

The invisible woman might be the actor no longer offered roles after her 40th birthday, the 50-year-old woman who can’t land a job interview, or the widow who finds her dinner invitations declining with the absence of her husband. She is the woman who finds that she is no longer the object of the male gaze—youth faded, childbearing years behind her, social value diminished. Referring to her anticipated disappearance on her upcoming 50th birthday, the writer Ayelet Waldman said to an interviewer, “I have a big personality, and I have a certain level of professional competence, and I’m used to being taken seriously professionally. And suddenly, it’s like I just vanished from the room. And I have to yell so much louder to be seen. … I just want to walk down the street and have someone notice that I exist.”

Her words evoke another woman walking, unseen, down the street nearly a century ago. As Clarissa Dalloway shops in London for flowers on a June morning, Virginia Woolf speculates about her protagonist’s transitory identity. Mrs. Dalloway, considering her place among the people she knows, finds that “often now this body she wore (she stopped to look at a Dutch picture), this body, with all its capacities, seemed nothing—nothing at all. She had the oddest sense of being herself invisible, unseen; unknown.” She recalls that she is known now simply by her husband’s name, and a few sentences later, she considers how sometimes it is simply by their gloves and shoes that women are identified. She knows nothing, she thinks, no language, no history, and hardly reads books except memoirs. She realizes then that “her only gift was knowing people almost by instinct.”

One’s identity, Woolf seems to say, is transient, and perhaps all the more so with age. As women become older, they entertain a wider set of choices about when and how they are seen. This vanishing can occur more rapidly or be felt more acutely. Clarissa Dalloway’s sense of fleeting self was described more explicitly decades later by the writer Francine du Plessix Gray in her essay “The Third Age.” If the gaze of others wanes, Gray suggests, one might choose to “acquire instead a deepened inward gaze, or intensify our observation of others, or evolve alternative means of attention-getting which transcend sexuality and depend, as the mentors of my youth taught me, upon presence, authority, and voice.”

Gray may be talking about the difference between being a subject and an object. It is a cliché to point out that ours is a culture in which men routinely objectify women, but according to Alison Carper, a psychologist who practices in New York, if a woman is complicit in this practice—that is, in viewing herself as an object—she cannot help but be acutely aware when that object loses its desirability. “As humans, we all need to be recognized,” Carper adds, “but as we grow older, the manner of recognition we search for can change. A subject is someone who experiences her own agency, who is aware of how she can and does have an impact on others and how she is, ultimately, the author of her own life. She is aware of the responsibility this carries.” A woman without fully developed interiority might continue to objectify herself.

Clarissa Dalloway is clearly a subject. She realizes that her body is simply something that she wears, and then, a sentence later, finds that it is really nothing, nothing at all. Woolf suggests a correlation between invisibility and the ability to know people by instinct when she identifies both these qualities in Clarissa within a single paragraph. Since she published Mrs. Dalloway in the mid-1920s, more prosaic studies of human nature have come to similar conclusions. A reduced sense of visibility does not necessarily constrain experience. Associated with greater empathy and compassion, invisibility directs us toward a more humanitarian view of the larger world. This diminished status can, in fact, sustain and inform—rather than limit—our lives. Going unrecognized can, paradoxically, help us recognize our place in the larger scheme of things.



It is a theme Woolf returns to again and again, as when Clarissa Dalloway considers the “odd affinities she had with people she had never spoken to, some woman in the street, some man behind a counter—even trees, or barns.” Clarissa recognizes that our lives can be measured by what we have done to touch the lives of others; she is attuned to how human associations can be formed with complete strangers. And to the enduring value—indeed, power—of such alliances.

Her modern counterpart might be Mystique, the shape-shifting mutant from the X-Men series, played most recently by Jennifer Lawrence. She has no physical self beyond her blue body and instead morphs into the forms of others, among them an assassin, a German secret agent, a professor, a young girl, a senator’s wife, a fashion model, and a member of the U.S. Department of Defense. Her power is her indistinct appearance; it is what enables her to assume other identities.

But another likely counterpart to Clarissa Dalloway might be the famous 1960s model Vera Lehndorff, popularly known then as Veruschka. Toward the conclusion of her career, she collaborated with the German artist Holger Trülzsch, painting her body in patterns, colors, and textures to match different backgrounds. “When I started to paint myself,” Lehndorff writes,

“the color and I were one: there was no “between.” … This experience of coherence between us and the world around us is one of well-being; it produces a sense of affinity with whatever it is with which we come into contact.”



There is Lehndorff, lying on gray sand or receding into a dark doorway or leaning against a white wall. In the last, her body has been stippled white up to her shoulders, but her head seems to have been dyed a bright azure to match the sky behind it. It is an image of the female body going from object to air, from material to immaterial, from thing to nothing. It is camouflage that has nothing to do with escaping prey, avoiding danger, or finding food or a mate, and everything to do with finding a coherence.


All this may speak to a revised etiquette of invisibility. Opacity itself can work as a connective tissue. If humans do leave a mark, it is just some quick and temporary elusive imprint, nothing more than a fugitive logo or insignia. And it’s probably not the worst thing for any of us to imagine identity as an arrangement of letters written for a few moments on the clouded window of a train that is speeding out of view.

This article has been adapted from Akiko Busch’s book, How to Disappear: Notes on Invisibility in a Time of Transparency.


The Invisibility of Older Women. By Akiko Busch. The Atlantic,  February 27, 2019. 






Akiko Busch’s latest book is How to Disappear: Notes on Invisibility in a Time of Transparency, from which this essay is adapted.

A yellow tang is loitering to my left. A school of iridescent purple reef fish shines into view. A royal-blue queen angelfish glides out of sight. Despite our proximity, I am beyond the notice of a massive southern stingray sweeping along the seafloor, the drape of its thin pectoral fins following and folding over the ripples of the sand bed. The striped parrotfish are oblivious to me, while the yellowtail damselfish and flurry of silversides couldn’t be less inter­ested. The school of tiny iridescent purple gobies flutters past with utter detachment.

We all know that sensation of life slowing down, of being suspended in time, of being outside the rhythm of ordinary life, but underwater, that is the way things really are. We may all be occupying the same turquoise chamber, but the sense of remove is vast; my amphibian self is alert to both the immeasurable dis­tance from and profound connection to the water world around me. Submerged, I have become a refugee from the visible world.

It’s an excursion that has value at a time when the twin circumstances of the surveillance economy and social media have made visibility our common currency. In the process, these have changed the way we see ourselves, often allowing us to believe that our lives can be measured by how we are seen rather than by what we do. But when identity is derived from projecting an image in the public realm, something is lost, some core of identity diminished, some sense of authority and interiority sacrificed. And it occurs to me that it is time to re-evaluate the merits of the inconspicuous life, to search out some antidote to continuous exposure, to reconsider the value of going unseen and overlooked.

Which is why I have signed up for this tutorial in disappearance 40 feet beneath the surface of the deep blue Caribbean Sea. It is a place where we carry ourselves differently. We are there and not. It is not just the shift in gravitational pull, but that the fluid environment is intrinsically more familiar to us. If the composition of our own beings is 60-per-cent liquid, it only makes sense that it is easy to be absorbed, or at least feel ab­sorbed, by the surrounding waters. We recognize the particles in which we are submerged, as though the blood in our own veins has found it possible to flow in congruence with the currents streaming around us. It is not quite a molecular kinship, but close. Underwater, we have a different relationship with our surroundings.

Water magnifies and distorts our perceptions. We are unable to smell. We are unable to speak, and that stills us in some essential way. The human voice is absent, replaced by the sound of breathing, a gentle repetition that induces a further calm. Other sounds are more muffled. Our ears are designed to function in air, and underwater, it is diffi­cult for us to recognize the direction from which sound is com­ing or to untangle its vibrations. We can hear, but not very well.

Yet, the sense of touch comes alive. The water temperature is in the high 70s, and different sets of skin receptors allow me to read its gentle coolness, its motion, texture, vibration and pressure. Touch is said to be 10 times stronger than verbal or emotional contact, and when I move, it is gradual, leisurely, multidirectional, as though my body has dematerialized in some intrinsic way, conforming to the currents as best it can. The aquatic world offers invisibility that is less about being unseen and more about a dilution of self and the sensation of assimila­tion and adaptation. As odd as it seems, I might even say that being underwater confers a sense of solidarity.

The mammalian dive reflex transforms one’s sense of being. When the body is submerged, the hu­man heart rate slows anywhere from 10 to 20 per cent. Blood circulation slows as well, redirecting flow to the vital organs. With heartbeat and circulation reset, our nervous systems are also recalibrated, and the sense of physical suspension has a psy­chic corollary. It is why people speak of feeling tranquil, meditative when they are in deep water. It is why human beings in a condition of emotional upset or trauma are sometimes advised to immerse their faces in a bowl of cold water. And why free divers who go into water up to 200 metres for minutes at a time on a single breath speak of feeling serene; without the rhythm of breathing, their sense of time is even further diminished.

That sense of languor extends to one’s thoughts and impres­sions. Observations come and go unhurried. A plume of anem­one waves quietly in the current. A three-foot webbed lavender sea fan flutters almost imperceptibly. A turquoise parrotfish drifts by me. An army of small fairy basslets, violet with brilliant yellow tails, streams beneath me. But each of these organisms has a strategy. The yellow trumpet fish shifts vertically to assume the structure of the stalks of coral sur­rounding it; or it may align itself with a larger fish shadowing its feeding spot. The rosy hues of the channel crab echo the bejewelled pink patches of crustose algae on which it rests. The delicate brown rosettes on the skin of a flounder are nearly indistinguishable from the pebbly surface of the seafloor.


The ballet of marine biota is full of purpose, function and reason, as well as predation, consumption, reproduction and all the familiar activities of everyday life. The speckled patterning of the moray eel is in sync with the colour and texture of the encrusted coral crevices it inhabits. The multicoloured mottled surface of a scorpion fish is indistinguishable from the algae in which it has taken up residence. The dots on the spotted butterfly fish are directional decoys, existing to confuse predators as to where, exactly, their eyes are. Parrotfish secrete a membrane of mucus at night to conceal their odour from nocturnal predators. The blue tang floating to my left is looking for algae to feed on; the spotted butterfly fish is foraging for tiny invertebrates; the threads of fire coral will sting me if I happen to brush up against them; and the yellow-bearded fireworm resting on the floor of the reef is equipped with bristles that will inject me with a painful toxin if I happen to touch it. For all their gaudy displays, each of these is a master of the inconspicuous. Invisibility in the aquatic realm is ordinary, powerful and above all, essential to survival.


Not long afterward, I encounter an immense hawksbill sea turtle scuttling along the sand, grazing on the algae and seagrass in its path, its three-foot carapace and mas­sive spotted legs advancing with an elephantine poise. It makes sense that we take such plea­sure in the state of weightlessness. A friend of mine who is a diver speaks of the way she loses herself in increments when submerged, and this little deficit of self suddenly seems key. Perhaps it comes not just from the sensory novelty, that thrill of zero gravity, but from some sensation of having a spirit self, some innate knowledge that it can be a good thing to lose the materiality of everyday life.

The aquatic world is as surreal as anything imagined by Sal­vador Dali. But the invisible man he painted in 1929, with golden hair made of clouds, legs fashioned by waterfalls, and a torso constructed of architectural ruins, was painted during what the artist called his paranoia phase, and reflects a horror of being consumed by one’s surroundings. The artist’s sense of identity was under siege, dissolving, on the verge of being de­voured by his environment. It is too bad Dali never made any diving trips in a tropical sea. Or knew anything about the mammalian dive reflex.




Perhaps he would have been more receptive to finding accommodation by the world around him. What would he have made of a basket star that wraps itself in strands of coral? Or a star-shaped sponge? Or one that looks like an orange elephant ear? Or others in the shape of balls and barrels, tubes, vases, ropes? Or worms that present themselves as silvery feather dusters? Or coral that comes in the shape of pencils, leaves, lettuce, knobs, corkscrews, antlers, fingers, candelabra, wires and strings, dinner plates and doorknobs, cacti and cups, brains and buttons, feathers and fans? Would he have persisted in his paranoia? If he had observed such a carnival 40 feet beneath the surface, his invisiphobia might likely have become invisiphilia.

This is not about vanishing so much as some vital rearrange­ment of weight, substance and space. It is possible for us to associate the limit­lessness of the vast blue abyss with freedom. We are affiliated with our surroundings, experiencing inclusion and placement in a wider world. It is not only our sense of space that is under revision here, but also our humanity. The overview effect is the term used in space ex­ploration to define that cognitive shift that astronauts experi­ence when they see the Earth from outer space. Viewing the blue marble from orbit, they re-evaluate life on earth, reconsid­ering the significance of regional and national boundaries and our status within them, inevitably reassessing the importance we give ourselves; not surprisingly, when photographs of the Earth as viewed from outer space were first taken in the late 1940s, they signalled a shift in human consciousness.


Immersion in the deep sea seems to offer some corollary, an underview ef­fect perhaps. Although it is a view from beneath rather than from above, from water rather than from space, and an experi­ence of absorption and connection rather than of distance and detachment, it, too, enables us to recalibrate our place in things.

That re-evaluation may be relevant now more than ever. Not because we necessarily should be more discreet, unobtrusive, inconspicuous – though all of these would likely do us good – but because the Earth is warming. There will be nine billion of us soon. We will have no choice but to reassess our place in things. And part of this may have to do with how we reconsider our identity; how we imagine some reduction in scale; how we consider a different way of being in this world; and how we learn to become constituents in a broader landscape. Our deeply held values about individuality may even become passé. We are, each one of us, less important than we think.

A yellowtail snapper drifts past. A blue parrotfish skims by beneath me. My presence means nothing to them.




The value of going unseen. By Akiko Busch. The Globe and Mail, March 1, 2019.




In our increasingly networked and image-saturated lives, the notion of disappearing has never been both more enchanting. A lifelong student and observer of the natural world, Akiko Busch, set out to explore her own uneasiness with this arrangement. Her new book, “How to Disappear: Notes on Invisibility in a Time of Transparency.”


Joe Donahue talks on The Book Show with Akiko Busch.   WAMC,  March 4, 2019. 



Caroline Donahue talks with Akiko Busch on  How to Disappear.

Akiko Busch wanted to look at how invisibility could be a superpower.   These days, so much of our time is spent worrying about how to be more visible as writers. Do we have enough presence on social media? Will a publisher accept our book if we send it to them, or will enough readers find our books if we publish them ourselves? In the midst of this intense quest for visibility and transparency in a world that is increasingly connected, Akiko Busch sought to look at how invisibility is a power as well when it is employed by choice.   In her beautiful book, she explores examples of invisibility in nature, her own home, and family, and as far away as Iceland, where their legends include invisible people who live alongside the visible ones, and who are just a bit better than the rest of us. This book opens us up to the magic of not being seen when we want to hide, and was a total sigh of relief to read and discuss since we writers love to be hermits, don't we?

The Secret Library Podcast,  April 4, 2019.





Akiko Busch is a writer and a swimmer. She teaches environmental writing at Bennington College and seems to live as off the grid as one can in 2019. Much of her writing feels drawn from understated encounters with nature and the pastoral sublime, such as observing water eels in a brook or chopping vegetables in a Hudson Valley home. Her 2009 book The Uncommon Life of Common Objects has an entire chapter devoted to vegetable-peelers. So when her new essay collection, How to Disappear: Notes on Invisibility in a Time of Transparency, touches on things like Barbie dolls that can connect to WiFi and smart refrigerators, the reader begins to worry that no one, not even Aniko Busch, can order a new vegetable-peeler online without worrying who’s tracking her and why.

In How to Disappear, Busch contemplates how government surveillance, smart technology, and our own desire to be seen have all contributed to a perhaps irrevocable loss of personal privacy. She does this circuitously, eschewing the alarmist and Luddite tropes that encumber many studies of our technology-dependent culture. Instead, Busch meanders across a broad cultural landscape to locate the source of our beliefs, fears, and desires about invisibility. She looks at the role of invisibility in children’s stories (from imaginary friends to Harry Potter’s invisibility cloak) and the Huldufólk, the invisible people who are thought to live inside Iceland’s lava rocks. She visits a physics lab at the University of Rochester where scientists study “transformation optics,” the practice of bending light waves around things to render them invisible. Another essay reconsiders Virginia Woolf’s novel Mrs. Dalloway to think through aging, and the invisibility of older women. Busch explores camouflage, anonymity and unsigned works of art, and police surveillance of minorities. By drawing from natural science, children’s literature, folklore, art history, and more, Busch takes the timely issue of privacy and makes it timeless.

Whenever I’m at a party and people ask me to say something in Russian, my go-to is У меня есть право иметь секреты—“I have the right to have secrets.” It both satisfies the desire people have to hear their stereotypes about Russia confirmed and makes it sound like I lead an interesting life. I was reminded of that sentence when I read Busch’s exploration of the French term jardin secret, “secret garden,” a catchall phrase that can refer to any private passion that provides what Busch calls “a psychic cloister” from the demands of the outside world. “Implicit in the jardin secret,” she writes “is that small personal histories need not always be shared; that human experience and imagination are sometimes a matter of private intentions, actions, or rewards.” While Busch insists a jardin secret can include such innocent pleasures as “a private collection of feathers, stones, books, or fans,” I couldn’t help but feel like they must be sensuous things, these secret gardens, pleasures more guilty than innocent. I certainly feel that way about my imaginary Russian secrets.

Why do we so often believe that secrecy must necessarily mask transgression? Busch unravels that association in How to Disappear. The laborious, sometimes caustic recipes for invisibility ink and potion included in the book (some from mythology, some from military history) themselves suggest something nefarious. Take for instance the hulinhjalmur, an invisibility-granting symbol from ancient Iceland that had to be smeared on a person’s forehead with a mixture of “blood drawn from your finger and nipples, mixed with the blood and brains of a raven along with a piece of human stomach.” Busch writes that our tendency “to associate [invisibility] with wrongdoing, degeneracy, malice, even the work of the devil” is not accidental. It is inscribed into many of our oldest myths, including the Ring of Gyges, retold famously by Kristin Scott Thomas’s character in The English Patient. Gyges, a simple shepherd who discovers a ring that confers invisibility, uses his newfound power to kill the king, marry his wife, and take the throne for himself. This idea, that invisibility can lead  “an otherwise ordinary and honorable person to commit transgressions and behave unjustly,” has stubbornly stayed with us.

Ironically, we engage most wholeheartedly in invisibility when we are supposedly at our most innocent, as children. In the opening chapter, Busch recounts a story of her two-year-old son throwing his grandmother’s gold earrings out of the window. “Appropriate reprimands were made,” she assures, “but I was curious: was this some experimentation with gravity?… Did I have a thief on my hands?” Busch ultimately concludes that her son was simply marveling at something child psychologists refer to as “object permanence,” the idea that “objects and people can continue to exist even though they may not be seen.” Tracing the importance of invisibility in children’s literature, particularly the “capes, raps, rings, shields, potions” that confer the power to make a child protagonist go unseen, Busch reminds us that “learning to manage disappearance is intrinsic to childhood play.”

In essence, Busch argues that growing up is part and parcel with the independence groomed through secret adventures, hideaways in the forest or on urban rooftops, and imaginary confidants that adults can’t see. Reading How to Disappear, I wondered if we aren’t, as a society, continuously in the process of learning object permanence. If we really believe that things continue to exist when they’re not visible, then why must they always be geotagged, photographed, shared, аnd optimally filtered?

One of the most powerful aspects of How to Disappear is Busch’s exploration of the ways that artists experiment with invisibility, erasure, and vanishing as sites of creative force and even political resistance. There is Irina Ratushinskaya, the Soviet dissident writer who, while imprisoned in a labor camp, wrote poems on bars of soap using the end of a matchstick. She washed the verses off after she committed them to memory. In recounting Ratushinskaya’s story, Busch disentangles the erasure of art from the legacy of censorship, mounting a case for invisibility as protest. She writes about Jonathan Safran Foer’s die-cut panegyric to Bruno Schulz, Tree of Codes, a book composed entirely of cutouts from the Polish author’s short-story collection, The Street of Crocodiles. I wondered why she didn’t mention the work of Alexandra Bell, whose Counternarratives series, made up of redacted news articles, uses strategic erasure to expose racial bias in media coverage. Bell’s 2017 piece, “A Teenager With Promise,” deletes all but those words from a New York Times headline about Michael Brown.

Visibility is, of course, a political issue. But Busch cautions us against thinking that our society’s most marginalized communities are necessarily invisible, as they are often thought to be; in many ways, she attests, they are hypervisible and surveilled, and I would add, tokenized, held up to the spotlight as signs of progress when practically none has been made. In teasing through this idea, I was reminded of the Martiniquan writer Édouard Glissant. Writing about the challenge postcolonial writers face in finding a global readership without losing local identity, Glissant famously declared, “We clamor for the right to opacity.” Rather than call for representation, Glissant believed in the political potency of inscrutability, of resisting attempts to dilute black art until it was comprehensible to white audiences. Opacity is a theory of concealment, not quite the same as invisibility. Glissant wanted to be seen, not looked through.

I think Busch’s interest in invisibility began, fittingly, with water eels. In her book The Last Steward: Reflections on Citizen Science, she observes a glass eel in a stream; the aptly named animal is perfectly see-through. Its insides, including its heart and its dinner, can be seen with the naked eye if you look closely enough. Busch remarks, with amazement, that something could be transparent and still a complete mystery; it would seem to challenge our most basic assumptions about the relationship between being seen and being understood. “How is it possible,” she wonders, “to hold something so utterly small and transparent in the palm of your hand and still know so little about it?” Indeed, maybe what we are all searching for is a way to move through our new world like a glass eel, on full view and yet, somehow, still mysterious.

I have never been mysterious, sadly. And so, I have always been attracted to people who can manage duplicity, who can disappear into the night and never tell anyone where they went. A friend once stole my car keys and did just that—it’s one of the reasons I like him. Reading Busch, I often thought of the short story “The Lady with the Dog” by Anton Chekhov. The main character, Gurov, is having an affair with a woman he met on vacation in Yalta. Having returned home to Moscow, he finds himself living a double life. One life is “open, seen and known by all” and the other is carried out in secret. That secret life contains “everything in which he was sincere and did not deceive himself, everything that made the kernel of his life.” Perhaps there can be a sincerity to invisibility. Perhaps we can, like Gurov and the water eel, lead two lives, one visible and one just for us.

The Beauty of Invisibility. By Jennifer Wilson. The Paris Review, February 25, 2019.





Transcendentalist writers will tell you that a quiet walk through a forest can upend your universe. It happened recently to Akiko Busch, author of How to Disappear: Notes on Invisibility in a Time of Transparency, a survival manifesto for the social media age disguised as a collection of personal essays.

Observing creatures in the wetlands of Hudson Valley, New York, where she lives, Busch writes:

‘In the woods no more than an hour, I am struck anew by invisibility and its improvisational choreography, as a necessary condition of life. I am reminded of the grace of reticence, the power of discretion, and the possibility of being utterly private and autonomous yet deeply aware of and receptive to the world. If I am enchanted by staying out of sight, it is because such behavior seems so rare in our own species. In recent years, we have been more preoccupied than ever by the question of how to stay in view.”

In 11 chapters, Busch offers a litany of exit strategies—a field guide she calls it—from today’s hyper-connected world. She argues for the utility of “going dark” as a counterpoint to our neurosis with tracking, checking in, and geotagging. Maybe not broadcasting our every joy and disappointment can be refreshing, if not transformational, she suggests.

I observed this kind of restraint at a business lunch in Yoshino, Japan. With every course, my companions—mostly dads—whipped out their mobile phones and contorted their bodies to capture those all-too familiar overhead plate close-ups. In amusement, I commented that it was nice to see that Instagram foodie habits were alive and well in rural Japan. But the pictures were actually not for social media, they clarified. It turns out the snapshots of salmon spaghetti and red bean parfaits were for themselves—private mementos of a good meal and the good company that day.



Busch’s book isn’t kindling for neo-Luddites. She doesn’t hate the internet, despite what some critics suggest. A close reading of her lyrical prose reveals that she’s simply calling for balance. “It is not retreating from the digital world but about finding some genuine alternative to a life of perpetual display,” she explains.

In parts, How to Disappear can feel dense with one too many examples. Within a few pages, Busch flits from homespun recipes for invisible ink, her father’s redacted CIA file, a MoMA exhibit about dust, the invention of the Signal app, Robert Rauschenberg’s Erased De Kooning, and an online ghost poetry experiment—invisibility is an elastic concept after all. Busch begins chapters with a charming personal anecdote that you wish she’d continue with rather than check off other examples. But perhaps her choice to not make the book so autobiographical is a demonstration of how an essayist writing in the first person can seize the privilege of being opaque—or partially invisible—to the reader.

In parts, How to Disappear can feel dense with one too many examples. Within a few pages, Busch flits from homespun recipes for invisible ink, her father’s redacted CIA file, a MoMA exhibit about dust, the invention of the Signal app, Robert Rauschenberg’s Erased De Kooning, and an online ghost poetry experiment—invisibility is an elastic concept after all. Busch begins chapters with a charming personal anecdote that you wish she’d continue with rather than check off other examples. But perhaps her choice to not make the book so autobiographical is a demonstration of how an essayist writing in the first person can seize the privilege of being opaque—or partially invisible—to the reader.

In praise of invisibility in the age of ceaseless self-promotion. By Anne Quito. Quartzy , March 31, 2019





When I was learning to swim, a powerful yet diminutive athlete—my 5-foot mother—gave me a tip: “Everything that actually matters, John, happens beneath the surface.” At the time, I thought this was nonsense. I wanted to be seen. My splashing and thrashing were visible signs of my speed. My mother just shook her head: They were signs of something, but definitely not speed.

Akiko Busch’s “How to Disappear: Notes on Invisibility in a Time of Transparency” serves as a gentle reminder of the wisdom of this advice and a way to broaden the scope of the suggestion: Stop splashing and thrashing; stop confusing what is most obvious or distracting for what is genuinely important. Almost everything that actually matters in life happens beneath the surface. Ms. Busch, who has rightly been compared to Annie Dillard and Edward Abbey, has dedicated nearly 30 years to sounding this message, one that our age seems intent on ignoring.

Ms. Busch’s “Nine Ways to Cross a River” (2007), a graceful meditation on open-water swimming, explored the power of quiet solitude. The book, like most understated virtues, came and went largely without notice. Three years later, her “Patience: Taking Time in an Age of Acceleration” stood against the rushing flow of modern life and was summarily swept away. “How to Disappear” runs against modernity’s most basic urge—our desperate desire to be seen—and therefore risks a similar fate. But it is precisely Ms. Busch’s subtle contrarianism that deserves our sustained attention.

Her intent is to “compile a field guide to invisibility,” but she rightly acknowledges the concept’s potential shortcomings. As Ralph Ellison noted in his 1952 novel “Invisible Man,” being unseen is often a result of social marginalization and oppression; in this case, being invisible amounts to not being, or counting, at all. Invisibility, Ms. Busch writes, “can be pejorative, referring to subterfuge, dishonesty, psychic emptiness, a vanishing act, an extinction.” Nonetheless, she insists, “transgression, paranoia, and social disparagement are the most obvious and least interesting things about invisibility.” “Least interesting” goes too far, but her point stands: Disappearing has its advantages.

In the natural world—in a lake or a river or a tree blind—“the human imperative to be seen is shown to be less practical than we think,” she writes. “It is the place where inconspicuousness is power rather than weakness.” The pre-Socratic philosopher Heraclitus once said that “Nature loves to hide,” but this isn’t quite right. Nature loves to hide from us when we insist on being seen. Try being invisible. Try hiding yourself, Ms. Busch suggests, and nature may not be so elusive. “How to Disappear” is, at least in part, a description of how the world might reappear to us if we weren’t so hellbent on overwhelming it.

Here and elsewhere in “How to Disappear” are traces of Peter Matthiessen’s “The Snow Leopard” (1978), an account of trying to catch sight of an invisible animal presence, a tale, Ms. Busch explains, that “offer[s] an alluring alternative to the self-branding so familiar today. . . a reprieve from reflexive fixations on self and image.”

Ms. Busch doesn’t harp on the idea that we live in a culture of self-branding and, primarily because she doesn’t have to. We already know it: This is the age of social networking, personal data mining and biometrics, all of which assemble and disassemble identities faster than we can say “hello” or “goodbye.” We complain about these violations of privacy as if they were inclement weather, inevitable misfortunes that we are now born to suffer. For the most part, however, these complaints are but banal talking points posted to Facebook, the site of our willing and constant exposure. Very few of us stop posting, sharing or “liking” long enough to consider the virtue of disappearing.

Ms. Busch understands the temptation to make everything garishly public. The willingness to expose ourselves stems from the more basic and powerful drive to be recognized. If one wants to “be somebody,” the first step is to be known by as many people as possible. This rarely involves genuine engagement with others but rather a calculated and obsessive campaign of self-promotion. To be clear, there is nothing inherently wrong with craving recognition, except that it tends to short-circuit all other forms of self-reliance or self-actualization. There are, in fact, other forms.

The late Victorians had a word for self-possession: They called it “reserve,” the willingness to withdraw, to save, to make something of ourselves inaccessible and therefore precious. If anything is important about a human life, perhaps it is what we keep undercover and then share, sparingly and authentically, with others. This is not exposure. It is revelation, and it means very little in the absence of reserve.




Without reserve or, in Ms. Busch’s words, invisibility, we may be left with painfully little, just a “general disquiet that comes with relinquishing—unreservedly and unconditionally—the personal information that is key to retaining a sense of identity,” Ms. Busch explains. “When private experience is indiscriminately offered for public consumption, ideas of a interior self are easily devalued.”

“Narcissus appears in each culture and each generation in his own particular guise,” Ms. Busch writes. This may be true, but today the pool is so clear, so broad, so tempting that it’s almost impossible not to be transfixed by the reflection. “How to Disappear” resists this temptation. “We are, each one of us,” Ms. Busch reminds us, “less important than we think.” To accept this diminishment of the self is the first step, but also the ultimate insight, of disappearing.

On the surface, “How to Disappear” is a palliative for the alienation that modern overexposure begets. Ms. Busch would like to save us from ourselves, from the lonely fate that afflicts Narcissus, his eyes forever locked on the only person he has ever truly loved—himself. But in its deeper moments, the book touches on an abiding, but easily forgotten, truth: Disappearing, the act of losing our selves, is a precondition of selflessness. Ms. Busch’s deeper concern is to save not Narcissus but rather the wider world his selfishness affects.

‘How to Disappear’ Review: The Unseen Virtues. By John Kaag, The Wall Street Journal, February 22, 2019. 





























27/09/2019

Chelsea Manning, the Connection between her Personal Struggles and her Leaking of Secret Documents




When Chelsea Manning was arrested in May 2010, the key piece of evidence tying her to large-scale leaks to WikiLeaks was a set of chat logs between Manning and Adrian Lamo—a hacker famous for his infiltration of the New York Times website (for which he was arrested and served time)—in which Manning appears to admit to the leaking. Lamo had given the logs to the FBI as well as to a journalist at Wired magazine. The journalist released the logs in abbreviated form, holding back on what Wired viewed as “personal” parts that did not directly reference Manning’s leaking.

After intense public speculation about what they were hiding, Wired released the full chat logs in July 2011 and revealed that the missing parts of the logs primarily concerned Manning’s questions about her gender identity and her struggles with addressing those questions under Don’t Ask Don’t Tell. Wired had chosen to redact those because they saw them as merely personal. Yet in the full logs, Manning explicitly and consistently links her leaking of government documents with her own struggles with living under Don’t Ask Don’t Tell and, in particular, with her struggles with her gender identity. For Manning, her struggles with state secrecy were connected with her struggles with the mandated secrecy surrounding her sexual and gender identity.

In a 2013 essay in The New Republic, Harvard law professor Yochai Benkler portrays Chelsea Manning as part of the “long-respected tradition” of whistleblowers in the United States. Whistleblowers, on Benkler’s account, serve the vital constitutional role of assuring “oversight” of institutions otherwise shrouded in secrecy— for example (and especially), institutions within the arena of national security.

Whistleblowers “offer a pressure valve, constrained by the personal risk whistleblowers take, and fueled by whatever moral courage they can muster.” Benkler argues that Manning should be classed within this tradition— of which Ellsberg is on his account the most notable example— not because of the effects of her actions, but because of the moral “motives” revealed in her statement on her guilty plea.

Benkler’s emphasis on Manning’s moral motives on behalf of “oversight” of government (or private corporations) resonates with broader US scripts about the figure of the “whistleblower,” a term coined in the 1970s by Ralph Nader. Nader similarly locates the importance of the whistleblower in assuring oversight of governmental and corporate organizations (Nader compares the structure of organizations to feudalism), which otherwise might go unchecked. Whistleblowing, Nader says, is the “last line of defense ordinary citizens have against the denial of their rights and the destruction of their interests by secretive and powerful institutions.” Nader also, like Benkler, emphasizes the importance of individual moral “courage” and care for the public good as the proper motivations of the whistleblower. Whistleblowing, Nader says, depends upon individuals’ “professional and individual responsibility,” which consists in “placing responsibility to society over that to an illegal or negligent or unjust organizational policy or activity.” For Nader— as for Benkler— in other words, the whistleblower serves an important role in society as a safeguard for the public good when it is threatened by private interest pursued under shadow of secrecy.

We can see this whistleblower script echoing throughout the many articles and opinion pieces written not only by Benkler, but by Manning’s other defenders. For example, Glenn Greenwald—a prolific defender of Manning writing for Salon and The Guardian—continually refers to Manning as a “whistleblower” and stresses Manning’s morally pure motives. For Greenwald, the Lamo-Manning chat logs show that “the private decided to leak these documents after [s]he became disillusioned with the Iraq war. [S]he described how reading classified documents made [her], for the first time, aware of the breadth of the corruption and violence committed by [her] country and allies. . . .When asked by the informant why [s]he did not sell the documents to a foreign government for profit, Manning replied that [s]he wanted the information to be publicly known in order to trigger ‘worldwide discussion, debates, and reforms.'”

While Manning’s biographer, Denver Nicks, claims that Manning may not be a traditional whistleblower simply due to the vast scope of documents she released—unlike the traditional whistleblower, who releases documents targeted at revealing a specific injustice—he nonetheless stresses that “Manning’s decision to leak state secrets was clearly made with altruistic motivations.”

By portraying Manning as a whistleblower, Manning’s defenders reveal an important part of her story. As Benkler, Greenwald, and Nicks argue, the chat logs between Manning and Lamo and Manning’s guilty plea statement show that Manning was motivated in part by a concern with the public good. Manning tells Lamo, for example, that she would not have sold her data “because its public data”; “it belongs in the public domain. . . .it should be a public good.”

Yet Manning’s chats with Lamo also reveal a narrative of her acts that connects her struggle with state secrecy to her struggle with living under Don’t Ask Don’t Tell and with her gender identity. In her introduction of herself to Lamo, Manning identifies herself in terms of these two aspects of her life: “hi. . .how are you? . . .im an army intelligence analyst, deployed to eastern Baghdad, pending discharge for ‘adjustment disorder’ in lieu of ‘gender identity disorder’. . .im sure you’re pretty busy . . . if you had unprecedented access to classified networks 14 hours a day 7 days a week for 8+ months, what would you do?” For Manning, the thread that ties these two aspects of her life together is clear: mandated secrecy. As she says after referring Lamo to the WikiLeaks website (without directly identifying herself yet as the leaker), “living such an opaque life, has forced me never to take transparency, openness, and honesty for granted.” Manning’s negative experiences of having to hide parts of herself under Don’t Ask Don’t Tell are not separate from her motives for leaking information; rather, they are part of why she feels the need to ensure transparency of military actions.



When Manning’s supporters efface these connections between her personal struggles and her leaking of documents, they do so in order to justify her actions as in service of the public good (rather than private interest or revenge). Yet in so doing, they also unintentionally repeat rather than remedy the injury done to Manning by the Don’t Ask Don’t Tell policy. Their portrayal of her as a whistleblower, and as what Dean Spade and Craig Willse call the “sympathetic gay soldier,” constructs her struggles with gender identity as “secrets” that must be kept if she is to serve the public good. This seems to do a specific injustice to Manning.

It also, however, blocks from view a story implicit in Manning’s self-representation: a story about how supposedly “private” aspects of Manning’s motivations to leak documents may themselves have been formed by Manning’s public experiences of failing to fit into public norms of gender comportment in the army.

To examine the connections drawn by Manning between her public leaking and her supposedly private struggles challenges the dominance of the whistleblower model through which Manning’s actions are usually seen. This model has productively legitimated forms of truth-telling that aim to expose arbitrariness on behalf of assuring accountability and adherence to rules. However, this model also reifies a distinction between public and private that tends to delegitimate forms of truth-telling that do not fit into dominant norms of publicness.

If the prevalence of the whistleblower model leads us to see Manning’s linkages between public and private as damaging to her credibility, those same linkages mark her as negotiating the dilemmas of an outsider truth-teller: someone whose refusal to comply with norms of publicity and privacy render her illegible to her society as a truth-teller, while also putting her in a position to tell us important and unsettling truths about the public and private realms.

Manning’s insistence on connecting her “private” struggles and public leaking should not be seen as corruptive of the attempt to speak truth, but instead as an attempt to change the world by creating spaces and connections where marginalized individuals can say what the world is like for them and begin to imagine how to make it otherwise.

While the whistleblower reveals facts hidden by the state or corporation on behalf of returning each organization to its proper concern with the public good, transformative truth-tellers like Manning reveal the public/private distinction as an oppressive dyad. Manning’s actions showed the changeability and transformability of those realms in her example and practice of truth-telling, and her actions demanded a public response distinct from the accountability demanded by the whistleblower: namely, a public affirmation of the leaked facts and documents as significant and, hence, of a world where outsider truth-tellers would be seen as meaningful speakers of truth.

We should read Manning’s leaking as an attempt not only to reveal facts, but also to help build a world where she, as a gender-nonconforming person, could be seen as a significant speaker of truth. Read as an act of transformative truth-telling, Manning’s leaking appears less as a failed attempt to assure governmental accountability and more as a risky (and still active) contribution to a world where outsiders, who are silenced and oppressed in both public and private realms, would find connections and freedom, a world still under construction.

For Chelsea Manning, Coming Out and Whistleblowing Were Deeply Linked. By Lida Maxwell. LitHub, September 23, 2019.








Almost a month ago Chelsea Manning was released from jail for refusing to testify before a grand jury investigating Julian Assange. She explained her refusal: “I will not participate in a secret process that I morally object to, particularly one that has been historically used to entrap and persecute activists for protected political speech.”

For this she was held in civil contempt and incarcerated for two months, including in solitary confinement.

Her release came with the dissolution of the grand jury, but she was issued another subpoena for another grand jury investigating Assange and has been imprisoned again. This time, the judge is also imposing a fine of $500 per day after thirty days, and $1,000 per day after sixty days.

Her actions are being treated as an individual act of resistance. But if we put them in context — of her previous actions and the history of the grand jury — her resistance opens up opportunities for collective action and solidarity, especially in regard to unchecked prosecutorial power.

This is, of course, not the first time that Manning has refused to comply with the law because of her commitment to public transparency. In 2010, Manning, then a soldier in the US Army, leaked huge amounts of classified government documents to Wikileaks that detailed US abuses in the Iraq and Afghanistan wars: unreported killing of civilians; the failure to adequately investigate accusations of torture; increased use of drones; and the use of special units to track down and kill individuals without trial, among other things.

While no mainstream public intellectuals spoke up on her behalf then, we might expect more to do so now, especially since so many journalists have been lauding the goods of governmental “transparency” and “facts” in the wake of the Trump candidacy and presidency. Yet only a few journalists in publications like Teen Vogue and the Intercept have spoken up recently on behalf of Manning. Perhaps this is because Manning’s commitment to transparency goes beyond empty platitudes.

For Manning, transparency is important not as a vague good in itself. Rather, transparency is important because it enables democratic political action and solidarity — especially among those vulnerable to state violence — and because secrecy has so often been used as a tool of oppression and control.

While Manning’s earlier leaking of classified documents about American wars in Iraq and Afghanistan are often portrayed by her supporters as “whistleblowing,” the significance of Manning’s actions in 2010 and now comes more clearly into view if we see them as “outsider truth-telling,” a practice of telling the truth that (1) is not aimed (as with the whistleblower) only at remedying a particular wrong, but also at showing problems with institutionalized forms of secrecy; and (2) aims not only at holding wrongdoers accountable, but also works to change the world so that those on the margins (on the “outside”) — like Manning — might be seen as significant public speakers of truth. Manning’s recent refusal to testify should be seen as an act of outsider truth-telling that shows the violence of legal procedures that are supposedly neutral and purely fact-centered and changes the world so that we might value and listen to voices that are often excluded and devalued.

While grand juries now appear as a routinized part of the criminal justice system, they were originally a site of popular voice and empowerment. Imported from the common law system in England, grand juries along with petit juries (or trial juries) were meant to act as a check on the abuse of power by the state. Before a criminal charge could be brought by the king, a grand jury had to determine whether the evidence warranted it.

During the colonial period, a grand jury was convened in 1733 to determine whether publisher John Zenger should be charged with libel for insulting the royal governor. They voted against it, functioning as a check not only on the abuse of power by the crown but also against the implications of the charge for the freedom of the press. Grand juries are used to investigate circumstances where a crime may have occurred but further evidence is needed, including organized crime.

But they have also been used to gather information about constitutionally protected activity (such as the freedom of assembly) by those involved with social movements, including the environmental movement and the LGBTQ movement — for example, by secretly calling members of the community who were protesting the pipeline at Standing Rock to testify, law enforcement created conditions of distrust and fear of imminent arrest. Leaders in the Puerto Rican independence movement have organized campaigns informing community members about their rights before federal grand juries because they have long been the focus of such inquiries.

Manning’s refusal to speak to the grand jury draws attention to the ways grand juries now function in a way opposite to their original function: their broad mandate to secretly investigate and coerce individuals to share information makes them a tool of intimidation by the state.

The secrecy of grand jury hearings, while meant to protect the confidentiality of witnesses, ends up making them even more prone to prosecutorial abuse. All topics are permissible during grand jury questioning, and no judge is present. Furthermore, subpoenas for witnesses are not difficult for prosecutors to obtain, and there are no opposing lawyers to question why witnesses are being asked to give details about actions protected by the Constitution.

Those who serve as jurors, while expected to represent peers of those who may be charged, find it difficult to go against a prosecutor motivated to convict. Grand juries indict in 98 percent of cases.

What might be done to restore juries, both grand and petit, to better serve their distinct function as a barrier against unchecked prosecutorial power?

The first is to follow the lead of Chelsea Manning’s distinctive commitment to transparency. Making public the fact of her subpoena and her refusal to be further involved with the investigation, Manning resisted secrecy as a tool of control and sought to enable and expand forms of democratic solidarity, showing us how to assess grand jury proceedings: not narrowly, in terms of whether the law is followed, but more expansively, in terms of how well they further goals of democratic empowerment.

Here, context matters. Given that the charge against Assange proceeded without her testimony, it seems clear that the call for Manning’s testimony has more to do with targeting activists — and punishing Manning in particular. In contrast, when subpoenas are issued (as in the case of President Trump’s financial documents and of Donald Trump Jr. being asked to provide information to the Senate Intelligence Committee) for the purpose of congressional oversight and a check on unitary executive power, they are on the side of democratic empowerment. Looked at in context, Trump’s and his son’s resistance to the subpoenas runs contrary to the democratic spirit of the grand jury.

Second, voters should select prosecutors who share their views about the potential for the abuse of grand jury powers. As Emily Bazelon has written in her new book Charged, the discretion attributed to prosecutors in determining charges is dramatically out of balance with the judge and the jury, two other discretionary nodes. Voters have the power to change the ideology of criminal prosecution at its most influential point.

Third, greater education about jury service is sorely needed. Currently what jurors understand about their responsibilities comes mainly from the video they are shown at the beginning of jury duty (and what they have gleaned from true crime television shows and podcasts). Community workshops and teach-ins are needed to teach jurors about their range of responsibilities and common examples of bias during jury deliberation.

They do not know, for example, that they have the power to nullify — that is, to not indict during a grand jury or to find a defendant not guilty during a trial regardless of the evidence in the case. This right of nullification is the linchpin that holds together the jury’s responsibility to stop unjust punishment by the state, beginning with the process of indictment. Resisting a subpoena to appear before a grand jury and serving as a juror for one are two types of what Chakravarti calls “radical enfranchisement,” understanding that citizenship calls for a differentiation between law and justice at critical moments.

Finally, the commonsense view that refusing to participate in the grand jury process is automatically contrary to the aim of justice is wrong. What Chelsea Manning’s actions show is that outsider truth-telling (not just compelled testimony on the stand) and resistance to prosecutorial intimidation (not just compliance with a prosecutor) reflect the democratic spirit of jury service, and especially the possibility of furthering and expanding democracy, rather than contracting it, through the law.


Chelsea Manning Against the Grand Jury. By Lida Maxwell and Sonali Chakravarti. Jacobin Mag, June 2019. 





In Laura Poitras’s documentary, Citizenfour, Edward Snowden worries to Poitras and Glenn Greenwald that “they” (the press and government) will use his “personality” as a distraction when Greenwald starts publishing stories about the documents that Snowden has leaked. Snowden’s concern was meaningful considering the media coverage of Chelsea Manning, who was on trial at the time Poitras was filming the documentary for charges arising from the Espionage Act, including the charge of aiding the enemy.

Manning’s queerness, gender nonconformity (she now identifies as trans*), and experiences of being bullied in the Army made her an easy target for claims that her leaking of documents was not true whistleblowing, but amounted simply to a private vendetta against the Army and government. In one of the first articles on Manning in the New York Times, for example, Ginger Thompson suggested that Manning might have leaked documents as a way of seeking revenge for being bullied in the military, or for her struggles under Don’t Ask Don’t Tell, or out of “delusions of grandeur.”

While Manning is never mentioned by name in Citizenfour, Snowden’s comment suggests that her unacknowledged presence may hover in the background — a specter against which Snowden and his advocates may be trying to distinguish him. Snowden’s comment implies his desire to be a model of rectitude and constraint, one whose actions cannot be questioned on the basis of any supposedly personal motives.

Snowden has been mostly successful on this score. While he certainly has a number of detractors among establishment politicians and some journalists (notably, Jeffrey Toobin), many on the Left clearly find his actions inspirational and motivational. In addition to Poitras’s documentary, Snowden has been the subject of two books (by Glenn Greenwald and Luke Harding) published by major American presses, and the ACLU has recently mounted a high-profile campaign to “Pardon Snowden,” complete with celebrity signatures. Perhaps most strikingly, Snowden has become the subject of a major Hollywood motion picure, Oliver Stone’s just-released biopic, Snowden.

Yet as Snowden has become a symbol in the mainstream left of resistance to state power and secrecy, Manning has receded from view. While many individuals have protested, signed petitions, written alternative press books, and penned letters on Manning’s behalf, dominant voices on the Left have placed Snowden at the center of our attention.

The mainstream left’s focus on Snowden, rather than Manning, as a model truth-teller may have something to do with the kinds of truths they each revealed; Snowden leaked a more coherent set of documents, that arguably revealed a greater wrong: government deception about mass surveillance. Yet if many on the Left (rightly) see Snowden’s act as important not just because of what he disclosed, but because of his political example, then we should ask what the stakes are of taking that example as our model of truth-telling, rather than — or in addition to — Manning’s.

For many on the Left, what Snowden offers us is a stirring example of what David Bromwich calls, in an insightful review of Citizenfour, “integrity — the insistence by an individual that his life and the principles he lives by should be all of a piece.” In Stone’s Snowden, for example, we see Snowden’s integrity through the progression of a fairly conventional story of the refusal of the “self-taught” man of conscience to be complicit in unjust deception.

Stone depicts Snowden as self-possessed, a man who refuses to let his thinking and principles be influenced by others (except perhaps by his liberal photographer girlfriend, whose interest in photographing and examining herself in her images serves as a complement to Snowden’s moral self-examination). Snowden’s self-possession is what allows him to accurately see, diagnose, and ultimately resist complicity in wrongdoing.

Poitras’s film gives us a more taut and complex picture of Snowden, and of the riskiness of his act, but still shows Snowden as a self-possessed, moral man: he says, for example, “I don’t want to hide on this, I don’t want to skulk around. I don’t think I should have to, and I’m not afraid.” Greenwald’s and Harding’s books offer similar depictions of Snowden.

Both films suggest indirectly that Snowden’s integrity might be a model for the rest of us. Stone’s Snowden does so by hinting at the pleasures that a life of principle can afford, in contrast to the discomfort and anxiety of a life of complicity in injustice.

At the end of the movie, Snowden (Joseph Gordon-Levitt) says that his “greatest freedom is that I don’t have to worry about what happens tomorrow, because I’m happy with what I’ve done today.” Despite leaving a comfortable job and life in “paradise” (Hawaii), Snowden (first played by Gordon-Levitt, and then the man himself) appears happier living a life in exile devoted to the fight against government secrecy and surveillance. At the very end, while an inspirational score plays, we see Snowden giving lectures via Skype and receiving a standing ovation. These, the film tells us, are the rewards and pleasures of the just — rewards we, or at least many of us, might also seek.

In a less celebratory vein, Bromwich similarly argues that Citizenfour offers a broad invocation to all of us: “[i]t is up to other Americans now, the uncertain end of Citizenfour says, to rouse ourselves and find the value of Snowden’s action as a resource.” For Bromwich, even if we cannot reveal classified documents, we can be people of integrity — committed to living according to principle, to not being complicit in deception, surveillance, and other wrongs.

In contrast to their valorization of Snowden’s integrity, these same filmmakers and journalists have tended to either remain silent about Chelsea Manning, or to suggest that Manning’s act was of a different order than Snowden’s. Manning is not mentioned by name in either film — an omission that bespeaks a conscious or unconscious desire to distance Snowden from Manning.

Harding and Greenwald, in contrast, distance Snowden from Manning explicitly. For example, in The Snowden Files Luke Harding says that Snowden’s leak “eclips[ed] the 2010 release of US diplomatic cables and warlogs by a disaffected US army private, Chelsea (formerly Bradley) Manning.” Implicit in Harding’s statement is the claim that Manning’s act was tainted by personal motives or troubles; “disaffected” connotes malaise, not principle.

In a different register, Glenn Greenwald — who was and continues to be an ardent supporter of Chelsea Manning — portrayed Snowden as someone who appears more like a real whistleblower than Manning.


In his book about Snowden, No Place to Hide, Greenwald notes that Manning “was criticized (unfairly and inaccurately, I believe) for supposedly leaking documents that she had not reviewed” — an argument that “was frequently used to undermine the notion that Manning’s actions were heroic. It was clear that nothing of the sort could be said about our NSA source. There was no question that he had carefully reviewed every document he had given us, that he had understood their meaning, then meticulously placed each one in an elegantly organized structure.”

Greenwald’s comment suggests that even if Manning is a true whistleblower, Snowden is easier to defend, that his actions make him appear like the whistleblower we want and expect.

The desire to distance Snowden from Manning is understandable. Leaders of social movements have long tried to select morally and politically un-impeachable (or at least, less impeachable) individuals as their symbols and exemplars. As Danielle McGuire recounts in At the Dark End of the Street, Rosa Parks was not the first person to refuse to sit at the back of the bus, but she was the person chosen by the NAACP and other early civil-rights leaders as the symbol around which they and other groups could and would rally.

Two other young women, Claudette Colvin and Mary Louise Smith, also challenged bus segregation in court. But E. D. Nixon, a leading civil rights organizer in Montgomery, deemed both women too compromised to serve as symbols: Colvin’s pregnancy outside of marriage and working-class status made her a “liability,” while Smith’s father drank and her family lived in a “low type of home.” In contrast, Parks, as Nixon said years later, was “honest, she was clean, she had integrity. The press couldn’t go out and dig up something she did last year, or last month, or five years ago.”

The logic is simple: If the person who resists unjust state power appears morally “pure,” the struggle by extension appears pure as well, pursued solely out of a concern with justice. Yet when we overlook or downplay Manning’s actions and render Snowden’s heroic, we perpetuate a hierarchy of public speakers — in this case, holding up an ideal of the self-possessed, white, straight man of principle — while treating Manning as someone better kept private, quiet, out of view.

In turn, we reify and treat as natural an unjust oppression that Manning was trying to fight. In the chat logs with Adrian Lamo, Manning claims that she leaked documents out of a broad discontent with government secrecy — not only the secrecy of their actions in Iraq, but also the secrecy demanded of her by Don’t Ask Don’t Tell. When we allow Manning to be pushed to the sideline, and treat her sexuality and gender nonconformity as matters of “personality” that can “distract” us, we reenact the injustice and silencing that she experienced in the Army.

But what if we see Manning differently — not as someone whose truth-telling is perverted by her “private” motives, but as someone who is a stronger and more potent exemplar of truth-telling because she refuses to privatize her queerness and gender nonconformity?

Manning’s refusal to see these as separate issues — to bracket her sexuality and gender while pursuing transparency — could and should be seen as a form of courage and integrity, to be emulated by others.

If Snowden offers us a model of the integrity of the self-possessed, we could say that Manning offers us a model of the integrity of the dispossessed.

This integrity is revealed in her refusal to separate her queerness and gender nonconformity from her public actions. It is revealed in her description (in the chat logs) of herself downloading documents while listening to Lady Gaga; resisting conformity to the model of the morally serious truth-teller, Manning shows that truth-telling can be a risky pleasure in and of itself. Her integrity is revealed in her wariness about revealing her identity. As she says in the chats with Lamo, she would not mind revealing her identity, if it weren’t for the fact that her picture would be plastered all over the media “as a boy.”

Her refusal to identify herself initially, in other words, was a refusal to be read and interpolated into a gender that did not do justice to who she was and is.

Finally, her integrity can be seen in her broad resistance to secrecy: not just to the government keeping secrets from the people, but to the mandated privatization (or secret-ization) of queerness and gender nonconformity. Manning’s leaking of documents insisted not only that the people know the truth about the government’s actions in Iraq, but also that she, too, is a proper member of the people as she is, a proper public speaker of truth.

We should hold Snowden up as a model of democratic action, as Stone, Poitras, and others do. Yet when we mobilize Snowden’s example and keep Manning in the background, we lose an important example and model of truth-telling as political resistance — one that may be especially relevant and inspirational for those who are not white, cisgender, heterosexual men.

From Manning’s integrity, we learn that even if the dominant culture sees you as untrustworthy, suspect, or queer, you may find and reveal integrity in telling the truth as who you are, and how you see it — and you may solicit a public who would vindicate you as a proper public speaker.

Elevating Manning’s example of integrity, we may also encourage and politically demand greater public receptivity to truth-telling that comes from the dispossessed: from people of color telling the public that the police are murdering black men and women; from women telling the truth about sexual assault and rape; from trans people revealing ongoing harassment and violence.

We could start such a project, today, by linking Snowden and Manning insistently, on principle, as a matter of conscience. There should be no pardon of Snowden that does not include a pardon of Manning. While Snowden lives in Moscow and gives talks via Skype, Chelsea Manning languishes in a jail cell, where she has been recently sentenced to serve fourteen days in solitary confinement for a suicide attempt.

As part of demanding a pardon for Manning, we could declaim this treatment, today, as unfair and cruel. Rather, though, than claiming that Manning deserves a pardon in spite of her private motives, we should demand the pardon in part because of her courage in connecting the dangers of government secrecy about war with the dangers of government secrecy about her sexuality and gender.

If Snowden’s integrity reminds us of the importance of following the principles each of us hold, Manning’s integrity reminds us of the importance of fighting for the voices of the dispossessed to be heard, and allowing those voices to challenge and transform our principles.


Chelsea Manning’s Integrity.    By Lida Maxwell. Jacobin Mag, October 2016









Ever since she was publicly identified as the source who had disclosed a huge trove of military and diplomatic documents to WikiLeaks in 2011, Chelsea Manning, the former Army intelligence analyst, has been a polarising cultural figure – called a traitor by prosecutors, but celebrated as an icon by transparency and anti-war activists. Her life story, and her role in one of the most extraordinary leaks in American history, has been told in news articles, an off-Broadway play and even an opera. But while she spoke at her court-martial and has participated in interviews, Manning herself has not told her own story. Until now. Manning is writing a memoir, which Farrar, Straus and Giroux will publish in winter 2020, the publisher announced earlier this month.

Manning was convicted in 2013 and sentenced to 35 years in prison, the longest sentence ever handed down in an American leak case. After her conviction, Manning announced that she was a transgender woman and changed her name [from Bradley] to Chelsea, although the military housed her in a Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, prison for male inmates. She had a difficult time there, attempting suicide twice in 2016, before President Barack Obama commuted most of the remainder of her sentence shortly before he left office in January 2017. In the meantime, WikiLeaks published Democratic emails stolen by Russian hackers during the 2016 presidential campaign, transforming its image from what it had been back when Manning decided to send archives of secret files to it.


Manning reappeared in the news this year, refusing to testify before a grand jury as federal prosecutors continue to build a case against Julian Assange, the WikiLeaks founder. Assange, in custody in Britain, is fighting extradition to the US for a charge that he conspired with Manning to try to crack an encoded password that would have permitted her to log onto a classified computer network under a different person’s account rather than her own, which would have helped her mask her tracks better. She was jailed for two months for contempt over her refusal to answer questions about her interactions with Assange, then freed because the grand jury expired. But on Thursday she was once again found in contempt by a federal judge for refusing to testify before a grand jury and will return to custody, just seven days after being released from the same Virginia jail.


Tell me about your book?

“It’s basically my life story up until I got the commutation, from my birth to my time in school and going to the army and going to prison and the court-martial process. It’s a personal narrative of what was going on in my life surrounding that time and what led to the leaks, what led to prison, and how this whole ordeal has really shaped me and changed me. I view this book as a coming-of-age story. For instance, how my colleagues in the intelligence field really were the driving force behind my questioning of assumptions that I had come into the military with – how jaded they were, some of them having done two, three, four deployments previously. And then also there is a lot of stuff about how prisons are awful, and how prisoners survive and get through being in confinement.”

Do you have a title yet?

“There is no title yet. I am trying very hard to have some control over that, but none has been decided yet. Noreen Malone from New York magazine worked on it with me. She did a lot of the groundwork in terms of the research, and I did the storytelling, so it was a collaborative effort. I’m still going through and editing where she has taken independent sources to help refine my story, fact-check, verify things and provide a third-person perspective in shaping things.”

Is it written in first-person or third-person?

“It is written in first-person, but there are parts of the book that reference material that are independent of me. I’m still under obligation under the court rules and the Classified Information Procedures Act of 1980 to not disclose closed court-martial testimony or verify evidence that was put in the record. Things like that. So I can’t talk about that stuff and I’m not going to, and so I’m trying to keep this and maintain this as more of a personal story. There are parts of it that might reference reports or whatnot but I’m just going to say, “the media reported this, but I’m not confirming or denying it”.


Are you going to submit the manuscript to the government for a classified information review?

“We’re trying our best to avoid the review process. There is a lot of stuff that is not going to be in the book that people would expect to be in there, but rules are rules and we can’t get around it. It’s more about personal experiences I had rather than anything specific. I’m not trying to relitigate the case, just tell my personal story.”

So if it ends with you getting out of military prison, you’re not going to address your current situation with the grand jury investigating WikiLeaks?

“No, we’re not planning on including that in this current stage. If there is a book that gets into the more juicy details about that stuff, then we’ll probably get around to that after going through a review process, several years down the road from now, whenever the dust settles. But I think this is more about trying to contextualise my story from my perspective rather than get into the weeds of what is in the record of the trial, what is in the documents, what the investigation focused on, because we’re just not able to get into that area.”

It sounds like you are a lot freer to talk about your gender identity than the WikiLeaks issue?

“Yeah. This is less a book about the case and more a book about trials, tribunals, struggles, difficulties, and overcoming them and surviving. If people are expecting to learn a lot more about the court-martial and a lot more about the case, then they probably shouldn’t be interested in this book. But if they want to know more about what it’s like to be me and survive, then there are reams of information in here. It’s much more autobiographical than it is a narrative thriller or crime story or anything like that. I have always pitched this as being very similar to Wild by Cheryl Strayed. I’m really opening myself up to some really intimate things in this book, some really very personal moments and much more intimate points of my life that I’ve never disclosed before. You’re probably going to learn more about my love life than about the disclosures.”

Chelsea Manning interview: ‘I’m opening myself up to some really intimate things in this book’ By Charlie Savage.  The Independent, May 17, 2019.